Glenstone Block Co. v. Pebworth

DANIEL E. SCOTT, Chief Judge,

dissenting.

Despite my empathy with the result, I cannot join it for several reasons.

Even after two hearings, evidence on the decisive “construction vs. purchase money” issue is embarrassingly thin. The deed of trust in question “is silent on this issue and on its face gives no hint that it was a construction loan as opposed to a purchase money deed of trust or other similar instrument.” Glenstone Block Co. v. Pebworth, 264 S.W.3d 703, 716 (Mo.App.2008).

Relevant testimony on remand came only from Mr. Van Stavern and was limited to (1) uncontested identification of documents, (2) one direct-examination answer describing the deed of trust as “a construction loan,” and (3) one cross-examination answer calling the same document a “purchase money deed of trust.” The only other new evidence was the Readvancement, which said the loan described by Mr. Van Stavern was for “the acquisition of land and development and construction” of a condominium (iefor both purchase money and construction).6

I cannot deduce, with the requisite degree of confidence, the nature of this loan based only on this evidence. If Appellant had to prove the priority of its lien, Appellant suffers the consequence of the lack of proof.

Further, the trial court apparently credited Mr. Van Stavern’s cross-examination testimony. It matters little whether I agree; the trial court was there and I was not. Thus, there is testimony supporting the judgment, and I cannot find that the weight of evidence is otherwise. As noted above, the record is so thin that I see no weight of evidence either way.

Since I cannot join in the result, I respectfully dissent.

. The Readvancement supported a $250,000 construction loan made after the mechanic's lien and other loan transactions. Yet, as Respondent's counsel noted at the hearing on remand, "[t]hat doesn’t change the fact that the original 2.3 million was a purchase money deed of trust”- — or at least Mr. Van Stavern so testified and the trial court so found — "and that is the deed of trust which has the priority over [Appellant's mechanics lien.”