dissenting:
As I see it the testimony produced by the plaintiff does not call for the application of Langville v. Glen Burnie Coach Lines, Inc., 233 Md. 181, 185-86 (1963). The majority relies primarily upon the testimony of Romeo, whom the plaintiff called as an adverse witness, Code, Art. 35, § 9 (1965 Repl. Vol.), to support its determination that the plaintiff by his own evidence had suggested two possible theories for the cause of the accident, one of which would absolve the defendant of liability. To a lesser degree the majority relies on the testimony of Officer Tague. It is true that a party calling an adverse party to testify is generally bound by his testimony. Trusty v. Wooden, 251 Md. 294, 297-99 (1968). But this does not mean that a party is bound by each and every statement, for the testimony may be contradicted or discredited by circumstances or other testimony. A jury is not bound to accept the testimony of a witness as true if *230it contains improbabilities, or if there are reasonable grounds for concluding that it is erroneous. P. Flanigan & Sons, Inc. v. Childs, 251 Md. 646 (1968) ; Harding v. Alpha Van Lines, Inc., 224 Md. 596 (1961) ; Proctor Electric Co. v. Zink, 217 Md. 22, 32-34 (1958).
I think Romeo’s testimony that the accident was caused by a sudden brake failure was inconsistent, contradictory and sufficiently discredited to free the plaintiff of any binding effect it might otherwise have. Romeo, it is true, testified that he could have stopped if his brakes had not failed. But this statement should not bind the plaintiff in light of the rest of his testimony and especially since it. was merely an opinion brought out in cross-examination. In Proctor Electric Co. v. Zink, supra, we said that “where the witness was adverse and his crucial evidence relied upon by the appellees was opinion testimony brought out in cross-examination, it was proper for the jury to say whether or not the circumstances or the improbability of his testimony showed that he was mistaken in some of his statements or opinions.” See also Williams v. Wheeler, 252 Md. 75, 80 (1969). It should be noted that Romeo had testified on direct examination that he was traveling “at least” 15 to 20 miles an hour when he approached the Larsen vehicle. He said he did not know exactly the distance between his vehicle and Larsen’s when he first applied the brakes, “but it wasn’t very far.” In his deposition he had stated that the distance was 25 feet. On cross-examination he said “it happened so fast I couldn’t judge the distance. I was pretty close to him when I applied the brakes. The second time.” Then in response to a question by his own counsel regarding the 25 foot distance, he said it probably was just a guess. In these circumstances Romeo’s statement that he could have stopped in time to avoid the collision was mere speculation, unsupported by any facts in evidence. In effect, Romeo was saying that he could have stopped his tractor-trailer carrying a load of about 15,000 pounds and traveling “at least” 15 to 20 *231miles an hour within 25 feet, a determination that should rest with the jury. In Martin Furniture Corp. v. Yost, 247 Md. 42, 53-55 (1967), we rejected a similar estimate of stopping ability, stating that the trial judge “attributed more significance to * * * [the driver’s] estimate of his ability to stop than is justified.”
There are, moreover, other inconsistencies in Romeo’s testimony. Although Romeo alleged that prior to the collision he had an unexpected and sudden brake failure, there were 48 feet of skid marks. The majority dismiss this evidence because Officer Tague testified it was impossible to determine whether they were made before or after the collision. But this ignores Romeo’s own statement in response to the question, “Did you use your emergency brake before this collision?” (Emphasis added.) He answered, “I used the hand throttle at the same time that I put my foot on the brake, at the same time, trying to stop the whole unit. That is what made it skid.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the evidence of skid marks need not prove negligence to have probative value. Here they were evidence to contradict Romeo’s statement that he had no brakes. His testimony is also discredited by his statement that the pressure buzzer, which is designed to warn of failing air pressure, did not sound before the accident; yet it did work, upon testing, after the accident. Finally, Romeo’s disposal of the “ruptured” air hose is a circumstance that ought to be considered in determining whether a jury would have reasonable grounds to disregard his testimony.
I think, in the circumstances, that the evidence, let alone the reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, was sufficient to entitle the jury to find that Romeo’s explanation as to how the accident occurred was discredited, at least to the extent that the jury could properly find either that he did not experience a brake failure, or if he did, that it was not the proximate cause of the collision. Wood v. Johnson, 242 Md. 446, 452-53 (1966). I would reverse and remand for a new trial.