(dissenting).
I do not agree with the portion of the opinion which holds that subsequent legislation repealed Special Acts 1929, No. 266 (20 Spec. Laws 849), by which the General Assembly expressly granted to New Haven the right “to establish and maintain an airport within the limits of said city and the town of East Haven and to acquire property as a site for such airport, either by purchase or by condemnation proceedings under the provisions of the general statutes.” There has been no express repeal, and repeal by implication is not favored. Knights of Columbus Council v. Mulcahy, 154 Conn. 583, 591, 227 A.2d 413. The established rule of statutory construction in this state has remained unchanged since it was early expressed in 1 Swift, Digest, p. 12, in 1822: “Later statutes repeal prior contrary statutes. This must be understood where the statutes are expressly contrary or negative words are used: otherwise, if both the statutes can be reconciled, they must stand and have a concurrent operation.”
“ ‘A statute is impliedly repealed by a later statute only if the latter is necessarily repugnant to the former.’ Landry v. Personnel Appeal Board, 138 Conn. 445, 451, 86 A.2d 70, and cases cited. They are ‘repugnant only when both cannot reasonably be given effect.’ State v. Giant’s Neck Land & Improvement Co., 116 Conn. 119, 122, 163 A. 651. If courts can by any fair interpretation find a reasonable field of operation for both statutes without destroying or perverting their evident meaning and intent, it is the duty of the courts to do so, thus reconciling them and according them concurrent effect. Leete v. Griswold Post, 114 Conn. 400, 405, 158 A. 919; Costa v. Reed, 113 Conn. 377, 385, 155 A. 417, and cases cited; 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d *475Ed.) § 2014.” Shanley v. Jankura, 144 Conn. 694, 702, 137 A.2d 536. “Therefore, where the later general statute does not propose an irreconcilable conflict, the prior special statute will be construed as remaining in effect as a qualification of or exception to the general law.” 1 Sutherland, op. cit. § 2021. “A special and local statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not affected by a statute general in its terms, broad enough to include cases embraced in the special law, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest.” State ex rel. Wallen v. Hatch, 82 Conn. 122, 124, 72 A. 575; 50 Am. Jur. 565, Statutes, § 564. The early special grant of authority to New Haven is not irreconcilable with the later general statutes granting a general and more limited authority to any municipality in connection with any airports thereafter “to be established”; nor do the later general statutes contain any “negative words.” I cannot agree that the General Assembly manifested an intention to repeal the 1929 special act.
New Haven was first granted legislative authority to establish an airport by Special Act No. 267 of the 1927 session of the General Assembly. 20 Spec. Laws 289. This act authorized New Haven “to establish and maintain an airport within the limits of said city.” Significantly, the 1929 session by Special Act No. 266 (20 Spec. Laws 849), amended the 1927 act to authorize New Haven “to establish and maintain an airport within the limits of said city and the town of East Haven.” It was this same 1929 session, which thus expressly authorized New Haven to acquire airport land in East Haven, which also enacted chapter 236 of the 1929 Public Acts, the predecessor of § 15-79 of the General Statutes, providing a general authority for the future establishment of *476airports by any municipality which elected to proceed under the General Statutes rather than by special authorization from the legislature. Obviously the General Assembly, as it had the right to do, expressly granted to New Haven special authority and powers beyond those granted under the general law.
I find nothing in the subsequent legislation repugnant to or irreconcilable with, much less implying the repeal of, the special authority granted to New Haven by the 1929 special act to acquire land in East Haven for its airport. On the contrary, I conclude that not only is there no repugnancy between the General Statutes and the 1929 special act authorizing the creation of the New Haven airport in that city and in the town of East Haven but it is manifest that the General Assembly specifically intended that the New Haven airport, as one of the first airports to be established in the state, should be an exception to the general provisions which should govern airports thereafter “to be established.” § 15-79.
In view of this basic disagreement with the conclusion reached in the majority opinion as to this aspect of the case it is unnecessary to comment further on that opinion. I would, however, note my doubt that § 15-79 of the General Statutes as it existed at the time in question encompassed the situation, presented by this case, where a municipality has by purchase acquired land for airport purposes. That statute provided that a municipality or municipalities “may talce any such land or interest therein . . . for the expansion or improvement of an airport” upon compliance with the procedures prescribed in the statute. (Emphasis added.) Despite the implication of the majority opinion as to the *477effect of § 15-79, neither the word “purchase” nor the word “buy” appears in the statute. See, e.g., 20 Spec. Laws 849, No. 266; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 90 § 51G; N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 353-a (McKinney 1965). The word “take” in the context of property acquisition commonly means to exclude the property owner from his private use and possession by condemnation for public purposes under the power of eminent domain, which, in turn, involves a preliminary determination that the acquisition of the property is necessary for a public purpose. See Trumbull v. Ehrsam, 148 Conn. 47, 55, 166 A.2d 844; Clark v. Cox, 134 Conn. 226, 229, 56 A.2d 512; Bishop v. New Haven, 82 Conn. 51, 58, 72 A. 646. While I would not decide the case on the basis of § 15-79, I am nonetheless concerned that the conclusion reached in the majority opinion necessitates the reading into § 15-79 of a limitation upon a municipality’s power to purchase which is by no means clearly expressed in that statute.
In this opinion Thim, J., concurred.