Dissenting Opinion by
Justice STUMBO.Respectfully, I must dissent from the majority’s holding that, by the meaning of “considered for employment” as used in *100KRS 18A.115(4) and 101 KAR 3:050, Section 1(2), the Legislature intended that the agency was not compelled to re-employ Faust. The majority was persuaded that Faust had reversion rights only to a position in the last class to which he previously held status in the classified service; and since there was no vacancy in that position, Faust’s only right was to be placed upon the re-employment list and “be considered” for employment in any vacant position for which he is qualified.
KRS 18A.115(4) and 18A.130(2) both require that terminated unclassified career employees “shall” be considered for employment in any vacant position for which they are qualified. The word “shall” is mandatory, and by using it instead of “may,” the Legislature removed the element of discretion from the consideration process.
However, the majority here holds that because “shall” is used in connection with “be considered,” it retains its discretionary character since “consider” is a discretionary term. They agree that although Faust had the right to be considered for reemployment as a “Staff Assistant,” a position for which he was qualified, he had no automatic right of reversion to this or any other position except those in his last class in the classified service, which was “Assistant Director.” The majority focuses on the “considered for employment” language, and negates the word “shall” that immediately precedes it.
It seems to defeat the purpose of the job protection granted by the statutes to negate “shall.” As the trial court stated, the purpose of the State Personnel Law was to establish a system of personnel administration based on merit principles governing, among other things, promotion and welfare of its classified employees. KRS 18A.010. The General Assembly made a provision to protect the job-security rights of career employees by the enactment of the career employee reversion rights statutes and through the approval of regulations promulgated to implement those statutes. Also, the intent of the Legislature was to assure the career employees of continued employment in the classified service in the event that they were dismissed from their unclassified positions without cause. Furthermore, the positive side for the career employees leaving the safety of the classified service was the guarantee of the retention of status and job placement if the non-merit position was lost. Therefore, it is clear from the regulations that the Legislature intended the career employees to have job protection, and the word “shall” in “shall be considered for employment” is confirmation.
Clearly, here, the Department gave no consideration to the placement of Faust in either of the vacant “Staff Assistant” positions, although the position of “Staff Assistant” was the functional equivalent of, or replacement classification of, his previous position as “Personnel Administrator.” Consideration is to be applied according to the re-employment procedures directed by KRS 18A.130, which says that a terminated career employee “shall, upon his written request, be re-employed.” Faust complied with this procedure by requesting the “Staff Assistant” position. KRS 18A.135 mandates placement of a career employee in a classified position and an appointing authority may refuse to re-employ “only for cause.” Further, the Legislature intended for career employees to be offered and placed in positions for which they are qualified rather than have them lose their property interest in continued employment on the whim of an appointing authority. Therefore, being “considered” would require the agency to “offer” Faust a vacant position, which would be “Staff Assistant.”
*101Moreover, the statutes make it clear that Faust has rights greater than merely employment rights. First, as a career employee promoted from a classified position to an unclassified position, he retains his status, or tenure, in the classified service. KRS 18A.0751(4)(j); 101 KAR 8:050 Section 1(2). Second, because he lost his unclassified position, he had the right to revert to any vacant position in the class for which he had status. KRS 18A.115(4); 101 KAR 8:050 Section 1(2). Third, if no vacancy existed, he had the right to a position pursuant to the layoff statutes. KRS 18A.113; KRS 18A.1132. Finally, Faust is entitled to be placed in any vacant position for which he is qualified. KRS 18A.130; KRS 18A.135.
When an employee has a property right in continued employment, the employer cannot deprive the employee of that right without due process. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Williams v. Commonwealth of Ky., 24 F.3d 1526 (6th Cir.1994). Here, by failing to follow the established procedures regarding reversion, the Department deprived Faust of his property right to continue his employment in state government, without due process. Therefore, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and order Faust’s reinstatement to the classified service, meaning that he be returned through reversion to the last position he held in the classified service (“Assistant Director”) if vacant, or to another vacant position in the same or similar job classification (such as “Staff Assistant”).