dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Generally, a person has no legal duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third person. Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.1995); Haight v. Savoy Apartments, 814 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist] 1991, writ denied). There is an exception to this rule when criminal conduct is a foreseeable result of a party’s negligence. Id. A landlord who retains control over the premises has a reasonable duty of care to keep the premises safe for tenants and their guests. Taylor v. Gilbert Gertner Enter., 466 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ re'fd n.r.e.).
Proximate cause consists of two elements: cause in fact and foreseeability. Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex.1992); Summers v. Fort Crockett Hotel, Ltd., 902 S.W.2d 20, 25 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). Both of these elements must be present to establish proximate cause. Farley, 529 S.W.2d at 755; Summers, 902 S.W.2d at 25. Cause in fact means that the defendant’s act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, which would not otherwise have occurred. Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.1995). Foreseeability requires that the general danger, not the exact sequence of events that produced the harm, be foreseeable. Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex.1996).
In the recent case of Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749 (Tex.1998), the supreme court clarified the factors to be considered by a court of appeals in determining foreseeability in the context of premises liability for the criminal acts of third parties:
[C]ourts should consider whether any criminal conduct previously occurred on or near the property, how recently it occurred, how often it occurred, how similar the conduct was to the conduct on the property, and what publicity was given the occurrences to indicate that the landowner knew or should have known about them.
Id. at 757.
The court calls these factors proximity, recency, frequency, similarity, and publicity. Id. at 759. The evidence must show that other crimes have occurred on the property or in the immediate vicinity. Id. at 757. The previous crimes must be sufficiently similar to the crime in question to place the defendant on notice of the specific danger. Id. at 758. Crimes such as domestic violence and vandalism of automobiles do not make violent crimes such as sexual assault foreseeable. Id. Publicity surrounding the previous crimes or actual knowledge of the crimes may indicate foreseeability. Id.
Appellees claim that the degree and nature of the crime on the premises and in the surrounding area, the appellants’ failure to request police department records to determine the amount of crime at the complex and in the vicinity, the inadequate fencing and lighting, and the presence of gang members and other undesirable indi*351viduals in the complex made the crime that resulted in the death of Campbell foreseeable.
To determine that Campbell’s murder was foreseeable, we must conclude that: (1) there were enough actual incidents of crime on the property, and they were sufficiently similar in nature to Campbell’s murder to establish that appellants knew or should have known that such a murder was likely to happen; or (2) there was publicity of crimes occurring in the vicinity of the apartments that were sufficient in number and similarity to Campbell’s murder to establish that appellants knew or should have known that such a murder was likely to happen on their property. If neither of these is established, then the evidence is not legally sufficient to show that a crime like Campbell’s murder was foreseeable.
Appellees’ expert witness, Horace Loomis, testified regarding the occurrence of crime at the property based upon his review and summary of the Dickinson Police Department’s records of calls to Dickinson Arms Apartments from January 1, 1991 to June 16, 1994. These call records were introduced as Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1. In his testimony, Loomis summarized these records for the jury as follows: 74 disorderly conduct calls, 26 vandalism calls, 20 calls for burglary of apartments, 15 vagrancy calls, 17 calls for auto theft, 11 assault calls, 10 parent-child dispute calls, eight theft calls (either from an apartment or automobile), and two “other” assault calls, which, he said, could include aggravated assault. A chart showing Loomis’s summary (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 38) also showed an aggravated robbery. Loomis admitted that the aggravated robbery was included because the arrest warrant was served at Dickinson Arms, although the crime was actually committed in Santa Fe, Texas.
Loomis was not able to say whether any of the listed assaults were stranger-initiated as opposed to domestic violence or fights between roommates. He said the disorderly conduct charges were misdemeanors and could have involved kids.
Loomis did not know of any rapes or murders (other than the incident that is the basis of this lawsuit) that occurred at the apartment complex. He was not aware of any aggravated assaults that occurred at the apartments before June 16, 1994 and was not aware of a single stranger-initiated crime at Dickinson Arms in the last three and one-half years.
The majority makes much of the “644 pages of records from the Dickinson Police Department regarding calls to the police for service” while failing to take into account that this was only a record of calls, not a record of actual crimes which occurred. Appellees in their brief direct us to Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1 and cite only five specific examples as evidence of crime at the complex: three assaults, a gunfight, and the arrest of Stacy Hughes for aggravated robbery. The record shows that two of the assaults are recorded as incidents of domestic violence that occurred on June 24, 1992 and December 19, 1993. The third assault was a complaint dated March 14, 1994 that resulted in a citation warning with no report filed by the investigating officer. The “gunfight” was a fight between roommates on October 22, 1993, in which shots were fired. The residents were evicted. Stacy Hughes was arrested on the premises on April 2, 1994 on a warrant for an aggravated robbery that occurred in Santa Fe, Texas.
The five occurrences cited in appellees’ brief are not in any way similar to the stranger on stranger violent crime that resulted in the death of Darin Campbell and are no evidence tending to show that the car-jacking and death of Campbell were foreseeable.
Appellees also refer to three incidents in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1 as showing suspected drug activity at the complex. However, none of these incidents resulted in an arrest, and the information in the record does not make it clear that any crime was *352committed. Even if clearly established, incidents of suspected drug activity do not show foreseeability of violent stranger-on-stranger criminal activity.
Appellees point to the following facts as indications that the complex had a gang problem: there was a gang related party in apartment 69 on the night of the murder; resident Kay Bishop’s testimony concerning nonresidents she observed on the property who made her uncomfortable; and Robert Terrazas’s description of Stacey Hughes’s guest as “a little gangster” and “thuggy.” Appellees argue that this indicates foreseeability of violent stranger-on-stranger crime because Detective Burrows testified that car jackings are a crime favored by gangs. However, appellees point to no crimes committed on the property by gang members, violent or otherwise, prior to the murder. Further, Detective Burrows, who identified herself as the lead gang investigator for the Dickinson Police Department, testified that she did not know that gang members lived in the complex and that there was no gang graffiti on the property.
There is no evidence of probative force regarding violent, stranger-initiated crimes on the premises of Dickinson Arms.
Loomis offered no testimony regarding crime in the immediate vicinity of Dickinson Arms. Detective Burrows testified that the El Rancho Motel has a bad reputation for drug activity and prostitution. She does not state in her testimony how far the motel is from Dickinson Arms, although in general she was testifying about an area that is about one mile square.
Detective Burrows also testified that three apartment complexes on the other side of 1-45 from Dickinson Arms have a bad reputation for drug activity, family violence, assaults, and child abuse. She did not testify regarding the reputation of Dickinson Arms Apartments.
It is questionable whether Detective Burrows’ testimony was any evidence of sufficiently similar criminal activity in the immediate vicinity of Dickinson Arms. However, as noted in Timberwalk, “Property owners bear no duty to regularly inspect criminal records to determine the risk of crime in the area. On the other hand, when the occurrence of criminal activity is widely publicized, a landlord can be expected to have knowledge of such crimes.” Id. at 759.
In considering the factor of publicity, we use the term in its broadest sense to encompass the public media and private dissemination of information. A review of the record reveals a complete absence of any evidence regarding any public dissemination of information about sufficiently similar criminal activity at or near the apartments. In fact, there is no evidence in the record regarding public dissemination of information about any crimes at or near the apartments. In addition, there is no evidence to show actual knowledge or that Dickinson Arms should have known of any sufficiently similar criminal activity near the premises.1
CONCLUSION
Applying a Timberwalk analysis to a legal sufficiency standard of review, I would find that there is no evidence regarding sufficiently similar criminal activity on the premises of Dickinson Arms, nor is there any evidence of publicity, _ either public or private, or of actual knowledge of any similar crimes in the area.
Considering these factors together, as we must under Timberwalk, I conclude that there is no evidence of probative force to support the jury’s finding of proximate cause, because there is no evidence of foreseeability.
*353I would sustain appellants’ second issue and reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment that appellees take nothing against appellants.
. The majority implies that Timberwalk holds that "there may be a duty to make some inquires under certain circumstances.” That is clearly contrary to Timberwalk’s stated holding that property owners bear no duty to "regularly inspect” criminal records to determine the risk of crime in the area. Id. at 759.