concurring:
While I agree with the result reached by Judge Popovich, I find it necessary to express my views on the issue presented. I do not believe that the ultimate issue we have been asked to decide is as framed by the Majority. We are not being asked whether “a doctor has [a] duty to control his patient’s driving habits or to protect third persons from the injuries occasioned by unforeseeable accidents ...” (Opinion p. 1338, 1339) nor are we required to “resolve ... whether Pennsylvania law imposes a duty on physicians to protect third parties from harm which could be inflicted on such persons by the physician’s patients.” (opinion p. 1340) Clearly, a doctor has no duty to control a patient’s driving habits. Further, the appellate courts of this Commonwealth have established that in certain instances a physician has a duty to third parties which can result in liability if breached. DiMarco v. Lynch Homes, 525 Pa. 558, 583 A.2d 422 (1990); Dunkle v. Fd. Service East Inc., 400 Pa.Super. 58, 582 A.2d 1342 (1990). In those cases, our courts have *547established the basic parameters of potential liability of health care providers to third party non-patients. That liability rests upon foreseeability and the duty imposed by that foreseeability.
In this case, we have existing a statutory duty imposed upon a physician to report certain medical conditions to the Department of Transportation. The question presented is whether the failure to report a reportable condition subjects the doctor to third party liability when injury occurs as a result of the manifestation of that condition. Like the Majority, I conclude that the answer is no and therefore, I too affirm the trial court.
The issue before us is to determine if a private remedy should be implied. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) the United States Supreme Court set forth four criteria to be examined in making that determination. It focused on discerning the intent of Congress in enacting the legislation. Three of those factors are germane to a state court setting. They are:
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, -that is, does the statute create a ... right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there is any indication of a legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2008 (citations omitted).
Applying this test, I believe that none of the conditions are met. I begin my analysis by first examining the second prong of the Cort test. Clearly, if the legislation contained language expressly granting or denying a private cause of action, the inquiry would end. This statute does neither and, therefor, we must proceed to the application of the remaining criteria to our facts to discern the legislative intent.
I conclude that the legislation does not seek to benefit a particular class of persons but rather is meant to identify *548potential impaired drivers so that they may be screened to determine if their operating privileges should be revoked. While it is true that this benefits the public at large, it does not benefit the plaintiff as a member of a particular class for whose protection the statute was passed. Therefore, the first part of the test has not been met.
Also, I conclude that judicial intervention is not consistent with the underlying scheme of the legislation. While it can be argued that the potential of third-party liability would cause doctors to be more inclined to forward reports to PennDot, thereby identifying more impaired drivers, we must keep in mind that it is not the filing of a report that insures the patient will not drive. First, there is no guarantee that if a report is filed, a patient’s operating privileges would be revoked. The Department of Transportation could exercise its discretion and not revoke the privileges. In addition, if the department incorrectly failed to revoke Mr. Jackson’s drivers license, the plaintiffs would have no cause of action against the Commonwealth. Giovannitti v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, 113 Pa.Cmwlth. 572, 537 A.2d 966 (1988). Also, we must also be mindful of the fact that many people drive while their licence is suspended. Under these circumstances the imposition of liability on the defendant does not further the purposes of the legislation.
Therefore, I am in agreement with Judge Popovich that the failure of a physician to file a report with the Department of Transportation, as required by the act, is not a basis for a private cause of action seeking to impose third-party liability against that doctor.