dissenting.
Judith Joseph (Joseph) was employed with Tri-State Scientific from May 1988 to September 1989 as a medical equipment salesperson. She filed for unemployment compensation benefits with the Office of Employment Security (OES) on October 1, 1989. The OES denied benefits and Joseph appealed. A hearing was scheduled before a referee. Shortly before the scheduled hearing, Tri-State asked for a continuance and that request was denied. Joseph appeared at the uncontested hearing. The referee issued a decision on March 20, 1990 which reversed the determination of the OES and granted benefits. The referee found, based on the evidence presented, that Joseph had worked for Tri-State on a salary plus commission basis, that she had no proprietary interest in the business, that she was not independently engaged in the business and that she was under the direction and control of the corporation. Upon appeal by Tri-State, the Unemployment Compensation *684Board of Review (Board) affirmed the referee’s decision. Tri-State now appeals to this Court.
Tri-State’s statement of the question involved is:
Whether the claimant was an independent contractor and not an employee because she received no salary, no benefits, or other regular compensation and Tri-State Scientific did not control the manner in which the claimant’s work was accomplished?
Under our scope of review, we are to affirm the Board unless we find that constitutional rights were violated, an error of law was committed or any necessary finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence. Kirkwood v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 106 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 92, 525 A.2d 841 (1987).
I dissent from the majority’s misapplication of our scope of review. As the majority notes, “Tri-State argues that the decision of the Board is insufficient as a matter of law because the Board failed to make findings of fact necessary to resolve the issues raised in this appeal.” (p. 307) The particular issue referred to by Tri-State, and inappropriately argued now, is whether Joseph was an employee within the meaning of the Law. It was Tri-State’s burden to prove that Joseph was not its employee. Tri-State had the opportunity to present evidence to support its position but it failed to do so when it did not appear at the hearing. The effect of the majority’s remand (although it agrees that the referee’s denial of Tri-State’s request for a continuance was proper) is to give Tri-State another chance to argue this already decided issue.
I disagree with the majority’s determination that the Board was required to make findings of fact on the issue of whether Joseph was Tri-State’s employee. The referee did make such findings of fact in his decision. The Board affirmed the referee’s decision, therefore it accepted the facts as found by the referee. The Board’s discussion of the determination of the proper amount of compensation to be paid and its findings which set forth Joseph’s wages reflects that it did accept the finding that Joseph was an *685employee; the claimant must be found to be an employee before the determination of the amount of compensation due her can be made.
Applying our scope of review, our inquiry now is whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. In making such a determination we must apply the definition of employment as set forth in Section 4(Z)(2)(B) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 753(i)(2)(B). Joseph was the only party to present evidence on this issue. Although the referee was not required to accept Joseph’s position, he did so. The referee found that Joseph was a salaried employee under the direction and control of Tri-State, that she had no proprietary interest in the business and that she was not independently engaged in the business, thus satisfying the requirements of “employment” under Section 4(Z)(2)(B). The Board reviewed the evidence and determined that the evidence supported the referee’s determination.
I note further that the case relied on by the majority for its proposition that the Board’s failure to make findings of fact as to Joseph’s employment status necessitates a remand, Monroe G. Koggan Associates, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,1 may be distinguishable. In that case there is no mention of the referee’s decision or findings on the issue of whether the claimant was an employee or an independent contractor. A footnote states:
2. The Office of Employment Security and the referee ruled- on the claimant’s eligibility only under Section 402(h) of the Act, 43 P.S. § 802(h). However, Section 402(h) by its express provisions applies only to claims for benefits during weeks in which the alleged self-employment is ongoing.
An employe shall be ineligible for any week—
(h) In which he is engaged in sei/-employment____
(Emphasis added.) ...
(80 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 628, 472 A.2d at 278)
*686It may be inferred from this that both the OES and the referee had denied benefits based on a finding that the claimant was an independent contractor. The Board, therefore, reversed the referee and was required to make specific findings of fact regarding its determination that the claimant was in fact an employee and not an independent contractor. See Office of Attorney General v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 111 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 187, 533 A.2d 1087 (1987). In the present case, the Board, as the ultimate finder of fact, affirmed the referee based on the evidence in the record. Our review is thus limited to whether that evidence supports the Board’s findings. Accordingly, based on the record evidence, I would affirm the Board.
. 80 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 626, 472 A.2d 277 (1984).