dissenting. If the issue here were whether the Board erred in spite of finding that claimant imposed the durational limit on his employment, I could accept the decision. The issue instead is whether the Board erred in refusing to reopen the evidence to allow the employer to submit additional evidence. As the majority states, the Board has discretion in making such a decision. See Miner v. Department of Employment & Training, 144 Vt. 211, 213, 475 A.2d 233, 235 (1984). I believe the decision here fell well within the Board’s discretion and should be affirmed.
There are four reasons why I believe the Board properly exercised its discretion in refusing to reopen for additional evidence. The first is that the employer had the clear opportunity to present this evidence and failed to do so. The issue arose at the referee’s hearing on February 15, 1989. At that time, the issues were whether claimant left voluntarily and whether he was an independent contractor. On the former issue, the employer testified that he wanted claimant to stay beyond the month “as an employed veterinarian,” but they could not agree on a salary for such permanent employment. He did not testify that he wanted claimant to stay for a further period as a relief veterinarian paid at the daily rate.
Claimant, on the other hand, clearly testified that the employer set the duration of the temporary employment. He stated that the employer “had a three to four week period which he could use me” and that the employer “approached me for working for a specific time period, a four-week period.” He added that he had no arrangements with any other employer for work after he finished at the Shelburne Veterinary Hospital. He eventually was hired by another employer on July 1st, approximately a month after leaving the Shelburne Veterinary Hospital.
The employer was allowed to question the claimant but failed to ask about the circumstances surrounding the durational limit on claimant’s temporary work. Although offered the opportunity, the employer did not give any rebuttal testimony. Thus, the referee had no indication that there was any dispute in the testimony. Not surprisingly, the referee found that the employer set the one-month limit on the employment.
Second, the employer has no good explanation why he failed to develop the issue of the durational limit at the referee’s hear*324ing. The letter from employer’s counsel seeking reopening stated that the reason was to clarify the evidence in the record. It gave no reason why the employer did not clarify the evidence at the time of the referee’s hearing, when he heard evidence that he now alleges is clearly false and did nothing about it. In fact, the evidence was undisputed and clear that the employer, not the claimant, imposed the durational limit.
The only other ground was stated by the employer (not his counsel) at the Board hearing and is apparently accepted by the majority here. He stated, “none of that opportunity [to present the evidence] was afforded me or given to me because the issue was not clearly defined at the preliminary hearing.” To the contrary, he had the opportunity to present the evidence, and the issue was sufficiently defined. He was told he had to present a case on voluntary leaving and did so; he “cannot look to the [referee] to insure the completeness of his [case].” Olde & Co. v. Boudreau, 150 Vt. 321, 323, 552 A.2d 793, 794 (1988). Claimant clearly saw the relevancy of the issue and testified on it without being disputed by the employer.
Third, there is no indication that the employer will be able to prove what he now alleges. Claimant testified directly to the contrary, without any response by the employer. The employer alleges that claimant had to leave because of other responsibilities; the evidence shows that he was without work for a month until he took a job in Maine. The employer alleges that claimant submitted a letter that states that he imposed the limit on his employment. The letter is in the record and does not state what the employer claims for it. Although the employer claims his nurses will testify to certain facts, no affidavits were offered to show that testimony.
Fourth, the taking of additional evidence at this late date is very unfair to claimant. He collected one month of unemployment compensation and moved out of state. It will cost him as much as the unemployment benefits he received to appear at an additional hearing. If he does not appear, his credibility must be weighed from a two-year-old record against new testimony from the employer and his witnesses. If he does not prevail, he may become liable for the benefits he received. See 21 V.S.A. § 1347(a), (b).
Rule 16(L) of the rules of the Vermont Employment Security Board allows additional evidence to be presented to the referee *325only where “the parties are given an opportunity of examining, cross examining, and refuting such evidence.” See 2 Code of Vermont Rules, Rule 23010001, at 21 (1985). Claimant will have only an illusory opportunity to cross-examine the employer’s witnesses or to refute them. It is unjust to make him go through another hearing.
The majority’s response to this appears to be a new rule of law, roughly stated as follows: “No matter how unfair to the claimant, when the employer alleges that he has relevant evidence he would have presented if he knew fully and completely the law applicable to his case, he must be allowed to present that evidence.” We have rejected a rule like that for court proceedings. See Boudreau, 150 Vt. at 324, 552 A.2d at 795 (decided under V.R.C.P. 60(b)). This rule undermines finality of unemployment compensation adjudication and gives employers a second try to avoid payment of benefits at the expense of unrepresented claimants. It is a bad rule from which I must dissent.