dissenting:
I am unable to agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial judge abused her discretion in denying the District’s motion for leave to amend its answer. Accordingly, I vote to affirm the judgment.
I.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
“Once responsive pleadings have been filed, permission to amend is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court and appellate court review of the question is limited to whether there was an abuse of discretion.” Gordon v. Raven Systems & Research, Inc., 462 A.2d 10, 13 (D.C.1983) (citations omitted). “[A]t bottom, [it is] the trial judge [who] must balance [the] competing interests.” Id. Where the judge has denied leave to amend on the grounds of prejudice to the non-moving party, we inquire whether the finding of prejudice “has a rational basis in the record.” Id. “[T]he appellate court, in its review capacity, does not render its own decision of what judgment is most wise under the circumstances presented.” Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 362 (D.C.1979). On the contrary, “[our] role in reviewing the exercise of discretion is supervisory in nature and deferential in attitude.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the trial judge issued a written order in which she enumerated several reasons for denying the District’s motion. An examination of her reasons and of the record as a whole persuades me that reversal is unwarranted.
II.
PREJUDICE
A. Pre-order prejudice to the plaintiff.
The trial judge recognized, and I agree, that leave to amend should be freely granted if “no substantial prejudice would result from permitting the defendant to raise an affirmative defense at a later stage in the litigation.” Order at 3 (quoting Whitener v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 505 A.2d 457, 459 (D.C.1986)). She noted, however, that leave to amend need not be granted where there has been “undue delay” or where allowance of the amendment would result in “undue prejudice” to the opposing party. Id. (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)). The judge found that, in this case, “there was indeed prejudice to the plaintiff’ because
[a]ll parties [had] gone through the entire discovery period. Time and expense [had] been committed by the plaintiff.
Order at 3.
The language quoted above, although somewhat cryptic, constitutes a factual finding that Tinker changed his position, and spent time and money, in reliance on the District’s failure to plead the statute of limitations until ten months after the suit was *71brought. It was obviously the judge’s view that if the District were permitted to change course after the plaintiff had acted in reliance in the District’s initial position, the plaintiff would be significantly prejudiced. A trial judge who has been supervising the litigation obviously knows more than an appellate court knows about the course of the case, and we must sustain her finding that Tinker would be prejudiced unless that finding is unsupported by the record. See D.C.Code § 17-305 (1989).
The principal basis for the judge’s finding of prejudice appears to have been that Tinker had conducted his discovery in reliance on the District’s position. In his separate concurring opinion, Judge Belson makes the point that in order to prevail on Count I (the negligent training count) Tinker would have been required to prove that, as a result of their negligent training, the police officers used excessive force. Accordingly, in Judge Belson’s view, any discovery which Tinker had devoted to the question of excessive force would continue to be relevant to the case even if the District was permitted to amend its answer and even if, following that amendment, Count II was dismissed as time-barred. If the time and effort expended on this discovery were not wasted, then, according to Judge Belson, Tinker was not prejudiced.
I cannot quarrel with Judge Belson’s logic; the use of excessive force was indeed an element of Count I. Although the continued usefulness of Tinker’s “excessive force” discovery for the litigation of Count I is relevant, however, I do not believe that this point conclusively negates Tinker’s claim of prejudice.
For more than half a year, Tinker’s attorneys were led to believe that the statute of limitations was out of the case and that Count II was going to be decided on the merits. In fact, the District expressly stipulated that expert testimony would not be required on the question of excessive force, and thus implicitly represented that counsel for Tinker could try the case on the plaintiffs simplest and strongest claim without retaining expert witnesses. As a result, counsel obviously placed Counts I and III1 on the back burner and did not conduct discovery on these claims.
The strategy adopted by Tinker’s attorneys in reliance on the District’s actions was not at all unreasonable. The trial judge found that “the plaintiff and his counsel are equitably entitled to rely upon the impact of this stipulation.” Surely she was absolutely right.
Expert witnesses do not come cheap. A litigant in Tinker’s position has limited resources available to pay experts or to conduct complex discovery relating to expert testimony. After Tinker’s attorneys had secured a stipulation that expert testimony would not be required on the excessive force claim, they concluded that they had an excellent chance of prevailing on that claim, and that it would therefore be unnecessary for them to retain an expert witness or to conduct discovery on Tinker’s negligence claims.2
If the trial judge had granted the District leave to amend its answer, and if the limitations defense to Count II had been sustained, then Tinker’s attorneys would have been compelled to alter in a most radical way the mindset and litigation plan pursuant to which they had been conducting the case for more than half a year. It would also belatedly have become necessary for counsel to take Counts I and III off the back burner and proceed with discovery and the naming of experts. Any competent trial lawyer would surely agree that a case (or a part of a case) is a great deal more difficult to put together when, for some reason, counsel has not actively pursued it for a substantial period of time.
There was therefore ample support in the record for the judge’s finding that Tinker would have been significantly prejudiced if the District had been permitted to amend its answer. To be sure, the judge could plausi*72bly have reached a different result. In my opinion, however, the judge’s finding was rational, and it should be sustained under our deferential standard of review.
B. Post-order prejudice to the plaintiff
The prejudice to Tinker which led to the judge’s denial of the District’s motion has been compounded by events which have occurred since the judge’s order. Tinker alleged in his opposition to the District’s motion for leave to amend its answer that
he would have sought discovery, including the naming of an expert in terms of improper police procedures, if this defense had previously been raised. Plaintiff did forego the other avenues of relief based on defendant’s answer which failed to raise the Statute of Limitations.
Tinker contended that, in the event that the motion for leave to amend was granted, he should be allowed “time for additional discovery and to name an expert in police practices and procedures.” At the time that Tinker filed his opposition, it was still possible for him to litigate Counts I and III, although Tinker would obviously have been prejudiced in the preparation and presentation of these claims by the delay occasioned by the District’s change of direction.
After the judge denied the District’s motion, however, there was no occasion to conduct the additional discovery, and Tinker, relying on the judge’s ruling, promptly dismissed Counts I and III. The District takes the position that the two dismissed counts, now time-barred, see D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1995), are out of the case. My colleagues, in a laudable effort to do equity, see Part IV of Judge Terry’s opinion, ante at 65, and Judge Belsoris opinion, ante at 70, n. 3, effectively reinstate these counts, but Tinker is now compelled to try to reconstruct, many years after the fact, a case requiring expert testimony. The District’s initial failure to assert its limitations defense, and its abrupt change of strategy, thus resulted in the entry of an order which led Tinker to dismiss claims which he could have (and surely would have) promptly litigated on the merits if the District had invoked the statute of limitations (as to Count II) in its original answer. In my opinion, the plaintiffs loss of an opportunity to litigate, without undue delay, the negligent training and medical negligence claims, constitutes obvious, palpable prejudice.
The trial judge could not and did not address the question of post-order prejudice to Tinker, for the relevant events occurred after her disposition of the District’s motion. The judge did explicitly rule, however, that Tinker was “equitably entitled” to conclude (on the basis of the District’s stipulation that expert testimony would not be required at the trial of Count II) that Count II would in fact be tried. In light of that holding, I find it inconceivable that, if the case were remanded to her, the judge would find unreasonable Tinker’s reliance on the judge’s ruling, in which the judge vindicated plaintiffs right to rely on that stipulation. See, e.g., Ouriaghli v. Moore, 621 A.2d 392, 395 (D.C.1993).
If we treat the issue as one for this court to decide in the first instance, I would likewise hold that Tinker’s reliance on the judge’s ruling was reasonable. The decision whether to allow a party to amend its answer is a highly discretionary one. Here, the District had made a belated and abrupt about-face which departed not only from the position taken in the District’s original answer but also from the understanding upon which the stipulation between the parties was based. Knowing that Tinker had relied on the District’s initial position, the judge declined to allow the District to amend. Tinker had no reason to believe that the trial judge’s ruling on such a discretionary call would subsequently be vacated as erroneous, and I do not think we should second-guess his counsel’s decision, in light of the judge’s order, not to spend time and money on expert witnesses “just in case.”
C. The lack of “on the merits” prejudice to the District.
The judge’s finding that Tinker would suffer prejudice if the District were belatedly allowed to amend its answer is further supported by the incontrovertible fact that any prejudice which the District suffered as a result of the denial of its motion related solely to a technical defense. The District *73was not precluded from presenting its position on the merits, and indeed did so when the case came to trial.
As Judge Terry expressly recognizes, maj. op. at 60, the statute of limitations is a defense which a defendant is obliged to raise in a responsive pleading, and which the trial court may deem waived if it has not been promptly asserted. See Super.Ct.Civ.R. 8(c); Feldman v. Gogos, 628 A.2d 103, 104-105 (D.C.1993); Whitener v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 505 A.2d 457, 458 (D.C.1986). Statutes of limitations
protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S.Ct. 352, 357, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979); Hobson v. District of Columbia, 686 A.2d 194, 198 (D.C.1996); Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192,1202 (D.C.1984) (quoting Kubrick); see also Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1874). “Statutorily imposed limitations on actions are technical defenses which should be strictly construed to avoid the forfeiture of a plaintiffs rights.” Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg, 38 Cal.3d 46, 210 Cal.Rptr. 781, 694 P.2d 1153, 1158 (1985) (citation omitted); see also Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Henkel, 689 A.2d 1224, 1233 (D.C.1997) (quoting Steketee). Such defenses may present “obstacles to just claims.” Id. This court has stated that “the statute of limitations is not such a meritorious defense that either the law or the facts should be strained in aid of it.” Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, 399-400 (D.C.1991) (citation omitted). The majority’s holding that the trial judge was required to allow the District to amend its answer to assert a limitations defense awards to the statute of limitations a rank in our hierarchy of values which, in light of the authorities cited, it assuredly does not deserve.
In the present case, the District makes no claim that it could not defend Count II because documents had been lost or because memories had faded. On the contrary, any such documents or memories would also have been relevant, at least, to Count I, which the District would have had to defend even if Count II had been dismissed. The District had also received pre-suit notice of the claim pursuant to D.C.Code § 12-309 (1995). It suffered no prejudice to its ability to contest the merits.
It is true, as Judge Terry observes, that pleadings are to be construed so as to do justice, see Super.Ct.Civ.R. 8(f), and that Rule 8(f) has been “consistently interpreted to reflect ‘a preference for resolution of disputes on the merits, not on technicalities of pleading.’” See maj. op. at 60 (citations omitted). In fact, however, the jury has decided this dispute on the merits, and it is the District that now insists that the complaint be dismissed on technical grounds.
Basically, the District is asking that its own technical error be excused so that it can belatedly assert a technical defect in the plaintiffs case; Tinker is to bear the consequences of his untimeliness, says the District, but the District’s own tardiness should be overlooked. By this double standard, the District seeks to escape the results of an impartial tribunal’s resolution of the substantive controversy between the parties. But disposition of litigation on the basis of counsel’s technical errors and omissions is a two-edged sword, and this is the kind of case in which those who live by such a sword should die by it.
III.
THE ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
The trial judge’s second reason for denying the District’s motion to amend was that “the length of delay [was] truly inexcusable.” She explained that “[t]hese kinds of technical defenses are of great benefit to ... governmental defendants, in terms of avoiding the expense of litigation and in light of the volume of litigation in this particular area.” Judge Terry asserts that “whether the delay was excusable or inexcusable is really beside the *74point.” Maj. op. at 61. This perception of “the point” is, in my view, unduly constricted.
“It is the responsibility of the trial court, when exercising its discretion, to fashion a ruling by balancing a variety of factors.” Gordon, supra, 462 A.2d at 13. The court should consider, inter alia, “the orderly administration of justice” and the adverse effects thereon of the moving party’s requests. Id. at 13.3 Although the trial judge did not expressly articulate her reasoning in terms of the administration of justice, her reference to the length of the delay and to the expense of litigation came very close to the point which the court was making in Gordon. If a litigant, and especially an experienced institutional litigant like the District,4 is permitted to defer the assertion of a limitations defense until after there has been discovery with respect to the allegedly time-barred claims, then the costs of litigation will be significantly increased, and judicial effectiveness in administering crowded dockets will be compromised.
“If the defense [of the statute of limitations] lurks in the case, vacillation can cause the other party irreparable injury.” Strauss v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 404 F.2d 1152, 1155 (2d Cir.1968); accord, Whitener, supra, 505 A.2d at 460 (quoting Strauss). By the same token, such vacillation can complicate and prolong the proceedings, to the prejudice of sound judicial administration, and the “risk of substantial prejudice increases in proportion to the length of [the] defendant’s delay in seeking the amendment.” Strauss, supra, 404 F.2d at 1155.
If the trial judge had permitted the District to amend its answer, then Counts I and III would necessarily have been taken off the back burner, and the judge would have had to act on Tinker’s alternative request for leave to name an expert witness and for extension of discovery. In light of the stipulation of the parties and Tinker’s right to rely on it — a right which the trial court expressly recognized — equitable considerations would have required the judge to give favorable consideration to Tinker’s request, and probably to grant it. Although discovery was complete, the judge would have had to reopen it. This would have meant more expense and delay, to the prejudice of orderly judicial administration. A ruling in favor of the District would thus have “prejudiced not only the [plaintiff] but also the ability of other persons — persons [who] are doing what is necessary to follow the rules — to utilize the system.” Perry v. Sera, 623 A.2d 1210, 1219 (D.C.1993). The trial judge’s ruling was laudably designed, in part, “to alleviate some of the languor which often plagues the civil calendar.” Id. at 1219 n. 23 (quoting Solomon v. Fairfax Village Condominium IV Unit Owner’s Ass’n, 621 A.2d 378, 379-80 (D.C.1993)).
IV.
THE STIPULATION
The trial judge also concluded that
the defendant has impliedly waived [the limitations] defense because the District took the affirmative step of joining with the plaintiff in filing a stipulation that speaks directly to how the parties will proceed on this count in the complaint. On January 24, 1992, the parties filed a[s]tipulation, in which counsel specifically agreed that “at the trial of the above captioned ease the issue of excessive force is one within the [ken] of the jury and will not be presented through expert testimony by either the plaintiff or the defendant.”
*75The District asserts in regard to the finding of waiver that “[i]t is difficult to fathom the trial court’s reasoning.” According to the District, “[t]he stipulation that permitted both parties to dispense with expert witnesses with respect to the question of excessive force had absolutely nothing to do with the statute of limitations.” I find the District’s analysis most unpersuasive.
If, as the District now asserts, all of Tinker’s excessive force claims were subject to dismissal under the one-year statute of limitations, then the stipulation was patently superfluous. Indeed, it would serve no purpose to enter a stipulation regarding the manner in which specified claims are to be tried if those claims are time-barred. By signing the stipulation, the District was representing, at least implicitly, that the excessive force claims were to be decided on their merits during the trial. Such a representation would be absurd with respect to a time-barred claim, and the stipulation thus conveyed the message that the claims were timely. When the District subsequently moved to amend its answer and to dismiss Count II, it was asserting the exact opposite of the prior message implied by the stipulation.
The trial judge found that Tinker was “equitably entitled to rely upon the impact of this stipulation.” I agree. A litigant’s change of mind obviously does not preclude the granting of leave to amend in every situation, but the District should not readily be permitted to change course so dramatically where discovery was complete, and where, as here, Tinker had set his litigation strategy in reliance on the District’s original position.5
V.
WHITENER
The District places heavy reliance on our decision in Whitener. That case, in my opinion, provides scant support for the District’s position.
The question presented in Whitener was whether WMATA’s failure to raise the statute of limitations in its answer constituted a waiver of that defense. The trial judge granted WMATA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, in which WMATA did raise a limitations defense. This court affirmed “[b]ecause appellants made no showing of prejudice, and the record disclose[d] none.” 505 A.2d at 457. We relied on “the same type of ‘prejudice’ standard [trial] courts regularly employ in determining whether to permit amendments to pleadings.” Id. at 459 (quoting LaPorte v. R.D. Werner Co., 561 F.Supp. 189, 191 (N.D.Ill.1983)).
There is a critical and, to me, dispositive difference between Whitener and the present case. In Whitener, the trial judge had found that the belated assertion .of a limitations defense would cause no prejudice, and she therefore permitted WMATA to assert that defense notwithstanding WMATA’s failure to include it in its answer. In the present case, on the other hand, the trial judge found that the introduction of such a defense after discovery had been completed would cause prejudice to the plaintiff, and she denied the District’s motion for leave to amend. Because, absent clear abuse or legal error, the disposition of a motion for leave to amend a pleading is basically the trial judge’s call, Gordon, supra, 462 A.2d at 13, the deferential standard which I have described in Part I of this opinion dictated affirmance both in Whitener and in this case. Moreover, in the present case, the parties had effectively stipulated that the excessive force claims would be presented to the jury, and there was no comparable stipulation in Whitener.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Because he was led to believe that the “excessive force” claims were properly in the case, Tinker found it unnecessary to proceed to trial on those counts of his complaint for which he would have had to retain an expert witness. Apparently in reliance on the stipulation — reliance which the trial judge found to be altogether justified — Tinker did not *76name an expert witness or otherwise prepare for trial on those counts, and he subsequently dismissed them in reliance on the trial judge’s order. Tinker now having obtained a substantial jury verdict, the District insists, and my colleagues hold, that the claim on which he went to trial is time-barred. If we were to accept the District’s position in its entirety, then Tinker would now find himself in a trap, for the claims that he dismissed in reliance on the stipulation and the trial court’s ruling would also be time-barred and it would be far too late to resuscitate them.
To me, the result for which the District contends is most inequitable. To paraphrase a passage from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 83 S.Ct. 283, 9 L.Ed.2d 261 (1962) (per curiam):
In view of the obvious great hardship to a party who relies upon the trial judge’s finding of [prejudice] and then suffers reversal of the finding, it should be given great deference by the reviewing court. Whatever the proper result as an initial matter on the facts here, the record contains a showing of unique circumstances sufficient that the Court of Appeals ought not to have disturbed the motion judge’s ruling.
Id. at 217, 83 S.Ct. at 285. My colleagues have alleviated the injustice which would flow from the District’s position by returning the parties to the status quo ante, and by thus effectively reinstating the dismissed claims. Tinker is now faced, however, with the Herculean task of resuscitating a case which the passage of time has rendered very stale indeed.
The jury’s verdict established that Tinker was gravely abused and mistreated by officers sworn to uphold the law. I have described the way in which the District’s change of course, after Tinker had relied on the District’s original position, effectively did him in. Ironically, the District probably finds itself better off today than it would have been if it had asserted the limitations defense in the first place, for at that time Tinker could have presented a fresh case on Counts I and III. Now, as a result of the District’s error, Tinker will instead have to try to reassemble an ancient one.
I respectfully dissent.6
. Count III was the medical negligence count.
. The trial judge’s subsequent denial of the District’s motion for leave to amend the answer reinforced the assessment that expert testimony would not be needed, and Tinker thereafter dismissed all of his claims except Count II. See Part II B, infra.
. The assertion that “the only issue here is whether the delay resulted in prejudice to the opposing party," maj. op. at 61 (emphasis added), overstates the case and cannot be reconciled with Gordon. See also 3 James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 15.08[4], at 15-69 to 15-75 & nn. 6-11 (2d ed. 1996) (enumerating common reasons for denying leave to amend, but explaining that "[t]hese reasons are, of course, not exhaustive.”).
. In this case, as in Faith v. Texaco, Inc., 48 F.R.D. 118 (W.D.Mich.1969), it is significant that the District was “in a position from the date of the filing of the complaint to explore and determine promptly all of the essentials of any defense of the statute of limitations." Id. at 121. I agree with Judge Belson, however, that the District should be held to the same standard of pleading as any other litigant, no higher, as he points out, but also no lower. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wical Ltd. Partnership, 630 A.2d 174, 183 (D.C.1993).
. "The kind of barristerial about-face which characterizes this case finds little favor in the courts.” In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 9 (D.C.1997) (quoting B.J.P. v. R.W.P., 637 A.2d 74, 78 (D.C.1994)).
. Because, in my judgment, the trial court's order denying the District's motion for leave to amend its answer ought to be sustained, I do not think it necessary for the court (or for me) to reach any other issues. For the reasons stated below, however, I am not as convinced as my colleagues are that Count II of the complaint— the sole count that went to trial — is time-barred in its entirety.
In paragraph 9 of the complaint, which is the lead paragraph of Count II, Tinker "adopts and incorporates by reference herein each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Count I." In paragraph 5, one of the paragraphs incorporated into Count II by reference, Tinker alleges that the police officers
failed to properly follow normal and accepted police practices and procedures, used excessive force in effectuating the arrest of the [pllaintiff, Joseph E. Tinker, did not respond properly to the situation as it existed, failed to react in a proper manner; violated the [p]lain-tiff's civil rights; and otherwise abused the [pllaintiff, Joseph E. Tinker.
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted). The complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Vincent v. Anderson, 621 A.2d 367, 372 (D.C.1993). Moreover, “[i]f there is any reasonable doubt in a statute of limitations problem, the court will resolve the question in favor of the complaint standing and against the challenge.” Simpson, supra, 597 A.2d at 401 (quoting Saunders v. Holloway Constr. Co., 724 F.Supp. 640, 642 (W.D.Ark.1989)). Applying these principles to Count II, it would be reasonable to conclude that Tinker has fairly alleged negligence on the part of the officers, as well as intentional assault and battery. If he has, then the three-year statute of limitations apparently applies. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1995). Compare Maddox v. Bano, 422 A.2d 763, 764-65 (D.C.1980), relied on by the District, with Etheredge v. District of Columbia, 635 A.2d 908, 918 (D.C.1993), cited by Tinker.