dissenting.
I would not invalidate the arbitration agreement in its entirety for the reasons set out in Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 323 S.W.3d 18 (Mo. banc 2010) (Price, C.J., dissenting). Further, the majority misstates the law. Missouri has always required a showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability before a court will void a contract. Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 525, 531 (Mo. banc 2009) (Norton, J., concurring); Repair Masters Const., Inc. v. Gary, 277 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Mo.App.2009); Shaffer v. Royal Gate Dodge, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Mo.App.2009); Kansas City Urology, P.A. v. United Healthcare Services, 261 S.W.3d 7, 15-16 (Mo.App.2008); Woods v. QC Financial Services, Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Mo.App.2008); Whitney v. Alltel Communications, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 308 (Mo.App.2005); Funding Systems Leasing Corp. v. King Louie International, 597 S.W.2d 624, 634 (Mo.App.1979); Cicle v. Chase Bank USA, 583 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir.2009); Pleasants v. American Express Company, 541 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir.2008).
Lastly, this case has two other issues resulting from the Missouri merchandising practices act, sections 407.010 et. seq. and section 484.020, RSMo 2000. First, although the act expressly provides the stat*141utory remedy of class action procedures for violations of the act, this authorization is permissive, not mandatory. § 407.025. There is nothing in the language of the act to suggest that the statutory remedy could not be waived by written agreement of the parties. Second, section 407.025 provides for the recovery of punitive damages and attorneys fees, and section 484.020 provides treble damages. These additional awards specified by the legislature present further incentive for an aggrieved individual to bring suit, and they undercut the majority’s rationale that class action procedures are required for an adequate remedy.