DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SIMPSON.I respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority that Section 306(a.l) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), 77 P.S. § 511.1,1 clearly and unambiguously requires payment of compensation to an incarcerated claimant up until the pronouncement of criminal sentence. For this reason and others discussed below, I would reverse and remand.
Relevantly, after his layoff in June, 2004, Todd Mattson (Claimant) received total disability benefits for injuries to his right wrist. In October 2005, he was incarcerated without bail on charges that he solicited the murder of his wife. His employer, Rogele, Inc. (Employer), stopped paying benefits about the time of this incarceration, and it petitioned for suspension of benefits based on the theory that Claimant voluntarily withdrew from the work force. On July 11, 2006, Claimant pled guilty to criminal solicitation. According to the majority opinion, on August 15, 2006, Claimant was sentenced to a term of four to eight years imprisonment. Employer offers to prove by a copy of the sentencing order that the effective date of the sentence was the date of original incarceration.,
After Claimant pled guilty but before he was sentenced, a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) circulated a decision denying the suspension petition related to the incarceration. The WCJ determined that Section 306(a.l) requires benefits for a claimant to continue while incarcerated pending trial, a conclusion consistent with the presumption of innocence and supportive of a claimant’s ability to obtain pretrial release on bail. The WCJ also noted that the case did not fall into any of the categories of automatic cessation of benefits. Concluding Employer had no basis to file the petition or to unilaterally stop payments, the WCJ awarded back benefits, a 50% penalty and unreasonable contest attorney fees. On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board affirmed.
At the outset, I note that this case falls into a category of automatic cessation of benefits. Moore v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Babcock & Wilcox Co.), 811 A.2d 631 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (authorization from a WCJ not required before employer may suspend benefits during claimant’s incarceration); Banic v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Trans-Bridge Lines, Inc.), 664 A.2d 1081 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) (same), aff'd on other grounds, 550 Pa. 276, 705 A.2d 432 (1997). Neither the compensation authorities nor the majority refer to these cases. These cases at least support remand for reconsideration of the penalty which was in part based on an error of law.
*640More importantly, however, I disagree that Section 306(a.l) clearly and unambiguously identifies the point at which benefits payable to an incarcerated claimant may cease. My position is that the phrase “incarceration after a conviction” is ambiguous and requires interpretation.
The word “conviction” has a popular as well as a technical meaning. As popularly used it implies a finding of guilt, but as technically understood it means the ascertainment of guilt and a judgment thereon. Commonwealth v. Minnich, 250 Pa. 363, 95 A. 565 (1915); Commonwealth v. Palarino, 168 Pa.Super. 152, 77 A.2d 665 (1951); see Dep’t of Transp. v. Chrzanowski, 95 Pa.Cmwlth. 568, 505 A.2d 1129 (1986). Sometimes, the term is applied in its technical sense, but often the term is applied according to its popular meaning. Commonwealth v. Anthony, 553 Pa. 55, 717 A.2d 1015 (1998) (guilty plea constitutes “conviction” for purposes of compulsory joinder rule); Commonwealth v. Bracalielly, 540 Pa. 460, 658 A.2d 755 (1995) (guilty plea constitutes “conviction” for purposes of pursuing prosecution pursuant to a statute barring criminal prosecution for offenses arising from same criminal episode); Commonwealth v. Rosario, 418 Pa.Super. 196, 613 A.2d 1244 (1992) (“conviction” exists barring double jeopardy if judgment of conviction, guilty verdict or accepted plea of guilty continues to stand), aff'd, 545 Pa. 4, 679 A.2d 756 (1996); E. Smalis Painting Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 70 Pa.Cmwlth. 90, 452 A.2d 601 (1982) (“conviction” for purpose of regulation requiring disclosure of felony convictions includes guilty plea even though sentence not yet imposed). Under these circumstances, ambiguity in the intended meaning of the word “conviction” permits interpretation of Section 306(a.1).
I acknowledge that the Act is usually liberally construed in favor of claimants. A review of Pennsylvania cases dealing with Section 306(a.l) incarceration issues, however, reveals an approach more focused on the expressed intent of the General Assembly to limit workers’ compensation benefits during periods of criminal incarceration. See Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Hendrie), 565 Pa. 493, 776 A.2d 951 (2001) (legislature sought to preclude the payment of workers’ compensation benefits to persons who are convicted of violation of Crimes Code and who, as a result of conviction, are thereafter removed from work force).
Thus, the Supreme Court declines to narrowly limit the term “incarceration,” concluding the term includes a claimant’s confinement in a mental institution as a condition of probation. Id. Also, this Court holds that the undefined term “incarceration” includes total and partial confinement regardless of work release and intermediate punishment (house arrest). Moore; Brinker’s Int’l, Inc., v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Weissenstein), 721 A.2d 406 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998). Further, this Court holds that the Act must be construed to avoid an absurd or unreasonable result, so that benefits should be denied a claimant who escaped custody, became employed during his extended elopement, and was injured at that work. Graves v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Newman), 668 A.2d 606 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995). In all these cases the appellate court adopted a construction of Section 306(a.l) which did not favor the claimant.
An interpretation which allows the suspension of benefits at the point of guilt determination is consistent with the General Assembly’s intent and with the popular meaning of the term “conviction.” Also, this interpretation achieves a reasonable result in that it avoids the presumption of innocence and bail considerations that troubled the WCJ and the majority. *641See Pa. R.Crim. P. 521 (special rules for bail after finding of guilt, including after guilty plea accepted).
The Pennsylvania cases2 support a conclusion that Section 306(a.l) permits cessation of benefits to this Claimant incarcerated after an accepted guilty plea. Accordingly, I would hold that Employer here could stop paying benefits to Claimant after July 11, 2006.3 Based on this conclusion, I would reverse and remand for recalculation of benefits.
Moreover, the Pennsylvania cases above, which are not mentioned in the majority opinion, could support a conclusion that Employer’s contest had some reasonable basis, especially given ambiguity in the term “conviction,” the novel factual issue of timing discussed here, and this Court’s language in Cummings Lumber Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Young), 669 A.2d 1027, 1028 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) (“While incarcerated, the claimant is not available to accept work; therefore, the claimant’s wage loss is caused by the incarceration, not by the disability.”). This is because the' existence of an unresolved legal issue or uncertainty as to the application of law to facts may constitute a reasonable contest. Chichester Sch. Dist. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Fox), 140 Pa.Cmwlth. 224, 592 A.2d 774 (1991). Also, the Pennsylvania cases could impact an award of a penalty.
For all these reasons, I would reverse and remand for recalculation of benefits and reconsideration of the penalty and award of unreasonable contest attorney fees.
. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, added by the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350. The Section states in pertinent part, "[n]oth-ing in this act shall require payment of compensation ... for any period during which the employe is incarcerated after a conviction. ...”
. The majority relies on a South Dakota case, Jackson v. Lee’s Travelers Lodge, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 858 (S.D.1997) for the proposition that benefits should not cease during pretrial incarceration. Unfortunately, unlike Pennsylvania, South Dakota's legislature did not express any intent on the incarceration issue, and that state's workers’ compensation statute does not address the issue at all. Interestingly, the South Dakota Supreme Court followed an older Ohio case issued before the Ohio statute was amended in 1986 to specifically address the incarceration issue. Compare id. at 866 with State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indust. Comm’n of Ohio, 34 Ohio St.3d 42, 43-44, 517 N.E.2d 533, 534-35 (1987). Therefore, the Jackson case is of no help in interpreting our General Assembly’s expressed intent.
. For three reasons I reject a construction that would permit benefit payments to cease as of the effective date of the sentence. First, that construction is not consistent with either the popular or the technical meaning of the term "conviction.” Second, I find no support for this reasoning in the cases from jurisdictions with similar statutory language. See, e.g., Jowers v. Liberty Construction Co., 740 So.2d 735 (La.Ct.App.1999) (claimant ineligible during entire incarceration, but compensation statute did not require conviction); Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc., 254 Mich.App. 651, 658 N.W.2d 510 (2003) (compensation statute suspends benefits where crime committed, but did not require conviction). Third, I fear such a construction would impose practical difficulties for compensation authorities in the interpretation of criminal sentences, thereby interfering with efficient benefit calculations. I therefore conclude a date certain, such as the date of an accepted guilty plea, is a reasonable construction.
I add, however, that even under my construction, Employer erred in ceasing benefit payments because of Claimant's incarceration before there was a determination of guilt. Accordingly, some back benefits are payable, and there is a basis for finding a violation of the Act which could support a penalty award.