concurring.
In this case the majority seeks to reverse the Superior Court’s decision, notwithstanding its adoption of that court’s application of provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) to the facts of this case. In so doing the majority conducts an unnecessary examination of the applicability of the U.C.C. statute of limitation. The trial court, in a well-written opinion, properly disposed of the statute of limitations argument by concluding that the nature of the instant contract distinguished it from the type of contract in which there was a single transaction of goods. See, e.g., Rufo v. The Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965). The trial court in the instant matter stated:
In Rufo, only a single sale of an item occurred, while in the instant case there was a repeated month-to-month renewal of a lease at will. Consequently, while Rufo is controlling in situations involving a single transaction of goods, it is inapposite where, as in the instant case, the agreement is renewed repeatedly on a month-to month basis and in effect involves multiple transactions in goods.
Slip op. at 13. (No.)
The Superior Court ignored the nature of this transaction and attempted to apply the U.C.C. sale-of-goods principles. That court relied upon the physical transfer of equipment to justify their conclusion that a lease of goods had occurred. The court then exacerbated the problem by citing Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736 (1977), a tort case, as authority for analogizing sale contracts to leasing transactions. The Superior Court’s mistaken view of the nature of the transaction occasioned its *534reaching an erroneous conclusion. The majority accepts the Superior Court’s characterization of this transaction and similarly attempts to extend this Court’s tort analysis in Francioni to contract principles.
As stated, the initial error occurred in this case when the Superior Court ignored the true nature of the instant transaction and applied U.C.C. sale-of-goods principles to a contract for the sale of services. The court then concluded that the action was time-barred by the U.C.C. statute of limitations. As is conceded, the title to the equipment was never intended to be transferred to the appellants. The alarm system was merely installed in their home and leased to them as part and parcel of the contract for continuing security services. Therefore, the provisions of the U.C.C. were irrelevant to this transaction which was a contract for the sale of a service, not a contract for the lease or sale of the equipment.
Under the instant agreement, this contract for services was renewed each month when appellants paid the service fee and Rollins continued to provide maintenance and protection. Here, the cause of action arose on February 2, 1984, when the alarm system failed to operate properly. The institution of this action on October 30, 1985, was clearly not time-barred. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(3).
The majority’s incorrect analysis of this matter is aggravated by the fact that it, like the Superior Court, analogizes tort law to this contractual situation to support a finding that sellers and lessors occupy a similar position. This analogy overlooks the obvious distinctions between the underlying policies for the imposition of tort liability and those policies upon which contractual liability is based. In tort cases, the objective is to modify a course of behavior through the allocation of financial risk upon the party in the best position to prevent the harm. In contrast, contract law contemplates that the parties to an agreement have volunteered to accept certain risks or financial responsibilities throughout the life of the contract. While tort law principles are flexible with changing societal expectations, con*535tract principles are expected to adhere to the intent of the parties who entered into the obligation. The majority here ignores the important distinction between the two disciplines and changes the intended obligations of the respective parties under this contract. The effect of the majority’s reasoning is to breach the sanctity of contractual relationships and to contravene the constitutional protection against the impairment of contracts.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this concurring opinion.