I concur, but write separately to emphasize three points.
First, summary adjudication of a cause of action must be (a) denied where the material facts are disputed, and (b) granted only when the undisputed facts establish the moving party’s right to prevail as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c), (f)(1).) In either event, no facts are adjudicated (Soto v. State of California (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 196, 199 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 11]), which means an order granting summary adjudication could not support a statement by anyone that any facts had been decided or “established.”
Second, section 437c expressly prohibits any comment by anybody (the trial court, the parties or a witness) about an order granting or denying a motion for summary adjudication. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (n)(3).)
*1140Third, the trial court’s comments in this case (which were tantamount to a directed verdict) prove the wisdom of the legislative amendments making it clear that, when some but not all causes of action are disposed of by summary adjudication, the remaining causes of action are to proceed to trial on their own merits, unfettered by references to whatever orders the court may have made about other causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (n)(1), (n)(3).) For all we know, Raghavan might have had tactical reasons for putting on less than a full court press when opposing BSS’s motion for summary adjudication of the defamation cause of action, something he was plainly entitled to do without risk of the penalty imposed at trial.
Respondents’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 18, 2006, S139616. Baxter, J., and Chin, J., did not participate therein.