Opinion
LILLIE, P. J.In this class action involving Los Angeles County general relief benefits, plaintiffs appeal from a December 14, 1992, order denying plaintiffs’ motion to enforce judgment and for permanent injunction. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in refusing to enforce a July 1991 stipulated judgment on two grounds: (1) subsequent legislation (Assem. Bill No. 2883 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 1992, ch. 721) purporting to invalidate the stipulated judgment constitutes an unconstitutional violation *1199of the contract clauses of the federal and state Constitutions; and (2) as applied to the stipulated judgment, the subsequent legislation violates the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution. As the factual background of this appeal involves a series of legislative amendments involving general assistance aid, we first set out the pertinent legislative framework.
Legislative and Procedural Background
A. Legislative Framework
“County general assistance ‘is a program of last resort for indigent and disabled persons unable to qualify for other kinds of public benefits.’ ” (Whitfield v. Board of Supervisors (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 451, 456 [277 Cal.Rptr. 815].) Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000 (hereinafter section 17000) imposes a mandatory duty upon the counties to support “ ‘all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident.’ ” (Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 676 [94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231].) “Section 17001 imposes a further mandatory duty on the board of supervisors of each county to adopt ‘ “standards of aid and care” ’ for the indigent and dependent poor.” (Whitfield v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 456.)
“The counties have broad discretion to set eligibility standards for, and conditions upon, their general assistance aid. (Clay v. Tryk (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 119, 124 . . . .) However, ‘ “ ‘[i]n administering general assistance relief the county acts as an agent of the state. [Citation.] When a statute confers upon a state agency the authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific or otherwise carry out its provisions, the agency’s regulations must be consistent, not in conflict with the statute, and reasonably necessary to effectuate its purpose. [Citation.]’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Oberlander v. County of Contra Costa (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 535, 539 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 182].)
Prior to 1991 legislation, case law had held that a board of supervisors’ establishment of general assistance grant levels must be based on a factual study of actual subsistence costs in the county. (Whitfield v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 457.) Minimum subsistence, at the least, must include allocations for housing, food, utilities, clothing, transportation and medical care (ibid), and “. . . a county must demonstrate reasonable support in the administrative record for the factual determinations used to set grant levels and . . . the board of supervisors has a duty to consider the actual studies.” (Id. at p. 459.) “The study ... is often called a Boehm study after the case which first held that the level of general assistance *1200payments must be set with reference to a factual study of what amount is needed for minimum subsistence. (Boehm v. County of Merced (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 447, 452 . . . .) In a subsequent decision after remand the appellate court held that a general assistance grant must include moneys for basic necessities which it defined as food, clothing, housing (including utilities), transportation and medical care. (Boehm v. Superior Court, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d 494, 502 (Boehm II).)” (Oberlander v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at pp. 541-542.)
“In 1991 the Legislature enacted section 17000.5 which took effect June 30 and provides in pertinent part: ‘(a) The board of supervisors in any county may adopt a general assistance standard of aid that is 62 percent of a guideline that is equal to the 1991 federal official poverty line and may annually adjust that guideline in an amount equal to any adjustment provided under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 11200) of Part 3 [Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)] for establishing a maximum aid level in the county, (b) The adoption of a standard of aid pursuant to this section shall constitute a sufficient standard of aid. [f] (d) For purposes of this section, “federal official poverty line” means the same as it is defined in subsection (2) of Section 9902 of Title 42 of the United States Code.’ ” (Oberlander v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 539.)
“The official poverty guideline for 1991 was set at varying dollar amounts based upon the size of the family unit. Thus for a family of one the figure was set at $6,620, for a family of two $8,880, for a family of three $11,140 and so forth.” (11 Cal.App.4th at p. 539.)
As stated by the court in Oberlander, the County of Contra Costa “maintains that the provision of section 17000.5 setting 62 percent of the federal poverty level as ‘a sufficient standard of aid’ was the legislative equivalent of a repeal of Boehm. It argues that after the enactment of section 17000.5, any county which meets the 62 percent requirement has by definition provided minimum subsistence needs, ergo the study requirement need not be met. We find that reading of the section to be compelling.” (11 Cal.App.4th at p. 542.)
In August 1992, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 2883, urgency legislation, effective on September 14, 1992, and which amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000.5 in certain respects which are not pertinent to this appeal. Section 2 of Assembly Bill No. 2883 provides in pertinent part: “(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there is a fiscal emergency in the State of California, which was not anticipated and that affects the ability of counties to provide welfare services in the state. *1201Counties that have entered into agreements, including court-ordered stipulated judgments, which require the payment of general assistance grants above the amounts provided under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 11200) of Part 3 of Division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, will suffer serious consequences if forced to maintain those levels. Therefore, it is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the provisions of existing' agreements, including court-ordered stipulated judgments, that require counties to provide general assistance grants above the current levels provided under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 11200) of Part 3 of Division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.” Subdivision (b) of section 2 declared the provisions of any such agreement or court-ordered stipulated judgment “null and void."
In light of the above legislative history, we set out the procedural background of this action, which had its genesis under the law as set out in Boehm, and which culminated in a stipulated judgment filed at about the time of the effective date of Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000.5 on June 30, 1991.
B. Procedural Background
In December 1990, three individual plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all those similarly situated, filed a verified complaint against the defendants (hereinafter referred to collectively as County) for injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief, and in the alternative, for peremptory writ of mandate, challenging the adequacy of County’s general relief grant of $312 per month, which they had been receiving since July 1, 1989. The complaint alleged that there was no evidence presented to County in 1989 or 1990 to support the maintenance of the current $312 per month grant level, which had not changed since 1988; that representatives of plaintiffs’ class had presented evidence that the grant for a single person should be increased to at least $420 per month; that County arbitrarily and capriciously declined to adjust the monthly grant allowances in 1989 and 1990 and failed to conduct any study or survey and failed to make any accurate, objective or factual determinations as to the actual costs of minimum subsistence in County.
The complaint further alleged that County’s failure to increase the monthly grant constituted a violation of mandatory duties under section 17000 and County’s failure to provide an adequate monthly allowance for shelter has rendered and continues to render many general relief recipients homeless. A separate cause of action was asserted for recovery of retroactive benefits since July 1, 1989, “because [plaintiffs] have been receiving inadequate GR [general relief] benefits, which were and are substantially less than they were and are legally entitled to receive.”
*1202In an answer filed in April 1991, County denied the allegations of the complaint and asserted numerous affirmative defenses.
In June 1991, the parties executed a stipulation for settlement and entry of judgment, which provided that the court may enter a judgment in the form attached thereto, provided that the court hold a fairness hearing on the judgment and approve of the stipulated settlement agreement of the class action. The stipulation also recited that “This settlement agreement, the terms listed in the judgment, and the exhibits attached thereto, constitute the entire agreement among the parties hereto and no other representations, warranties or inducements have been made to any party concerning this settlement agreement.”
The stipulation also provided that it “shall not in any way be construed as an admission by defendants, or any of them, of any liability whatsoever, or as an admission by defendants or any of them, that they have acted wrongfully with respect to the class or any other person, or as an admission by defendants, or any of them, that the class or any person has any rights whatsoever against defendants or any of them.”
At a July 24, 1991, hearing, the court approved the settlement agreement; in a July 30, 1991, written order, the court ordered entry of the stipulated judgment.
The stipulated judgment provided essentially that for each fiscal year from July 1, 1991, through June 30, 1996, the general relief monthly cash grant for a single person household shall be the greater of $341 per month or the monthly amount for a single person household under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) grant. Under certain circumstances not pertinent to this appeal, the judgment afforded plaintiffs an option to terminate. Paragraph 15 of the judgment further provided that “the cash grant aspects of the GR program ... are adequate and sufficient to meet the minimum subsistence needs of Los Angeles County GR recipients which are targeted for assistance by such cash grant amounts, and are thereby adequate and sufficient to meet and discharge any and all legal obligations of defendants which are alleged in the Complaint. . . .”
In paragraph 16 of the judgment, plaintiffs waived their rights to receive retroactive general relief benefits for the fiscal years 1989-1990 and 1990-1991.
Paragraph 17 of the judgment stated: “Nothing in this judgment shall prohibit defendants from implementing any other policies or practices relating to the general relief program required by changes in state or federal law. *1203In the event that the California State Legislature abolishes all obligations under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 17000, or takes control of or otherwise assumes the County’s obligations under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 17000, the terms of this , judgment will automatically expire.”
In October 1992, plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce judgment and for permanent injunction; plaintiffs alleged that County, in reliance on Assembly Bill No. 2883, proposed cutting the single person general relief grant from $341 to $299; plaintiffs asserted that the terms of the stipulated judgment should be enforced without regard to Assembly Bill No. 2883, which they alleged was unconstitutional as applied to the judgment on two grounds: the statute violated the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution, and violated the prohibition against impairment of contracts in the federal and state Constitutions.
In opposition to plaintiffs’ motion, defendants argued that subsequently enacted legislation may lawfully annul an executory decree and the legislation was not unconstitutional. After extensive briefing and oral argument, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion to enforce judgment and for injunction on December 14, 1992.1 Plaintiffs filed timely notice of appeal from the order denying their motion. In their briefs on appeal, appellants raise the same two constitutional challenges to Assembly Bill No. 2883 which they argued below. We first discuss the issue of whether Assembly Bill No. 2883 violated the constitutional prohibitions against impairment of contracts.
I
Impairment of Contract
“The rules governing the constitutionality of legislation which impairs contractual obligations were recently stated by the California Supreme Court *1204in City of Torrance v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 371 .... [ft] ‘The language of these clauses “appears unambiguously absolute . . . (Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus (1978) 438 U.S. 234, 240 . . . .) “No State shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts. . . .” (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10.) “A . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 9.) Read literally, these provisions appear to proscribe any impairment. However, it has long been settled that the proscription is “not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula.” (Home Bldg. & L. Assn. v. Blaisdell (1934) 290 U.S. 398, 428 .. . .) [ffl ‘As the United States Supreme Court recently stated, “it is to be accepted as a commonplace that the Contract Clause does not operate to obliterate the police power of the States. ‘It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. . . .’ [Citation.] As Mr. Justice Holmes succinctly [stated] . . . ‘One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject matter.’ ” (Allied Structural Steel, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 241-242 ....)’ ” (In re Marriage of Potter (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 73, 82-83 [224 Cal.Rptr. 312].)
“[S]even United States Supreme Court and circuit court of appeals decisions have addressed the effect of subsequent legislation on decrees or judgments affecting public rights and constitute persuasive authority. In State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. (1856) 59 U.S. 421, 429-436 . . . , the Supreme Court considered the effect of subsequent legislation on an existing injunction. An injunction secured by the State of Pennsylvania barred the Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. from maintaining a bridge in a specific spot on grounds that it was an unlawful structure. A subsequent act of Congress, however, declared the bridge to be a lawful structure. The Supreme Court held it was necessary to dissolve the injunction because the subsequent legislation had eliminated the need for the injunction. (Id. at pp. 435-436 . . . .) In Hodges v. Snyder (1923) 261 U.S. 600, 603-604 . . . , the court held that subsequent legislation could annul an injunction against the consolidation of a school district. The court stated: ‘[A] suit brought for the enforcement of a public right. . . even after it has been established by the judgment of the court, may be annulled by subsequent legislation and should not be thereafter enforced; although, in so far as a private right has been incidentally established by such judgment, as for special damages to the plaintiff or for [her or] his costs, it may not be thus *1205taken away. [Citation.]’ (Ibid.) Similarly, in System Federation v. Wright (1961) 364 U.S. 642, 649-651 . . . , the court held that the district court had abused its discretion in refusing to modify a consent decree which was in conflict with subsequently enacted legislation. The consent decree had barred the defendants from discriminating against nonunion employees because of their refusal to join a union. Congress later enacted a law permitting railroads to require union shops. The Supreme Court held that courts must be free to modify consent decrees when a change in the law brings the terms of the consent decree in conflict with statutory objectives. (Id. at p. 651.)” (Van de Kamp v. Gumbiner (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1286-1287 [270 Cal.Rptr. 907].)
As explained more fully below, the instant stipulated judgment does not constitute a “contract” for purposes of contract clause analysis. Even if it comes within the contract clause, the stipulated judgment is not impaired by Assembly Bill No. 2883, because paragraph 17 provides that the judgment was to “automatically expire” if the Legislature “takes control of” obligations under section 17000, and the Legislature did so with Assembly Bill No. 2883.
In determining whether the stipulated judgment is a “contract” for contract clause analysis, we must first address appellants’ characterization of the judgment as including more than a decree to secure future County compliance with section 17000; appellants argue that the claim for retroactive benefits was part of the consideration for the relief agreed to by County, that such “claim was made organic to the settlement reached, and it was accordingly merged therein as part of the resolution of the underlying action. To simply and completely abrogate the decree robs plaintiffs of the valuable claim as if it had never existed.”
The same rules apply in ascertaining the meaning of a court order or judgment as in ascertaining the meaning of any other writing. (Verner v. Verner (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 718, 724 [143 Cal.Rptr. 826].) “The interpretation of the effect of a judgment is a question of law within the ambit of the appellate court.” (John Siebel Associates v. Keele (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 560, 565 [233 Cal.Rptr. 231].)
The instant stipulated judgment is clear and unambiguous in providing that the claims for retroactive benefits were being waived. There is nothing in the judgment which supports the proposition that some portion of the future grant level of $341 included a portion reflecting retroactive benefits. In fact, paragraph 15 states that the “cash grant aspects of the GR program, as adjusted in paragraphs 3 through 8 above, are adequate and *1206sufficient to meet the minimum subsistence needs of Los Angeles County GR recipients,” and that the “cash grant amounts established in paragraphs 3 through 8 above reflect amounts equal to or greater than actual costs as determined in the County’s studies of housing, food, clothing, and personal needs.” Paragraphs 3 through 8 of the judgment deal with grant levels commencing July 1, 1991, through June 30, 1996. Nothing in the judgment establishes a value for the proper benefit levels for the fiscal years 1989-1990 and 1990-1991.
The clear and unambiguous terms of the instant judgment require that we reject appellants’ interpretation of the judgment as including essentially a damage award for retroactive benefits. Under the terms of the judgment, such benefits were waived. However, we do not decide the issue of whether appellants’ claims for retroactive benefits are lost if the judgment is determined to be annulled; we do not intend to foreclose appellants’ assertion that the claims may remain pending and subject to future adjudication. We only conclude that the instant judgment does not include an award for retroactive benefits, and contains only a decree for prospective general relief grant payments. The judgment, then, provides declaratory and injunctive relief that looks only to the future.
In light of our conclusion that the payment obligations set out in the stipulated judgment deal with prospective general relief grant payments, we address the issue of whether the stipulated judgment is a contract for purposes of the contract clauses of the federal and state Constitutions.
“In a stipulated judgment, or consent decree, litigants voluntarily terminate a lawsuit by assenting to specified terms, which the court agrees to enforce as a judgment. [Citations.] As the high court has recognized, stipulated judgments bear the earmarks both of judgments entered after litigation and contracts derived through mutual agreement: ‘[C]onsent decrees “have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees”; a dual character that has resulted in different treatment for different purposes.’ (Firefighters v. Cleveland (1986) 478 U.S. 501, 519 [92 L.Ed.2d 405, 421, 106 S.Ct. 3063], [italics added].) As in Firefighters, the issue before us is ‘not whether we can label a consent decree as a “contract” or a “judgment,” for we can do both.’ (Ibid.)” (California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658, 663-664 [268 Cal.Rptr. 284, 788 P.2d 1156], original italics.)
We conclude that the stipulated judgment is not a “contract” under contract clause analysis.
Although the instant judgment was based upon the parties’ settlement agreement, the settlement occurred within a case seeking injunctive and *1207declaratory relief. “It is settled that where there has been a change in the controlling facts upon which a permanent injunction was granted, or the law has been changed, modified or extended, or where the ends of justice would be served by modification or dissolution, the court has the inherent power to vacate or modify an injunction where the circumstances and situation of the parties have so changed as to render such action just and equitable. [Citations.] This principle governs even though the judgment providing the injunctive relief is predicated upon stipulation of the parties.” (Welsch v. Goswick (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 398, 404-405 [181 Cal.Rptr. 703].)
“A state is without power to enter into binding contracts not to exercise its police power in the future. (United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, supra, 431 U.S. at p. 23, fn. 20 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 110].) . . . ‘The States must possess broad power to adopt general regulatory measures without being concerned that private contracts will be impaired, or even destroyed, as a result. Otherwise, one would be able to obtain immunity from state regulation by making private contractual arrangements. This principle is summarized in Justice Holmes’ well-known dictum: “One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them.” (Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 [52 L.Ed. 828, 832, 28 S.Ct. 529] (1908).)’ [Citation.]” (Interstate Marina Development Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 435, 448 [202 Cal.Rptr. 377].)
Although the court in Interstate Marina Development was addressing the issue of County rent control law, we conclude that the issue of general relief benefits under section 17000 also involves regulation within the police power of the state. Because this is so, we must interpret the stipulated judgment as based on and authorized by the statutory underpinnings for general relief benefits as those laws then existed. The prior version of Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000 “did not create constitutionally protectable expectations. A legislature may repeal a statute that created non-contractual expectations as long as there is a rational basis for repeal.” (Barcellos and Wolfsen v. Westlands Water Dist. (9th Cir. 1990) 899 F.2d 814, 825.)2
In System Federation v. Wright (1961) 364 U.S. 642, 651-653 [5 L.Ed.2d 349, 355-356, 81 S.Ct. 368], the court explained: “In a case like this the District Court’s authority to adopt a consent decree comes only from the statute which the decree is intended to enforce. Frequently of course the *1208terms arrived at by the parties are accepted without change by the adopting court. But just as the adopting court is free to reject agreed-upon terms as not in furtherance of statutory objectives, so must it be free to modify the terms of a consent decree when a change in law brings those terms in conflict with statutory objectives. In short, it was the Railway Labor Act, and only incidentally the parties, that the District Court served in entering the consent decree now before us. The court must be free to continue to further the objectives of that Act when its provisions are amended. The parties have no power to require of the court continuing enforcement of rights the statute no longer gives. [1] . . . The parties could not become the conscience of the equity court and decide for it once and for all what was equitable and what was not, because the court was not acting to enforce a promise but to enforce a statute.”
The principles set out in System Federation are applicable here because the rights at issue in the judgment—prospective rights to general relief benefits —are subject to statutory regulation. “California Constitution article XVI, section 11, provides: ‘The Legislature has plenary power to provide for the administration of any constitutional provisions or laws heretofore or hereafter enacted concerning the administration of relief, and to that end may modify, transfer, or enlarge the powers vested in any state agency or officer concerned with the administration of relief or laws appertaining thereto. . . ” (Board of Supervisors v. McMahon (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 286, 297-298 [268 Cal.Rptr. 219].) “As the state’s agents, counties must comply with statutes; relief from state mandates must come from the Legislature and not from the courts.” (Id. at pp. 300-301.)
Despite appellants’ insistence that System Federation is inapposite, we believe that it, and the other authorities cited above, support the conclusion that the stipulated judgment in this case is not a contract within the purview of the federal or state contract clauses.
We are not persuaded that a line of cases, cited by appellants and discussed in the dissenting opinion, and which deal with the employment or pension rights of local government employees, is applicable to this case. In Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 296 [152 Cal.Rptr. 903, 591 P.2d 1], the court addressed the issue of whether the contract clause of the state and federal constitutions was violated by a statute that declared null and void a memorandum of understanding (agreement) between a local agency and certain of its employees to pay a cost-of-living increase in excess of that granted to state employees. The court explained that “. . . the agreements between the respondent local entities and petitioners are binding contracts. Under the *1209Meyers-Milias-Brown Act [citation] local governmental entities may enter into collective bargaining contracts with authorized employee organizations. . . . [O]nce adopted by the governing body, such agreements are ‘indubitably binding.’ ” (23 Cal.3d at p. 304, fn. omitted.) The court then went on to hold that the statute severely impaired petitioners’ contractual rights and that respondents “have clearly failed to satisfy their threshold burden of demonstrating that the substantial abridgement of petitioners’ contract rights to an increase in wages was warranted by a grave fiscal crisis, and they advance no other justification for the impairment.” (23 Cal.3d at pp. 313-314.)
We believe that Sonoma County is inapposite. Both prior to and after the stipulated judgment in this case, there was no statutorily authorized contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and County. Moreover, the instant stipulated judgment cannot be construed as creating a protectable expectation with respect to future grant levels. This is so because grant recipients cannot reasonably be said to have a protectable interest in the law governing grant levels to remain unchanged; the stipulated judgment even acknowledges as much. Distinguishable also from the instant case are Olson v. Cory (1980) 27 Cal.3d 532 [178 Cal.Rptr. 568, 636 P.2d 532], involving the issue of whether 1976 legislation placing a limit on cost-of-living increases for judicial salaries impermissibly impaired vested or contractual rights of judges in office and of judicial pensioners, and United Firefighters of Los Angeles City v. City of Los Angeles (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1095 [259 Cal.Rptr. 65], involving the vested contractual pension rights of public employees. None of the foregoing cases supports appellant’s claim that the instant judgment creates constitutionally protectable expectations within the contract clause.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the judgment does constitute a contract within the constitutional contract clauses, no obligation therein can be deemed to have been impaired by Assembly Bill No. 2883. This is so because paragraph 17 requires that the terms in the judgment “will automatically expire” in the event that the Legislature “takes control of or otherwise assumes the County’s obligations under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 17000.” The enactment of Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000.5 and the passage of Assembly Bill No. 2883 were each an event in which the Legislature took control of County’s general relief obligations. Indeed, the foregoing authorities require that we so interpret this provision of the “contract,” inasmuch as “ ‘ “[i]t is to be presumed that parties contract in contemplation of the inherent right of the state to exercise unhampered the police power that the sovereign always reserves to itself for the protection of peace, safety, health and morals. Its effect cannot be *1210nullified in advance by making contracts inconsistent with its enforcement.” ’ ” (Delucchi v. County of Santa Cruz (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 814, 823 [225 Cal.Rptr. 43].)
Accordingly, the judgment must be construed to have automatically terminated with the passage of Assembly Bill No. 2883. Thus, terms of the judgment were consistent with Assembly Bill No. 2883. This interpretation of the terms of the judgment renders any contract clause claim without merit. (See Delucchi v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 824.)
We disagree with the language in the dissenting opinion that the instant judgment represents an attempt to avoid compliance with the law, or to compromise such compliance. County had no authority to “contract out” of the then existing law. As noted above, County was obligated to comply with the law, and the judgment is clearly drafted to acknowledge that its provisions constituted such compliance. As long as the Legislature does not change the law, the terms of the judgment may constitute respondents’ valid compliance. However, just as County could not avoid its then existing statutory obligations, it could not compromise or avoid any future statutory obligations under different laws. Such a result is tantamount to a contracting away of the police power of the state. If appellants are allowed to prevail, this will be the result.
Even if we assume that the instant judgment constitutes a contract subject to the contract clause, appellants fail to establish that Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000.5 or Assembly Bill No. 2883 unconstitutionally impair any purported contractual obligations.
“A law or ordinance which substantially impairs a contractual obligation nonetheless may be constitutional. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, ‘[although the language of the Contract Clause is facially absolute, its prohibition must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the State “to safeguard the vital interests of its people.” [Citation.]”’ (United Firefighters of Los Angeles City v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 1109.) If the state regulation constitutes a substantial impairment, the state, in justification, must have a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem. (Ibid.) “ ‘When the State is a party to the contract, “complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1110.) “Thus, ‘a State cannot refuse to meet its legitimate financial obligations simply because it would prefer to spend the money to promote the public good rather than the private welfare of its *1211creditors. [A court] can only sustain [an impairment] if that impairment [is] both reasonable and necessary to serve the . . . important purposes claimed by the State.’ ” (Ibid.)
In their briefs, appellants fail to address the foregoing factors and fail to refer to the legislative history or intent of the challenged legislation. In the trial court, respondents offered some documents which were allegedly part of the legislative history of the challenged enactments. On appeal, respondents also argue in their brief that “The problem addressed by the urgency statutes enacted with the 1992-93 State budget was the allocation of limited welfare funds among all counties in the state, not the particular financial obligations of any particular county,” and “That a magnet effect would result from substantially disparate benefits in neighboring counties is clear. After section 17000.5 was enacted, a portion of the state’s 58 counties were required by judicial decrees to maintain the higher grant levels of prior years.” In other words, respondents suggest that a concern for statewide equity in grant levels was one justification for the enactments.
Rather than address the issue of legislative intent, and the public purposes for the law asserted by respondents, appellants focus on conduct by County, which did not enact the laws. For example, the opening brief states that “the [County] Board made no showing that the impairment was properly justified.” Even if we assume that County lobbied on behalf of Assembly Bill No. 2883, it was the Legislature which adopted it. Thus, the focus here should be on legislative intent and the policy justifications considered by the Legislature, not those of County or other groups lobbying on the issue of general assistance grant levels.3
Given appellants’ complete failure to address the issue of whether the impairment was reasonable and necessary to serve the public purposes identified by respondents, we conclude that they have not established the impairment was unconstitutional under the contract clause.
II
Separation of Powers
Appellants contend that Assembly Bill No. 2883 “represents an impermissible legislative encroachment upon judicial authority in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine under the California Constitution,” because the legislation discarded “a final judgment of a court.”
*1212“In California, the separation of powers doctrine is embodied in article III, section 3 of the California Constitution which provides: ‘The powers of state government are legislative, executive and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.’ ” (Mandel v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531, 539, fn. 4 [174 Cal.Rptr. 841, 629 P.2d 935].) “Our Constitution assigns the resolution of such specific controversies to the judicial branch of government (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1) and provides the Legislature with no authority to set itself above the judiciary by discarding the outcome or readjudicating the merits of particular judicial proceedings.” (Id. at p. 547.) Just as the courts may not reevaluate the wisdom or merits of statutes which have secured final passage by the Legislature, the Legislature enjoys no constitutional prerogative to disregard the authority of final court judgments resolving specific controversies within the judiciary’s domain. (Ibid.)
Appellants fail to establish that the instant stipulated judgment constituted a “final judgment” for purposes of the separation of powers doctrine. The same authorities cited above for the proposition that the judgment does not constitute a “contract” for contracts clause analysis also support the proposition that the instant judgment did not vest in appellants any rights that were not subject to alteration by the Legislature. In other words, the judicial authority embodied in the stipulated judgment was the authority to enforce a particular statute, and the court “must... be free to modify the terms of a consent decree when a change in law brings those terms in conflict with statutory objectives.” (System Federation v. Wright, supra, 364 U.S. 642, 651 [5 L.Ed.2d 349, 355, 81 S.Ct. 368].)
“While our branches of government are coequal they are not completely independent. . . . And while the Legislature cannot act as a ‘super-court,’ rejecting judicial decisions with which it disagrees [citation], it may make a law to prospectively abrogate the effect of a judicial decision. (Matter of Coburn (1913) 165 Cal. 202, 210 . . . .)” (County of Contra Costa v. State of California (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 62, 77, fn. 9 [222 Cal.Rptr. 750].)
We reject appellants’ arguments that this case is controlled by Mandel v. Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d 531, and Serrano v. Priest (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 188 [182 Cal.Rptr. 387], as both of those cases involved a judgment for an award of attorney fees, and not the type of declaratory judgment and injunctive decree at issue herein. A judgment for attorney fees calls for the payment of a past obligation and does not involve the continuing judicial supervision of a decree affecting public rights. (See, e.g., Daylo v. Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs (D.C. Cir. 1974) 501 F.2d 811, 818 [163 App.D.C. 251].)
*1213We need not discuss the contention raised by appellants that “The Board did not make sufficient showing to support modification of the judgment,” as our record does not show any modification was sought or ordered.
Disposition
The order is affirmed. Each party to bear its own costs on appeal.
Woods (Fred), J., concurred.
In a written ruling on submitted matter, the trial court concluded that the stipulated settlement “is predominantly a prospective executory decree. ... A court decree that seeks to limit the enactment of law is as much an invasion of the separation of powers as legislation which seeks to extinguish a valid retrospective judgment. No contract can limit the legislative prerogative, and it is by statutory enactment after all, by which a society commits to a willingness to care for and support any group in its midst. System Federation v. Wright (1961) 364 U.S. 642 [5 L.Ed.2d 349, 81 S.Ct. 368] and the additional authorities cited by defendants are controlling. [1] Even if the settlement were determined to be a pure contract establishing nothing more than certain ‘financial obligations’ of the county as plaintiffs urge, there exist several arguable text book (Restatement of Contracts) legal defenses to enforcement, and the terms of the settlement agreement itself provide others. (Failure of consideration; frustration of purpose; the agreement will automatically expire if the Legislature abolishes all obligations etc., and the argument can be made that the provision contemplated all subsistence obligations and that is precisely what has occurred; the agreement provides that it will also automatically expire if the state ‘takes control of,’ and this is arguably precisely what has occurred; etc.)”
Neither in the trial court nor in this court have appellants challenged Assembly Bill No. 2883 as lacking a rational basis.
The lengthy dissenting opinion is infected with the same flaws as appellants’ briefs. While certain issues and policy matters may have some emotional appeal, they are irrelevant to the legal issues at hand.