Dissenting.
This case is over ten years old. The action was filed in Scott Circuit Court in August 1999. On November 22, 2000, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Toyota, applying Early v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 690 S.W.2d 898 (Ky.App.1985), to the effect that the Ap-pellees herein were required to proceed administratively on their wage and hour claim before the circuit court could review it. Appellees appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court, and this Court denied discretionary review on February 12, 2003. The circuit court’s dismissal of the case became final on that date. CR 76.30.
*656Then, in 2005, this Court reversed the longstanding precedent of Early in Parts Depot, Inc. v. Beiswenger, 170 S.W.3d 354 (Ky.2005), holding that circuit courts have parallel jurisdiction with the administrative agencies, and that the claimant could elect how to proceed.
The extraordinary circumstances Appel-lees complain of are that they were deprived of their choice of forum and compelled to proceed administratively. Unless this Court is prepared to say that the preference for proceeding in circuit court rather than through an administrative proceeding is so fundamental as to come under the aegis of due process of law, then I have difficulty finding extraordinary grounds for relief under CR 60.02(f). The Appellees were not denied due process. The administrative proceeding provides a sufficient forum and ample opportunity for the Appellees to vindicate any interests or rights they might have. They should at the very least be required to show how they are harmed if they are to be given relief from a final judgment. They have not done so.
In August 2009, this Court considered a motion for rehearing based on an Opinion entered by a vote of 5-2 in March of 2009. In that Opinion, we held that the Scott Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the CR 60.02 motion filed in this action. On review, I agreed with the rest of the Court that the Opinion was over-broad in stating that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear a CR 60.02 motion. Generally speaking, a trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction to hear CR 60.02 motions. However, a trial court does not have jurisdiction to proceed on a CR 60.02 motion based on grounds subsections (a) to (c) in the rule after one year has expired or on (f) for “extraordinary reasons” when the claim is a mere subterfuge for an untimely motion in reality based on grounds in (a) to (c). See Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Moberly, 241 S.W.3d 329 (Ky.2007).
Also, even with jurisdiction, a trial court can be prevented from proceeding by issuance of a writ based on the “certain special cases” category adopted in Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799 (Ky.1961), later approved by this Court in Hoskins v. Maride, 150 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky.2004). This comes through a “Class 2” writ, where a trial court has jurisdiction, but is proceeding erroneously. Ordinarily, a petitioner must show that he has no adequate remedy by appeal and will suffer great and irreparable harm to obtain such a writ, but the “certain special cases” category allows an exception to the second requirement where the error will cause a substantial miscarriage of justice, and correction of the error is “necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration.” Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801; see also Hos-kins, 150 S.W.3d at 20.
Thus, to determine if a court, within its jurisdiction, should be subject to a “special cases” writ, an appellate court must determine three things: the lower court is acting erroneously, there is no adequate remedy by appeal, and the orderly administration of justice will be adversely affected by the substantial miscarriage of justice. In reviewing such a writ, the court necessarily must review whether the trial court is indeed acting erroneously as part of the analysis for the special cases writ.
I believe the trial court was acting within his jurisdiction but was doing so very erroneously. The judge found that there were extraordinary reasons to set aside a six year old final judgment because interpretation of the law had changed. In doing so, he at least implicitly found that proceeding in circuit court was superior to proceeding in an administrative tribunal. That administrative proceeding was then *657ongoing. He elevated the right to choose a forum, which is granted by the legislature and not an inherent right, to at least the level of, if not a greater height than, due process.
But the mere fact that it was “unfair” that Appellees did not get to choose a forum cannot be more important than the ability to rely on the finality of judgments. “The principle of res judicata or finality of judgments is central to our legal system.” Bolin v. T & T Mining, 231 S.W.3d 130, 133 (Ky.2007); see also Baze v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Ky.2008) (“Our interest in the finality of judgments ... is axiomatic”). That principle can only be overcome in extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., Bishir v. Bishir, 698 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Ky.1985) (“The strong and sensible policy of the law in favor of the finality of judgments has historically been overcome only in the presence of the most compelling equities.”). Allowing the resurrection of long final cases “would create endless possibilities for frivolous claims that would wreak havoc upon the finality of judgments,” Bowling v. Commonwealth, 168 S.W.3d 2, 11 (Ky.2004), rendering the principle all but meaningless. Unless the denial of Appellees’ choice of forum was so “unfair” as to rise to the level of a due process violation — which it certainly did not — the interest in finality of the judgment, especially after six years, must carry the day.
Having concluded that the trial court was acting erroneously, can it be said that Toyota does not have an adequate remedy by appeal? In this instance, I do not think it does. Having relied on the final judgment, and proceeded in another forum in good faith, reopening the final judgment in this case does more harm than cause mere general inconvenience. If nothing else, the doctrine of equitable laches should apply to a judgment that was six years old when the trial court attempted to reopen it. And, like every other person and business in the Commonwealth, Toyota is entitled to the orderly administration of justice, which we cannot have if final judgments can be set aside simply because one of the litigants received an undesirable outcome. There is no adequate remedy for lost time and the nullification of six years of reliance on the finality of a judgment. Where is the concern for fairness to Toyota?
If all that is necessary to set aside a six-year-old final judgment is a change in the law, then there can be no doubt that the orderly administration of justice will be irreparably harmed. As the majority candidly admits, this Court does not usually alter final judgments because the law changes. Yet the circuit court’s whimsical approach in this case (and this Court’s acquiescence to it) does harm to repose, and to the law of the case doctrine.
The majority says that a trial court’s jurisdiction to hear a CR 60.02 motion allows the court to apply one of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine, but does not say which one, unless it is the same “extraordinary circumstances” that serve as the basis of the motion. There is nothing so extraordinary about this case that would set it apart from countless other cases where a subsequent change in the law affects the final judgment. Such a circumstance could be envisioned if a change in the law affected a litigant’s freedom, or his life, or appropriate medical treatment, or removal from an injurious environment, for example, but I fail to see how being unable to choose a forum rises to that level. Appellees were not denied any fundamental right by operation of law of the case.
I particularly cannot agree with the following language in the majority opinion:
*658In short, we conclude that the law of the case doctrine does not invariably deprive a trial court of jurisdiction to consider under CR 60.02(f) an issue already decided if the law upon which the original decision was based — including a controlling appellate opinion — has materially changed.
This statement clearly invites a CR 60.02 motion for every change in the law in the future against judgments, no matter how old. I cannot imagine anything that would wreak more havoc on the orderly administration of justice. Obviously, I believe that Toyota is entitled to a special cases writ.
And, to clarify, I do not think that the holding in Asset Acceptance prevents issuance of a special cases writ. If there was no mistake, and that is not the actual basis for the CR 60.02(f) motion, then Toyota would not be entitled to an Asset Acceptance appeal. However, that would not preclude the need for consideration of a special cases writ. Consequently, by no means does the holding in Asset Acceptance relieve this Court of the necessity to hear a writ case on a CR 60.02 motion.
I believe that the majority view will endanger the orderly administration of justice, in particular, the application of finality to cases. I cannot agree with the majority’s assumption that going forward in this ease in circuit court at this late date would actually benefit the progression of law in this state. To the contrary, there is nothing unique or unusual in these wage and hour claims beyond routine operation of law. Similarly, the claim that allowing the Appellees’ cases to proceed furthers justice by giving them access to court mistakenly assumes that they would otherwise have no access to a remedy. Yet it is clear that the Appellees had, and have, a forum other than the circuit court to address these claims.
I would therefore reverse the Court of Appeals, and order the issuance of the writ prohibiting reopening of this case at this late date.
SCOTT, J., joins this dissenting opinion.