Retired, Specially Assigned.
I
We consider in these consolidated cases whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in affirming judgments of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City which denied motions filed by Montgomery County to intervene (1) in a class action suit filed on behalf of present and future students of the Baltimore City Public School System by attorneys for the American Civil *178Liberties Union (ACLU), Keith and Stephanie Bradford, and a number of other individuals (collectively the Bradford plaintiffs or the Bradford case); named as defendants were the State Board of Education and several State officials; and (2) a declaratory judgment action filed by the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City against the State Board of Education (the City case). The main thrust of each action was to obtain a declaratory decree that the Baltimore City public school students were deprived of their rights to at least the minimum quality of education mandated by Article VIII, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution which provides:
The General Assembly, at its First Session after the adoption of this Constitution, shall by Law establish throughout the State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools; and shall provide by taxation, or otherwise, for their maintenance.
A
The Bradford complaint alleged that the State was responsible for a number of educational deficiencies in the Baltimore public school system due to various economic, social, and educational factors peculiar to Baltimore City, as a result of which the public school students in the City will be unable to obtain an adequate education as guaranteed by the Maryland Constitution. In this regard, the complaint referred to the high incidence of Baltimore City public school students who live in poverty, many of whom live in households with fewer than two parents; that many of the students’ parents are not high school graduates and they are unemployed, and are homeless or pregnant; live under the threat of violence; have been held back in school; score more than one year below grade level on standardized testing measures; or have otherwise been determined to be in need of remedial education.
According to the allegations of the complaint, these children are most susceptible to the harmful effects of an inadequate education and are thus “at-risk” students. The complaint emphasized the lack of adequate education that these students *179are receiving by citing unsatisfactory compliance with State Board of Education standards as codified in the Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR), Title 13A. In particular, the complaint focuses attention on the poor performance of these students on State outcome tests, low student attendance resulting from an inordinately excessive absenteeism, and extremely high dropout rates (six times higher than the State Board’s “satisfactory standard”). The complaint also referred to a lack of preparation for higher education (only 30% of the students who graduate from Baltimore City high schools had completed minimum course requirements that would qualify them for admission to the University of Maryland system). It also referred to inadequate educational resources far short of the standard for an adequate education and to a far greater extent than any other school district in Maryland.
As to these allegations of inadequate educational resources, the complaint referred to “standards” promulgated by the State Board of Education relative to the resources that a school district should provide to students to satisfy the requirement of receiving a constitutionally adequate education. Specifically, the complaint averred that Baltimore City public schools had one of the highest student-to-teacher ratios in Maryland and that fewer than 1% of the Baltimore City public schools had the required number of libraries staffed to adequately serve the students.
In its prayers for relief, the complaint disavowed seeking to reduce or reallocate educational resources currently provided to any other school district in Maryland; rather it sought to secure access to an adequate education for the children attending the public schools in Baltimore City. The complaint sought a declaration that the State had failed to fulfill its constitutional obligation to provide a system of public schools adequate to meet the needs of school children in Baltimore City public schools. The Bradford plaintiffs sought a court order requiring the State to work with the plaintiffs and Baltimore City to improve the City’s public schools so that they provide an adequate education in conformance with contemporary educational standards; and to further order the *180State to take all steps necessary to implement an educational improvement plan which would result in providing an adequate education to the public school children in Baltimore City.
On January 25, 1995, Montgomery County, Maryland, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-214, moved to intervene in the class action suit either - as a matter of right or permissively. That rule provides as follows:
(a) Of Right.—Upon timely motion, a person shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when the person has an unconditional right to intervene as a matter of law; or (2) when the person claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and the person is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the ability to protect that interest unless it is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive. -
(1) Generally.—Upon timely motion a person may be permitted to intervene in an action when the person’s claim or defense has a question of law or fact in common with the action.
In its motion, Montgomery County acknowledged that the Bradford complaint did not directly attack the constitutionality of the system of public school funding which we upheld in Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983). That case involved a challenge by several fiscally distressed school districts, including Baltimore City, to the constitutionality of Maryland statutes under both the Maryland Constitution (Article VIII, § 1) and the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution with respect to the system of financing public elementary and secondary schools in Maryland’s twenty-four school districts. We there noted that the Maryland public school system is primarily financed by a combination of State and local tax revenues under a per pupil equalization formula whereby the State, in its distribution of financial aid to local public school systems, provides *181greater amounts to jurisdictions having more limited local resources than to those having greater local resources. Hornbeck thus focused in particular upon the existence of wide disparities in taxable wealth among the various school districts, and the effect of those differences upon the fiscal capacity of the poorer districts to provide their students with educational offerings and resources comparable to those of the more affluent school districts. While Hornbeck teaches that the Maryland constitutional provision does not mandate uniformity in per pupil funding or require that the system operate uniformly in every school district, it does require that the General Assembly establish a Statewide system to provide an adequate public school education to the children in every school district. As Hornbeck recognizes, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d 758, Maryland has established “comprehensive Statewide qualitative standards governing all facets of the educational process in the State’s public elementary and secondary schools.” Wfliere, however, these standards “failed to make provision for an adequate education,” or the State’s school financing system “did not provide all school districts with the means essential to provide the basic education contemplated by § 1 of Article VIII, when measured by contemporary educational standards, a constitutional violation may be evident. But “[sjimply to show that the educational resources available in the poorer school districts are inferior to those in the rich districts does not mean that there is insufficient funding provided by the State’s financing system for all students to obtain an adequate education.” Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d 758.
Montgomery County’s motion to intervene in the Bradford case asserted that if there were to be a finding of a violation of Article VIII, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution, the plaintiffs would view the remedy “as being a vast increase in the commitment of State financial resources to the Baltimore City Public School System, a commitment which already is in excess of that which is made by the State to most other school systems in the State, including that in Montgomery County.” The County further stated in its motion to intervene that “the *182diversion of still additional State resources to Baltimore City would cause a diminution in the resources available to other jurisdictions in the State, including Montgomery County, in the absence of an increase in State taxes which, at the present time, appears unlikely.” Continuing, Montgomery County’s motion to intervene stated that if the plaintiffs were to prevail, Montgomery County, which is responsible for the local funding of its public schools, would be called upon to devote still more revenues from local tax sources for support of its public school system. As a result, Montgomery County urged that it has a “strong interest” in the subject of the suit and is so situated “that disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect that interest unless it is allowed to participate as a party, since it is not adequately represented by existing parties” in the sense contemplated by Maryland Rule 2—214(a)(2). In this regard, Montgomery County alleged that it has a fundamental interest in participating in defining the parameters and components of a constitutionally adequate education in Maryland school districts in a manner that does not adversely affect Montgomery County or its public school system. The case raised other issues which, according to Montgomery County, if decided adversely to it could profoundly affect its own public school system which is largely funded by the County.
The County relied primarily on the provisions of Rule 2-214 and this Court’s decision in Citizens Coordinating Comm. v. TKU, 276 Md. 705, 351 A.2d 133 (1976), a case in which we concluded that under Maryland Rule 208, the predecessor to Rule 2-214, intervention as a matter of right should have been granted.
On February 13, 1995, the Bradford plaintiffs opposed the County’s motion to intervene, stating that the fundamental prerequisite to intervention of right under Rule 2-214 was not satisfied, namely “a direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the action,” i.e., whether the public schoolchildren of Baltimore City are receiving the “thorough and efficient” education guaranteed by the Maryland Constitution. As to this, the plaintiffs asserted that *183Montgomery County impermissibly seeks to intervene by connecting the subject matter of this action with a speculative impact on the County’s local tax burden ... by a leap of faith, not by principles of law.” In arguing that Montgomery County does not qualify for intervention as of right under Rule 2-214(a)(2), they relied primarily on Shenk v. MD. District Savings & Loan, 235 Md. 326, 201 A.2d 498 (1964) and Hartford Ins. Co. v. Birdsong, 69 Md.App. 615, 519 A.2d 219 (1987) for the proposition that the interest asserted by the would-be intervenor may be neither speculative nor contingent.
The defendant State Board of Education also opposed the County’s motion on the ground that the primary issue presented concerns the adequacy of the education of the children of Baltimore City. It says that Montgomery County has no constitutional or statutory obligation with respect to the quality of education that the children of Baltimore City receive and, therefore, have no legal interest in whether that education is constitutionally adequate. Moreover, it posits that Montgomery County’s allegations present “an extremely narrow and hypothetical interest in this case: i.e., money,” which is not the primary subject of the litigation. According to the State Board’s motion:
[T]he primary subject [of the suit] is the adequacy of the education received by the children of Baltimore City, and Montgomery County cannot, and does not, claim any legal interest relating to that subject. Further with respect to money, Montgomery County is not ‘so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the ability to protect’ its interests.
Montgomery County, by a further memorandum filed on March 29,1995, undertook to counter the allegations in opposition to its motion to intervene. In support of its position, it placed reliance on the TKU case, supra, 276 Md. 705, 351 A.2d 133, which it says holds that the intervention rule “merely requires the applicant for intervention [as of right] to show that it might be disadvantaged by the disposition of the action in which it seeks to intervene and that it have an interest for *184the protection of which intervention is essential and not otherwise protected.” (Emphasis in original)
On April 11, 1995, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (Kaplan, J.) denied Montgomery County’s motion to intervene both as of right or on a permissive basis. It said that the sole controversy was whether the children in Baltimore City “were obtaining an adequate education within the meaning of the Maryland Constitution, Article VIII, § 1. As to this, the trial court said:
Whether the children in Montgomery County are getting an appropriate education is not involved in this lawsuit. The only thing that [Montgomery County] ... could be in here for is some prospective loss of funds because there’s only so much in the State pot and if Baltimore City gets more of that State pot, then Montgomery County will get less and so will Kent County and so will Garrett County and so will all of the rest of the twenty three other jurisdictions than Baltimore City.
... I don’t see that as an interest in this particular litigation. It’s some speculative thing that may never occur way down the line.
It said that there are four separate prongs to Rule 2-214: “(1) the application for intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant must have an interest in the subject matter of the action; (3) disposition of the action would at least potentially impair the applicant’s ability to protect its interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by existing parties,” citing Hartford Ins. Co. v. Birdsong, supra, 69 Md.App. at 622, 519 A.2d 219. It said that failure to satisfy any prong warrants denial of a motion to intervene as of right. It said that Montgomery County failed to satisfy the second prong of the test. Montgomery County appealed to the Court of Special Appeals from the trial court’s denial of its motion to *185intervene in the Bradford case.1
B
On September 15, 1995, prior to the decision of the Court of Special Appeals on Montgomery County’s motion to intervene, a second complaint for declaratory judgment was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (the City case). It was filed by the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City against the State Board of Education, and the State Superintendent of Schools, alleging, as in the Bradford case, that students in the Baltimore City public schools (not limited to “at-risk” students) were being deprived of their right to an adequate education in violation of the Maryland Constitution, Article VIII, § 1, and sought by way of relief that the State provide a constitutionally adequate education to these students.2 Montgomery County moved to intervene in this case on the same grounds as it set forth in the Bradford case.
C
On October 20, 1995, a Third Party Complaint was filed in the Bradford case by the State Board of Education, members of the Board in their official capacities, and the State Superintendent of Schools against the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City and the Superintendent of Public Instruction of Baltimore City. This complaint alleged that the public schools of Baltimore City were grossly mismanaged in that, among other things, the defendants refused to implement the recommendations of various study groups, failed to access and expend funds available to it, and refused to avail itself of fiscal and technical assistance offered by the State to meet State standards and rectify other deficiencies. The Third Party Complaint sought an order directing the City school manage*186ment to substantially restructure the Baltimore City Public School System to correct the claimed deficiencies.
D
On February 14, 1996, the Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City denying the County’s motion to intervene in the Bradford case. In doing so, it rejected Montgomery County’s argument that to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 2-214(a), it simply needed to show an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and aver that, absent intervention, it “may be disadvantaged” in that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair its ability to protect its interest. The court said that the “may be disadvantaged” prong was “just one aspect to the rule governing intervening as a matter of right.” To otherwise conclude, the court said, would be “an extremely myopic reading of the rule and relevant case law.” Noting that the cases relied upon by Montgomery County—TKU and Board of Trustees v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 562 A.2d 720 (1989)—did not support the County’s position, it stated that the mere finding that a party “may be disadvantaged” does not automatically give rise to a right to intervene.
In making the determination whether the trial court properly concluded that Montgomery County has no legal interest in the subject matter of the present case, the intermediate appellate court looked to its decision in Birdsong, supra, where it said that “in order to be a ground for intervention, the interest asserted must be one which it is essential to protect and which is not otherwise protected and thus, the interest asserted could not be “merely speculative [but] rather it must be a ‘direct, significant legally protectable interest’ to support the claim of intervention as of right.” 69 Md.App. at 626-628, 519 A.2d 219. (Emphasis added.)
The court rejected the contention that because Montgomery County also has children “at-risk” it must be allowed to *187participate in a trial that determines the level of education that should be supplied to an “at-risk” child. It reasoned that if Montgomery County is concerned with its “at-risk” children and believes that the State is not supplying them with a constitutionally guaranteed adequate education, it can bring its own suit against the State. In this regard, it recognized that the Bradford complaint is extremely fact-specific and focuses solely on the children in the Baltimore City public school system.
Responsive to another Montgomery County contention, the court said that the resolution of this case will not necessarily establish a mandated level of education that must be supplied to children throughout the State, as that is a matter for the legislature which must give content to the term “adequate.” Because of this, the court concluded that the simple contention that the County has “at-risk” children does not reach the necessary threshold level to permit it to intervene as a matter of right.
Nor did the court find any merit in the County’s contention that it is entitled to intervene as a matter of right where the relief requested, if granted, is likely to require increased Montgomery County resources and taxes. It said that the Bradford plaintiffs are not seeking a redistribution of State assets as was true in Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., supra, nor is it asking for a restructuring of its finance system as the plaintiffs in Hornbeck were asserting. None of the Montgomery County prayers for relief, the court said, rose to the level required to satisfy the County’s request for intervention as of right. The court explained that it was pure speculation that should the relief requested be given, it would place any burden on Montgomery County, noting that suppositions and innuendo do not form a basis to support a party seeking to intervene in a case as a matter of right.
The court found no merit in the County’s further assertion that it was entitled to intervention as of right because of its interest in protecting State and local shared responsibility for funding and managing public education in the State. As to *188this, the court said that there are no allegations in the complaint that challenged the statewide system of local control. It simply alleges that the children in the Baltimore City public schools are not afforded their right to a constitutionally guaranteed adequate education. Continuing the court said that a resolution of that issue will not result in an overhaul of the entire State system of local management. By way of further explanation, the court said that the only system that could possibly be affected and is in danger of losing management control is Baltimore City. The court continued by stating that because Montgomery County has no significant legal interest in whether the children of Baltimore City are receiving an adequate education, Montgomery County’s motion to intervene as a matter of right was properly denied in the Bradford case.3
E
After Montgomery County’s motion to intervene in the City case was denied for the same reasons as in the Bradford case, we were presented with two questions for appellate review common to both the Bradford and City cases, namely:
1. Whether the “essentiality of interest” test for intervening as of right adopted by the Court of Special Appeals in Birdsong should be overruled or its application to the case be reversed on the basis that it is inconsistent with this Court’s ruling in the TKU case.
2. Whether Montgomery County should have been permitted to intervene in both cases where the relief requested, if granted, would result in substantial additional financial burdens on the County in the funding of its local education system and the possible elimination of shared State and local responsibility for public education in Maryland.
*189F
Subsequently, on October 18, 1996, prior to oral argument of the cases before us, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted the motion of the Bradford plaintiffs for partial summary judgment, concluding that the Maryland Constitution, Article VIII, § 1, requires the State to provide a thorough and efficient system of free public schools in order that all students in Maryland public schools be provided with a constitutionally adequate education. In its order, the circuit court said that “based on the evidence submitted by the parties, there was no genuine material factual dispute that the public schoolchildren in Baltimore City were not being provided with an education that is adequate when measured by contemporary educational standards. The court stated in its order, however, that there is “a genuine dispute regarding the cause of the inadequate education provided to students in Baltimore City public schools and the liability therefor.”
G
On November 12, 1996, in a “Joint News Release,” the parties announced that they had reached a written agreement to settle the cases without trial. The Release stated that the agreement included a commitment to provide “substantial additional State funding in the amount of $254,000,000 over a five-year period for the City public schools through the year 2002, the funding being combined with management and additional reforms [to include] a consent decree” entered by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City by agreement of the parties, all for the purpose of improving student achievement. First year State funding required a $30,000,000 State appropriation in fiscal 1998, $50,000,000 in each of fiscal years 1999 and 2000, and at least $50,000,000 each in years 2001 and 2002, as well as $24,000,000 for school construction. The agreement called for a “New,” Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City, selected jointly by the Mayor and the Governor from a list of names proposed by the State Board of Education. The new School Commissioners would select a Chief Executive Officer *190for the City schools who would select a management team, including a Chief Academic Officer and a Chief Fiscal Officer. The new Board, under the agreement, would be required to forge a master plan for improvement of the City schools, to include protecting the rights of City schoolchildren receiving special education under federal court orders by integrating the special education service into the new management structure of the City school system.4 The Release characterized the parties’ agreement as a “partnership” between the State and the City to create new management with increased resources. The agreement noted the entry of the partial summary judgment in the Bradford case based on the violation of the Maryland Constitution, Article VIII, § 1 as to the Baltimore City public schools. At the same time, it pointed out that the cause for the failure of the City Public School System to provide the required constitutionally adequate education remained undetermined.
Consistent with the Joint News Release, a twenty-five-page Consent Decree was entered by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on November 26, 1996, signed by each of the parties in the Bradford and City cases. It noted the parties’ agreement that $254,000,000 of State funds “shall be provided” to the Baltimore City public schools over a five-year period. The Consent Decree, by its terms, specified that it would not become fully effective until “(a) the Governor signs the partnership legislation in a form that does not affect the substantive rights of the parties established by this Decree, and (b) the State Budget for FY 1998 is approved with the additional funds for FY 1998____” The Consent Decree further specified that if these contingencies have not occurred by May 1, 1997, the Consent Decree “shall be null and void” and trial of the cases would proceed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on May 7, 1997. The Consent Decree incorporated a proposed twenty-page legislative enactment conforming with *191and in implementation of the provisions of the Joint News Release. It provided that if the “partnership legislation” is enacted with any variance from the proposed measures, the parties may waive the variances in writing. It further provided that if any variance is not waived in writing, any party may file a motion with the court, within a specified time limit, “seeking a determination whether the variance affects the party’s substantive rights under the [Consent] Decree.” It was also specified that if the General Assembly revises or modifies the “partnership legislation after the 1997 Legislative Session and before the expiration of the Consent Decree, all parties reserve the right to challenge any variance.”
By its further terms, the consent Decree “shall be in effect through June 30, 2002 unless the Court extends the term upon timely motion of one of the parties and upon a showing of good cause to extend the Decree.” Finally, the Consent Decree provided that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City would retain “continuing jurisdiction during the term of this Decree to monitor and to enforce compliance” with its provisions; and that any party to the Decree may seek to enforce its terms but that notwithstanding termination of the Decree, the circuit court would retain jurisdiction to resolve any dispute that may have arisen during the terms of this Decree.
On December 9, 1996, after full briefing by the parties, we heard oral argument of Montgomery County’s challenge to the denial of its intervention motions in the Bradford and City cases.
II
The parties disagree as to the correct legal standard governing the applicability of the provisions of Rule 2-214(a), (which as amended we adopted in 1984) to the cases now before us. It is, therefore, necessary that we carefully consider the import of the cases relied upon by each side. In this regard, we again note that the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals in Birdsong, upon which the plaintiffs place primary reliance, was decided in 1987 under present Rule 2-214(a); *192while Montgomery County places principal reliance upon TKU, decided in 1976 under the provisions of former Maryland Rule 208(a). That Rule provided that upon timely application a person shall be permitted to intervene as a matter of right in an action “(a) where the representation of the applicant’s interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action. ” (Emphasis added.) In TKU, we observed that the language of then governing Rule 208(a) was identical to Fed. R.Civ.P. 24 (hereafter, the Federal Rule) as it stood prior to 1966. 276 Md. at 710-711, 351 A.2d 133. We observed in TKU that by that time “a division of authority had emerged in the reported federal decision regarding the requirement that the applicant for intervention “is or may be bound by a judgment in the action.” Id. We noted that most cases deciding the question interpreted the word “bound,” as used in the Federal Rule, narrowly in requiring a showing that the judgment would have a res judicata effect upon the would-be intervenor. Id. But we recognized that a “stubborn minority” clung to the view “that a more utilitarian and realistic interpretation should be applied, permitting intervention whenever a judgment would put the applicant at a practical disadvantage in his own litigation or would substantially affect the would-be intervenor’s ability to protect his interest.” Id.5 We further observed in TKU that with “an obvious view to the minority position, the 1966 amendment to Federal Rule 24 changed the intervention as of right test to permit intervention “when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.” Id. We also opined that the primary purpose of the 1966 amendment to the provisions of then Federal Rule 24 “was to relax the test for intervention of right by replacing the *193‘res judicata rule’ "with the less onerous one requiring the applicant merely to show that he might be disadvantaged by the disposition of the action in which he had sought to intervene.” Id. at 711, 351 A.2d 133. (Emphasis added.) We next said that “the requirement which we imposed upon the applicant for intervention under [then] Rule 208(a) is that he have an interest for the protection of which intervention is essential and which is not otherwise protected,” citing our 1964 one-page opinion in Shenk, supra, 235 Md. at 327, 201 A.2d 498. Id. at 712, 351 A.2d 133. We added the further statement that “[T]his standard is wholly compatible with the current language of Federal Rule 24,” and that the federal cases defining Rule 24 “continue to serve as a guide to our interpretation of Rule 208(a).” Id. at 712, 351 A.2d 133. In sum, we concluded in TKU that whether the applicant for intervention “has an interest which it is essential to protect may be equated with the requirement of Rule 208(a) that he ‘is or may be bound by a judgment in the action.’ ” Id. We concluded on the facts in TKU, in permitting intervention as of right, that the case was one dealing “with a transaction in which appellants claim an interest [which] may as a practical matter impair or impede their ability to protect that interest.” Id. at 713, 351 A.2d 133.
In Board of Trustees v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 562 A.2d 720 (1989), an intervention of right case decided under present Rule 2-214(a), we pointed out that “to show that the disposition of an action may as a practical matter impair or impede ... [the applicant’s] ability to protect his interest” requires that the applicant “merely show that he might be disadvantaged by the disposition of the action in which he sought to intervene ... [and] need not make the additional showing that the disposition of that action would be res judicata as to him.” Id. at 89, n. 19, 562 A.2d 720.
In Shenk, decided in 1964 under former Rule 208(a), the would-be intervener was a free shareholder in a savings and loan association which was placed in receivership; she sought to intervene as a matter of right in the receivership proceedings in order to be “kept informed” in the event that “some *194future aspect of the proceedings affect[ed] her interests adversely.” Id. We there said that under Maryland law “a person not a party will not be permitted to intervene in litigation unless he has an interest which it is essential to protect and which is not otherwise protected.” 235 Md. at 327, 201 A.2d 498. In denying intervention, we said that her interest was “merely speculative and affords no present basis upon which to become a party to the proceedings” under then Rule 208(a).
The Birdsong intervention case focused on the provisions of Rule 2-214(a) that a person seeking to intervene as of right must claim “an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action.” 69 Md.App. at 626, 519 A.2d 219. The court said that in order to be a ground for intervention, “the interest asserted must be one which it is essential to protect and which is not otherwise protected,” citing TKU, 276 Md. at 712, 351 A.2d 133, (Emphasis added.); Shenk, 235 Md. at 327, 201 A.2d 498, and Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 518, 91 S.Ct. 534, 536, 27 L.Ed.2d 580 (1971), the latter case holding that the interest contemplated by the Federal intervention rule, which was virtually identical to Maryland Rule 2-214(a), is a “significantly protectable interest.” Id. at 626, 519 A.2d 219. The court in Birdsong found that the asserted interest was insufficient to warrant intervention. The argument in favor of intervention, the court said, was “predicated on the possible occurrence of two events”: an award of damages against a defendant and an attempt to enforce such an award against an insurance company. Id. at 628, 519 A.2d 219. The court recognized that while there may be some substance to the insurer’s fears concerning these events, they were “merely speculative” and afforded no present basis upon which to become a party to the proceedings. Id. The insurer’s interest in the outcome of the trial on the issue of damages was said by the court to be “a contingent interest rather then the ‘direct, significant legally practicable interest’ required for intervention as of right.” Id.
*195Ill
In undertaking to convince us that both the trial court and Court of Special Appeals erred in rejecting its motions to intervene in the Bradford and City cases, Montgomery County asserts that it is the most populous county in Maryland and ranks behind only Baltimore City and Prince George’s County in the number of “at-risk” students within its borders. It says that it serves as the principal source of funding for the Montgomery County public school system and that because of the impact of existing “equalization” of State funding, it provides 77% of the operating revenues of its school system, while Baltimore City provides approximately 29% to operate its school system. The County suggests that any significant increase in overall State education funds being unlikely, the only realistic way to devote substantial additional financial resources to the Baltimore City public school system would be by the use of a still steeper equalization formula which would further reduce already scarce State funds for the Montgomery County schools, and thereby cause an increase in the County’s local support obligations.
At stake in these cases, according to the County, is a determination of what constitutes an adequate education, not merely in Baltimore City, but in every school district in the State. It therefore claims a direct interest in a court ruling that potentially could affect the nature, extent and costs of the instructional program which it is required to fund, particularly so in connection with “at-risk” children. As to these “at-risk” children, Montgomery County posits that they generally create a greater demand for social, medical and police services than do other children, and their circumstances outside the classroom may impede their ability to benefit fully from a basic or adequate education. Moreover, the County maintains that any court decision that construed Article VIII, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution to obligate boards of education to provide otherwise discretionary social, medical or police services to “at-risk” children would have immense financial consequences to Montgomery County. These burdens, the County suggests, would result not only from the indirect impact that *196such costs would have in Montgomery County, but also directly in Montgomery County due to its large population of “at-risk” children.
The County next refers to its long history of supporting public education and describes how it has provided more than a basic or adequate education to its students in accordance with its “local policy prerogative that it desires to preserve.” As to this, it says that its ability to fulfill its role as the largest source of funding for an adequate education, or for any enhancements thereof, could be threatened if it were required to enhance substantially its local contribution in order that other jurisdictions might have greater State funds or dramatically increase services provided directly to the large number of “at-risk” children presently within its school system.
The County argues that both lower courts applied an overly restrictive standard for intervention which is inconsistent with this Court’s TKU case. But, says the County, under either the TKU standard or the more restrictive Birdsong standard, the County’s interests were sufficient to entitle it to intervene as a matter of right.
The County argues that it has satisfied all the requirements of Rule 2-214(a), including that it has claimed an interest relating to the subject of the action and has demonstrated that disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the ability to protect that interest.
Montgomery County further maintains that with its own high number of “at-risk” students, it has obvious concerns and interest over the impact upon its local funding obligations that would ensue if steeper equalization were required to fund increased revenue requirements of other school systems. Moreover, the County expresses concern that if minimum constitutional standards for the education of “at-risk” children were set at an unnecessarily high level, there would be a direct and immediate impact on Montgomery County, not just due to increased costs in Baltimore City but also due to increased costs of its own in the furnishing of an adequate education to the large population of “at-risk” children within its own borders. In this regard, Montgomery County sees as *197a fundamental issue “the degree to which the command for a ‘thorough and efficient system of free public schools’ encompasses the furnishing of social and other services.” In this connection, the County poses the question whether an adequate education becomes constitutionally inadequate if there is a failure of other agencies to provide discretionary social, medical or police services.
The County thus claims that a decision in the Bradford and City cases could seriously impact funding requirements of the public school system that Montgomery County is required by law to support. The County contends that its financial obligation for the support of its local public school system has increased dramatically over the past decade while the State’s share has declined. As a result, the County says that it has a vital interest in preserving State funding levels and avoiding further unnecessary erosion. Accordingly, the County takes the position that it has a direct interest in any court decision that would establish the level of resources that constitutionally must be devoted to a large segment of the student population within its own borders. And should the court find a constitutional violation, the County contends that it would have a concrete interest in the remedies that the court might fashion; these remedies could include elimination or alteration of the traditional shared responsibility for the funding and operating of local public school systems.
In sum, Montgomery County urges that its intervention motions should have been granted under Rule 2-214(a) in that (1) they were timely filed, (2) the County had a clear interest in the subject of the actions, i.e., determination of the level of education constitutionally required for children generally, including “at-risk” children, and that (3) disposition of the actions, as a practical matter, might impair or impede its ability to protect that interest, and (4) the representation by existing parties was not adequate.
IV
The phrases “essential to protect,” “essentiality of interest,” and “might be disadvantaged,” used in some of our *198cases in describing components of the provisions of Rule 2-214(a), do not of themselves constitute the legal standard to be applied in determining whether intervention of right was properly denied in these cases; it thus bears emphasis that Montgomery County’s motions to intervene as of right in these cases as a party defendant under Rule 2-214(a) requires that it carry the burden of establishing “an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action,” and further establish that it is “so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the ability to protect that interest.” The “transaction” in these cases, i.e. the two lawsuits, is limited in scope to the plaintiffs’ claim that the State has failed to provide the requisite resources and services to the Baltimore City public schoolchildren necessary to fulfill its constitutional obligation to provide these students with an adequate education in conformity with contemporary educational standards. While the plaintiffs acknowledge that mismanagement of the available resources by the City’s public schools may be partially to blame, they say that the State is legally responsible as well for any such mismanagement.
We are in basic agreement with the Bradford and City cases plaintiffs’ conclusion that Montgomery County’s “concerns” with the relief prayed in their cases is insufficient to bring its intervention motions within the ambit of Rule 2-214(a)(2). We find no basis for Montgomery County’s intervention on the ground that should the plaintiffs prevail in their lawsuits, the State will reduce the County’s share of State funding for its own schools in order to finance ordered improvements to the Baltimore City school system. The County’s further concern that it will also be compelled to increase local property taxes to make up the shortfall is both remote and speculative and affords no ground for intervention as of right. Indeed, any impact on the County is contingent upon the happening of those uncertain and speculative events, and none would follow automatically from a judgment for the plaintiffs in these cases. In this regard, we share the plaintiffs’ view that a judgment in their favor will not automatically or necessarily result in any *199of Maryland’s current public school funding resources being diverted from their current uses to provide additional funding for the City’s public schools. Moreover, the concern expressed by the County in this regard, namely that it may at some time in the future have an effect on its share of the State’s education budget, or its tax burden, is far too remote and indefinite to justify intervention under Rule 2-214(a).
Nor is there any merit in Montgomery County’s further contention that it has a protectable legal interest in avoiding the potential impact that a ruling in plaintiffs’ favor would have on its own population of “at-risk” schoolchildren. In this connection, the County maintains that should the plaintiffs be successful in persuading the court that “at-risk” children in Baltimore City public schools require enhanced educational resources and services pursuant to Article VIII, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution, then at some later time the County, at considerable additional expense, may be required to supplement the resources which it currently provides to its own “at-risk” schoolchildren.
As to this, the County’s concerns are indirect, remote, and speculative; they do not focus directly on the “transaction” involved in these cases, viz, whether the plaintiffs’ actions, directed, as they are, solely to the constitutional adequacy of the education provided to children in the Baltimore City public schools, implicates Montgomery County’s legal interest in any way which would give it a right to intervene in these cases under Rule 2-214(a). Were it otherwise, according to the plaintiffs, and that was all that was needed to establish a right to intervene, then any applicants’ generalized interest in participating in the formulation of a constitutional standard, to which the person may be subjected, could intervene as a party from which an interpretation of a constitutional provision might emerge. We share the plaintiffs’ position on this issue.
The significant legally protectable interest which Montgomery County next claims to support its intervention motions derives from its concern that disposition of the Bradford and City cases might result in a transformation of the *200current State-local educational financing scheme. As to this, the plaintiffs say, and we agree, that the County’s position is based on supposition and speculation, and there is nothing in the relief sought in these complaints that seeks a general overhaul of the entire system of local management.
V
The cases before us involve nothing more than Montgomery County’s motion to intervene and we do not therefore consider the merits of the underlying cases. At the time these motions were decided by the trial court and by the Court of Special Appeals, the parties had not entered into an agreement to settle the cases without trial. Nor at that time had a consent decree been entered by the circuit court with the approval of all parties to the case. The Decree incorporated a proposed legislative enactment for approval by the General Assembly; it called for a State appropriation of $254,000,000 over a five-year period with initial funding in fiscal year 1998 of $30,000,-000. The Governor included first-year funding for this project in his 1998 fiscal year proposed budget. The proposed legislative enactment was introduced in the General Assembly as Emergency HB 312 in January, 1997, and no action has yet to be taken on the measure. The partial summary judgment entered by the circuit court on October 18, 1996 to the effect that the schoolchildren in Baltimore City were in fact denied their right to a constitutionally adequate education, was not supported by any evidentiary findings by the court insofar as the record discloses. The entry of the partial summary judgment would thus appear to have thereafter supported the parties’ agreement to the entry of the Consent Decree.
While Montgomery County views these subsequent events to demonstrate that its motions to intervene were neither contingent nor speculative, we do not take them into account in our disposition of Montgomery County’s intervention motions. In the posture of the cases now before us, we can only conclude that Montgomery County’s motions to intervene as of right were properly denied, and we shall therefore affirm the judgments of the Court of Special Appeals.
*201 JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND.
. That denial of a motion to intervene is an appealable final order is well settled. See e.g. Citizens Coordinating Comm. v. TKU, 276 Md. 705, 709-710, 351 A.2d 133 (1976).
. The complaint in the City case was amended on January 31, 1996, mostly without substantive change.
. The court considered but denied Montgomery County’s request to intervene on a permissive basis under Rule 2-214(b).
. The federal case is entitled Vaughan G. et al. v. Mayor et al., Civil Action No. NJG—84—1911 in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
. The cases representing the competing holdings on this issue are collected at footnotes 4 and 5 in TKU, 276 Md. at 711, 351 A.2d 133.