concurring.
I agree with the result reached by the majority in this case and its decision to utilize the State Constitution to vindicate a right seemingly neglected by the federal Constitution. I write *359separately to expose the reasoning that I find implicit in our decision and to explain more fully the judicial principles which I believe underlie the salutary resort to state constitutions as a fountainhead of individual rights.
I
The United States Supreme Court has clearly recognized that each state has the “sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.” PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040, 64 L.Ed.2d 741, 752 (1980). See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 718, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1218, 43 L.Ed.2d 570, 575 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 730, 734 (1967). With growing frequency, states are now availing themselves of this resource, finding in their own constitutions greater protections for citizens’ rights than those found to exist under parallel provisions in the federal Constitution. See, e.g., Shiras v. Britt, 267 Ark. 97, 589 S.W.2d 18, 19 (1979); People v. Rucker, 26 Cal.3d 368, 389-391, 605 P.2d 843, 856, 162 Cal.Rptr. 13, 26 (1980); People v. Privitera, 23 Cal.3d 697, 710, 591 P.2d 919, 926, 153 Cal.Rptr. 431, 438 (1979), cert. den., 444 U.S. 949, 100 S.Ct. 419, 62 L.Ed.2d 318 (1979); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 369 n.6, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (1974); O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1979); Keene Publishing Corp. v. Cheshire County Superior Court, 119 N.H. 710, 406 A.2d 137, 138 (1979); Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 79, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1194, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 174 (1979), cert. den. 446 U.S. 984, 100 S.Ct. 2965, 64 L.Ed.2d 840 (1980); Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 436, 442, 399 N.E.2d 518, 521, 525, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630, 643-44 (1979); Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 160-61, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1173, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 43-44 (1978); People v. Onofre, 72 A.D.2d 268, 270, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566, 568 (1980). See generally Brennan, “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,” 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489, 491-95 (1977); Countryman, “The Role of a Bill of Rights in a Modern *360State Constitution: Why a State Bill of Rights?,” 45 Wash.L. Rev. 454, 45&-59, 470-74 (1970); Falk, “Foreword The State Constitution: A More Than ‘Adequate’ Nonfederal Ground,” 61 Cal.L.Rev. 273, 281-85 (1973); Force, “State ‘Bill of Rights’: A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance,” 3 Valparaiso L.Rev. 125, 129, 142-43 (1969); Howard, “State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,” 62 Va.L.Rev. 873, 874-77, 910-11 (1976); Howard, “The Supreme Court and Federalism,” in The Courts: The Pendulum of Federalism 49, 71-76 (Roscoe Pound American Trial Lawyers Foundation 1979); Paulsen, “State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms,” 4 Vand.L.Rev. 620, 621 (1951); Project Report, “Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights,” 8 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 271, 285 (1973).
Our own courts have followed this same course, recognizing the New Jersey Constitution as an alternative and independent source of individual rights. We have expressed the firm belief that “state constitutions exist as a cognate source of individual freedoms and that state constitutional guarantees of these rights may indeed surpass the guarantees of the federal constitution.” State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 553 (1980). We have, therefore, felt free to extend the guarantees of our State Constitution to a panoply of rights deemed essential to both the quality of individual life and the preservation of personal liberty. See, Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287 (1982) (enhanced equal protection accorded individual right to health and privacy); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 227 (1981) (standing to ■challenge validity of car search); Schmid, 84 N.J. at 560 (right of free speech on private university campus); State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25, 30, 34 (1979) (privacy-based freedom from “unreasonable searches and seizures”); State v. Tropea, 78 N.J. 309, 313 n.2 (1978) (double jeopardy and fundamental fairness); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 79 (1978) (equal protection); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 216, 217 (1977) (right of sexual privacy); Taxpayers Assn. of Weymouth Tp. v. Weymouth Tp., 80 N.J. 6 (1976) (equal protection); In re Quinlan, 70 *361N.J. 10, 19, 40-41, 51 (1976), cert. den. sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922, 97 S.Ct. 319, 50 L.Ed.2d 289 (1976) (right of choice to terminate life support systems as aspect of right of privacy); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353 (1975) (freedom from “unreasonable searches and seizures”); So. Burl. Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Tp. of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 175, cert. den. and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808, 96 S.Ct. 18, 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975) (zoning obligation of municipalities to provide housing opportunities for lower income groups); State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 513-14 (1975) (double jeopardy and fundamental fairness); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 482, 509 (1973), cert. den. sub nom., Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973) (equal protection accorded right to an education); Worden v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 345-346 (1972) (right to vote). Justice Pashman emphasizes this point in his concurring opinion, ante at 350.
This Court has been fully responsive to its judicial role in ultimately resolving questions that concern its citizens. As Justice Brennan has observed: “[I]t is the state courts at all levels, not the federal courts, that finally determine the overwhelming number of the vital issues of life, liberty and property that trouble countless human beings of this Nation every year.” Brennan, “Introduction: Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Mountain,” 10 Seton Hall L.Rev. xii (1979). There is a danger, however, in state courts turning uncritically to their state constitutions for convenient solutions to problems not readily or obviously found elsewhere. The erosion or dilution of constitutional doctrine may be the eventual result of such an expedient approach.1 See Collins, “Reliance on State Constitutions — Away *362From a Reactionary Approach,” 9 Hastings Const.L.Q. 1, 2 (1981); Bice, “Anderson and the Adequate State Ground,” 45 S.Cal.L.Rev. 750, 766 (1972). See generally “Developments — the Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights,” 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1323, 1362-66 (1982).
It would be unfortunate if our decision today were cast in that light. The majority recognizes that, as a matter of federal constitutional law, personal telephone records are not constitutionally protected. Ante at 344-345. It then invokes the State charter to achieve a result unattainable under federal law.
There is surely no impropriety in state courts building an independent body of state constitutional law. See Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,” 73 Harv.L. Rev. 1 (1959). Moreover, there is no mandate that a state court explain itself when it invokes the state charter to achieve a result unavailable under federal law. See, e.g., Collins, supra, 9 Hastings Const.L.Q. at 16-18; Kamp, “Private Abridgement of Speech and State Constitutions,” 90 Yale L.J. 165 (1980); Kelman, “Forward: Rediscovering the State Constitutional Bill of Rights,” 27 Wayne L.Rev. 413 (1981); Wilkes, “The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court,” 62 Ky.L.J. 421 (1974). Indeed, the trend of state courts using their own constitutions to avoid restrictive federal rules on individual rights can be regarded as a sign of healthy federalism for which no justification is required, since federal and state systems are in many respects separate sovereigns, each free to act without regard to the wishes of the other. Note, supra, 13 Am.Crim.L.Rev. at 748.
Nevertheless, our national judicial history and traditions closely wed federal and state constitutional doctrine. It is not entirely realistic, sound or historically accurate to regard the separation between the federal and state systems as a schism. *363The states are not always free to act independently under their own constitutions. State constitutions may be used to supplement or expand federally guaranteed constitutional rights. However, they may never be used to undermine or circumscribe them. U.S.Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. See State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 69 (1972) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring). Furthermore, a considerable measure of cooperation must exist in a truly effective federalist system. Both federal and state courts share the goal of working for the good of the people to ensure order and freedom under what is publicly perceived as a single system of law. See Hart, “Relations Between State and Federal Law,” 54 Colum.L.Rev. 489 (1954); Note, supra, 13 Am.Crim.L.Rev. at 748-49. Moreover, while a natural monolithic legal system is not contemplated, some consistency and uniformity between the state and federal governments in certain areas of judicial administration is desirable.
For these reasons, state courts should be sensitive to developments in federal law. Federal precedent in areas addressed by similar provisions in our state constitutions can be meaningful and instructive. We have recently recognized the importance of federal sources of constitutional doctrine. See General Assembly v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 381-384 (1982). The opinions of the Supreme Court, while not controlling on state courts construing their own constitutions, are nevertheless important guides on the subjects which they squarely address.
It is therefore appropriate, in my estimation, to identify and explain standards or criteria for determining when to invoke our State Constitution as an independent source for protecting individual rights. See State v. Simpson, 95 Wash.2d 170, 200-02, 622 P.2d 1199, 1217 (1980) (Horowitz, J., dissenting). See also Bice, supra, 45 S.Cal.L.Rev. at 765-68; Deukmejian & Thompson, “All Sail and No Anchor — Judicial Review Under the California Constitution,” 6 Hastings Const.L.Q. 975, 987-96 (1979); Howard, supra, 62 Val.L.Rev. at 934-44. There are several considerations that are relevant and important in making that determination. * *364(1) Textual Language — A state constitution’s language may itself provide a basis for reaching a result different from that which could be obtained under federal law. Textual language can be relevant in either of two contexts. First, distinctive provisions of our State charter may recognize rights not identified in the federal Constitution. For example, the New Jersey Constitution provides for a right to education (N.J.Const., Art. VIII, § 4, par. 1) which has served as the basis for protections not afforded by the federal Constitution. Robinson, 62 N.J. 473.
Second, the phrasing of a particular provision in our charter may be so significantly different from the language used to address the same subject in the federal Constitution that we can feel free to interpret our provision on an independent basis. Thus, in Schmid, we noted that the unique language of the New Jersey charter’s free speech clause (N.J.Const., Art. 1, par. 6) was one indication that the provision was meant to be broader in scope than the First Amendment. 84 N.J. at 557. See Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 207-08 (1982) (Schreiber, J., dissenting). See also State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160, 169 (Me.1974) (broadened right to jury trial suggested by difference between Me.Const. art. I, § 6, guaranteeing jury trial in “all criminal prosecutions,” and federal language limiting right to jury trial to “Crimes,” U.S.Const. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3); Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash.2d 230, 240-43, 635 P.2d 108, 114-16 (1981) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (Wash. Const. art. I, § 5 mandates broader protections of speech than U.S.Const. amend. I, because the former is not confined to cases involving state action). Moreover, the fundamental right to choose to have an abortion is entitled to enhanced protection under our State Constitution’s doctrine of equal protection, found to be implicit in N.J.Const., Art. 1, par. 1. Right to Choose, 91 N.J. at 302-304. And individual rights involving personal privacy may be recognized under the State Constitution’s bill of rights. See In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 250 (1981) (recognizing the right of all people to enjoy and pursue their individual well-being and happiness).
*365(2) Legislative History — Whether or not the textual language of a given provision is different from that found in the federal Constitution, legislative history may reveal an intention that will support reading the provision independently of federal law. For example, in Schmid, we explored the legislative history in determining that our free speech clause was intended to be more expansive than the First Amendment. 84 N.J. at 557. See Maressa, 89 N.J. at 207-08 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). See also State v. Miyaski, 62 Hawaii 269, 281-82, 614 P.2d 915, 922-23 (1980) (Hawaii Const., art. I, § 10 meant to incorporate the self-incrimination protections provided by U.S.Const. amend. V as interpreted at time state constitution was adopted, but not to incorporate subsequent erosion of the federal standard).
(3) Preexisting State Law — Previously established bodies of state law may also suggest distinctive state constitutional rights. See Schmid, 84 N.J. at 557. State law is often responsive to concerns long before they are addressed by constitutional claims. Howard, supra, 62 Val.L.Rev. at 1416-18. Such preexisting law can help to define the scope of the constitutional right later established. Id.
(4) Structural Differences — Differences in structure between the federal and state constitutions might also provide a basis for rejecting the constraints of federal doctrine at the state level. The United States Constitution is a grant of enumerated powers to the federal government. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 225-26 (1977) (Schreiber, J., concurring); Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 8-9 (1957). Our State Constitution, on the other hand, serves only to limit the sovereign power which inheres directly in the people and indirectly in their elected representatives.2 Schmid, 84 N.J. at 558; Smith v. Penta, 81 N.J. 65, 74 (1980); Gangemi, 25 N.J. *366at 8-9. Hence, the explicit affirmation of fundamental rights in our Constitution can be seen as a guarantee of those rights and not as a restriction upon them. Schmid, 84 N.J. at 558. See also Alderwood, 96 Wash.2d at 238-39, 242, 635 P.2d at 113, 115 (state action requirement is dictated by conservative pressures peculiar to federal constitutional role and, thus, is not applicable at the state level).
(5) Matters of Particular State Interest or Local Concern — A state constitution may also be employed to address matters of peculiar state interest or local concern. When particular questions are local in character and do not appear to require a uniform national policy, they are ripe for decision under state law. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976) (decision of what salary level to pay state employees properly reposes in states); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 13 L.Ed. 996 (1851) (pilotage is not of such a nature as to require uniform rule throughout country). Moreover, some matters are uniquely appropriate for independent state action. For example, in Alston, we adopted a rule of standing to challenge searches and seizures that is broader than the federal standard. 88 N.J. at 227. We felt free to do so because that question implicated the management of our own court system, which is of peculiarly local concern. It also reflected a strong state policy in favor of access to our courts and liberalized standing to vindicate legal claims. See, e.g., Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482, 490-91 (1980); N.J. Chamber of Commerce v. N.J. Elec. Law Enforce. Comm., 82 N.J. 57, 67 (1980); Home Builders League of South Jersey, Inc. v. Tp. of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 132 (1979); Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971).
(6) State Traditions — A state’s history and traditions may also provide a basis for the independent application of its constitution. Thus, in Schmid, we emphasized New Jersey’s strong tradition of protecting individual expressional and associational rights in holding that the New Jersey Constitution provided *367greater protections for the right to free speech than those found in the federal Constitution. And in State v. Belluci, 81 N.J. 531 (1979), we gave the state constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel more expansive protection than that found in the federal Constitution because of our firm policy regarding the proper role of attorneys in criminal trials. See also Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 399-401 (Alaska 1970) (broad availability of jury trial for petty offenses when constitution was adopted); In re Advisory Opinion to the Senate, 108 RI. 628, 630, 278 A.2d 852, 853 (1971) (State’s tradition of requiring twelve-person juries in criminal cases read into R.I.Const., art. 1, §§ 10, 15).
(7) Public Attitudes — Distinctive attitudes of a state’s citizenry may also furnish grounds to expand constitutional rights under state charters. While we have never cited this criterion in our decisions, courts in other jurisdictions have pointed to public attitudes as a relevant factor in their deliberations. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 503-04 (Alaska 1975) (broad privacy protection mandated by Alaskans’ desire for individualistic lifestyles); District Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, -, 1980 Mass.Adv.Sh. 2231, 2245, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1282 (death penalty contrary to prevailing standards of decency in Massachusetts, as evidenced by absence of any use of death penalty in Commonwealth since 1948).
The explication of standards such as these demonstrates that the discovery of unique individual rights in a state constitution does not spring from pure intuition but, rather, from a process that is reasonable and reasoned. This process does not require presumptive weight to be accorded the federal experience, just an intelligent awareness and assessment of that experience.3 *368See, e.g., General Assembly, 90 N.J. at 381-384. The enumerated criteria, which are synthesized from a burgeoning body of authority, are essentially illustrative, rather than exhaustive. They share a common thread — that distinctive and identifiable attributes of a state government, its laws and its people justify recourse to the state constitution as an independent source for recognizing and protecting individual rights.
II
Applying these principles to this case, I am satisfied that adequate grounds exist for invoking the State Constitution. New Jersey’s long history of statutory and legal protection for telephonic communications makes independent resort to the State charter appropriate in the face of conflicting federal law.
The majority correctly recognizes that toll billing records are not entitled to protection under the federal Constitution. Ante at 342-343. The Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of telephonic communications. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). However, it does not protect “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public.” Id. at 351, 88 S.Ct. at 511,19 L.Ed.2d at 582. Hence, in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a pen register may be used to record the numbers dialed from one’s home phone without violating that individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.4 I agree with the majority that the rationale of Smith would appear just as applicable to the telephone company’s release of billing records.5 *369In fact, every federal court that has addressed the issue has held that phone billing records are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Reporters Com. v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 593 F.2d 1030, 1046 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. den., 440 U.S. 949, 99 S.Ct. 1431, 59 L.Ed.2d 639 (1979); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 n.10 (9 Cir. 1977), cert. den., 434 U.S. 1045, 98 S.Ct. 889, 54 L.Ed.2d 796 (1978); Nolan v. United States, 423 F.2d 1031, 1044 (10 Cir. 1969), cert. den., 400 U.S. 848, 91 S.Ct. 47, 27 L.Ed.2d 85 (1970); United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536, 542 (2 Cir.), cert. den., 396 U.S. 879, 90 S.Ct. 150, 24 L.Ed.2d 136 (1969).
The question then becomes whether there exists a right cognizable under our State Constitution to protect the privacy of telephone billing records. As I have already explained, I would invoke the State charter as an independent source for protecting individual rights when there are sound reasons grounded in State law, tradition or policy to do so. I find such reasons present in this case.
Defendant Hunt claims that the release of his home telephone billing records violated Article 1, par. 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. That provision mirrors the language of the Fourth Amendment. However, identical language does not necessarily imply identical meaning. As Justice Holmes once stated: “A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought.” Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 38 S.Ct. 158, 159, 62 L.Ed.2d 372, 376 (1918). Thus, we have held that “[e]ven if the language of the state constitutional and federal constitutional provisions were identical, this Court could *370give differing interpretations to the provisions.”6 Schmid, 84 N.J. at 557 n.8. Accord, Johnson, 68 N.J. at 353 n.2.
While I agree with the majority that, as a general rule, federal and state courts should apply uniform rules governing search and seizure, ante at 344, the “search and seizure” provisions of the federal and state constitutions have not always been found to be coterminous. See Johnson, 68 N.J. at 353.
In this instance, our concern is with the privacy of one’s telephone billing record, which is an inescapable incident of telephone use. A survey of New Jersey law reveals an historial pattern of providing the utmost protection for telephonic communications. As noted by the majority opinion, ante at 345-346, the New Jersey Legislature saw fit to condemn the tapping of telephone lines long before the Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in Katz and Congress responded by passing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2520. See L. 1930, c. 215, § 1 at 987 (making it a misdemeanor to tap or make any connection with a telephone line or to aid any person to cause that to be done). This reflected an early and consistent public policy against this kind of invasion of privacy. Morss v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 358-59 (1957). Our current statute, the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 et seq, which generally parallels the present federal act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2520, has been construed as containing greater protections and stricter requirements than the federal statute. See, e.g., State v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418, 437 (1981) (State statutory wiretap minimization provision is more stringent than its federal counterpart); State v. Cerbo, 78 N.J. 595, *371601 (1979) (State must seal tapes of completed wiretap immediately upon expiration of the tap); In re Wiretap Communication, 76 N.J. 255, 260 (1978) (wiretap statutes, implicating individual rights of privacy, are to be strictly construed to limit potential invasion); State v. Molinaro, 117 N.J.Super. 276 (Law Div.1971), rev’d, 122 N.J.Super. 181 (App.Div.1973) (intrinsic as well as extrinsic minimization required; legislative mandate of suppression must be enforced), cited with approval in Catania, 85 N.J. at 445; State v. Sidoti, 116 N.J.Super. 70 (Law Div.1971), rev’d on other grounds, 120 N.J.Super. 208 (App.Div.1972) (special need required to warrant wiretap of public telephone); State v. Christy, 112 N.J.Super. 48 (Law Div.1970) (requirements for wiretap order must be scrupulously met). But see State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518 (1972), overruled by Catania, 85 N.J. at 431. Thus, through our statutory and case law, it has been the firm policy in this State to protect the privacy of telephonic communications to the fullest extent possible.
Of course, what is involved in this case is not the conversation itself but the record that a call was made. In a strict sense, the divulgence of the number dialed to make a call reveals nothing about the content of the conversation that transpired as a result of that call. Nevertheless, such information reveals a great deal about one’s associational contacts and, inferentially, about the nature of one’s communications. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 748, 99 S.Ct. at 2584, 61 L.Ed.2d at 231 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For this identical reason, I wrote separately in the Wire Communication case to express my view that the telephone company could be compelled under the Wiretap Act to conduct an in-progress trace in conjunction with a valid wiretap, subject to continuous judicial supervision and all of the strict procedural protections provided by that Act.7 As I noted in that case, in the area of *372telephonic communications, the number dialed and the conversation that follows are “inextricably related.” 76 N.J. at 271.
This interrelationship is evident from the very facts of this case. The phone billing records were sought as a preliminary step to obtaining a wiretap order. The police sought the information contained in those records to establish probable cause for a wiretap. The records revealed more than just numbers. They revealed enough about the nature of defendant’s interactions and associations with other persons to justify allowing police to intrude on private communications. Since the content of telephone conversations themselves are unquestionably protected under our State charter, so logically should the record that conversations occurred. Thus, I agree with the majority that “all the information which [an individual] furnishes with respect to a particular call is private.” Ante at 347. I would also urge that the use of such records be regulated strictly in accordance with the standards of the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act. See Wire Communications, 76 N.J. at 283 (Handler, J., dissenting).
The protection we now accord telephone billing records follows the course long set under New Jersey law. As previously noted, our State has been a strong proponent in the area of protecting telephonic communications. We have safeguarded the privacy of such communications to the broadest extent possible. Consistent with this longstanding statutory and legal tradition of extending the utmost solicitude to telephonic communications, I am satisfied that the New Jersey Constitution protects the privacy of all aspects of telephone use, including toll billing records. Therefore, I concur in the opinion of the Court.
PASHMAN and HANDLER, JJ., concurring in the result.
*373For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices PASHMAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, HANDLER, POLLOCK and O’HERN — 7.
For reversal —None.
This, in a sense, has occurred in California, labeled “the birthplace of th[e] new judicial independence” by one commentator. Note, “State Constitutional Guarantees as Adequate State Ground: Supreme Court Review and Problems of Federalism,” 13 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 737, 740 (1976). The voters of that state recently passed a referendum requiring state courts to give the same meaning to provisions of the California Constitution as is given to parallel provisions in the U.S. Constitution. See Proposition 8 (adopted June 8, 1982). The refer*362endum may affect the ability of the California courts to give their own charter independent force.
For example, the First Amendment simply provides that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,” U.S.Const. amend. I, while the New Jersey Constitution affirmatively guarantees that “[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,” N.J. Const. (1947), Art. 1, par. 6.
To the extent that Justice Pashman suggests in his concurring opinion that this approach establishes a presumption in favor of federal constitutional interpretations, supra at 355, no decision of this Court has recognized such a presumption, and nothing in this opinion or in the majority opinion, as I read it, calls for or encourages the establishment of such a presumption.
A pen register is “a mechanical device attached to a given telephone line and usually installed at a central telephone facility. It records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from that line.” United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.1, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1842 n.1, 40 L.Ed.2d 341, 372 n.1 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
If anything, the pen register situation presents a stronger case for recognizing a constitutionally protectable privacy interest than does the billing records example. While a phone billing record notes only toll calls, a pen *369register records all numbers dialed, including local calls. Thus, the pen register provides more information than a toll billing record, making it arguably more intrusive of privacy. Moreover, the telephone company has a proper business reason for keeping toll billing records. However, it is under no compulsion to install pen register and would not have done so in Smith had the police not requested it.
As Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court has observed: “It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions textually identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to mirror their federal counterpart. The lesson of history is otherwise: the Bill of Rights was based upon the corresponding provisions of the first state constitutions, rather than the reverse.” People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 329 (1975).
The mechanics of an in-progress trace are fully described in State v. Hibbs, 123 N.J.Super. 152, 154-59 (Cty.Ct.1972), aff’d, 123 N.J.Super. 124 (App.Div.1973). To perform the trace, the telephone company connects a “trouble recorder” on the lines of the tapped phone. Like a pen register, the recorder *372then prints out a record identifying the phone number of all incoming calls. Id. at 156. The recorder neither monitors the call in any way nor interferes with the sending or receiving of calls. Id. at 157.