concurring:
As I understand the opinion for the court, we first conclude — contrary to the opinion of the Committee on Admissions— that D.C.App.R. 46(c)(3)(i) no longer requires an applicant for admission to our bar without examination to demonstrate that he or she has been engaged in the active practice of law in another jurisdiction for the five years immediately preceding the application. The applicant has to show only that he or she has been “an active member in good standing” of the bar of another jurisdiction for that five year period, without regard to how much legal practice the applicant has actually conducted in that state. We also conclude that our rule, as thus interpreted, is not constitutionally infirm.
Next, we assume for the sake of argument that the Committee’s inquiry into the extent of Baker’s practice of law in Geor*686gia — which was material to his admission here under the Committee’s good faith understanding of the rule — was also material to the issue of Baker’s “good moral character” under Rule 46(d), even though we hold that the Committee’s inquiry itself was legally irrelevant under Rule 46(e)(3)(i).
Finally, although we defer to the Committee’s findings that Baker lacked candor and was evasive as to certain questions and tax returns germane to understanding his practice of law in Georgia, we conclude as a matter of law that Baker satisfied his burden of proving good moral character because he was honest and forthright enough for the Committee to find rather easily that he had not actively practiced law for five years in Georgia (and because there was no other negative information). In other words, Baker’s waffling on part of the inquiry was legally insignificant when compared to his candid admissions that made clear he could not meet an active practice requirement.
I write separately for two reasons. First, I would hold, not merely assume for argument’s sake, that the Committee’s good faith inquiry into the extent of Baker’s Georgia practice was material to the issue of his good moral character even though, as it turned out, the extent of Baker’s Georgia practice was legally irrelevant to his admission to the District of Columbia bar under Rule 46(c)(3)(i). The Committee’s interpretation of the rule, based in part on constitutional concerns, was not frivolous or ill-intentioned. Under such circumstances, I believe we should not leave any room for doubt: an applicant’s lack of candor or evasiveness cannot be excused merely because a question by the Committee on Admissions, asked in good faith without objection, turns out to be legally irrelevant. The situation would be different, of course, if an applicant objected and refused to answer a question because of an expressly stated intent to test the legality of a particular admissions requirement.
Second, because we must accept Committee fact-finding supported by the record and must afford the Committee’s recommendation “some deference," In re Man-ville, 494 A.2d 1289, 1293 (D.C.1985), I am troubled about overriding the Committee’s conclusion that Baker lacked candor and was evasive to the point that he failed to carry his burden to prove good moral character. The Committee observed Baker in person on at least two occasions; our perception is limited to a written transcript. Furthermore, there was no dissenting vote in the Committee’s recommendation to deny Baker admission to our bar. Nonetheless, having read the transcript of Baker’s formal hearing several times, I am prepared to vote for his admission. His rambling, confusing responses do not suggest to me lapses of character as much as they reflect a sheer inability to communicate. I am satisfied that on this record we would be acting arbitrarily if we were to deny Baker admission — a decision that “remains for this court,” not the committee, “to make.” Id.