dissenting.
The majority finds that the DeGrandy v. Wetherell court did not have a compelling interest for creating Congressional District 3 (District 3) and that District 3 was not narrowly tailored. The majority concludes that the DeGrandy court erred in finding as compelling interests compliance with the Voting Rights Act and remedying the effects of Florida’s past discrimination against African-Americans. In reaching its conclusions, the majority strips the DeGrandy plaintiffs of a remedy and even more strange fails to provide a remedy to the plaintiffs in this case. In formulating this untenable result, the majority has (1) infused issues into the case that neither the plaintiffs nor defendants raised; (2) totally disregarded relevant precedent; (3) rewritten the requirements for claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; (4) ensured that the application of strict scrutiny is only “strict in theory” but “fatal in fact”; and (5) based many of its legal conclusions on internally inconsistent rationales. The majority’s opinion in this case bears a striking resemblance to the sentiments that compelled the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act: namely, that African-Americans and other minorities are susceptible to exclusion from full participation in the political process.
*1497The minority plaintiffs in the DeGrandy litigation alleged that they suffered constitutional and statutory violations as a result of the state of Florida’s population increases and shifts in the congressional and state legislative districts. After a full trial, the DeGrandy court found constitutional violations and Voting Rights Act violations. As part of a remedy for these violations, the court adopted a plan that included the present District 3. The majority, in this ease, proceeds as though it has the right to retry the prior DeGrandy case, a separate case that the parties in that litigation did not appeal. Noteworthy is the fact that the plaintiffs in this case have overturned the decision in DeGrandy, without being parties to the DeGrandy litigation. Stranger still is the fact that Judge Vinson, who authored an opinion in the DeGrandy litigation upholding District 3 in the face of the same challenges presented in this case, now forms the majority in condemning District 3.
I. DeGrandy v. Wetherell
In DeGrandy, a three-judge court held that the state of Florida’s congressional districts violated both the one-person, one-vote requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F.Supp. 1076, 1090 (NU.Fla.1992). The De-Grandy litigation arose out of a lawsuit that Miguel DeGrandy, a Hispanic member of the Florida House of Representatives, and other registered voters (DeGrandy plaintiffs) initiated in 1992. The DeGrandy plaintiffs alleged that the congressional district scheme in Florida, at the time of the lawsuit, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act.1
At the time the DeGrandy plaintiffs filed their lawsuit, the state of Florida had become entitled to four additional congressional seats due to population growth that occurred between 1980 and 1990. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1078. The Florida state legislature, however, ended its 1992 session without adopting either a congressional redistricting or a state reapportionment plan. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1079. As a result of the Florida state legislature’s inaction, the task of redistricting fell on the federal courts. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1083-84.
After all parties in the litigation presented their cases, the DeGrandy court made specific findings of fact regarding Florida’s history of both official and unofficial discrimination against African-Americans and other minorities, especially in the context of voting. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1079. For example, the DeGrandy court found that the state of Florida imposed a poll tax on African-American voters under article VI, section 8 of the Florida Constitution. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1079. The DeGrandy court also found that Florida’s constitution segregated African-American and white schoolchildren as well as prohibited the intermarriage of whites with African-Americans. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1079.
The DeGrandy court noted a more contemporary version of Florida’s official discrimination against African-Americans was revealed “as recently as 1967, [in] § 350.20 Fla.Stat. [that] provided in part: The Florida Public Service Commissioners may prescribe reasonable rules and regulations relating to the separation of white and colored passengers in passenger cars being operated in this state by any railroad company or other common carrier.” DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1079. The DeGrandy court also took judicial notice of prior federal court findings of past discriminatory election practices in Florida such as at-large elections, white primaries, majority vote requirements, and candidate filing fees. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1079. Faced with overwhelming evidence of both past and recent discriminatory practices, the DeGrandy court concluded that “the legal barriers and the economic barriers which the legacy of racism has created in the state of *1498Florida, have prevented African-Americans from fully participating in the political process.” DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1079.
Not only did the court find pervasive discriminatory practices and lingering effects of those practices, the DeGrandy court and the litigants agreed that racially polarized voting occurred throughout Florida to varying degrees. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1079. Since all of the parties in the litigation stipulated that racially polarized voting occurred in Florida, the DeGrandy court did not have to engage in an extensive analysis of racially polarized voting. In light of this overwhelming evidence of both official and unofficial acts of discrimination to disenfranchise minority voters, the DeGrandy court devised a redistricting plan that would remedy constitutional and statutory violations against African-American voters and other minorities that would neither offend the Constitution nor Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. De-Grandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1083. First, the DeGrandy court appointed a Special Master to facilitate the formation of a redistricting plan. The Special Master reviewed several proposed plans, but ultimately decided to devise his own plan to more effectively address the constitutional and statutory violations. The Special Master developed plan 308 which called for the creation of two African-American majority districts (Districts 3 and 17) and one African-American influence district (District 23). DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1087-88. Second, the DeGrandy court reviewed the proposed plans and Special Master’s plan 308 and adopted the Special Master’s plan creating two African-American majority districts and one African-American influence district.2 The DeGrandy case was not appealed; thus, the ruling became final. It is important to remember that the DeGrandy case became final and was never appealed. This truth, DeGrandy was not appealed, renders the majority’s reasoning incomprehensible. The majority now dismantles District 3 of the DeGrandy court’s redistricting plan and throws into confusion Florida’s congressional election process.
II. District 3 Achieved the Objectives of the DeGrandy Court
Before addressing the majority’s numerous erroneous legal conclusions and incompatible rationales, it is important to assess the representation that constituents living in District 3 have received as a result of the development of this district. Although I do not suggest that the successful representation obtained in this district predominates over constitutional considerations, it is important to recognize that this district has accomplished what the DeGrandy court set out to achieve: remedying the past exclusion that African-American voters endured in Florida’s political process and creating a district that works for all of its constituents. Moreover, this discussion exposes the absurdity of the majority’s finding that District 3 will inevitably be overburdensome to “innocent” white residents in District 3. District 3 not only complies with constitutional and statutory mandates, it works.3
*1499During the trial, the defendants presented evidence demonstrating the benefits that all constituents within District 3 have derived from the district’s current configuration. Congresswoman Corrine Brown currently represents District 3, and, as the candidate of choice, she has served all of her constituents. This court received exhibits, testimony, and affidavits attesting to the tremendous and effective representation District 3 has received from Congresswoman Brown. For example, this court heard testimony from Thomas Gerald Witt, an 85-year-old white republican who has been the mayor of Lake City for approximately eighteen years. His testimony strongly suggests that all constituents within District 3 are currently receiving effective representation. The following exchange occurred at trial:
Q: You have been mayor for, you said, approximately eighteen years. Could you give me an assessment, based on your position as the chief executive officer of the Lake City municipality, what your assessment is of the type of representation that Lake City has received as a result of the configuration and shape of the congressional district known as District Number 3?
A: Well, I tell you it’s almost unbelievable.
Q: What do you mean by that, sir?
A: I’ve had several constituents tell me, it looks like Corrine would save a lot of gas money if she’d move to Lake City. She was in Lake City whenever we needed her, and she was quite dedicated to be the kind of representative that any community would like to have.
Q: Have you seen any racial dimension to her representation?
A: None at all.
Q: Based on your knowledge of your city and the representation that you’ve testified today about, with regard to the third congressional district, what effect would it have on Lake City if the current third congressional district were dismantled?
A: Well, if it would mean losing Miss Brown, why, it would be sort of like a tragedy. We feel like we have something that we’ve never had before, and we sure don’t want to lose it.
Q: How would you contrast the representation that’s being received right now by Lake City in comparison to prior years?
A: Well, like I said, we just sort of read in the paper who was representing us and seldom saw anyone.
The court also heard testimony from Glynell Pressley, a lifelong resident of Lake City and chairman of a political organization known as the Community Fair Action Committee (CFAC), who testified, in part, as follows:
Q: Mr. Pressley, has the creation of the third congressional district had any impact in your community?
A: It definitely has. It has heightened the political awareness of African-Americans in the community. It has—we’ve been privileged to have Representative Corrine Brown in our community not only in our community of Láke City but in the small communities which is predominantly white or for white, [sic] First time in history of Columbia County that we’ve had a congress person visit in a town meeting. The populace for white in Columbia County, [sic] Not only did that happen but she’s been visible in town meetings in Lake City. She’s been to shelters for old persons. She’s just been a visible person in the community. She’s brought in dollars for the community. Prior congress persons we didn’t see other than on the paper and in the news media.
The court also heard testimony from Way-Ion Clifton, the Chief of Police of Gainesville, Florida. Chief Clifton’s testimony also rebutted the plaintiffs’ suggestion that District 3 was not narrowly tailored because it fostered an afro-centric perspective in Congress. The Police Chief testified as follows:
*1500Q: Have you perceived, as Chief of Police, in all of your dealings -with Congresswoman Brown, have you perceived any kind of racial dimension or racial aspect to the representation that she attempts to give?
A: Absolutely not.
Q: How would you describe the representation you presently have—I think you said you were chief for eleven years. How would you compare the representation you’ve received under the current configuration with representations the city has received with regard to law enforcement in the past?
A: In the past obviously for a number of years law enforcement really had no bills, no provisions provided within the federal government for law enforcement. Q: How would you characterize the representation now that is being afforded to law enforcement community in Gaines-ville?
A: Well, specifically in regard to Congresswoman Brown, she has more or less led the charge there for us as far as law enforcement goes. She has facilitated as I said our grant applications. We have received substantial amounts of money. But not only that, she seems to take a particular interest in law enforcement. I’m never in Gainesville and she’s in Gainesville that she doesn’t seek me out, not only for recognition but to discuss the different kind of crime problems we’ve got and how we both can work on them.
Q: Have you had any opportunities, since 1992, to meet with Congresswoman Brown or members of her staff?
A: On many occasions.
Q: Would you describe some of those to the court, please?
A: Congresswoman Brown was very instrumental in helping us at the police department and the police chiefs in the state of Florida to get the crime bill passed Congress. She facilitated a number of meetings with members of the House of Representatives in Washington. She and Representative Thurmond actually got me on in a briefing with the President of the United States, with his cabinet, when he submitted the bill to the senate; and I was on the sideline of the signing of the crime bill.
Additionally, she has helped—she has facilitated federal grants based on the provisions of that bill for the Gainesville Police Department.
Q: What have some of those grants been used for?
A: All of the grants have been used for community policing. We have received, I think a $450,000 federal grant, matched by our local of $150,000, so $600,000. And we are one of the few, I think thirteen, cities in the state designated as a federal weed and seed site with a $2.1 million grant, hopefully in our future.
From the evidence presented at trial, all constituents in District 3 have been well served under its current configuration. Moreover, the evidence presented at trial suggests that District 3 as drawn induces its representative to reach out to all constituents within the district. District 3 is diverse and contains only a bare majority of 50.6 percent of African-American voters.4 Without resorting to law, anyone employing common sense would conclude that a 50-50 split could hardly result in vote dilution.
Under its current configuration, cities, local governments, and residents within District 3 have received many other benefits. For example, the Mayor of Jacksonville, Florida, wrote Congresswoman Brown thanking her for her diligent efforts with the “Jacksonville projects” which resulted in the construction of a new downtown courthouse. A United States Senator from Florida also recognized Congresswoman Brown’s exceptional efforts in helping the state of Florida retain $97.5 million of federal transportation *1501funds that will help with the construction of the 1-4 interchange in Orlando, among other projects. These are just a couple of examples of the numerous letters of gratitude Congresswoman Brown has received for the excellent representation she has provided to District 3.5
In order to demonstrate how the configuration of District 3 actually fosters biracial coalitions to achieve effective representation, the defendants presented testimony from Congresswoman Brown. Congresswoman Brown testified that because of her district’s configuration she conducts town meetings throughout the district to meet with all citizens within District 3 to discuss issues. For example, she stated that in August 1995 she conducted 25 town meetings and personally met with 5,000 of her constituents throughout District 3. She also testified that through her offices she conducts workshops and seminars on how small cities may utilize the departments and agencies of the federal government, and oftentimes, these workshops are in areas that are predominantly white or have white city managers and city officials. Congresswoman Brown also testified that she chose her committee assignments based upon the needs of the constituents in District 3 and not based on her personal preferences. She testified that her preferences would have been to serve on education and labor committees becausé her background is in those areas; however, she decided to seek positions on the Transportation Committee and the Veterans Affairs Committee because of the large number of veterans in District 3 and the substantial infrastructure improvements needed in her district. Congresswoman Brown also identified three other major concerns in District 3 that transcend racial lines: housing, economic development, and crime prevention. Recognizing these needs, Congresswoman Brown pursued courses of action to serve her constituents; for example, Congresswoman Brown secured $18 million in housing grants for the city of Gainesville, particularly the east side of Gainesville that had not benefited from development in the past eighteen years. Moreover, Congresswoman Brown testified that she provided over $11 million in federal dollars for the COPS program for crime prevention. The defendants’ counsel pressed Congresswoman Brown on the issue of representation:
Q: Do you represent people of just one race?
A: I represent all of the people in my district. My philosophy has always been that, when the community has a cold, the African-American community has pneumonia. So, you’ve got to work to treat the symptoms and the problems in the communities and I’ve done that.
Q: Congresswoman Brown, if I ask you to describe to the court why this district, the Third Congressional District of Florida, makes sense to the people who live within it and your representation of those people, what would you say?
A: Well, the first thing I’d say that the court in its wisdom drew the district but it drew the entire map. And if you look at the results, for the first time in the history of the state, the congressional delegation is reflective of the people that live there. We have two Hispanics, three African-Americans, five women, fifteen republicans, and eight democrats. So, the map reflects the people, and it reflects the diversity in the state.
Q: And what about the voices or the voters within the Third Congressional Dis*1502trict, how are their needs being met by the Third Congressional District?
A: Well, my opinion is that, before the Third Congressional District was drawn, the voters in this area was disenfranchised. The participation was low. In one particular area, they didn’t go to town meetings, they didn’t go to the offices of the congressional people for constituent services. It is different now. If I call a meeting, a town meeting in Ocala at 12 o’clock on Saturday I’m going to have a hundred people there. People want representation, but they want to feel that their representative represents them.
The evidence in this case shows that District 3 works, and it works for everyone.6
III. Erroneous Finding of Racial Gerrymander
In January 1994, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, claiming that District 3, which the DeGrandy court created, violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F.Supp. 1529, 1534 (N.D.Fla.1995). The plaintiffs in this case did not allege that District 3 violated the Voting Rights Act nor did they claim that the district represented an unconstitutional dilution of white voting strength.7 Mortham, 915 F.Supp. at 1534. The plaintiffs in Mortham moved for summary judgment, and the majority granted them partial summary judgment on the claim that District 3 amounted to a racial gerrymander. Mortham, 915 F.Supp. at 1551.
In finding that District 3 amounted to a racial gerrymander, the majority stated that “one does not need to look any further than a map of the third district to reach the conclusion that race was in fact the predominate motivating factor of the DeGrandy court.” Mortham, 915 F.Supp. at 1550.8 In arriving at its decision to grant partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the majority placed far too much emphasis on the shape of District 3. The majority’s error, in relying primarily on shape, becomes apparent in light of the Supreme Court’s statement in Miller that:
Our observation in Shaw of the consequences of racial stereotyping was not meant to suggest that a district must be bizarre on its face before there is a constitutional violation. Nor was our conclusion in Shaw that in certain circumstances a district’s appearance (or, to be more precise, its appearance in combination with certain demographic evidence) can give rise to an equal protection claim, 509 U.S. at 649, 113 S.Ct. at 2828, a holding that bizarreness was a threshold showing, as appellants believe it to be. Our circumspect approach and narrow holding in Shaw did not erect an artificial rule barring accepted equal protection analysis in other redistricting cases. Shape is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary element of the constitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of proof, but because it may be persuasive circumstantial *1503evidence that race for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature’s dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines.
Miller v. Johnson, — U.S. —, —, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2486, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995).
A review of the DeGrandy opinion, the Special Master’s report, and the Independent Expert’s report demonstrates that the DeGrandy court considered several variables other than race in formulating District 3.9 For example, the DeGrandy court acknowledged that it had a constitutional obligation to achieve population equality among districts. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1084. The DeGrandy court also took into consideration the principles from Section 2 and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1083 (“This court must consider in crafting the redistricting plan the Section 2 requirement of ensuring that the plan does not dilute the votes of racial or language minorities.”). Furthermore, the DeGrandy court considered compactness recognizing that generating compact districts was “desirable.” DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1084.
In configuring the congressional districts to comply with constitutional prescriptions and the Voting Rights Act, the DeGrandy court also adhered to the principles set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1083. For example, the De-Grandy court rejected proposed plans that contained African-American populations that did not comprise communities of interest such as the Ireland plan. In rejecting the Ireland plan, the DeGrandy court stated:
The ... plan’s African-American majority district in central Florida is extremely long, irregularly shaped, and extends from Palm Beach County in south Florida to Volusia County in central Florida and from St. Lucie County on the Atlantic coast to Pinellas County on the Gulf coast. This long, irregularly shaped district traverses parts of seventeen counties and involves three major media markets. The communities linked in this sprawling district are likely to have competing interests and do not constitute communities of interest.
DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1086. The De-Grandy court also rejected other proposed plans that attempted to link African-American populations together that could not reasonably constitute communities of interest. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1086 (rejecting a plan because it contained African-American populations in Tampa and Orlando that were likely to have competing interests). In view of the many variables that were factored into the DeGrandy court’s decision in redistricting and in view of the careful consideration given traditional districting criteria, the majority has erred-in ruling that District 3 constituted a racial gerrymander.
IV. Applicability of Shaw and Miller
I also disagree with the majority's application of strict scrutiny in assessing the constitutionality of District 3. See Miller v. Johnson, — U.S. —, —, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2482, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) (recognizing that when race is the predominant factor in districting, then strict scrutiny applies). Assuming, however, that District 3 is a racial gerrymander, I have maintained throughout these proceedings and hold to the position that the Supreme Court's decisions in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) and Miller v. Johnson, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) do not control this case.
I continue to believe that the principles emanating from both Shaw and Miller only apply to a state legislature's redistricting scheme, and not a federal court plan drawn to remedy a constitutional violation or a Voting Rights Act violation. In Shaw v. Reno, Justice O'Connor's opinion stated at the outset that "[t]his case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional right to vote and the propriety of race based state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633, 113 S.Ct. at 2819 (emphasis *1504added). More importantly, Justice O'Connor's opinion also stated, "[t]oday, we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race and that the separation lacks sufficient justification." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658, 113 S.Ct. at 2832.
Likewise, a review of Miller v. Johnson indicates that its mandate is confined to resolving challenges .to a state legislature’s redistricting plan and not a federal court drawn remedial plan. Consider, for example, the following passage from Miller:
The courts in assessing the sufficiency of a challenge to a districting plan, must be sensitive to the complex interplay of forces that enter a legislature’s redistricting calculus. Redistricting legislatures will, for example, almost always be aware of judicial demographics; but it does not follow that race predominates in the redistricting process. The distinction between being-aware of racial considerations and being motivated by them may be difficult to make. This evidentiary difficulty, together with the sensitive nature of redistricting and the presumption of good faith that must be accorded legislative enactments, requires courts to exercise extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims that a state has drawn district lines on the basis of race. The plaintiffs burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or direct evidence going to the legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interest to racial considerations. Where these or other race neutral considerations are the basis for redistricting legislation and are not subordinated to race a state can “defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines.”
Miller, — U.S. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 2488 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647, 113 S.Ct. at 2827). While I do not suggest that federal courts may disregard the Constitution in crafting remedies for Voting Rights Act and constitutional violations, I do not believe that the same rigorous standards applied to legislative bodies in enacting redistricting plans apply equally to federal courts enacting remedial redistricting plans. For example, in United States v. Paradise, the Supreme Court suggested that more deference should be accorded to district court remedies, even in the context of assessing a narrowly tailored remedy, when it explained:
In determining whether this order was “narrowly tailored” we must acknowledge the respect owed a district judge’s judgment that a specified relief is essential to cure a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. A district court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discrimination effects of past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 183, 107 S.Ct. 1053, 1072-73, 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987) (citation omitted). In addition, the Supreme Court suggested that remedial plans need not always be limited to the least restrictive means of implementation recognizing "that the choice of remedies to redress racial discrimination is a `balancing process left within appropriate constitutional or statutory limits to the sound discretion of the trial court.'" Paradise, 480 U.S. at 183, 107 S.Ct. at 1073 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2790, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)).10
*1505I continue to believe that DeWitt v. Wilson provides a more appropriate framework for reviewing a court drawn plan. DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F.Supp. 1409 (E.D.Cal.1994), aff'd in part and appeal dismissed in part, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 2637, 132 L.Ed.2d 876 (1995). In DeWitt, a three-judge federal court found that a 1992 redistricting plan that the California Supreme Court developed was constitutional notwithstanding the court's consideration of race in drawing the lines. DeWitt, 856 F.Supp. at 1413. In reaching that result, the court stated that "[w]e conclude that in the context of redistricting, where race is considered only in applying traditional redistricting principles along with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, that strict scrutiny is not required." DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F.Supp. 1409, 1415 (E.D.Cal.1994), aff'd in part and appeal dismissed in part, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 2637, 132 L.Ed.2d 876 (1995). The Supreme Court summarily affirmed DeWitt the same day it issued its opinion in Miller v. Johnson, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995). DeWitt v. Wilson, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 2637, 132 L.Ed.2d 876 (1995). The majority has misapplied Shaw and Miller.
V. Satisfying Strict Scrutiny
Recognizing that federal courts must comply with constitutional limits in implementing redistricting plans, I am convinced that District 3 should survive strict scrutiny even under the rigors of Shaw and Miller. As the majority points out, in order to satisfy strict scrutiny the congressional district has to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Miller v. Johnson, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993); see also Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986). Admittedly, satisfying strict scrutiny is not easy. In this case, however, the majority has not heeded the Supreme Court's attempt "to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is strict in theory but fatal in fact." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, — U.S. —, —, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2117, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). This is evident from the majority's holding that no compelling interest existed to warrant the DeGrandy court's creation of District 3.
A. Compelling State Interest
In this case, the defendants put on overwhelming evidence demonstrating that the DeGrandy court had a compelling state interest in adopting the congressional redistricting plan that encompassed District 3.11 Again, one only has to look at the factual findings made in the DeGrandy case to appreciate the magnitude of the compelling state interest that the majority simply disregards as an insufficient basis in evidence.
First, I believe that under the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the voting rights context a compelling governmental interest may exist in complying with the Voting Rights Act when creating congressional districts. Miller v. Johnson, — U.S. —, — - —, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2490-91, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 652-53, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2830, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). In Shaw, the Supreme Court stated *1506that "[s]tates certainly have a very strong interest in complying with federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally valid as interpreted and as applied." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 654, 113 S.Ct. at 2830. Although the Supreme Court did not use the term "compelling interest," I believe its use of "very strong interest" suggests that the Voting Rights Act may constitute a compelling state interest under certain circumstances. See Quilter v. Voinovich, 912 F.Supp. 1006, 1019 (N.D.Ohio), appeal dismissed, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 42, 133 L.Ed.2d 9 (1995). The Supreme Court has recognized that compliance with federal laws, particularly remedial laws, justifies the use of racial classifications to assure compliance when sufficient evidence exists to justify the conclusion that there has been prior discrimination. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277, 292-93, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1848-49, 1856-57, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 500, 109 S.Ct. at 725.
Second, a compelling interest exists in remedying the effects of past discrimination. Both Shaw and Miller indicate that a congressional district that relies heavily on race can be justified in light of a "significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past discrimination." Miller, — U.S. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 2490 (citing Shaw, 509 U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2831); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, — U.S. —, —, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2117, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 494, 509-11, 109 S.Ct. 706, 722, 730-31, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1847, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986). Before I proceed with my analysis relating to finding a compelling interest, it is necessary to address two preliminary arguments the majority proffers to reject a finding of a compelling state interest in this case.
1. Majority’s Erroneous Findings
At the outset, the majority’s analysis reveals a degree of confusion that—standing-alone—-precludes me from joining the majority opinion. First, the majority begins its analysis of compliance with the Voting Rights Act as compelling interests by pointing out that the DeGrandy court “was operating under the mistaken assumption that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act required the adoption of a congressional redistricting plan with as many majority-minority districts as could reasonably be accomplished.” This finding simply avoids the underlying issue. Whether a court or state legislature correctly “complies” with the Voting Right Act does not inform the court one way or the other as to whether “compliance” constitutes a compelling interest.
Not only do I believe that the majority’s initial finding relating to compliance as a compelling interest is unhelpful, it is apparent from the DeGrandy opinion that the majority misconstrues or mischaracterizes what the DeGrandy court attempted to accomplish in drafting a redistricting plan. It is clear that the DeGrandy court did not attempt to create as many majority-minority districts as reasonably “possible”; rather, the court created as many majority-minority districts as reasonably “necessary” to ensure “that the plan does not dilute the votes of racial or language minorities.” DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1083. The DeGrandy court did not operate under the premise that it had to maximize the number of majority-minority districts in order to prevent a Section 2 violation. In his specially concurring opinion, Judge Vinson stated: “It is not our goal, therefore, under Section 2 to draw as many minority districts as ‘possible.’ But we should draw as many as can reasonably be done.” DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1091 (emphasis added). More importantly, Judge Vinson also stated that: “I believe the plan we adopt is fair and accomplishes what we are striving to do....” DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1092 (emphasis added). It is clear from both the DeGrandy opinion and Judge Vinson’s concurring opinion that the DeGrandy court was “striving” to prevent further dilution of minority votes and remedy statutory and constitutional violations the court found. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1084-91. The DeGrandy court was motivated to create majority-minority districts, but only to the extent “necessary” to ensure that minorities did not continue to endure violations of their constitutional and statutory rights. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1090-91. Amazingly, the majority now mischaracter*1507izes the DeGrandy court’s efforts as an attempt to maximize majority-minority districts.12
Second, the majority finds that the De-Grandy plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim is moot in light of the DeGrandy court’s granting summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim of an unconstitutional malapportionment in Florida’s districting scheme. As a preliminary matter, I note that neither the defendants in DeGrandy nor the plaintiffs in this case raised the issue of mootness. The majority has again—mistakenly—infused another issue into the trial that none of the parties raised.
The majority relies on Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 122 L.Ed.2d 388 (1993) for support. Growe is inapposite to this ease. In Growe, a group of plaintiffs filed a malapportionment claim against Minnesota’s state congressional and legislative districts in state court. A separate group of plaintiffs filed suit in federal court based on malapportionment and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The state and federal proceedings were pending simultaneously.
The state court rendered a decision finding that the state of Minnesota’s state congressional and legislative districts were unconstitutionally malapportioned and the court adopted a remedy. Emison v. Growe, 782 F.Supp. 427, 433 (D.Minn.1992). When the state court entered its final order on January 30, 1992, the federal proceedings were still pending. The federal court issued a ruling after the state court’s ruling and found that the state court’s legislative plan violated the Voting Rights Act because it did not contain a majority-minority district. Emison v. Growe, 782 F.Supp. 427, 439-40 (D.Minn. 1992).
The Supreme Court reversed ruling that the plaintiffs' Section 2 claim in the federal court proceedings was moot. Growe, 507 U.S. at 39, 113 S.Ct. at 1083-84. The Supreme Court found that the state court had issued a final order invalidating the state's legislative districting plan and had enacted a new plan; therefore, the federal litigation on the Section 2 claim was moot. Growe, 507 U.S. at 39, 113 S.Ct. at 1083-84. The majority's attempt to extend the reasoning of Growe here is flawed because in Growe the state court also analyzed and issued a ruling on the issue of whether the state's plan violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act even though the state court plaintiffs did not raise the issue. See Cotlow v. Growe, No. C8-91-985 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Nov. 21, 1991) (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Preliminary Order for Judgment on Legislative Redistricting). In DeGrandy, the plaintiffs' Section 2 claim was not moot because when the court issued its summary judgment motion on the malapportionment claim no ruling on the Section 2 claim had occurred. An issue becomes moot once a controversy is resolved. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395-96, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208-09, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). The DeGrandy plaintiffs, unlike the Growe plaintiffs, did not have their Section 2 controversy resolved. Moreover, the Section 2 issue could only become moot if the DeGrandy defendants could fulfill their heavy burden of proving that the alleged statutory violation was not likely to recur and the events that are alleged to have made the action moot have "completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation." County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979).13
In this case, the DeGrandy plaintiffs were entitled to have their Section 2 controversy resolved. Of more significance, the DeGrandy court did not find that the Section 2 claim was moot because it went on to rule on the Voting Rights Act violation. DeGrandy, 794 *1508F.Supp. at 1090 (finding that Florida’s current congressional districts violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, the one-person-one-vote principle and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1973). Therefore, the majority’s conclusion that the DeGrandy plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim was moot is simply wrong.
2. Compliance with the Voting Rights Act
The majority has also erred in finding that the DeGrandy court lacked a compelling interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act. The Voting Rights Act was adopted to "banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 86 S.Ct. 803, 808, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966). Court ordered plans, like legislatively enacted plans, must comply with the mandates of Section 2 and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 and § 1973 c. SRAC v. Theodore, 508 U.S. 968, 113 S.Ct. 2954, 125 L.Ed.2d 656 (1993), vacating and remanding Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F.Supp. 1329 (D.S.C.1992) (vacating for consideration in light of Solicitor General's position that argued that the district court had erred in failing to fully consider whether remedial plan complied with antidilution principles of Section 2); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 148-49, 101 S.Ct. 2224, 2235-36, 68 L.Ed.2d 724 (1981). Also, court ordered redistricting plans must meet "special standards of population equality and racial fairness," Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 39, 102 S.Ct. 1518, 1520, 71 L.Ed.2d 725 (1982), and be "`free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination,'" Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1834, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977) (quoting Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710, 84 S.Ct. 1449, 1458, 12 L.Ed.2d 620 (1964)).
The Supreme Court has found that a compelling state interest includes avoiding federal statutory violations and remedying past or present violations of federal statutes aimed at removing discrimination from society. Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-93, 500, 109 S.Ct. at 720-22, 725; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 289, 106 S.Ct. at 1854-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Similarly, the Supreme Court has made it clear that states have a compelling interest in implementing race-based remedies when necessary to eradicate the effects of past racial discrimination. Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-93, 109 S.Ct. at 720-22; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280-82, 106 S.Ct. at 1850-51. I believe that the decision in Shaw v. Hunt correctly recognized the corollary to the foregoing principles in the voting rights context when it stated:
Under these principles, we think it clear that a state has a “compelling” interest in engaging in race-based redistricting to give effect to minority voting strength whenever it has a “strong basis in evidence” for concluding that such action is “necessary” to prevent its electoral districting scheme from violating the Voting Rights Act.
Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F.Supp. 408, 437 (E.D.N.C.1994), probable jurisd. noted, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 2639, 132 L.Ed.2d 878 (1995). Several other courts have also recognized that complying with the Voting Rights Act may constitute a compelling interest. See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F.Supp. 1354, 1381-82 (S.D.Ga.1994), aff'd, Miller v. Johnson, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995); White v. Alabama, 867 F.Supp. 1519, 1548 (M.D.Ala.1994), vacated, 74 F.3d 1058 (11th Cir.1996); accord King v. State Bd. of Elections, 1996 WL 130439, *27 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 7, 1996) (recognizing the compliance with the Voting Rights Act as a compelling state interest); Quilter v. Voinovich, 912 F.Supp. 1006, 1019 (N.D.Ohio 1995) (recognizing that compliance with Voting Rights Act may serve as a compelling state interest under certain circumstances). The DeGrandy court properly relied on compliance with the Voting Rights Act as a compelling interest that justified the creation of District 3.
In DeGrandy, the unenviable task of drawing congressional districts fell upon the court, and the DeGrandy court designed congressional districts to ensure that they did not perpetuate constitutional and Voting Rights Act violations it found minorities suffered under Florida's existing congressional districts. To ensure that whatever plan it adopted complied with the requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the De*1509Grandy court relied on the Supreme Court's teachings in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986) for guidance in crafting a plan that would not violate the Voting Rights Act. Under Gingles, a multi-member districting scheme may violate the Voting Rights Act when: (1) the minority group is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district"; (2) the minority group is "politically cohesive"; and (3) the white majority "votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766-67. Accordingly, I believe that
when a state has reliable information that indicates the relevant minority group could establish a prima facie challenge under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to the existing districting plan, then it has a “strong basis in evidence” for concluding that it must engage in race-based redistricting to comply with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and it has established a “compelling interest” for remedial measures.
Quitter v. Voinovich, 912 F.Supp. at 1020 (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F.Supp. 408, 440 (E.D.N.C.1994)). In order to reach its conclusion, the majority has totally disregarded binding precedent and rewritten the requirements for finding a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
a. Political Cohesion and Racial Bloc Voting: The Second and Third Gingles Factors
In proving the second and third Gingles factors in this case, the defendants presented more than sufficient evidence to establish the existence of a “politically cohesive” minority group and to show that “racially polarized” voting in the northeastern area of Florida usually led to the defeat of minorities’ candidate of choice.14 In addition to the substantial evidence the defendants offered at trial, the DeGrandy court also found that racially polarized voting occurred in Florida. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1079. During, the trial in this case, the court heard testimony from an expert witness, Professor Alan Lichtman. Dr. Lichtman testified that based upon his statistical analysis of county-wide legislative, congressional, and presidential election returns voting in the seventeen county area he examined revealed evidence of consistent racially polarized voting. Dr. Lichtman employed a technique known as “ecological regression” which is a technique that has been consistently employed in voting rights cases.15 Dr. Lichtman testified that his analysis of Florida elections revealed that African-American voters are generally cohesive and white voters vote sufficiently as a bloc to defeat African-American voters’ candidate of choice in majority white jurisdictions. Lichtman Report at 10-17, tables 1-4. In fact, in four recent biracial congressional elections in the area, on average ninety-four percent of African-American voters supported an African-American candidate while an average of only twenty-three percent of non-African-American voters supported the African-American candidate.16 Lichtman Report at 11-12.
In an effort to reach its conclusion in this case, the majority rejects Dr. Lichtman's *1510analysis and totally disregards precedent in revamping the test for ascertaining racially polarized voting. First, the majority rejects Dr. Lichtman's testimony because of "critical methodological errors"; namely, he only evaluated election contests involving an African-American and white candidates. This finding is baseless and contradicts precedent in this circuit. It is well established in the Eleventh Circuit that in determining the existence and extent of racially polarized voting, black versus white elections are the most probative contests to assess and are entitled to more weight than other contests. See, e.g., SCLC v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281, 1293 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 704, 133 L.Ed.2d 660 (1996); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1540 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 1795, 131 L.Ed.2d 723 (1995).
Without even engaging in superficial analysis, the majority also finds that in order to determine whether racially polarized voting occurred a court must examine whether racial bias motivated the voting community and must examine party affiliations. This is a blatant disregard of what Section 2 requires and defies binding precedent. The majority’s suggestion that racial animus needs to be demonstrated in order to show racially polarized voting is unfounded and goes against Circuit and Supreme Court precedents.17 In Gingles, the Supreme Court held that
the legal concept of racially polarized voting, as it relates to claims of vote dilution, refers only to the existence of a correlation between the race of the voters and the selection of certain candidates. Plaintiffs need not prove causation or intent in order to prove a prima facie case of racial bloc voting....
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 74, 106 S.Ct. at 2778 (emphasis added). The majority’s error becomes even more apparent in light of the plain terms of the statute that provides in relevant part:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color____
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes ... are not equally open to participation by members of [protected class] in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the state or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their portion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973. Nothing in this section suggests that plaintiffs must prove that racial animus is driving the majority electorate or require the plaintiffs to negate partisan politics. The correctness of my position is established in the legislative history of Section 2, in the following passage from a Senate Report:
During the committee deliberations, opponents of the results test argued that the report bill is inconsistent with the results standard because Section 2, as amended, still contains the phrase “a denial or abridgement [of the right to vote] on account of race or color.” The argument is that the words “on account of’ themselves create a requirement of purposeful discrimination. This claim overlooks the present structure of the Voting Rights Act, which completely refutes it. Section 5 of the present Act requires the Attorney General or the district court to disapprove a proposed voting law change unless the submitting jurisdiction establishes that it “does not have the purpose and will not *1511have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or col- or----” ... Thus it is patently [clear] that Congress has used the words “on account of race or color” in the Act to mean “with respect to” race or color, and not to connote any required purpose of racial discrimination. Any other arguments based on similar parsing of isolated words in the bill, that there is some implied “purpose” component in Section 2, even when plaintiffs proceed under the results standard, are equally misplaced and incorrect.
S.Rep. No. 417 at 27-28 n. 109, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 177, 205-06.
I must make an additional observation. As a practical matter, how does the majority propose that minority voters prove racial animus? Under the majority’s unsound approach, minority voters would have to question voters about their motives for voting for particular candidates. First, it is unlikely that voters or political parties motivated through racial considerations will openly admit to being so motivated. Second, plaintiffs engaging in a searching inquiry regarding voters’ motivation may be infringing on First Amendment rights. Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 663 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981) (holding that because of First Amendment concerns, voters’ motivations are not subject to searching scrutiny in voting rights cases), clarified, 669 F.2d 316 (5th Cir.1982).
b. First Gingles Factor
Since more than sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to demonstrate political cohesive minority voters and sufficient racial bloc voting to prevent minorities from electing their candidates of choice, I now consider the first Gingles factor—the size and geographical compactness of the minority group. The majority has erred in relating compactness to the shape of the district.18 The first Gingles factor does not demand compactness in the shape of the district in any absolute sense. The majority’s confusion and erroneous finding apparently stems from the failure to realize that the “compactness” inquiry in Gingles concerns whether the “minority population,” and not the district drawn to encompass that population, is geographically compact and sufficiently numerous to constitute a majority single district. King v. State Bd. of Elections, 1996 WL 130439, at *25. Therefore, the majority’s analysis of geographic compactness is flawed because it equates the Gingles threshold requirement of geographical compactness with the principles of compactness used to assess whether racial gerrymandering has occurred. King, 1996 WL 130439, at *25.
Moreover, assuming we follow the majority's course of analysis, according to Gingles, the compactness of a proposed majority-minority district must be examined in light of the state's traditional and customary redistricting practices. In light of those customary and traditional redistricting practices, a majority-minority congressional district may survive strict scrutiny. For example, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the ruling in Jeffers v. Clinton which held that the proposed majority black legislative districts, although somewhat irregular in configuration, satisfied the Gingles threshold standard because they were "not materially stranger in shape" than other legislatively drawn districts. Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F.Supp. 196, 207 (E.D.Ark.1989), aff'd mem., 498 U.S. 1019, 111 S.Ct. 662, 112 L.Ed.2d 656 (1991); see also Houston v. Lafayette County, 56 F.3d 606 (5th Cir.1995); Clark v. Calhoun County, 21 F.3d 92, 95-96 & n. 2 (5th Cir. 1994); Cane v. Worcester County, 35 F.3d 921, 926-27 n. 6 (4th Cir.1994) (proposed district acceptable under Gingles despite irregularities in shape because it is "similar in appearance to one of the former residency districts"). The majority in this case errs because its ruling establishes a higher stan*1512dard for compactness for majority-minority districts than for any other districts.19
It is clear that neither Section 2 nor the Constitution mandates a federal law compactness requirement that demands a higher standard of compactness for majority-minority districts than for any other districts. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2827, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (traditional districting principles such as compactness are not constitutionally required); Miller, — U.S. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 2497. To illustrate very clearly that this court is holding District 3 to higher standards than a non-majority African-American district, it is important to note that the Florida State Senate District 2 is practically identical to District 3.20 During the trial, the court heard testimony from the state senator from District 2 describing the substantial identity between her district and District 3. Senator Betty Holzendorf testified as follows:
Q: What I would like you to do, is to describe to the court the similarities between the current senate district that you represent, geographically, and the eastern portion of Congressional District 3.
A: My current Senate District 2 is the same as senate—the congressional district except, when you get to St. Johns County, you cut across Putnam County to go into Alachua County.
Note, that Senate District 2 has a majority white voting age population. This evidence along with other exhibits admitted at trial indicate that the DeGrandy court adhered to the state of Florida’s districting principles and that the majority has heightened the compactness inquiry for majority-minority districts.
I also believe that the majority has erred because its determination of compactness does not take into account the effectiveness of the representation received in the district. See Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F.Supp. 1459, 1465-66 (M.D.Ala.1988); see also DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F.Supp. 1409, 1413-14 (E.D.Calif.1994) (three-judge court), aff'd in part and appeal dismissed in part, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 2637, 132 L.Ed.2d 876 (1995) (compactness includes considerations of transportation and communication). Despite the defendants' undisputed presentation of evidence demonstrating that District 3 is designed in a way that provides all of its constituents the opportunity for effective representation, the majority erroneously rejects such offers as irrelevant. In DeGrandy the court found that "the consideration of communities of interest is relevant to the determination of compactness." DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1085. The DeGrandy court specifically found that African-Americans living in District 3 are cohesive and share a community of interest notwithstanding the fact that they live in different municipalities. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1085; Special Master's Report at 27.
The evidence presented at trial not only demonstrated that African-Americans within District 3 share a community of interest, but indeed the evidence goes further to demonstrate that both African-American and white residents in District 3 share common economic and demographic characteristics that set them apart from African-Americans and non-African-American residents in other districts. Lichtman Report at 17-19. Also, undisputed testimony in this trial revealed that residents within District 3 enjoy greater access to, and more input with, their congressional representative under the current configuration of District 3 than they experienced prior to 1992. It is clear that the majority has failed to give due consideration to these communities of interest in the context of the first Gingles factor which is particularly appropriate in the state of Florida because strict geographic compactness per se is not a statutory redistricting requirement.21 Simi*1513larly, the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the preservation of county boundaries is neither required nor a de facto practice in Florida legislative redistricting, according to expert John Guthrie. I believe that the majority errs in refusing to recognize the functional compactness of District 3. See Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Identifying and Remedying Racial Gerrymandering, 8 J.L. & Politics, 345, 389 (1992) (functional comparative approach is preferable for determining if proposed majority-minority district is sufficiently compact).
I do not understand how the majority comfortably relies on the testimony of Dr. Ronald Weber to rebut the strong evidence of functional compactness. Dr. Weber’s testimony lacks credibility because in 1992 before the DeGrandy court, Dr. Weber testified in support of the “Margolis plan” which included a majority African-American district that is practically identical to District 3. Dr. Weber acknowledged the substantial similarity of the proposed majority-minority district in the Margolis plan and District 3, and he testified that the Margolis plan scored “relatively well” on three measures of compactness. In contradicting his earlier testimony, Dr. Weber testified in this case that those same three measures of compactness undermine any possible justification for the configuration of District 3. In light of his contradictory assertions, I fail to see how the majority can place any reliance on Dr. Weber’s opinion on this matter.
Admittedly, District 3 ranks poorly on the three mathematical measures for compactness upon which Dr. Weber relied, and I do not disregard this fact.22 I believe, however, that those "compactness scores" should not outweigh the substantial evidence of functional compactness. Furthermore, the mathematical formulae relied upon in those three mathematical measures of compactness are not generally accepted in the field as authoritative, cf. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1091 n. 3, and I do not believe that any court has recognized that such an inflexible method of analysis is the most appropriate standard for evaluating compactness under Gingles. Interestingly, even the two sources that Dr. Weber principally relied upon in his analysis acknowledge that the three mathematical formulae Dr. Weber used for measuring compactness should not be used in isolation and that many demographers and political scientists believe those quantitative measures are inappropriate and unreliable. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms "Bizarre Districts" in Voting Rights: Evaluating Election District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich.L.Rev. 483 (1993); Congressional Res. Serv., Congressional Districts: Objectively Evaluating Shapes, at 2-3 (1994).
Undeniably, the three Gingles factors are of primary consideration in analyzing a claim of a possible Section 2 violation, but, those factors alone are not dispositive. The inquiry must also include an assessment of the totality of circumstances. In considering the totality of the circumstances, a court must assess factors including: (1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state; (2) the extent to which the state has used voting practices that enhance the opportunity for discrimination; and (3) the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision continue to bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment, and health that hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43-45, 106 S.Ct. at 2762-64. In refusing to find a compelling state interest, the majority failed to consider other factors the Supreme Court deems important in evaluating whether a Section 2 claim exists. In assessing whether a Section 2 claim exists, courts must also consider the presence or absence of "substantial proportionality" between the number of majority-minority districts and the minority's group's share of the relevant *1514population. Johnson v. DeGrandy, — U.S. at —, 114 S.Ct. at 2658. Although African-Americans comprise close to fourteen percent of Florida's population, until 1992 not a single majority African-American congressional district existed in the state of Florida. This evidence bolsters the DeGrandy court's finding that Florida's existing apportionment plan violated Section 2.
c. Totality of the Circumstances: Past Discrimination and SocioEconomic Conditions
Because I believe that occasionally allegations of discrimination and the effects of discrimination are met with skepticism, it is necessary to present in great detail some of the evidence and testimony presented at the trial of this case.
(1) Expert Testimony of Dr. Daryl Paulson
During this trial, the defendants put on many lay and expert witnesses to substantiate their claim that discriminatory practices in Florida effectively disenfranchised African-Americans from the political process in the past and that those past practices presently affect African-Americans’ participation in the political process. The court recognized Dr. Daryl Paulson as an expert in southern politics, civil rights, political parties, and elections. Dr. Paulson’s report and testimony at trial outlined practices used to disenfranchise African-Americans during those relevant time periods.
1865-1900: Dr. Paulson testified that during the reconstruction period, specifically from 1870 to the 1880s, African-Americans enjoyed extensive participation in Florida’s political process both in terms of voting and holding public office at all levels, including local, state, and national office. Dr. Paulson testified that approximately twenty-five percent of the Florida State Legislature consisted of African-Americans. Moreover, he testified that the state of Florida even elected an African-American representative to the United States Congress when Josiah Walls was elected to serve in 1870, 1872, and 1874. Dr. Paulson attributed the success of African-Americans’ political participation to the presence of federal troops in the south to ensure that African-Americans could exercise their rights under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
According to Dr. Paulson’s testimony, in the late 1870s, federal troops withdrew from the south, including Florida, and therefore removed the only protection that African-Americans had in order to exercise their political rights. Dr. Paulson also discussed the immediate acts the state of Florida took to squash African-Americans’ attempt to participate in the political process as they had when federal troops were present. For example, in 1885, the state of Florida redrafted its constitution with one of the purposes to repress African-Americans’ right to vote. Moreover, in 1889, the Florida legislature passed a number of laws designed with the discriminatory intent of preventing African-Americans from voting. As a result of these discriminatory acts during this period, Dr. Paulson testified that African-Americans experienced a tremendous decline in the (1) registration rates, (2) participation rates, and (3) holding of public offices. For instance, Dr. Paulson pointed to the fact that in 1888 African-Americans’ voter turnout was around sixty-two percent, and in 1892 it dropped precipitously to eleven percent.
From 1885 to 1900, the state of Florida adopted a multitude of laws to block African-Americans’ participation in Florida’s political process. For example, in 1889, the state of Florida enacted perhaps its most significant barrier to African-American political participation: the poll tax. In addition to the poll tax, Florida employed the secret ballot. Florida employed the secret ballot to take advantage of the high illiteracy rate among the African-American population. Under the secret ballot law in Florida, an illiterate person could not receive assistance in reading the ballot. Therefore, under the guise of protecting the integrity of the ballot, the state of Florida kept a large proportion of illiterate African-Americans from voting because no one could enter the voting booths to help in reading the ballots.
Next, the state of Florida instituted the multiple ballot box law or the eight ballot box law. Under the multiple ballot box law, a *1515voter was required to east eight separate ballots and to place them in eight different ballot boxes. If any ballot was placed in an incorrect ballot box, it could not be counted. Since the illiteracy rate for African-Americans during this time period was approximately forty percent, a substantial number of African-American voters east votes that were discarded because the voters placed the ballots in incorrect ballot boxes.
Other techniques utilized to disenfranchise African-American voters during this time period included “tissue ballots” or “little joker ballots” and vote fraud. In order to effectuate a tissue ballot scheme, election officials, in areas densely populated with African-Americans, would stuff the ballot boxes to ensure that the box contained more ballots than eligible voters. In order to correct the discrepancy, the election officials would pull out a number of ballots equal to the excess and, not surprisingly, they often pulled out the “tissue ballots” or “little jokers” which had been given to African-American voters. Unquestionably, these practices effectively excluded African-Americans from their right to participate in Florida’s political process.
1900-1950: Florida’s attempt to exclude African-Americans from participating in the political process did not end in the nineteenth century. Dr. Paulson testified that during the period from 1900 to 1944 Florida continued in its practices to assure that only whites could affect Florida’s political process. For instance, in 1902, the Florida Democratic Party adopted a “white primary” policy excluding African-American voters from participating in the democratic party primaries. Dr. Paulson testified that as late as 1944, no African-American voters in Florida registered as democrat, and only about 20,000 registered as republican. This is significant because democratic candidates frequently ran unopposed. Moreover, Dr. Paulson testified that in addition to official practices employed to diminish African-Americans’ desire to vote, unofficial acts such as economic discrimination and threats of physical harm decreased African-Americans’ incentives to vote.
In 1944, the Supreme Court decided Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944) which banned all-white primaries, and in 1945, the Florida Supreme Court in Davis v. State ex rel. Cromwell, 156 Fla. 181, 23 So.2d 85 (1945), held Florida's white primaries to be unconstitutional. In response to this ruling, the city of Jacksonville switched from a ward to an at-large election scheme to prevent the election of African-American candidates from predominantly African-American wards. Prior to the switch, an African-American consistently represented the sixth ward on Jacksonville's city council. This ended, however, in 1907 when the state legislature gerrymandered election boundaries to dilute the African-American vote.
1950-Present: Dr. Paulson also testified that during the period from 1950 to the present, various measures were pursued to hinder African-Americans in voting. For example, he testified that in 1975 when Congress considered an extension of the Voting Rights Act, representatives from southern states, including Florida, vehemently objected to this proposed amendment arguing that the Voting Rights Act had accomplished its objectives and was no longer needed. Moreover, Dr. Paulson testified that many elections in the state of Florida during the 1950s and 1960s had overt racial appeal. According to Dr. Paulson, virtually every governor who ran or was elected in the state of Florida during the 1950s and 1960s expressly supported policies of segregation. For example, Governor Claude Kirk attempted to take over the Manatee County School Board in defiance of federal court orders to desegregate the schools. Former Governor LeRoy Collins stated that the state of Florida was just as determined as any other state to maintain segregation. Likewise, in a 1960 campaign, Governor Farris Bryant accused his opponent of being an integrationist and referred to himself as a firm believer in segregation.
District 3: Dr. Paulson’s testimony also specifically addressed how African-Americans in the northern part of Florida and specifically within District 3 suffered from state sponsored and unofficial acts of discrimination in voting. Dr. Paulson testified that approximately seventy-five percent of *1516Florida’s population during the early part of the twentieth century resided in the northern tier counties of Florida, including Jacksonville. Jacksonville was the largest city in the state of Florida at that time. Dr. Paulson testified that in Jacksonville, where African-Americans comprised fifty-seven percent of the population, the state of Florida abolished elective government in 1889 for a temporary period. In 1907, the city of Jacksonville engaged in racial gerrymandering to dilute the African-American vote in predominantly African-American districts. In 1945, the city of Jacksonville switched from district elections to an at-large system to prevent heavily populated African-American areas from electing their candidate of choice. Dr. Paul-son also testified that the lingering effects of the past discriminatory practices are demonstrated when one considers (1) economic conditions of African-Americans in the northern portion of Florida, (2) educational progress, and (3) political participation.
(2) Expert Testimony of Dr. Richard Engstrom
In order to demonstrate how the past discriminatory practices currently affect the African-American community in the northern part of Florida, the defendants presented the expert testimony of Dr. Richard Engstrom. Dr. Engstrom testified that he observed a lower voter registration rate among African-Americans in the seventeen county area of northern Florida. Fourteen of those counties are included in District 3. Dr. Engstrom testified that in the subject area approximately 50.9 percent of African-Americans of voting age were registered to vote compared to 58.9 percent of voting age whites registered to vote. Moreover, Dr. Engstrom testified to the actual voter participation rate that occurred in this area based on participation estimates derived through ecological regressional analysis that Dr. Lichtman performed. Dr. Engstrom analyzed the election returns from elections in 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1994 and found that African-Americans had a lower participation rate in these elections than non-African-Americans in all four elections.
Dr. Engstrom also analyzed socio-economic data of residents within District 3 and testified that his studies revealed that the percentage of persons twenty-five years or older who were high school graduates among the African-American community was lower than it was among white residents in this area. Likewise, he examined the percentage of college graduates in the area and found that African-Americans also had a lower percentage of college graduates than whites. Dr. Engstrom also looked at the income of the residents within District 3 and found that African-Americans had a lower per capita income and median family income than whites.
(3) Specific Instances of Discrimination
During this trial, the defendants presented testimony from several witnesses in order to confirm the actual effects of Florida’s legacy of discrimination that the expert testimony addressed from a statistical and historical perspective. The defendants presented testimony from Mr. Samuel Muldrew, a World War II veteran and resident of Jacksonville, Florida, for fifty-five years. Mr. Muldrew recounted his experiences of trying to register to vote and in attempting to exercise his right to vote. Mr. Muldrew testified that he first registered to vote in 1950, and that it was difficult for him and other African-Americans to vote. To illustrate, Mr. Muldrew stated that election officials would move voting booths from place to place or relocate known voting booth locations to the opposite side of town away from densely populated African-American areas. Mr. Muldrew also testified that during the 1950s and 1960s, many African-Americans in the Jacksonville area did not own automobiles or have alternative means of transportation.
In discussing his experiences with the political process, Mr. Muldrew compared his contact with the political process prior to the DeGrandy court’s drawing of District 3 with the representation and access he and others have had subsequent to the DeGrandy decision. In so doing, Mr. Muldrew testified that he attempted in vain for the past forty-five years to obtain a Purple Heart and his full veteran benefits. He got no favorable results. Shortly after Congresswoman Corrine Brown was elected to represent District 3, she facilitated his receipt of a Purple Heart *1517and his full veteran benefits. As a result of Congresswoman Brown’s assistance to Mr. Muldrew, he informed several other veterans of her effective representation in order to help facilitate their receipt of benefits. As someone who personally experienced the consequences of official and unofficial acts of discrimination against African-Americans, Mr. Muldrew’s summation confirmed that the DeGrandy court’s formulation of District 3 served a compelling state interest when he stated that “I was proud to say that Mrs. Brown was not a black congress[woman] or nor was she a white congress[woman]. She was a people congress[woman] and that I can appreciate.”
Perhaps the most compelling testimony presented in this case came from Mr. Lloyd Pearson. Mr. Pearson’s testimony aptly captured the essence of the lingering effects racial discrimination has had on African-Americans in Florida’s political process. Even plaintiffs’ counsel during closing arguments recognized the strength of Mr. Pearson’s testimony concerning the effects of discrimination when he stated that one of the real “heroes” of this case is Lloyd Pearson. Mr. Pearson testified that he has lived in Jacksonville, Florida, for the past seventy-four years and is a resident of Florida’s third congressional district. Mr. Pearson is a retired postal worker. Mr. Pearson testified that he first registered to vote in 1942, and found “it was quite an experience.” Mr. Pearson testified that he had to register as a republican, and this frustrated him because at that time most candidates ran on a democratic ticket. He stated that after 1944, when white primaries were struck down, he was able to register as a democrat and became involved in helping to register African-Americans and others to vote. Mr. Pearson explained the difficulties he encountered in trying to persuade African-Americans to attempt to participate in Florida’s political process. He testified that many African-Americans did not want to register to vote because they feared that their white employers would seek retribution. He revealed that his greatest barrier to getting African-Americans interested in voting was the egregious experiences many of them observed other African-Americans encounter in their attempt to exercise the right to vote.
After retiring from the post office, Mr. Pearson was deputized as an assistant registrar in Duval County. He essentially became a “one person registration machine,” registering approximately 40,000 persons over a thirteen-year period. His efforts were not without obstacles. Many of the people he helped register to vote were “purged” from the voter registration lists for failing to exercise their right to vote within two years. For example, in 1989, he helped register 9,000 African-Americans and 3,000 white voters, but in 1991 election officials purged from the rolls 13,000 African-Americans and 19,000 whites.
Mr. Pearson indicated that he also had difficulties with the elections office. Mr. Pearson testified that in trying to register African-Americans to vote he was often told that voting was “white folk’s business” and that others urged him to “stop pushing” them to vote. In concluding his testimony, Mr. Pearson stated that based upon his thirty years of experience in voter registration work in Jacksonville, Florida, he has observed substantial benefits from the creation of District 3. He noticed an increase in African-Americans registering to vote and increased coalitions between white and African-American voters in the area.
The court heard testimony from Leon Russell, the current state president of the Florida State Conference of NAACP Branches.23 Mr. Russell testified that the assassination of Harry T. Moore in 1951 struck fear in the hearts of African-American residents in Florida considering whether to exercise their right to vote. He testified that Mr. Moore was a former president of the Florida State Conference of NAACP Branches and involved with an organization known as the Progressive Voters League. In those capacities, Mr. Moore pursued actions to motivate African-Americans to register to vote and to *1518participate in the political process. Mr. Russell testified that as a result of those activities, Mr. Moore’s home was bombed, and both he and his wife were killed. In addition to this specific instance of discrimination aimed at diminishing African-Americans’ desire to vote, Mr. Russell also testified to various techniques used in the northeast quadrant of Florida to dilute African-Americans’ vote. During the trial, Mr. Russell testified to the following:
Q: Has there been a persistent pattern of the use of dilutive techniques in northeast Florida?
A: I think that one of the major points of examples of vote dilution in northeast Florida is, in fact, the Duval County, Jacksonville consolidated government. At the time of consolidation, the city of Jacksonville had a population that was 46 percent black and becoming somewhat of a force, political force, of its own; and the action—the consolidation action actually ended up bringing in that large population outside the city limits had having the effect of diluting the 46 percent ability to affect change in the political process within Duval County.
I think that you can look at the history of at-large elections, in those types of instances across the state; and, in many instances, if you trace their origins back, you’ll find that they were put in place for the specific purpose of diluting blacks, pockets of black populations’ ability to affect change in the electoral process. That, again, is something that, even today, remains a problem with at-large districts.
Remarkably, the majority wholly disregards this testimony as supporting a finding of a compelling interest in remedying the present effects of past discrimination. The testimony was specific, substantiated, overwhelming, and unrebutted. The majority’s blatant disregard for the findings of the DeGrandy court and the evidence adduced at this trial indicates that the majority believes that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory,” but “fatal” in fact.' I cannot join in this disregard of evidence, precedent, and sound reasoning. The DeGrandy court had a compelling interest in both complying with the Voting Rights Act and remedying the present effects of past discrimination when it drew District 3.
(4) Majority’s Erroneous Legal Analysis
The majority's discussion of the totality of the circumstances test required under Gingles, indicates that the majority simply misunderstands what is required under the test. First, the majority insists that the effects of past discrimination alone are insufficient to establish a Section 2 violation.24 The majority holds that in order for minorities to establish a claim under Section 2 they must prove the present effects of past discrimination and existing voting practices in Florida that discriminates against African-Americans or other racial or ethnic minority groups. The majority's test essentially eviscerates the remedial purpose inherent in the Voting Rights Act. The Voting Rights Act was enacted to "banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 86 S.Ct. 803, 808, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966). The majority's requirement of showing an existing practice is unfounded and illogical. Besides, even under the majority's erroneous legal test, the defendants in this case should prevail because the DeGrandy court specifically found that "official state discrimination has adversely affected the ability of minorities to participate in the political process." DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1079-80. Without providing any analysis to rebut that finding, and without pointing to any evidence the plaintiffs *1519presented, the majority simply disregards the findings made in DeGrandy.25
Next, the majority commits an egregious error in finding that the socio-economic disparity between minority Voters and white voters does not present evidence of a Voting Rights Act violation. When the Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982, a senate report stated that:
The courts have recognized that disproportionate educational, employment, income level and living conditions arising from past discrimination tend to depress minority political participation. Where these conditions are shown and where the level of black participation in politics is depressed, plaintiffs need not prove any further causal nexus between their disparate socio-economic status and the depressed level of political participation.
S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 n. 114 (1992). The majority employs even more erroneous reasoning when it makes a wholly irrelevant finding that the socio-economic disparities between African-Americans and whites in District 3 are similar to socio-economic differences between whites and African-Americans in similar districts throughout the country. The implication of the majority's finding is that since discrimination against African-Americans residing in northern states did not exist to the same extent as discrimination against African-Americans in Florida, then the socio-economic conditions of African-Americans in the north should be substantially better than the socio-economic conditions of African-Americans in the south, or at least reveal a lower socio-economic disparity with whites. African-Americans throughout America have endured discrimination and exclusion in the political process for far too long without the benefits of the Voting Rights Act. Therefore, even if African-Americans in Florida share similar socio-economic conditions as African-Americans in states where discrimination was less "egregious," this does not advance the majority's position that these manifestations of past discrimination cannot support a finding of a Voting Rights Act violation. On the contrary, the majority's reasoning — albeit unsound — actually bolsters the finding of a Voting Rights Act violation. First, the Bositis study, assessing characteristics of members of the Congressional Black Caucus's congressional districts found similar characteristics in the socio-economic and racial make-up of the districts. See David Bositis, The Congressional Black Caucus in the 103rd Congress (1994). That same data, however, can be interpreted to support the defendants' claim that in order for an African-Americans to be elected to Congress or for African-American voters to elect the candidate of their choice they need a majority or a near majority African-American congressional district. As Dr. Bositis's report indicates, many African-American representatives in Congress are elected from congressional districts that have heavy African-American populations. Second, the majority's position can easily be interpreted as showing that minorities throughout the country continue to bear the effects of past discrimination in the political process. See, e.g., King v. State Bd. of Elections, 1996 WL 130439 (N.D.Ill., Mar. 7, 1996) (Voting Rights Act claim in the state of Illinois); Quilter v. Voinovich, 912 F.Supp. 1006 (N.D.Ohio 1995) (Voting Rights Act claim in the state of Ohio); DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F.Supp. 1409 (E.D.Cal.), aff'd in part and appeal dismissed in part, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 2637, 132 L.Ed.2d 876 (1995) (Voting Rights Act claim in the state of California); Emison v. Growe, 782 F.Supp. 427 (D.Minn.1992) (Voting Rights Act challenge in Minnesota). I submit that the majority's finding, without more, does not advance their position that African-Americans in Florida have not been excluded from Florida's political process.26
*1520B. Remedying the Effects of Past Discrimination
Assuming arguendo that no compelling interest exists in complying with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, then I would find that the DeGrandy court had a compelling interest in formulating District 3 to remedy the continuing effects of Florida's past state sponsored discrimination in voting. Both Shaw and Miller recognized that a redistricting plan that includes a majority-minority district may be justified under strict scrutiny because of the governmental interest in remedying the continuing effects of past discrimination. Miller, — U.S. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 2490 (citing Shaw, 509 U.S. at 654, 113 S.Ct. at 2831). Not only has the Supreme Court recognized this well established principle in the voting rights context, it has acknowledged a compelling state interest in remedying the effects of past discrimination in other areas of law, particularly affirmative action related to employment and contracting. See Adarand, — U.S. at —, 115 S.Ct. at 2117; Croson, 488 U.S. at 494, 109 S.Ct. at 722; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274, 106 S.Ct. at 1847. The Supreme Court in Johnson v. DeGrandy acknowledged that a lesson from Gingles is that "society's racial and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority districts to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity." DeGrandy, — U.S. at —, 114 S.Ct. at 2661. In this case, the majority has simply disregarded the undisputed evidence of Florida's history of official and unofficial acts of discrimination and the impact that past discrimination currently has on the African-American community. Contrary to the majority's incredible assertion that the DeGrandy court's motivation was not to remedy past discrimination, the DeGrandy opinion clearly demonstrates that its goal was to remedy the effects of Florida's past discrimination against African-Americans and to prevent any further statutory or constitutional violations. DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F.Supp. 1076, 1079-85 (N.D.Fla.1992).
C. Narrowly Tailored Remedy
The foregoing findings of fact from the DeGrandy court and the expert and anecdotal testimony presented in this trial clearly demonstrate that a compelling governmental interests existed in complying with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and remedying the continuing effects of Florida’s past discrimination to justify the DeGrandy court’s creation of District 3.
Similarly, the record in this case proves that District 3 is narrowly tailored. In considering whether a remedy was narrowly tailored in other areas of law, the Supreme Court's opinions indicate that courts should consider (1) the relationship of the remedial goal to the relevant portion of the minority group members; (2) the impact of the remedy on third parties; (3) the efficacy of alternative race neutral or more narrowly tailored remedies; (4) the relation and flexibility of the remedy; and (5) whether the plan imposes a quota. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171-85, 107 S.Ct. 1053, 1066-74, 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987); see also, Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 481, 106 S.Ct. 3019, 3052-53, 92 L.Ed.2d 344 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring), Wygant, 476 U.S. at 293, 106 S.Ct. at 1857. In this case, the majority's conclusion that District 3 is not narrowly tailored centers on only two of these issues. First, whether the DeGrandy court created more majority-minority districts than reasonably necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act. And, second whether the creation of District 3 is overly burdensome on innocent third parties; specifically, white residents in District 3. Consequently, I will limit my discussion to these two considerations.
In spite of the majority’s holding, the record in this case unquestionably demonstrates that the DeGrandy court did not create more majority-minority districts than reasonably necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act and remedy the effects of Florida’s legacy of racial discrimination. Moreover, the DeGrandy court did not attempt to maximize the number of majority-minority districts when drawing Florida’s redistricting plan. The majority concedes, as it must, that
the DeGrandy court did not employ a strict maximization policy. In fact, if De-Grandy had applied such a policy, it could possibly have created as many as 5 African-American majority-minority districts *1521and 5 Hispanic majority-minority districts based upon the VAP (43.4% of the total districts), or 6 African-American majority districts and 5 Hispanic majority districts based upon population (47.8% of total districts).
The majority concludes, nonetheless, that the DeGrandy court was engaged in “the very type of de facto proportional representation that the Supreme Court has since disapproved.” Yet, the majority acknowledges that the DeGrandy court did not apply a “proportionality policy” as defined in the disclaimer clause of Section 2. Therefore, under the majority’s reasoning in this case, any redistricting plan containing more than one majority-minority district amounts to a de facto proportional representation. In support of this conclusion the majority finds that District 3 is not narrowly tailored because the DeGrandy court rejected plans containing only one African-American majority-minority district. The majority states:
The DeGrandy court was offered other more narrowly tailored plans that were less race based and more cognizant of traditional race-neutral redistricting criteria. To the extent that these plans created fewer than two African-American majority-minority districts and one African-American minority influence district, they were summarily rejected. See DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1086-87. However, the DeGrandy court (in rejecting these plans) apparently relied upon an erroneous assumption that its failure to create a proportional number of African-American majority-minority and influence districts would violate section 2 of the Act. This assumption has since been repudiated by the Supreme Court.
As previously discussed, the DeGrandy court also rejected several plans creating two African-American majority districts. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1085-87. The DeGrandy court adopted plan 308 because it recognized legitimate state redistricting principles while also complying with the Voting Rights Act and effectively remedying the effects of Florida’s history of discrimination in the voting process.
A review of the DeGrandy opinion leaves one with the undeniable impression that in configuring District 3, the court used race to the minimum extent possible given the court’s compelling objectives. Moreover, District 3 recognizes other legitimate state redistricting interests such as community of interest as displayed in the similar economic status, background, and aspirations among the residents of the district. See Special Master’s Report at 27-28. The DeGrandy court specifically rejected alternative majority-minority districts that would have joined communities “likely to have competing interests,” districts that were too far flung and sprawling, including one that would have extended from Palm Beach County in south Florida to Volusia County in central Florida, and from St. Lucie County on the Atlantic coast to the Pinellas County gulf coast. De-Grandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1086. Even the plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Ronald Weber, admitted that District 3 was the most compact and narrowly tailored majority-minority district that the DeGrandy court considered in the north Florida area. In his testimony in this case, the following exchange occurred:
Q: And indeed you recall the court’s decision saying that the plan that it adopted in 1992 was modeled as to that district on the Margolis plan. Do you recall that, sir?
A: I don’t remember that statement in the opinion but I’ll accept your word.
Q: And, sir, in any event, you would agree that the majority black district in northeast Florida in the Senator Margolis plan is very similar, as you look at it, to the plan, to the district in the court ordered plan?
A: I think if you look at the maps, yes you could come to that conclusion. I think if you look at data, there are some modest differences.
Q: Isn’t it true, Dr. Weber, that in 1992 you expressed the opinion in this courtroom that District 3 in the Margolis plan scored relatively well on the three measures of compactness often examined in redistricting.
*1522A: That is true, and it was in comparison to three other plans for the district in the same area of the state.
Q: And you also testified in this court that the north Florida minority district in the Margolis plan is less violative of natural and local subdivision boundaries than the north and central Florida minority districts proposed under the other plans.
A: That’s right, three other plans.
Q: And Dr. Weber, could you just go ahead then and read the last sentence of your report, the 1992 report?
A: Yes, of course. “It is also my expert opinion that the Margolis plan will not result in the dilution of black or Hispanic voter rights as defined under section 2 of the U.S. Voting Rights as amended in 1992.”
The majority also asserts that the configuration of District 3 will have an overly burdensome impact on innocent third parties, namely, white voters within District 3 and also African-American voters outside of District 3.27 This position is illogical and internally inconsistent. The plaintiffs in this case did not allege that the configuration of District 3 led to dilution of white votes within District 3 or a denial of equal political access, nor did any of the plaintiffs allege that African-American voters outside of District 3 suffered a denial of equal political access because of District 3’s configuration.28 See Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F.Supp. 1529, 1534 (N.D.Fla.1995). Second, the majority states that “[t]he fact that innocent third parties receive a fair result cannot ameliorate the deprivation of those parties’ fundamental right to equally participate in the political process.” Stripped to essentials, the majority’s finding is that when white voters are relegated to a minority status within an oddly shaped congressional district, then their fundamental right to equally participate in the political process is harmed. Of course, the majority fails to recognize the logical corollary to that statement, which is that since African-Americans in the northeast quadrant of Florida have always been relegated to “minority voting status” within congressional districts, then they have suffered deprivations of their fundamental right to equally participate in the political process.
It is important to note that District 3 is an interim plan and will exist only until the Florida legislature adopts a valid congressional redistricting plan or through the next decennial census, whichever first occurs. Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F.Supp. at 1545. Furthermore, the DeGrandy court’s formulation of District 3 does not amount to a rigid quota or an inherently inflexible remedy because white voters and white candidates are not excluded from participation in Congressional elections or from seeking office in all congressional districts. See Johnson v. De*1523Grandy, — U.S. at — n. 11, 114 S.Ct. at 2658 n. 11.
Dr. David Bositis provided expert testimony regarding the political competitiveness of District 3. First, Dr. Bositis testified that unmistakable signals of competitiveness exist in District 3. For example, President Clinton only received fifty-seven percent of the vote in District 3 in 1992, according to Dr. Bositis, and this was the lowest level of support President Clinton received in any majority African-American congressional district. Second, reviewing congressional contests in 1992 and 1994, Dr. Bositis found that the voter turnout among white and black voters was about the same. Dr. Bositis also testified that in his assessment of the 1992 and 1994 District 3 congressional election, Congresswoman Brown's district was the fourth most competitive district of all of the districts in the state of Florida in 1994. Therefore, District 3 does not impose a rigid quota for African-Americans; rather, it is a competitive district that provides African-American voters an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. See Johnson v. DeGrandy, — U.S. at — n. 11, 114 S.Ct. at 2658 n. 11 (noting that creation of majority-minority election district does not guarantee proportional minority representation but instead provides political opportunity to minority voters). Cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509, 109 S.Ct. at 730 (non-minority contractors completely excluded from competing for a fixed percentage of contracts); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (non-minorities completely excluded from participating for 16 of the 100 slots in the medical school class). District 3 does not guarantee the election of an African-American candidate, but it does ensure that African-American voters will have a reasonable opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. District 3 is narrowly tailored.
VI. Abdication of Court’s Responsibility
The greatest wrong emanating from this decision is the majority’s refusal to recognize that the DeGrandy plaintiffs are entitled to a remedy. The plaintiffs in DeGrandy v. Wetherell prevailed in their litigation in 1992. The parties in the DeGrandy litigation agreed that African-Americans suffered vote dilution and needed congressional districts that would provide them an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.
If the plan adopted in DeGrandy is not the most narrowly tailored plan, then this court should draw a new plan or adopt one of the other proposed plans. The majority, in the name of federalism, has abandoned its responsibility to provide remedies to aggrieved parties.- Instead, the majority orders the Florida legislature to formulate a redistricting plan and in the name of federalism and comity requires this state body to act before a specified date. If the Florida legislature fails to act, then this court will have to do what it should do now: that is, alter the DeGrandy remedy. If the majority is willing to engage in redistricting at some point in the future, under much greater time constraints, it should do so now without the confusion that is sure to follow upon the filing of this opinion.29
It makes little sense for aggrieved parties to seek relief in the courts only to be sent back to the very source of their harm for a remedy. Federal courts have “not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discrimination effects past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.” United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 183, 107 S.Ct. 1053, 1073, 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987) (emphasis added). If the DeGrandy remedy is wrong, then this court should correct that remedy. Rather, the majority in this case risks upsetting all of Florida’s congressional districts and causing shifts in incumbents’ districts at *1524the beginning of the congressional election season. The plaintiffs in DeGrandy are left without relief; even the plaintiffs in this case are left without relief. The citizens of Florida, in the name of federalism, are left to await further litigation just prior to the congressional election season.
Regrettably, members of the Florida congressional delegation were denied the right to intervene in this case with a promise that the attack in this case would only affect the northeastern most parts of Florida. Unfortunately, the majority’s remedy may affect every congressional district in Florida, without giving members of Congress and the voters in the districts notice or an opportunity to be heard.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
*1525APPENDIX
"Unusually-shaped" legislative districts in Florida (1992 to present)
District Black Vap Hispanic VAP Race of Incumbent
Senate District 4 13.2% 1.8% white
Senate District 14 26.3% 7.4% white
Senate District 18 4.6% 5.0% white
Senate District 35 10.1% 7.4% white
House District 10 14.4% 1.1% white
House District 22 9.8% 3.9% white
House District 25 4.1% 3.8% white
House District 32 4.1% 5.8% white
House District 36 4.3% 8.2% white
House District 44 4.0% 3.1% white
House District 56 7.3% 10.4% white
House District 61 6.6% 4.6% white
House District 66 5.3% 8.1% white
House District 78 19.8% 5.7% white
House District 92 2.3% 8.5% white
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. The court consolidated the DeGrandy litigation with a similar lawsuit that the Florida State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Color People Branches (NAACP) and many individual African-American voters filed on April 7, 1992. In the NAACP's complaint, the plaintiffs alleged a Section 2 claim and unconstitutional malapportionment. De-Grandy 2nd Am.Compl. at ¶ 100.
. The DeGrandy court also considered and rejected the following plans: the Ireland plan—because it was extremely long, irregularly shaped, and likely to have communities with competing interests; the James plan—because it packed African-American voters into two districts; the De-Grandy plan—because it linked together areas likely to have competing interests and only established a single African-American majority district; the Lawyer's Committee plan—because it contained the same disadvantages as the De-Grandy plan; the Common Cause plan—because it only created one majority African-American voting district; the Wetherell plan—because it elevated other traditional districting criteria over the principle of ensuring that minority voting strength was not further diluted; the Gordon plan—because it split the Hispanic community in Dade County; the Reddick plan—because it minimized the ability of minority groups, particularly African-Americans, to fully participate in the political process; and the Webster plan—because it perpetuated the traditional dilution of African-Americans voting strength by keeping African-American voters submerged in heavily populated white districts. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. 1076, 1086-88.
. The majority states that the configuration of District 3 denies white voters equal access to the political process because they were placed within "widely separated group[s] of African-American voters." Not only is this finding unsubstantiated and unsound, it reeks of hypocrisy. First, the plaintiffs in this case did not offer any evidence of being denied equal access to the political process in District 3. Second, under the majority's reasoning, all African-Americans who reside in irregularly shaped majority white districts are *1499also being denied equal access to the political process. Obviously then, the majority's reasoning will spark much litigation, unless the majority is willing to assume that only white voters, who are in the minority can be denied, equal access to the political process.
. In one breath the majority finds that a bare majority of 50.6 percent African-American voters denies equal access to white voters; yet, in the next breath the majority finds that African-American voters will not be denied equal access even if their voting age population is only 25.0 percent. This is another example of the majority's internally inconsistent positions.
. The current configuration of District 3 lends itself to effective representation as evidenced in the praise Congresswoman Brown has received from the following: Glenda Hood, the mayor of the city of Orlando; F. Lee Tillotson, executive director of the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority; Leroy D. Jones, vice president of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers; Daniel Holsenbeck, vice president of the University of Central Florida; Miles Francis, executive director of the Jacksonville Transportation Authority; Walter Lee, president of the Jacksonville Chamber of Commerce; Charles Spence, president of Florida Community College at Jacksonville; Carla Marlier of WJCT Television Station; Eddie Talley, president of Transport Workers Union Local 291, AFL-CIO; Jim LaSala, international president of the Amalgamated Transit Union; James Brazee, president of the Vietnam Veterans of America, Inc.; James Magill, director of Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States; and Carl Tankcrsley, administrative supervisor, city of Crescent City, Florida.
. This evidence also demonstrates that the functional concerns Judge Vinson expressed in his concurrence in DeGrandy about District 3's inability to operate effectively never materialized. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1092 (Vinson, J., specially concurring).
. Even though the plaintiffs did not allege that white voters suffered vote dilution, the majority suggests that white voters suffered vote dilution. The majority found that white voters in District 3 were denied equal access to the political process.
Not a single white voter from District 3 testified in this case about being denied equal access to the political process in District 3. In fact, the plaintiffs did not present a single "fact witness" and relied on the testimony of two experts. The majority even discounts the testimony of one of these two expert witnesses. On more than one occasion, the majority has directed the litigation of this case from the bench. The finding of white voters being denied equal access to the political process in District 3 is another example of the majority’s infusion of issues into the case that none of the parties raised.
.I reiterate my earlier position that the majority erred in granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the claim that District 3 amounted to an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. See Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F.Supp. 1529, 1563-66 (N.D.Fla.1995) (Hatchett, J., dissenting). One only has to review the DeGrandy opinion to realize that the three-judge court considered traditional redistricting principles along with race, but certainly did not allow racial considerations to predominate in formulating the congressional districts.
. Of course, racial and ethnic considerations are appropriate in drawing districts to further the objectives of the Voting Rights Act. United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977).
. The majority contends that a long line of Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that federal courts’ remedial plans are subject to stricter review than plans drawn by legislatures. In Connor v. Finch, the Supreme Court stated that federal court drawn plans are generally held to stricter standards while engaging in redistricting. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1833-34, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977). Although the Court ostensibly established a per se *1505rule of stricter standards applying to federal court drawn plans in one breath, in the next breath the Court stepped back from that position when it acknowledged that stricter standards will apply to federal court drawn plans "unless there are persuasive justifications" for allowing a federal court to deviate from those standards. Connor, 431 U.S. at 414, 97 S.Ct. at 1833-34. Next, the majority contends that because a federal court engaged in redistricting is acting in a pseudo-legislative capacity, it must be subject to the same standards of review as a legislature engaging in redistricting. The federal court's role is quite distinct in this context, however, because it is providing a remedy to state legislative action that caused a constitutional or statutory violation.
. Indeed, one of the more troubling aspects of the majority's conclusion is the meager amount of evidence the plaintiffs put on in this case. This court placed the burden of persuasion on the plaintiffs to prove the absence of a narrowly tailored plan to further a compelling interest. The plaintiffs only presented two expert witnesses. The majority concedes, as it must, that one of the expert’s—Dr. Maggiotto—testimony was unreliable because his methodologies were unsound. Likewise, the plaintiffs' other expert testimony from Dr. Weber was unreliable because he actually testified, during the DeGrandy proceedings, in favor of the plan that formed the basis for District 3. The plaintiffs’ failed to meet their burden of persuasion.
. Indeed, the majority concedes that the De-Grandy court did not employ a "strict maximization policy.” Nonetheless, the majority attempts to characterize the DeGrandy court's attempt to create majority-minority districts that could "reasonably be done” to prevent further statutory violations as an incorrect application of Section 2.
. It is also important to note that the DeGrandy court considered the Section 2 analysis against the proposed plans to ensure that the plans did not dilute the votes of language or racial minorities. DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1083. Therefore, the majority’s mootness finding is clearly erroneous.
. The majority states that African-Americans in northeast Florida "consistently elected" their candidate of choice under the 1982 redistricting plan. I disagree. Nothing in the testimony the majority cites demonstrates that the African-American community consistently elected its candidate of choice. Nothing in the record supports the majority's assertion that African-Americans in northeast Florida have "consistently" elected a candidate of their choice.
. Ecological regression or ecological inference was employed in Thornburg v. Gingles and by the Eleventh Circuit in Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 1795, 131 L.Ed.2d 723 (1995).
. The majority finds that the success of some African-American candidates in District 3 demonstrates that minorities are capable of electing their candidates of choice. Clearly, that contention is erroneous in light of the Supreme Court's finding that "the election of a few minority candidates" is not indicative of the absence of minority vote dilution. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 75, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2779, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). Moreover, the Supreme Court went on to state that "the language of Section 2 and its legislative history plainly demonstrate that proof that some minority candidates have been elected does not foreclose a Section 2 claim." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 75, 106 S.Ct. at 2779.
. Even under the majority's erroneous standard for assessing racially polarized voting, two judges employing the same standard actually found racially polarized voting existed in Duval County, one of the more heavily populated counties in District 3. See Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1537 (11th Cir.1994) (Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.).
. Although the majority places great emphasis on the term "compactness,” it is interesting to note that the term has no standard definition among political scientists according to expert testimony from Dr. Scher. See also Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms "Bizarre Districts” in Voting Rights: Evaluating Election District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich.L.Rev. 483 (1993); Congressional Res.Serv., Congressional Districts: Objectively Evaluating Shapes, at 2-3 (1994).
. In order to expose the majority’s application of stricter standards for majority-minority districts compared to majority-white districts, a map of oddly shaped majority-white districts is attached. Def.Ex. 10, Tab 10. See Appendix.
. In addition to Florida Senate District 2 being essentially identical to Congressional District 3, a number of other state senate and house districts are bizarre in shape and traverse geographically dispersed areas of the state. See Def.Exh. at Tab 10.
.According to the expert testimony of Dr. Richard Scher, the only statutory or constitutional requirement for districting in the state of Florida *1513is "contiguity.” In fact, Dr. Scher testified that his review of districting plans in 1972 and 1980 revealed that compactness was given a very low priority. Dr. Scher went on to testify that his research reveals that District 3 fits within Florida’s traditional districting criteria.
. Note, however, that the state of Florida has several predominantly white districts that are unusually shaped or bizarre, and these districts are Senate Districts 4, 14, 18, and 35; State House Districts 10, 22, 25, 32, 36, 44, 56, 61, 66, 78, and 92. Def.Exh. at tab 10. See Appendix.
. The DeGrandy court declared that Mr. Russell was an expert in Florida redistricting policies. Moreover, Mr. Russell personally formulated a redistricting plan for the DeGrandy court's consideration.
. Surely, the majority realizes that no one in this case attempted to establish a Section 2 violation by solely relying on the present effects of past discrimination. Rather, the purpose of the inquiry into past discrimination is viewed in context with the three Gingles factors, socio-economic factors, lack of electoral success among other considerations to establish a Section 2 violation. Moreover, an independent consideration of the present effects of past discrimination relates to the finding of a compelling interest in remedying those effects of discrimination independent of a consideration of compliance with the Voting Rights Act.
. It is worth noting that Chief Judge Paul did not hear the evidence, see the exhibits, or participate in the fact finding in DeGrandy.
. The majority’s finding regarding the socioeconomic conditions of African-Americans in Florida compared to African-Americans in other areas of the country, absent some analysis, embarks this court on a dangerous path: specifically, hinting at some innate characteristic within the African-American community that may more readily account for the similar socio-economic conditions.
. Note, District 3 is one of the most highly integrated congressional districts in the country and contains only a bare majority of 50.6 percent of black voting age population and cannot be considered "packed” with more African-American voters than necessary to address the compelling governmental interests discussed above. It is interesting to note that many of the congressional districts challenged throughout the country as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders "are actually among the most integrated districts in the country. The electorate of North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District, the district described in Shaw is only 53.5 percent African-American; the districts condemned in Louisiana, Georgia, and Texas had roughly similar racial compositions.” See Pamela S. Karlan, "Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy," 1995 U.Chi.Legal F. 83, 94 (1995).
. First, the plaintiffs in this case did not allege vote dilution under Section 2. Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F.Supp. 1529, 1534 (N.D.Fla.1995). Second, the majority's rank speculation that African-American voters outside of District 3 will now be denied equal access to the political process is baseless as they offered no evidence to substantiate their claim. See Clark v. Calhoun County, 21 F.3d 92, 95 (5th Cir.1994) (recognizing that "[w]henever a majority black district is created to remedy a section 2 violation, the number of black voters in the other districts must necessarily be reduced."). More important, these plaintiffs lack standing to raise any claim for African-American voters outside of District 3. See United States v. Hays, — U.S. —, — - —, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 2435-37, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995). This lawsuit involves white voters within District 3 claiming that the configuration of District 3 violates the Equal Protection Clause, not that the configuration of District 3 diluted their vote or denied them equal access.
. As the majority correctly points out, the Florida legislature "cannot simply readopt the De-Grandy redistricting plan.” The Florida legislature can, however, adopt a plan identical to the DeGrandy plan or substantially similar to the DeGrandy plan as long as it is not done for predominantly race-based reasons. The majority cites no law that would prevent the Florida legislature from so doing. Moreover, if one reviews the maps contained in the Appendix, then it becomes clear that the odd shape of District 3 should not make it constitutionally infirm absent predominant racial considerations. District 3 is consistent with odd shaped majority white state house and senate districts where racial considerations presumably did not predominate.