concurring in result only by separate opinion.
The appellants, Robert and Kim Hill, filed suit against Appellee, the Kentucky Lottery Corporation (KLC), claiming retaliatory termination in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KRS 344), common law wrongful discharge, and defamation. KLC sought summary judgment, claiming that the Chapter 344 retaliation claim preempted the common law claim for wrongful discharge, and asserting absolute privilege. The trial court denied summary judgment, and the case proceeded to a three-week jury trial which resulted in a verdict for Appellants on December 18, 2002. Robert was awarded $2,645,450 in compensatory and punitive damages, and Kim was awarded $1,697,866. KLC filed a bare motion under CR 50.02, 59.01 and 59.05 on December 26, 2002. At the same time, KLC submitted a judgment purportedly reflecting the jury verdict, which the trial court entered on January 23, 2003.
However, the judgment prepared by KLC contained substantially erroneous amounts for the damages awards. This forced the Hills to file a motion to vacate the erroneous judgment on January 23, 2003. On January 31, 2003, KLC filed an “Amended Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Motion for New Trial and Motion to Alter, Vacate or Amend the Judgment.” On May 12, 2003, the trial court granted the Hills’ motion to vacate and entered “final” judgments for each which were consistent with the verdict. They were accompanied by a separate order which included the following language: “It should be noted that these Judgments are not final and appealable and are subject to further rulings on the motions currently pending to alter, amend, or vacate.” KLC did not file a new motion to alter, vacate or amend, nor did it file a notice of appeal within the thirty days following the entry of the May 12 judgment. At that point, the Hills had no reason to appeal, having prevailed on all their claims.
On August 8, 2003, the trial court ruled on the “pending” motions, denying the JNOV motion, but nevertheless ruling in favor of KLC on three grounds: the defamation jury instructions erroneously did not include the defense of qualified privilege; KLC was entitled to preemption on the wrongful discharge claim; and KLC was entitled to a retrial of the damages award on retaliation and punitive damages. Both parties appealed this ruling, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals as interlocutory.
At the second trial, KLC prevailed on the defamation claim, and the damages award for the Hills was much lower. Post-trial, the trial court awarded attorneys’ fees to the Hills in the amount of $212, 959.87, and fixed post-judgment interest at 6%. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment in the second trial. We granted discretionary review to consider the question of whether the trial court had lost jurisdiction of the case after it entered an amended judgment from which no appeal was taken, when the grant of the new trial did not come until 88 days after entry of the amended judgment or, if it had jurisdiction, whether it was correct on the merits.
The majority has decided that the trial court was acting with jurisdiction when it *434entered the order for a new trial on August 8, 2003. I disagree. The majority also concludes that the motion to vacate, which was filed in relation to the judgment that was set aside, somehow survived the voiding of that judgment, and thus declines to address the procedural question of whether such motions filed prior to entry of a judgment are authorized or timely under our Rules of Civil Procedure. I believe this question is crucial, because the majority holding creates a “relation forward” doctrine that effectively nullifies the time limits set forth in the Civil Rules, and promotes the premature filing of motions that will lead to procedural messes such as the one in this case.
The majority view is that KLC had the right to rely on the judge’s statement in his order attached to the “Final Judgment” for each of the Hills that its motions were “pending” and that the judgments were not final and appealable. At first glance, this is an appealing argument, but it does not outweigh the potential damage as to how the Civil Rules are applied. Oddly enough, both parties did think it appropriate to appeal the trial court’s ruling granting a new trial, which could be nothing but interlocutory if the trial court had jurisdiction, which in turn explains why the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals. (The proper avenue for relief if the trial court had no jurisdiction in issuing its new-trial order would have been a writ action.) In fact, regardless of the judge’s statement, the May 12 judgments were final and thus appealable because there were no “pending” motions that would stop the running of time to file post-trial motions or the notice of appeal.
When a judgment is set aside and a new judgment is entered, all time periods begin to run from the date of entry of the new judgment by the clerk. CR 58. CR 59.02 requires that a motion for a new trial be served “not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.” CR 59.04 includes the same language — “[n]ot later than 10 days after entry of judgment” — with regard to a trial court granting a new trial sua sponte. Similarly, CR 59.05 requires a motion to alter, vacate or amend to be served “not later than 10 days after entry of the final judgment.” Each rule refers to “the judgment” — not a judgment but the specific one the motion relates to.
The question then is whether the language “not later than” allows for such motions to be served before entry of the judgment. I believe that use of the language “after entry of the judgment” indicates that such motions must be filed after entry of the judgment, but before or on the tenth day after entry. That simply did not happen here. KLC’s motions to vacate the judgment or for a JNOV were pending until the judgment they followed was set aside. Thereafter, they were void. KLC did not file such motions in regard to the May 12 judgment. Ten days after entry of that judgment, KLC was foreclosed from filing them. Thirty days thereafter, they forfeited their right to appeal by not filing a timely notice of appeal.
I concur in result, because under my reasoning I reach the same result as the majority: the verdict from the first trial stands and must be reinstated as the judgment in this ease because no motion or appeal related to the May 12 judgment was timely filed. But I cannot concur that a trial court has discretion to ignore the Civil Rules, which is also the net effect of the majority ruling. If we allow the premature filing of substantive post-trial motions, we invite confusion. If we allow them to relate forward after entry of a new judgment, we compound the problem. What if the basis for the “pending” motion was on grounds that had no bearing on the new judgment? Would the trial court be *435allowed to relate the motion forward to defeat the time limits, and then allow amendments to conform to the new judgment? What does this do to the purpose of the Civil Rules, which are, after all, this Court’s own rules? The enacted Civil Rules are presumably made for a reason, and they are not rules at all if they are subject to being ignored at the judge’s discretion; they would become mere guidelines.
I do agree that there are times when equity allows a trial court some discretion when there would otherwise be none, but this is not one of those times. The two parties are not in unequal positions, and the number of appeals our appellate courts review tells me that attorneys are not so intimidated by the judge’s position that they will fail in their duty to raise appropriate issues. The judge was wrong in this case, and KLC had to act accordingly to ensure that its rights to post-trial motion and appeal were preserved. The Hills had no reason to appeal the first verdict, and did attempt to appeal the trial court’s order for a new trial. They did all they could do (except, perhaps, seeking a writ).
Consequently, I believe the trial court did lose jurisdiction over this case after ten days from entry of the May 12 judgments. I would therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for reinstatement of the May 12 judgments that were in accordance with the jury verdict in the first trial. I concur with the majority view regarding the award of post-judgment interest and attorneys’ fees.