concurring:
As I agree with that portion of the majority opinion which recognizes that the dismissal of the second, third, and fourth counts of the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens was not an abuse of discretion and see nothing in the order of remand which would preclude the trial court from also dismissing the first count for that very same reason, I feel compelled to concur.
It does seem to me, however, that the majority opinion in calling the attention of the trial court to our observation in Sartori v. Society of American Military Engineers, 499 A.2d 883, 886 (D.C.1985), overlooked the fact that the court below was fully aware of Sartori and ably distinguished it from the case before us in its memorandum opinion. Appellant does indeed contend that any company incorporated in the District of Columbia cannot validly object to being sued in the courts of that jurisdiction. A similar contention, however, was rejected by us in Frost v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., 327 A.2d 810, 815 (D.C.1974), where we held that the place of incorporation was an “irrelevant consideration” in determining a forum non conve-niens issue. See also Nee v. Dillon, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 332, 334, 239 F.2d 953, 955 (1956). The Sartori decision did not overrule Frost, nor did it impair the doctrine that local statutes regulating conditions of employment have no extra-territorial application. District of Columbia v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 327 A.2d 818, 825 (D.C. 1974).
While I do not quarrel with the majority holding that the trial court incorrectly resolved the subject-matter jurisdictional issue, it does seem to me that undue significance is attached to allegations in plaintiff’s affidavit that the terms of employment were negotiated between herself and the principal defendant in part on a number of occasions when they were together in the District. But how one party can call an employment contract, which that very party refused to sign, the product of a negotia*1183tion is difficult to understand. The affi-ant’s assertion that some of the acts of sex discrimination occurred in the District amounts to nothing more than a vague conclusionary allegation. Any description of the facts which constituted “acts of sex discrimination” is conspicuously lacking.1
Be that as it may, however, the majority opinion concedes that on the pleadings and affidavits, the trial court was justified under a Rule 12(b)(1) motion in finding that plaintiff was a Maryland resident and that her “actual place of employment was at all times in Maryland.” On this basis, the trial court then reached the conclusion that a sufficient nexus to give the trial court jurisdiction over Count I was lacking, citing as controlling the Honig case, 388 A.2d 887 (D.C.1978). The majority opinion disagrees with this conclusion only, pointing out that Honig simply sustained the right of the Human Rights Commission to dismiss a complaint on the grounds of “administrative convenience” under D.C.Code § l-2556(a).
Thus, what we deem error in the trial court’s disposition of the case is solely its dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. But even if a trial court has jurisdiction, there is no provision in the Human Rights Act which would prevent it from refusing to entertain a complaint based in part on its provisions where all the grounds for invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens are present. This appears to be the situation here. Thus, although the lower court was probably wrong in regarding itself bound by Honig, it was still free on the motion before it to conclude the case should more appropriately have been filed in the courts of Maryland.
In my view, a wiser disposition of this case would be to affirm, rather than to reverse and remand, on the ground that the trial court reached the right result even though it gave the wrong reason for its action. Affirmance on such grounds is certainly within the scope of our authority. In distinguishing the scope of review over administrative agencies and the disposition of appeals from a trial court, the Supreme Court in the leading case of Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 459, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943), reiterated this principle:
In confining our review to a judgment upon the validity of the grounds upon which the Commission itself based its action, we do not disturb the settled rule that, in reviewing the decision of a lower court, it must be affirmed if the result is correct “although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.” Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937). The reason for this rule is obvious. It would be wasteful to send a case back to a lower court to reinstate a decision which it had already made but which the appellate court concluded should properly be based on another ground within the power of the appellate court to formulate.
As this court put it in a more recent decision, Karath v. Generalis, 277 A.2d 650, 653 (D.C.1971):
[I]t is not necessary for a trial court to make findings and if the record discloses some valid ground for supporting its judgment, it should not be disturbed on appeal.
. This allegation in the affidavit refers to two designated paragraphs in the complaint, only one of which alleges any facts, viz., No. 13, saying that on one occasion she complained to Howard about not being paid as well as the male account managers, and that he replied that they were older and she should work "smart” and not just "hard.” While this explanation might be interpreted as revealing an improper policy, it was certainly not an act of discrimination, but rather an attempt to justify conduct already in effect. Hence, the affidavit raises no issue of disputed fact.