OPINION
McCORMICK, P.J.,delivered the opinion of the Court
in which MANSFIELD, KELLER, HOLLAND, WOMACK and KEASLER, JJ. joined.We have exercised our discretionary authority to review the Court of Appeals’ 2-1 decision rejecting appellant’s claim that the Harris County District Attorney was collaterally estopped from litigating at a motion to suppress hearing in a DWI criminal prosecution the issue of reasonable suspicion to stop appellant’s car because the Texas Department of Public Safety had received an adverse ruling on that issue in a prior administrative proceeding to revoke appellant’s driver’s license for refusal to take a breath test. Reynolds v. State, 967 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998). We affirm.
The Court of Appeals issued three opinions. Justice Hedges’ lead opinion without elaboration relied on this Court’s recent decision in State v. Brabson.1 Reynolds, 967 S.W.2d at 494 (Hedges, J.). Apparently believing cases like this implicate federal constitutional double jeopardy principles under Ashe v. Swenson,2 Justice Wilson’s concurring opinion joined “the majority opinion’s reliance” on Brabson and also advanced another reason to reject appel*15lant’s collateral estoppel claim. Reynolds, 967 S.W.2d at 495-96 (Wilson, J., concurring).
Justice Cohen’s dissenting opinion claimed our decision in Brabson on the “parties” or “privity” issue was “questionable” under federal constitutional double jeopardy principles. Reynolds, 967 S.W.2d at 497 (Cohen, J., dissenting). Justice Cohen’s dissenting opinion also claimed our decision in State v. Aguilar3 rather than our decision in Brabson controlled the disposition of this case because, among other things, the current applicable statute “is the same as the statute” in Aguilar while Brabson was decided under a prior statutory scheme unlike the present one. Reynolds, 967 S.W.2d at 496-97 (Cohen, J., dissenting).4 Justice Cohen’s dissenting opinion also claimed Brabson and the current applicable statute expressing a clear intent that collateral estoppel principles do not apply in cases like this5 violate federal constitutional double jeopardy principles under Ashe and also conflict with this Court’s decision in Aguilar. Id.
We granted discretionary review primarily to revisit this Court’s majority opinion on original submission in Brabson on the “parties” or “privity” issue and to address the claim that Brabson and Aguilar irreconcilably conflict. We reaffirm the majority opinion on original submission in Brabson and we also adopt Judge Wom-ack’s concurring opinion on original submission in Brabson6 on the “parties” or “privity” issue.
I.
We initially address the prece-dential value of Brabson. Judge Baird’s dissenting opinion to the denial of rehearing in Brabson suggested the entire 5-3 majority opinion on original submission in Brabson was converted into a plurality opinion when one of the judges who voted with the majority opinion on original submission voted to grant rehearing to reconsider only the “parties” issue. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 202 (Baird, J., dissenting to denial of reh’g), and at 206-07 (Price, J., dissenting to denial of reh’g).7
This does not make the Court’s majority opinion on original submission in Brabson a plurality opinion. Because a majority of this Court was unwilling to grant rehearing to reconsider this Court’s 5-8 majority opinion on original submission in Brabson, that majority opinion constitutes the decision of the Court and carries precedential weight which the bench and bar are obliged to follow unless the Legislature overturns it or at least five judges on this Court overrule it in whole or in part. See, *16e.g., Whitaker v. State, 977 S.W.2d 595, 602 (Tex.Cr.App.1998) (Price, J., concurring) (each judge on the Court has a responsibility to “observe precedent” until “a majority of this court indicates a -willingness to reconsider” it).
II.
We next address Justice Cohen’s claim that Aguilar is the current decisional law in cases like this and the claim that Brabson and Aguilar irreconcilably conflict. See Reynolds, 967 S.W.2d at 496-97 (Cohen, J., dissenting); see also Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 202 (Baird, J., dissenting to denial of reh’g). Justice Cohen’s dissenting opinion claimed Aguilar decided the collateral estoppel bar applies in cases like this. Reynolds, 967 S.W.2d at 496 (Cohen, J., dissenting). Noting that our opinion on original submission in Brabson did not distinguish or expressly overrule Aguilar, Justice Cohen’s dissenting opinion doubted “that a Court of Criminal Appeals intent on rapidly abandoning Aguilar would not do so expressly.” Id. The suggestion is that there is some irreconcilable conflict between Brabson and Aguilar and that Brabson should have addressed Aguilar. See Id.; see also Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 202 (Baird, J., dissenting to denial of reh’g).
There is no conflict between these cases so it was unnecessary in Brabson to distinguish, overrule or even mention Aguilar. In Aguilar it was unnecessary to decide whether the collateral estoppel bar applies in cases like this since the defendant “failed to demonstrate the .requisite elements to support his claim of collateral estoppel” anyway. Aguilar, 947 S.W.2d at 260.
That part of the Court’s opinion in Aguilar suggesting the collateral estoppel bar applies in cases like this was dicta and was unnecessary to the decision in that case. Aguilar, 947 S.W.2d at 261 (“Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel might, in principal (sic), bar the State from relitigating fact issues found in a previous administrative license revocation proceeding”). (Emphasis Supplied). This, like similar dicta in other cases,8 does not constitute a decision that the collateral estoppel bar applies in cases like this, and the bench and bar would err to rely on Aguilar for the proposition that it does. Brabson is the current decisional law on the issue.
III.
We now revisit the holding in the majority opinion on original submission in Brabson on the “parties” or “privity” issue. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 184. We find it necessary to restate this holding.
Judge Baird’s dissenting opinion to the denial of rehearing in Brabson claimed we held on original submission in Brabson that “the State is not the State.” Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 202 (Baird, J., dissenting to denial of reh’g). This presents a classic example of setting up a straw man and then knocking it down.
Consistent with authority from other jurisdictions,9 the Court’s holding on original submission in Brabson on the “parties” issue is the “Texas Department of Public Safety and the Dallas County District Attorney are not the same parties” for collateral estoppel purposes. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 184. Nowhere does the Court’s majority opinion on original submission in Brabson hold “the State is not the State.”
The claim is the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Dallas County District Attorney are the same parties for collateral estoppel purposes because they “are different parts of the executive *17branch of the State of Texas”10 or because they “are entities ‘emanating from the same sovereignty.’”11 Judge Womack’s concurring opinion on original submission in Brabson adequately addresses these claims. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 186-88 (Womack, J., concurring).
Justice Cohen’s dissenting opinion in Reynolds contains the most constructive criticism of this Court’s holding on original submission in Brabson on the “parties” issue. Reynolds, 967 S.W.2d at 497 (Cohen, J., dissenting). Justice Cohen’s dissent claims the Texas Department of Public Safety and a District Attorney are not parties at all, but instead are two governmental entities in the same branch of government representing the same party or client which are the people of the State of Texas. Id.
This is analogous to the same private client or party being represented by a private lawyer seeking to relitigate in a subsequent proceeding the same issue that was resolved adversely to the private client in a prior proceeding when the client was represented by another lawyer. Of course when a fact issue is resolved against a private citizen represented by lawyer A in proceeding 1, that same private citizen usually cannot relitigate the same fact issue in proceeding 2 on the basis that the private citizen is now represented by lawyer B.
While there is some merit to the position that the Texas Department of Public Safety and a District Attorney represent the same client which is the citizens of this State, these governmental entities nevertheless should not be considered the same parties for collateral estoppel purposes in cases like this. The citizens of this State have no power, as does a private litigant, to control the course of the litigation by the lawyers representing these governmental entities. These lawyers exercise governmental powers in the public interest. They do not represent any private citizen or private interest as does a private lawyer.
It is well-settled that sometimes the rules that apply to private lawyers representing private citizens do not apply to public lawyers exercising governmental powers in the public interest. For example, it has been held that “when a unit of government is exercising its governmental powers, it is not subject to estoppel.” See State v. Durham, 860 S.W.2d 63, 67-68 (Tex.1993) (State in its sovereign capacity, unlike ordinary litigants, not subject to defense of estoppel); Hardman v. State, 614 S.W.2d 123,128 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
In addition, it is important to note that collateral estoppel principles originally were a product of civil litigation developed under the common law and that collateral estoppel issues usually arise between private litigants in civil cases. See Ashe, 90 S.Ct. at 1204 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Collateral estoppel becomes a “strange mutant as it is transformed to control” in criminal cases. See Ashe, 90 S.Ct. at 1204-06 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
For example, in practice traditional collateral estoppel principles have not applied with equal force to both sides in criminal cases. There are those who complain that traditional collateral estoppel principles should be strictly applied to the “State” in cases like this but these principles should not apply to the other side. See Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 190-96 (Baird, J., dissenting). In other words, the claim seems to be that collateral estoppel principles should be “mutated” into a one-way street that benefits only criminal defendants. See id.
But traditional collateral estoppel principles are supposed to work for the benefit of or apply equally to both sides in a lawsuit. See Ashe, 90 S.Ct. at 1194 (when “an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment *18that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit”). (Emphasis Supplied). Ashe adopted a constitutional rule that literally applies to both parties or that does not constitutionally prevent its application to both parties. Id. Ashe does not literally say collateral estoppel principles apply in criminal cases but only for the benefit of one side.
No one would seriously argue that had the Texas Department of Public Safety won on the issue of reasonable suspicion to stop appellant’s car in the administrative proceeding to revoke appellant’s driver’s license, then collateral estoppel principles would prevent appellant from relitigating that issue against the Harris County District Attorney in the subsequent criminal prosecution. See Ashe, 90 S.Ct. at 1205 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (courts that have applied collateral estoppel principles to criminal actions would not apply it to both parties). However, there is nothing in Ashe or double jeopardy jurisprudence which would foreclose the District Attorney from taking and prevailing on such a position were we to apply traditional collateral estoppel principles to criminal cases.
And, no one would seriously argue that had the prosecution won in the first criminal prosecution in Ashe, then collateral estoppel principles would have precluded the defendant from relitigating the issue of identity in a subsequent criminal prosecution for robbing a different poker player. See Ashe, 90 S.Ct. at 1191, 1195 (defendant criminally prosecuted for robbery of one of six poker players after having been acquitted of robbery of one of the other poker players). There is nothing in Ashe or double jeopardy jurisprudence which would have precluded this from happening. Arguably there is nothing in any of the other provisions of the Constitution which would have precluded this from happening
since the defendant would have received an adverse jury finding on the issue of his identity in the first trial. We nevertheless believe such a position would be somewhat extreme and would not prevail.
The point of this discussion is that traditional collateral estoppel principles applicable to civil cases are somewhat relaxed and are not entirely applicable to criminal cases. This is another reason why, consistent with authority from other jurisdictions, it is appropriate to hold the Texas Department of Public Safety and a District Attorney are not the same “parties” for collateral estoppel purposes in cases like this. In Brabson, no one claimed the Dallas County District Attorney had an opportunity to litigate the probable cause issue in the administrative license revocation proceeding.
IV.
We now address whether our holding on original submission in Brabson on the “parties” issue and whether current Texas statutes12 expressly providing that collateral estoppel principles do not apply in cases like this violate federal constitutional double jeopardy principles. Justice Cohen’s dissenting opinion in Reynolds claimed our holding on original submission in Brabson on the “parties” issue is “questionable” under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184,1188-89, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970). Reynolds, 967 S.W.2d at 497 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
We disagree. Waller held, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that a defendant could not under the “dual sovereignty” doctrine be criminally prosecuted twice “for the same alleged crime” in a municipal and then in a state court. Waller, 90 S.Ct. at 1186-88. Waller does not apply here because this case does not involve a defendant being criminally prosecuted twice for *19the same offense. A license revocation administrative proceeding is a civil proceeding, not a criminal prosecution. We are not required to follow Waller in cases like this. See also Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 188 (Womack, J., concurring) (federal authority may be authoritative as to privity of federal agencies but it has no authority over the question of privity among state agencies).
Justice Cohen’s dissenting opinion also claimed Brabson and current Texas statutes expressly providing that collateral es-toppel principles do not apply in cases like this violate double jeopardy principles under Ashe and conflict with what this Court “decided” in Aguilar. Reynolds, 967 S.W.2d at 497 (Cohen, J., dissenting). Justice Cohen’s dissenting opinion claimed Aguilar decided that cases like this implicate federal constitutional collateral estop-pel principles under Ashe which the Legislature cannot legislate away. Reynolds, 967 S.W.2d at 497 (Cohen, J., dissenting) (characterizing Aguilar as dealing with collateral estoppel principles under the double jeopardy clause which the Legislature is constitutionally prohibited from declaring inapplicable). For the reasons already discussed, any suggestion in Aguilar that federal constitutional collateral estop-pel principles apply in cases like this was dicta.
The majority opinion on original submission in Brabson carefully pointed out that cases like this do not implicate the rule of collateral estoppel as “embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.” Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 188 fn. 2.13 The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy which is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment14 protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction and against multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 895 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 28 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969); see also Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 98, 118 S.Ct. 488, 493, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (double jeopardy protects against “multiple criminal punishments” for the “same offense”); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556, 568 (1993) (double jeopardy also protects against “successive prosecutions” for the “same criminal offense”).
Since Ashe’s rule of collateral es-toppel is a component of federal constitutional double jeopardy jurisprudence, then, under principles of federalism, this rule applies to the states only in these types of cases that implicate these essential protections of the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause. See Showery v. Samaniego, 814 F.2d 200, 203-04 (5th Cir.1987) (collateral estoppel does not rise to the level of a constitutional requirement “apart from the double jeopardy clause” and declining to find the collateral estoppel doctrine cognizable as a constitutional claim apart from those claims recognized under the double jeopardy clause). This also means Ashe prohibits state legislatures from legislating away the rule of collateral estoppel as “embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy” only in these types of cases.
In all other types of cases state legislatures are free to legislate any way they want. See, e.g., Article 1, Section 2, Tex. Const, (providing the people with the fundamental constitutional right to self-government). Ashe did not announce some *20free-standing all encompassing collateral estoppel constitutional principle apart from double jeopardy principles that is immune from the legislative process. See Showery, 814 F.2d at 203-04.
Cases like this do not implicate Ashe because they are not “successive criminal prosecution” cases15 or “multiple criminal punishment” eases.16 Therefore, Ashe does not prohibit our Legislature from expressly providing that the determination of an administrative judge in a civil administrative proceeding to revoke a person’s driver’s license “does not preclude litigation of the same or similar facts in a criminal prosecution.” See Section 724.048(a)(3), Texas Transportation Code.
In Ex parte Tarver, this Court decided a district attorney was collaterally estopped from relitigating in a criminal prosecution a fact issue that previously had been resolved adversely to the same district attorney in a probation revocation proceeding. Tarver, 725 S.W.2d at 195, 200 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). Tarver rejected the claim that the case involved multiple punishments for the same offense under double jeopardy principles. Tarver, 725 S.W.2d at 197. However, relying on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Swisher v. Brady, Tarver decided the “narrow” circumstances of that case implicated another risk “the Double Jeopardy clauses (sic) protects against.” Tarver, 725 S.W.2d at 200 citing Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 98 S.Ct. 2699, 2707, 57 L.Ed.2d 705 (1978).
In Swisher the United States Supreme Court rejected the juvenile defendants’ claims that a Master’s initial findings and recommendations favorable to the juveniles on whether they committed delinquent conduct could not under a Maryland rule of procedure later be challenged by the State in another proceeding before the Juvenile Court Judge. Swisher, 98 S.Ct. at 2702-03, 2708. For various reasons the Supreme Court decided jeopardy did not attach in the initial proceeding before the Master which generated the favorable findings to the juveniles. Id.; compare Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1781-87, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) (jeopardy attached in Juvenile Court proceeding because it was “essentially criminal” in nature; therefore, juvenile was twice placed in jeopardy when, after the adjudicatory hearing in the Juvenile Court proceeding on charge of delinquent conduct, he was transferred to adult court, tried and convicted, for same conduct).
Therefore, Tarver apparently decided jeopardy attached in the probation revocation proceeding because the probation revocation proceeding was close enough to a criminal prosecution or was “essentially criminal.” See Breed, 95 S.Ct. at 1785 (risk to which double jeopardy clause refers not present in proceedings that are not “essentially criminal”).17 Oth*21erwise, Tarver could not have decided the “narrow” circumstances of that case implicated “one of the risks” against which the double jeopardy clause protects and it could not have applied federal constitutional collateral estoppel principles under Ashe.18 Tarver, 725 S.W.2d at 200; see Showery, 814 F.2d at 202-04.
We can easily distinguish Tarver from the present case. A license revocation administrative proceeding is nothing like a probation revocation proceeding. It is not a “criminal prosecution” and it is not “essentially criminal.” See Breed, 95 S.Ct. at 1785 (risk to which double jeopardy clause refers not present in proceedings that are not “essentially criminal”); Tharp, 935 S.W.2d at 161 (administrative revocation of driver’s license not criminal “punishment” for double jeopardy purposes); Showery, 814 F.2d at 202-03; Burrows v. Texas Dept. Of Public Safety, 740 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1987, no pet.) (license revocation administrative proceedings are essentially civil in nature and not criminal prosecutions).
Finally, assuming a license revocation administrative proceeding is “essentially criminal” so as to qualify as a “criminal prosecution” for double jeopardy purposes, Ashe still did not prohibit the district attorney from litigating at the motion to suppress hearing in the DWI criminal prosecution the issue of reasonable suspicion to stop appellant’s car. The current law requiring the Texas Department of Public Safety to reinstate the person’s license upon, among other things, a finding by the administrative judge that there existed no “reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop or arrest the person” 19 does not amount to an “acquittal” or a finding that appellant did not commit the DWI offense. See Ashe, 90 S.Ct. at *221195-96 (jury’s general “not guilty” verdict in first prosecution for robbery of poker player A, on basis that defendant was not one of the robbers effectively was an “acquittal” on charge in second prosecution that defendant robbed poker player B);20 Tarver, 725 S.W.2d at 196, 200 (defendant effectively “acquitted” in probation revocation proceeding of same offense which was subject of the subsequent criminal prosecution).21 This is fatal to appellant’s federal constitutional collateral estoppel claim under Ashe. See Pearce, 89 S.Ct. at 2076 (double jeopardy protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after “acquittal”).
V.
We address some of the concerns raised in Judge Meyers’ dissenting opinion to the denial of rehearing in Brabson. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 206 (Meyers, J., dissenting to denial of reh’g); see also Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 207 (Price, J., dissenting to denial of reh’g) (adopting these concerns). Judge Meyers’ dissenting opinion to the denial of rehearing in Brabson claims our holding on original submission in Brabson on the “parties” issue will subject criminal defendants to successive criminal prosecutions for the same offense by different district attorneys and cause the Attorney General to obtain new findings in federal habeas corpus proceedings because the Attorney General “is a different party than the District Attorney.” Id.
We disagree. The former clearly is prohibited by federal constitutional double jeopardy principles no matter who the “parties” are to the proceedings. And federal courts are mandated by federal statutes to defer to state court findings in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Federal courts do not defer to these findings in these proceedings based on collateral estoppel principles.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
MEYERS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which JOHNSON, J., joined. PRICE, J., filed a dissenting opinion.. State v. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tex.Cr.App.1998) (Dallas County District Attorney not collaterally estopped from litigating at a motion to suppress hearing in a DWI criminal prosecution the issue of probable cause for defendant's arrest when the Texas Department of Public Safety had received an adverse ruling on that issue in a prior administrative proceeding to revoke defendant’s driver’s license).
. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-46, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970) (adopting rule of collateral estoppel as "embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy”).
. State v. Aguilar, 947 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Tex.Cr.App.1997).
. However, Brabson and Aguilar were decided under the same statutory scheme. Compare Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 184, with, Aguilar, 947 S.W.2d at 258.
. The current law in refusal to submit a specimen of breath or blood cases expressly provides that the administrative judge’s determination "does not preclude litigation of the same or similar facts in a criminal prosecution”. See Section 724.048(a)(3), Texas Transportation Code. The current law in failure to pass test for intoxication cases also expressly provides that the administrative judge's determination "does not preclude litigation of the same or similar facts in a criminal prosecution.” See Section 524.012(e)(3), Texas Transportation Code.
. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 186-88 (Womack, J., concurring).
. The Judge, who joined the majority opinion on original submission but who also voted to grant rehearing, voted to grant rehearing only on the "parties” issue. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 206-07 (Price, J., dissenting to denial of reh’g) (unnecessary to address "parties” issue because there were two other "veiy sound reasons for the result reached in this case on original submission”). Therefore, even under Judge Baird’s view of determining the prece-dential effect of Brabson, Brabson would still be a majority opinion on everything decided in the opinion on original submission except for the "parties” issue.
. See Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 186 (suggestion in some of this Court's prior cases that the collateral estoppel bar might apply in cases like this was dicta and unnecessary to ultimate disposition of those cases).
. See Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 200 (McCormick, P.J., concurring to denial of reh'g).
. See Reynolds, 967 S.W.2d at 497 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
. See Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 192 (Baird, X, dissenting).
. Section 724.048(a)(3), Texas Transportation Code; Section 524.012(e)(3), Texas Transportation Code.
. This decision was necessary to the majority holding on original submission in Brabson because if cases like this implicate federal constitutional collateral estoppel principles, then we probably would have been required under Waller to hold the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Dallas County District Attorney were the same “parties."
. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2062-63, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969) (making the double jeopardy clause of Fifth Amendment applicable to states through due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
. The license revocation administrative proceeding was a civil proceeding, not a criminal prosecution.
. See Ex parte Tharp, 935 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (administrative suspension of driver's license is not criminal "punishment” for double jeopardy purposes); State v. Ratliff, 304 Or. 254, 744 P.2d 247, 248 (1987) (no constitutional basis exists for double jeopardy challenge in cases like this because no criminal sanctions are imposed as a consequence of first proceeding).
. Before Tarver was decided this Court had held a probation revocation proceeding is not a "criminal prosecution” or is not "essentially criminal” for double jeopardy purposes because it is "administrative in nature.” Davenport v. State, 574 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); see also Chambers v. State, 700 S.W.2d 597, 598-99 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). Chambers and Davenport apparently were overruled sub silentio in Tarver. See Tarver, 725 S.W.2d at 197 fn. 1; Ex parte Byrd, 752 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).
Tarver is inconsistent with Fifth Circuit case law which based on Breed holds "the double jeopardy clause does not apply to parole and probation revocation proceedings” because they are not “essentially criminal.” Showery, 814 F.2d at 202; see also Stringer v. Williams, 161 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir.1998). Showery erroneously characterized Tarver as "extending state constitutional guarantees beyond those afforded by the federal Constitution.” Showery, 814 F.2d at 204; see also Stringer, *21161 F.3d at 263. However, Tarver was decided as a matter of federal constitutional law. Tarver, 725 S.W.2d at 200.
Of course, we are not required to follow Fifth Circuit federal constitutional interpretations. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 846, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (in our federal system, a state trial court’s interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative than that of the federal court of appeals in whose circuit the trial court is located). However, the reader might note that though the defendant in Tarver won in state court, he would have lost in federal court for failure to state a federal constitutional claim. See Showery, 814 F.2d at 203-04.
. Common-law “administrative collateral es-toppel” principles support the result in Tarver making it unnecessary to resort to federal constitutional collateral estoppel principles to support it. Tarver, 725 S.W.2d at 195, 200; see also Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 186 (Brabson consistent with “narrowness” of holding in Tarver because in Tarver, the parties were the same, the ultimate fact issue in the probation revocation proceeding and the subsequent criminal prosecution was the same, the ultimate fact issue was resolved adversely to the "State” in the probation revocation proceeding, and that fact issue was "properly before” the trial court in the probation revocation proceeding). A criminal prosecution in cases like Tarver can violate common-law "administrative collateral estoppel” principles without also violating federal constitutional collateral estoppel principles under Ashe. See Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 186; Showery, 814 F.2d at 202-03.
The majority opinion on original submission in Brabson relied on Tarver for stating this Court had adopted for criminal cases the common-law doctrine of "administrative collateral estoppel.” Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 183. However, Tarver was decided as a matter of federal constitutional law. This raises the question of whether this Court has ever adopted this common-law doctrine for criminal cases and whether collateral estoppel principles apply to criminal cases outside the double jeopardy context. See Ashe, 90 S.Ct. at 1203-05 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (questioning whether collateral estoppel principles should apply to criminal cases); Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 207 (Price, J., dissenting to denial of reh’g) (a rule that collateral estoppel principles "will simply not be used as a bar” in these types of cases is "far more sound” than deciding that a district attorney and the Texas Department of Public Safety are not the same "parties” for collateral estoppel purposes). We did not grant discretionary review in this case to reexamine this aspect of the Brabson decision.
. See Section 724.043(b), Texas Transportation Code; Section 724.042(1), Texas Transportation Code.
. In Ashe, 90 S.Ct. at 1195-96, the jury effectively “decided" the defendant did not commit the offense for which he was being prosecuted in the subsequent prosecution:
"After the first jury had acquitted the petitioner of robbing [poker player A], Missouri could certainly not have brought him to trial again upon that charge. Once a jury had determined upon conflicting testimony that there was at least a reasonable doubt that the petitioner was one of the robbers, the State could not present the same or different identification evidence in a second prosecution for the robbeiy of [poker player A] in the hope that a different jury might find that evidence more convincing. The situation is no constitutionally different here, even though the second trial related to [poker player B] of the same robbery. For the name of the victim, in the circumstances of this case, had no bearing whatever upon the issue of whether the petitioner was one of the robbers." (Emphasis Supplied).
. In Tarver, 725 S.W.2d at 196, 200, the trial court in the probation revocation proceeding decided the defendant did not commit the offense for which he was being prosecuted in the subsequent prosecution.