In my view there is no substantial evidence in the record of this case to support the trial court’s implied finding that the City of San Diego (City) had an urgent need for immediate possession of Ashok Israni’s property (the Property). (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1255.410, subd. (c).)1 It is also my view that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Israni’s request for a section 1255.420 stay of the order of immediate possession (OIP). I would grant the petition for writ of mandate and direct the trial court to vacate its order for immediate possession issued August 22, 2000.
The trial court issued the OIP under section 1255.410, subdivision (c) to be effective September 13, 2000. A showing of an urgent need for immediate possession is a condition to the issuance of the OIP under section 1255.410, subdivision (c). City did not show it had an urgent need for possession of the Property before September 15, 2000.
City’s resolution authorizing condemnation of the Property stated that it was needed by City to assure the existence of a transitional housing facility *647in accordance with the homeless assistance element of the San Diego Naval Training Center Reuse Plan and to contribute to the low- and moderate-income housing element of City’s general plan. The resolution also stated that condemnation of the Property would “enhance the long term stability” of the Vietnam Veterans of San Diego, Inc. (VVSD), enable VVSD to expand its services and remain in operation in its present location. City therefore wished to acquire title to the Property not only to satisfy the Naval Training Center Reuse Plan and contribute to City’s general plan, but to assure that VVSD would remain an occupant of the Property. This conclusion is consistent with VVSD’s statement that it did not exercise its option to extend the term of its lease of the Property because City assured it of continued occupancy of the Property after the September 14, 2000, end of the lease term; City’s assurance was based on City’s intent to condemn the Property.
The sole basis for City’s assertion of an urgent need for the OIP under section 1255.410, subdivision (c) is that it needed possession of the Property to assure its continued occupancy by VVSD. There was no urgent need for City’s possession of the Property to satisfy the San Diego Naval Training Center Reuse Plan or the housing element of City’s general plan.
The meaning of the phrase “urgent need” in section 1255.410, subdivision (c) is a question of first impression in California. Furthermore, when this statutory phrase was first adopted in 1975, the Law Revision Commission did not explain its meaning. This statutory phrase did not originate from any other states’ eminent domain statutes or the Uniform (now Model) Eminent Domain Code. Although one Wisconsin condemnation statute, Wisconsin Statutes section 32.21, uses the phrase “urgently needed” in reference to a state agency obtaining immediate possession of property being condemned, there are no reported cases interpreting that phrase or its application. There is no precedent that interprets the phrase “urgent need.”
The parties discuss possible interpretations of the phrase, focusing on whether the word “urgent” connotes a quantity or seriousness of the need or a temporal consideration, or both. At the least, I interpret the word “urgent” in this context to mean at least a temporal need. An order for immediate possession under section 1255.410, subdivision (c) permits the condemning authority to obtain possession earlier than 30 or 90 days after service of notice of the order of possession only if the need for possession is urgent; otherwise possession must await the passage of 30 or 90 days. By shortening the time to obtain possession only if the need is urgent, section 1255.410, *648subdivision (c) seems to contemplate that an urgent need is a temporal or immediate need.
However, it is unnecessary in this case to resolve any dispute as to the meaning of the word “urgent” in the context of section 1255.410, subdivision (c). The sole basis for City’s assertion of an urgent need for possession of the Property was to assure the continued occupancy of the Property by VVSD. Until the end of the term of VVSD’s lease with Israni, not only did City not have an urgent need, however defined, for possession; it had no need at all.
City did not have an urgent need for possession of the Property on or before September 14, 2000, because VVSD could not have been required to leave the Property until after that date. The lease term did not expire until midnight on September 14, 2000, and VVSD could not be forced to leave until September 15 or thereafter. Accordingly, City’s urgent need for the OIP to retain VVSD’s occupancy of the Property could not arise until September 15. Furthermore, until at least September 15, 2000, the use of the Property continued to be in compliance with the homeless assistance element of the San Diego Naval Training Center Reuse Plan and to contribute to the low- and moderate-income housing element of City’s general plan, for neither of which was there any evidence of a temporal need. Therefore, there is no evidence to support an order for City’s immediate possession of the Property prior to midnight on September 14, 2000, and the OIP effective prior to that time was unauthorized by section 1255.410, subdivision (c) and should be vacated.
The trial court erred by denying Israni’s request for a section 1255.420 stay of the OIP’s effective date because he showed: (1) he would be substantially harmed by the September 13, 2000, effective date of the OIP; (2) City did not need possession on that date; and (3) City would not be substantially harmed if it did not receive possession on that date. Section 1255.420 permits the trial court to stay the effective date of its order for immediate possession if it finds that any defendant or the property occupant will suffer substantial hardship by losing possession on the original OIP effective date, and the condemning authority does not need possession on that date and would not suffer substantial hardship by extending that date.
There are no reported cases interpreting the phrase “substantial hardship” in the context of section 1255.420. Israni asserts that the trial court erred by expressly finding his potential loss of the $635,000 tenant improvements portion of the condemnation award pursuant to the provisions of the lease agreement could not constitute a substantial hardship.
*649City argues that the trial court was correct in its finding that an adverse effect of condemnation resulting from an owner’s ancillary third party agreement, here the lease agreement, cannot constitute a substantial hardship under section 1255.420. Israni bargained with VVSD for the condemnation provision in the lease agreement and arguably should not be able to assert a substantial hardship from a pre-September 15 possession date so that he can obtain a windfall award of the value of tenant improvements made at VVSD’s expense. City’s argument is not persuasive.
Under section 1255.420, a substantial hardship to the property owner does not necessarily have to arise out of the direct effect of loss of possession; it can also arise out of indirect effects of contractual arrangements affected by the effective date of the OIP, here, the lease’s condemnation provision allocating to VVSD from the condemnation award the value of its tenant improvements if VVSD loses possession of the Property during the lease term because of condemnation proceedings. Israni would lose the value of VVSD’s tenant improvements if the effective date of the OIP is on or before the end of the lease term on September 14, and that loss constitutes a section 1255.420 substantial hardship.
However, even if Israni’s loss constitutes a substantial hardship, the two remaining factors regarding the effect of a section 1255.420 stay on City must be addressed. Did City need possession of the Property on or before September 14 and would City suffer a substantial hardship if a stay were issued? City did not need possession of the Property prior to the end of the term of the Israni-VVSD lease; its only justification for an immediate possession order was to assure the continued occupancy of the Property by VVSD. VVSD’s occupancy of the Property could not be disturbed prior to September 15, 2000, and City’s stated need could not therefore have arisen until that date. Furthermore, City has proffered no evidence that it would suffer substantial harm by delaying the effective date of the OIP.
The trial court should have extended the effective date of the OIP under section 1255.420.
Petitioner’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 25, 2001. Brown, J., did not participate therein.
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.