I dissent.
The majority formulates a rule of law essentially comprising a pronouncement that there are no Fourth Amendment prohibitions applying to administrative searches of closely regulated businesses. Federal law holds to the contrary.
I first disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s factual finding, that Officer Camarillo entered appellant’s inner office wearing both his bar check hat and his municipal ordinance inspector hat, is supported by substantial evidence. It was undisputed from the testimony at the hearing on the suppression motion that Camarillo went to appellant’s bar at the request of a superior to check for a dance permit. The only request the officer made to appellant upon entering his bar was to produce his dance permit. Camarillo followed appellant down the hall to his office after appellant said he would look for his dance permit documentation there. Before this, appellant had showed the officer all of his business licenses except the requested permit. Indeed, the trial court made the additional finding that Camarillo entered appellant’s office without consent, without a warrant, and without probable cause that appellant had violated any law.
Although making much of its point that Officer Camarillo’s subjective motivations in entering appellant’s bar and office are irrelevant under federal law (a proposition with which I agree), the majority in fact relies on the officer’s subjective comments that he went into appellant’s bar to do a “bar check” to support its conclusion of substantial evidence. The record is unrefuted that the only “objective” reason Officer Camarillo had to go into appellant’s inner office was in wearing his municipal ordinance inspector hat.
I further disagree with the majority that the officer’s search of appellant’s office was constitutionally reasonable. In response to whether federal law authorizes the search in this case, the majority merely concludes that the trial court’s finding that Camarillo was wearing two hats allowed him to go into appellant’s office.
The reasonableness of a warrantless search depends on the specific enforcement needs and privacy guaranties at issue in any case. (People v. Paulson (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1480, 1486 [265 Cal.Rptr. 579], citing Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. (1978) 436 U.S. 307, 321 [56 L.Ed.2d 305, 316-317, 98 S.Ct. 1816].) It is important to keep in mind in the present case that administrative searches are not criminal searches. The majority here appears to blur the lines between the two. Although administrative laws *842generally impose criminal sanctions for refusal to comply (People v. Tillery (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1569, 1580 [260 Cal.Rptr. 320]), an administrative statute is not a penal law. A penal statute emphasizes the punishment of individuals for specific acts of behavior. An administrative law has an entirely different method of remedying a social problem by establishing how particular businesses should be operated and allowing government officials to ensure those rules are followed. (People v. Paulson, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d 1486, citing New York v. Burger (1987) 482 U.S. 691, 712-713 [96 L.Ed.2d 601, 619-621, 107 S.Ct. 2636].)
The trial court’s legal conclusion was correct to one extent. It is true under federal law that, since appellant was operating a closely regulated business, any part of his premises, including his private office, was open to a warrant-less inspection for the purposes specified by the Alcoholic Beverage Act. (Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 72, 76 [25 L.Ed.2d 60, 64, 90 S.Ct. 774]; Terry York Imports, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 307, 319-320 [242 Cal.Rptr. 790].) In general, the legality of administrative inspections does not depend on consent or warrant, but on the authority of the statute under which the inspection is conducted. (United States v. Biswell (1972) 406 U.S. 311, 314-315 [32 L.Ed.2d 87, 91-92, 92 S.Ct. 1593].)
However, federal law has not done away with Fourth Amendment prohibitions in the area of pervasively regulated businesses. It is not true that the owner of a business in a closely regulated industry has no expectation of privacy, as the majority opinion appears to conclude. The Supreme Court terms it a “reduced” (not “nonexistent”) expectation of privacy which “lessens” (not “eliminates) application of the warrant requirement in order to fulfill the Fourth Amendment’s standard of reasonableness for a government search. (New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. 702 [96 L.Ed.2d 613-614].) Even in the context of a pervasively regulated business, a warrantless inspection will be deemed constitutionally reasonable only so long as the following three criteria are met: (1) there must be a substantial government interest underlying the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made; (2) the warrantless inspection must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and (3) the scheme’s inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. (Id., pp. 702-703 [96 L.Ed.2d 613-615].)
In this case, the majority does not even cite New York v. Burger, which establishes Fourth Amendment limitations on searches of pervasively regulated businesses. The only authority on which the People rely to justify Officer Camarillo’s warrantless entry into appellant’s inner office is Business *843and Professions Code sections 25753 and 25755, part of the Alcoholic Beverage Act. Respondent failed to give this court any information regarding the subject entertainment or dance permit law. In fact, it was unknown until oral argument in this case whether the law was a municipal, county, or state directive. The requirement to obtain an entertainment or dance permit is now known to be part of a city administrative scheme regulating fire and other safety and welfare concerns.
Business and Professions Code sections 25753 and 25755 reveal that Officer Camarillo was authorized to inspect without a warrant during business hours any part of the premises of a local commercial establishment licensed under the Alcoholic Beverage Act in order to enforce any provision of the act and any “penal law.” The People have not provided this court with any statutory language authorizing a California law enforcement officer to conduct a warrantless inspection of a commercial premises selling liquor in order to determine the owner’s adherence to local fire safety laws.
No one can argue that the State of California or the City of Oxnard did not have substantial government regulation interests in this case. (Burger criteria No. 1.) However, I fail to see where Burger criteria Nos. 2 and 3 have been met. The record indicates the opposite. Officer Camarillo conducted a warrantless search for the dance permit which was not a purpose under the Alcoholic Beverage Act. (Burger criteria No. 2.) The act did not inform appellant that his commercial premises would be subject to warrantless inspections for local administrative law compliance, therefore, it did not perform as a substitute for a warrant by carefully restricting the “scope” of inspections. (New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. 703 [96 L.Ed.2d 614-615].)
The two California appellate court cases which deal with warrantless administrative searches of businesses dispensing liquor are consistent with Burger. People v. Lisner (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 637 [57 Cal.Rptr. 674] held that agents of the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control and local police had the power to inspect for suspected violations of California’s penal statutes. People v. Paulson, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d 1480, rejected defendant’s claim that the warrantless search of his bar solely to find evidence of a narcotics violation exceeded the scope of administrative searches under Business and Professions Code sections 25753 and 25755. The Paulson court relied on Business and Professions Code section 24200.5, mandating the revocation of a liquor license if the licensee permits the sale of illegal substances on the licensed premises, to uphold the search. It reasoned that the statute provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant by explicitly informing the licensee that his premises could be inspected anytime during business hours for sales of drugs.
*844Here, unlike Lisner or Paulson, there is no explicit statutory authority giving Officer Camarillo the right to conduct a warrantless inspection of appellant’s business for a suspected violation of a municipal administrative law. Simply put, Business and Professions Code sections 25753 and 25755 do not give law enforcement carte blanche authority to inspect businesses selling alcohol for any violation of any law.
As the appellate court in Paulson concluded: “[T]his is not a case in which, as a condition of doing business, the state has required a blanket submission to warrantless searches at any time or for any purpose.” (216 Cal.App.3d 1490, italics added.) Consistent with this conclusion, I have found no case authority permitting a warrantless administrative search where the inspector’s actions were not wholly consistent with the specific statutory purposes under which the inspection was made. As the Supreme Court has made clear, the right to inspect even closely regulated businesses without a warrant must be accompanied by procedures which carefully restrict the government’s actions. (New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. 703; Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, supra, 397 U.S. 77 [25 L.Ed.2d 64-65].)
I believe Officer Camarillo’s actions objectively violated Fourth Amendment standards enunciated in New York v. Burger. The order denying appellant’s suppression motion should be reversed.
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 14, 1992. Stone, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 23, 1992.