MEMORANDUM OPINION.
This Court is faced with the difficult and sensitive task of reapportioning the State of Minnesota into eight congressional districts of equal size. We face this task because the State Legislature has failed to perform it.
We must base our decision on one of two conflicting principles. The first is to protect the incumbent Congressmen. That end is accomplished by making only those changes in present district lines necessary to correct population inequities.
The second alternative is to afford equal representation to all regions of the State. That end is accomplished by recognizing the fact that one-half of the State’s residents live in metropolitan Minnesota and one-half live in out-state Minnesota.
We have chosen the second alternative and adopt a plan with four districts in the metropolitan area and four districts out-state (“four-four” plan). We do so because this plan is most consistent with State constitutional and statutory policy. It groups together peoples with like needs and concerns. To do otherwise is to disperse approximately 460,000 metropolitan residents into various districts dominated by strong out-state majorities. That number is nearly sufficient to constitute its own congressional district.
I.
All parties, including the State of Minnesota, agree that the present apportionment of congressional districts1 violates Article I, *147Section 2 of the United States Constitution. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 93 S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973). By Order dated September 15, 1981, the Court declared the present configuration of districts unconstitutional. They no longer equally apportion the population of Minnesota. Five of the districts underrepresent their residents by amounts that range from .79% to 9.92%. Those districts are the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth. Three of the districts overrepresent their residents by amounts that range from 7.08% to 16.38%. Those districts are the Third, Fourth, and Fifth.
Throughout these proceedings, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the responsibility of the legislative and executive branches of the State for congressional redistricting. Article IV, Section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution states in pertinent part:
At the first session after each enumeration of the inhabitants of this state made by the authority of the United States, the legislature shall have the power to prescribe the bounds of congressional and legislative districts.
The State has been urged to meet that responsibility. It has been given more than an adequate opportunity to do so. As stated in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1394, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964):
reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination * * * judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.
The State Legislature has failed to agree upon a plan of congressional redistricting. The House of Representatives has approved one plan and the Senate has approved a different plan. The differences between those plans are fundamental and unresolved. Consequently, the Court has been forced to undertake the task of redistricting.
Four redistricting plans have been submitted by the parties. The plaintiffs and the State Senate have each submitted one plan. The plan of the State Senate was passed by a partisan vote of the DFL majority. The Minnesota Independent Republican Congressional Delegation has submitted two plans. The first of those, Plan A, is a revision of the plan of the State House of Representatives. The second, Plan B, is an alternative submission prepared on behalf of the delegation. Both Plans A and B were prepared by the Director of Redistricting and Computer Services, Republican National Committee. Several additional plans were prepared by the Masters or individual members of the Court for study by the full Court. The Masters made no recommendations to the Court regarding which of the various plans they prepared best met constitutional requirements and the Court’s adopted criteria.
The plans of the plaintiffs and the State Senate locate four of the eight congressional districts in metropolitan Minnesota. The seven-county metropolitan area constitutes 48.7% of the State’s population. The remaining four districts are located in out-state Minnesota. Plan A of the Minnesota Independent Republican Congressional Delegation locates three districts in metropolitan Minnesota, one district is located out-state, and four districts combine out-state and metropolitan populations. In all instances the out-state population dominates the combined districts.2 Plan B also locates three districts in metropolitan Minnesota, two districts are located out-state, and three districts combine out-state and metro*148politan populations. Again, the out-state populations dominate the combined districts.3
II.
After careful study, we adopt a plan of congressional redistricting that establishes four metropolitan districts and four out-state districts. Each district is virtually equal in population and compact. We adopt the plan for the following reasons:
1. The plan recognizes the fact, after the population changes of the last decade, that essentially one-half of the people of Minnesota live in the metropolitan area and one-half live in out-state Minnesota.
2. The plan best advances the State’s Constitutional policy that districts be “of convenient contiguous territory.” Minnesota Constitution, Article IV, Section 3. It does so by:
a. Preserving rather than splitting the natural grouping of the metropolitan residents in the formation of districts. It recognizes to the extent possible the community of interests that metropolitan residents share. It recognizes to the same extent the community of interests shared by the out-state residents.
b. Forming districts that are compact.
3. The plan best advances the State’s statutory policy to recognize the metropolitan area as a distinct region of the State with unique governmental concerns. See, e.g., Minn.Laws 1957, Ch. 468 (creating a comprehensive planning agency for the region); Minn.Laws 1967, Ch. 892 (creating the metropolitan transit commission); Minn.Laws 1971, Ex.Sess. Ch. 24 (creating metropolitan revenue distribution); Lifteau v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission, 270 N.W.2d 749, 756 (Minn.1978) (Metropolitan Council is a political subdivision of the State); City of New Brighton v. Metropolitan Council, 306 Minn. 425, 428, 237 N.W.2d 620, 623 (1975) (same).
4. The plan is consistent with the principles employed in the apportionment of legislative districts in the companion case Sharon La Comb et al. v. Joan Growe, Secretary of State of Minnesota, et al., 541 F.Supp. 160. In both instances, every effort was made to preserve rather than dilute the effective representation of people with like needs and concerns. In the metropolitan area, we deliberately confined the legislative districts to the boundaries of the seven-county area wherever possible without breach of the other criteria adopted by the Court. Within that seven-county area, in turn, we made every effort to confine districts to municipal boundaries. The urban and suburban communities of interest were accorded strong recognition. The out-state area, consequently, was also accorded strong recognition as a broad community of interest within which the Court preserved county, township, and municipal boundaries to the maximum extent possible. Neither the legislative nor the congressional plan was drawn to protect incumbents.4
5. The plan best meets the criteria adopted by the Court for congressional redistricting.5
*149Although we adopt a “four-four” plan, we do not accept the precise plans of either the plaintiffs or the State Senate. Neither plan minimizes population deviations from equality nor maximizes the compactness of districts. As stated in White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 2352, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973):
The command of Article I, § 2, that representatives be chosen “by the People of the several States” was elucidated in Wesberry v. Sanders * * * to permit only those population variances among congressional districts that “are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality[.]”
Moreover, both plans contain features apparently designed to achieve political ends.6
The plan we adopt closely follows the “four-four” plan prepared by the Masters at the request of the full Court. It is faithful to the principle of affording equal representation to all regions of the State, it minimizes population deviations from equality, and it is compact. A map of the Court’s plan is attached as Appendices B and C.* A smaller map of the plan is attached to the opinion for the reader’s convenience as Figure I. The controlling description of each district is contained in Appendix A. If there are any variances, the descriptions in Appendix A control.
The ideal congressional district is 509,496 people. Under the Court’s plan, the maximum deviation from ideal or equality is 36 people. That is .00706%. This is better than any plan submitted by the parties.7 The total population deviation is 76 and the average deviation is 9.5. Again, this is better than any plan submitted by the parties.8
The metropolitan districts are the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth. With the exception of 64,129 people, principally from Wright and Sherburne Counties, they are wholly within the seven-county metropolitan area. To the extent these districts go outside of the metropolitan region, they include close contiguous areas to maximize compactness. It was necessary to include some out-state people because the metropolitan area is 1.3% short of being exactly 50% of the State’s population. The Fourth and Fifth districts locate the principal cities of the State, Minneapolis and Saint Paul, in different districts, contrary to Plan B of the Independent Republican Congressional Delegation. The First, Second, Seventh, and Eighth districts are out-state in character.
The districts are compact. Because they separately group the metropolitan population and the out-state population, they are necessarily more compact than the plans of the Minnesota Independent Republican Congressional Delegation. Under the delegation’s Plan A, seven of the eight districts draw on the metropolitan area. Consequently, districts extend from north of Grand Marais to Coon Rapids, from the Iowa border to Forest Lake and to Eagan, and from extreme southwestern Minnesota on the South Dakota and Iowa borders to Wayzata continuing north to East Side Township in Mille Lacs County. For the same reason, its Plan B is not as compact as reasonably possible. Districts extend from *150extreme northeastern Minnesota to White Bear Lake, from the Iowa border to Forest Lake and to Shorewood, and from extreme southwestern Minnesota to the top of Mille Lacs County. These districts neither comply with the Minnesota Constitutional mandate of districts of “convenient contiguous territory” nor the Court’s criterion of compactness.
The proponents of Plans A and B argue for their adoption on the basis that they reflect State policy regarding congressional districts. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973), is cited in support of the argument. In that case, the Supreme Court held:
Just as a federal district court, in the context of legislative reapportionment, should follow the policies and preferences of the State, as expressed in statutory and constitutional provisions or in the reapportionment plans proposed by the state legislature, whenever adherence to state policy does not detract from the requirements of the Federal Constitution, we hold that a district court should similarly honor state policies in the context of congressional reapportionment. Id. at 795, 93 S.Ct. at 2354.
The Court adopts its plan because it best honors discernible State policy.
It is the State’s policy, expressed by constitutional provision, that districts be “of convenient contiguous territory”. Minnesota Constitution, Article IV, Section 3. The word “convenient” is defined in The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press 1971) to mean:
1. Agreeing (in opinion); in accord.
2. Accordant, contiguous consonant.
7. Within easy reach; easily accessible. It is defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary (Second Edition Unabridged) to mean:
1. Fit or adopted; suitable; congruous; commensurate; appropriate; becoming; proper.
The Court’s plan best serves that State policy. It groups persons with like needs and concerns by recognizing the communities of interest within the State. In addition, it is the most compact. Plans A and B admittedly divide metropolitan Minnesota into more districts than required by the population of the region. Also, they are not compact.
It is the State’s policy, expressed by statutory provisions, to recognize the like needs and concerns of the residents of metropolitan Minnesota. The seven-county metropolitan area is a distinct region afforded unique treatment by the Legislature. The Court’s plan preserves the effective representation of the residents of this area. Moreover, because of the statutory recognition of the region as a community of interest, the Court’s configuration of congressional districts into convenient contiguous territory is pursuant to State legislative guidance. Plans A and B admittedly are in conflict with these purposes.
The plans of the Minnesota Independent Republican Congressional Delegation have the effect of disenfranchising a substantial number of metropolitan residents from congressional representation whenever their interests conflict with those of out-state Minnesota. This occurs in the districts which combine metropolitan and out-state residents because, in every instance, the out-state population dominates. The extent of dominance ranges from 64.4% to 97.8%. Surely, the effective representation of the metropolitan residents of the combined districts is diluted by Plans A and B or similar plans. The Court cannot adopt a plan with that consequence in the absence of a showing that it serves important State interests. The showing that has been made demonstrates that that consequence disserves important State interests.
Unfortunately, we do not have the benefit of a plan found appropriate by the elected members of the two houses of the State Legislature. We do not have a current expression of the State’s political prefer*151enees regarding the complicated redistricting process. For those reasons, the situation presented is unlike the one faced by the Court in White v. Weiser, supra. Instead of a contemporaneous decision by the State which resolves the competing political demands of incumbents and political parties, we have two statements, one from each house of the Legislature, that sharply conflict. Accordingly, we look for and find our guidance in State policy free of the political overtones inherent in redistricting.
Minnesota’s delegation of Independent Republican Congressmen would have us find the State’s policy in the existing congressional district configurations. They ask us to make only minimal changes from the current district lines.9 The delegation asserts it is the State’s policy to leave smaller rural counties united and to split larger urban counties. They also argue that minimal change from current district configurations will avoid voter confusion.
Certainly, the current configuration of the congressional districts splits urban counties more than rural ones. That is an accurate observation of fact. There is nothing, however, to.suggest that fact was a policy which guided the 1971 Legislature when it created those districts. The enacting statutes, M.S.A. §§ 2.731-2.811, give no support to the claim.10 We do not base our decision on the political compromises of redistricting of past decades. We base it on the constitutional and statutory statements of State policy.
Minimizing voter confusion is, of course, desirable. Any redistricting plan presents the opportunity for some confusion. Consequently, the Court, like the proponents of Plans A and B, takes as the starting point the last configuration of congressional districts. The districts are modified only to serve State policy and satisfy the constitutional mandate that one person’s vote shall equal another’s.
The Court has been guided by and has applied the enduring, articulated policies of the State. Upon the Legislature’s default on its responsibility, the Court has undertaken the redistricting task affirmatively and positively.
III.
We continue to enjoin the defendants, including Joan Growe, Secretary of State of Minnesota, from holding or conducting any future elections for Congress under any apportionment plan except that which we adopt today or a constitutional plan adopted after this date by the State of Minnesota.
We express our appreciation to the parties and intervenors, to the staff of the Minnesota Department of Land Management, to the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, to Masters John S. Hoyt, Jr., Andrew R. Kislik, and Allen Hinderaker, and to Court assistants Ron Schultz and Rosemary McQuaid for the assistance and cooperation they gave to the Court in this matter.
Appropriate orders taxing costs against Joan Growe, Secretary of State, will be entered for Masters’ fees and expenses, assistants’ fees and expenses, printing expenses, computer expenses and miscellaneous supplies and equipment.
*152
. The eight congressional districts of the State of Minnesota are currently apportioned pursu*147ant to M.S.A. §§ 2.731-2.811. The apportionment of these districts followed the 1970 Census.
. Under Plan A the populations of the combined districts are as follow:
Total Population Metro Population Percent Metro
District 1 509,474 181,628 35.6
District 2 509,520 166,310 32.6
District 6 509,476 11,261 2.2
District 8 509,498 98,209 19.3
. Under Plan B the populations of the combined districts are as follows:
Total Population Metro Percent Population Metro
District 1 509,534 181,688 35.6
District 2 509,577 181,221 35.6
District 8 509,501 98,212 19.3
. The few minor changes made in the boundaries of legislative districts to serve the interests of incumbents are detailed in note fourteen of the legislative plan filed this date. We repeat here that two incumbent Senators reside in each of eleven of the new senate districts and two incumbent Representatives reside in each of nineteen of the new house districts. In addition, there will be thirty open seats.
. By Order dated December 29, 1981, the Court adopted the following criteria:
1. The eight congressional districts shall be as nearly equal in population as possible. The maximum permissible deviation from population equality is plus or minus one-quarter of one percent (.25%) or 1,274 people.
2. The districts shall be single member, compact, and contiguous.
3. The districts shall preserve political subdivisions in the formation of districts.
4. The districts shall preserve the voting strength of minority population and, wherever *149possible, increase the probability of minority representation from areas of sizable concentrations of minority population.
The Court further ordered that communities of interest could be preserved in the formation of districts.
. For example, both plans would place Itasca and Koochiching county into the Seventh Congressional District.
Appendices A-F deleted for purposes of publication.
. The maximum population deviation of the parties’ plans is:
Plaintiffs 1,219
State Senate 1,188
Plan A 41
Plan B 110
. The total and average population deviations of the parties’ plans is:
Total Average
Plaintiffs 5,098 637
State Senate 5,198 650
Plan A 138 17
Plan B 350 44
. In fact, the needed changes are not “minimal.” In order to achieve equal apportionment, 27,-578 people must be removed from the First District; 42,284 people must be removed from the Second District; 36,066 people must be added to the Third District; 49,679 people must be added to the Fourth District; 83,432 people must be added to the Fifth District; 44,778 people must be removed from the Sixth District; 4,023 people must be removed from the Seventh District; and 50,514 people must be removed from the Eighth District.
. The Court’s plan splits a minimum number of out-state counties. Seventy-three of the out-state counties remain intact and seven are split.