dissenting.
I dissent. • Appellant is entitled to collect the “survivors loss” if she can prove that her son “would probably have . . . contributed” income to her, even though she was not dependent on her son.1 Although the definition of “Survivor” is ambiguous in this regard, I maintain that the phrase “dependent on decedent for support” does not modify the word “parent”.
A statute must be construed to give effect to every word because the legislature intends all of the provisions of its laws to be effective. 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1921(a), 1922(2); Lukus v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 276 Pa.Super. 232, 419 A.2d 431 (1980). Since a child, parent, brother or sister of the *361deceased is also a relative, it would be totally unnecessary to list them separately if the legislature intended them to be “dependent on the deceased for support”. The majority’s reading renders the phrase “child, parent, brother, sister” wholly redundant.
The majority’s reading creates another redundancy: to be entitled to “Survivor’s loss”, appellant would have to prove both that she was dependent on the deceased and that the deceased would probably have contributed income to her. If appellant was a dependent, it is a forgone conclusion that the deceased would have contributed income to her. Sub-part (A) of the definition of “Survivor’s loss” is rendered ineffective.
The majority opinion also disregards the “last antecedent rule” of statutory construction: when a phrase follows several expressions to which it might be applied, the phrase is to be limited to the last antecedent. Buntz v. General American Life Insurance Co., 136 Pa.Super. 284, 7 A.2d 93 (1939). Applying this rule, the phrase “dependent upon the deceased for support” only modifies “relative”. The majority argues that the last antecedent rule is not applicable when the “sense of an entire act” requires a different reading. Commonwealth v. Rosenbloom Finance Corp., 457 Pa. 496, 500, 325 A.2d 907, 909 (1974). I submit that the sense of the entire act requires that appellant recover.
Insurance statutes are to be liberally construed to effect their purposes and to promote justice. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(c); Sheppard v. Old Republic Life Insurance Co., 21 Pa.Cmwlth. 360, 346 A.2d 383 (1975). The purpose of the No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act was to establish “a Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of deceased victims.” 40 P.S. § 1009.102(b) (Supp.1980-81). Consistent with this purpose, the statute should be liberally construed as not to require appellant to prove dependency to be eligible for “Survivor’s loss.”
KAUFFMAN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.