Because the district court has exclusive jurisdiction over the Uniform Transfer to Minors Act, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for entry of the writ.
Though a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy, which this Court hesitates to grant, the remedy is available against a court that is clearly acting beyond its jurisdiction. Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky.2004). Thus, to determine whether to grant this writ, this Court must evaluate whether the Jefferson Circuit Court had jurisdiction over Appel-lee’s accounting action.
Kentucky has codified the UTMA in KRS Chapter 385 and has vested exclusive jurisdiction under the act in the Commonwealth’s district courts. See KRS 385.012(5) (“Court,” under the act, “means District Court”); Privett v. Clendenin, 52 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Ky.2001) (“[DJistrict courts have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over claims brought under the UTMA.”). The UTMA provides a structure for a bequest, such as the instant one, to be given to a minor but with a custodian who is appointed to take control of and deal with the property until the minor reaches the age of majority. See KRS 385.022-.202.
The bequest to Appellee was explicitly given under the UTMA and Appellant was named as the custodian. It is, therefore, unquestionable that the UTMA’s provisions applied to the bequest when it was given and as long as Appellee remained a minor. See KRS 385.212. The only issue is whether the UTMA covers this matter now that Appellee has become an adult.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals focused on interpreting KRS 385.192(1). That section provides for accounting actions against the custodian of a bequest, by “[a] minor who has attained the age of fourteen (14) years.” KRS 385.192(1). The Court of Appeals questioned whom “a minor” refers to in this provision. Is it anyone who was “a minor” when he or she received the gift, or is it only one who is still “a minor” at the time he or she seeks accounting?
I believe, however, that KRS 385.202 controls. That statute provides that “[t]he custodian shall transfer in an appropriate manner the custodial property to the minor or to the minor’s estate upon ... [t]he minor’s attainment of age eighteen ... or ... [t]he minor’s death.” KRS 385.202. This is the section of the UTMA that Appellant has violated. He was required by this provision to transfer the custodial property at the time Appellee attained eighteen years of age. Thus, the only question is whether KRS 385.202 provides a remedy to a now adult beneficiary where the custodian has failed to fulfill his obligation,
That section does not itself explicitly provide for relief by litigation or otherwise. Nonetheless, upon reading the Act as a whole, we conclude that the right provided in KRS 385.202 carries with it a statutory remedy. A proceeding to vindicate the right in KRS 385.202, by way of an accounting, is recognized by KRS 385.192(3), which states, “The court, in a proceeding under KRS 385.032 to 385.222 or in any other proceeding, may require or permit the custodian or the custodian’s legal representative to account.” In describing “a proceeding under KRS 385.032 to 385.222,” the statute clearly contemplates an action brought to assert any- right created or recognized by any of the covered sections. The statute also clearly allows for an accounting. ICRS 385.202 is, of course, within the set of sections covered by KRS 385.193(3).
Appellee can, therefore, bring an action under KRS 385.202 and KRS 185.192(3) to *8seek an accounting from the custodian. Although Appellant no longer has any entitlement with regard to the custodial property, he is still a “custodian” under the UTMA’s broad definition. “ ‘Custodian’ means a person so designated” in a transfer under the UTMA. KRS 385.012(7). Roth parties agree that Appellant was so designated.
To enforce his right to the custodial property, Appellee may sue under KRS 385.202 and KRS 385.192(3) for an accounting from Appellant over his handling of the property. Because Appellee’s cause of action arises under the UTMA, it is under the exclusive jurisdiction of district court. See Privett, 52 S.W.3d at 532. As a result, Jefferson Circuit Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over such a cause of action.
I thus agree with Appellant with regard to the jurisdiction of the Jefferson Circuit Court. However, for the exact reasons just announced, Appellant’s paradoxical theory that jurisdiction is also lacking in Jefferson District Court, because Appellee is no longer a minor, is resoundingly rejected. Even though Appellee is an adult, the Act provides a remedy to vindicate his right under KRS 385.202.
SCHRODER, J., joins this dissenting opinion.