concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Dr. Seeber’s recorded statement to defendant, Equine Clinics’ insurance company, stating that Dr. DeLeo had administered Kymar, is not admissible into evidence against Dr. DeLeo. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the statement was not admissible against Equine Clinics. I would find that sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented to show that Dr. Seeber was an agent authorized by Equine Clinics when he gave the recorded statement. I would therefore find that the trial court erred in excluding Dr. Seeber’s recorded statement.
Appellants alleged, and defendants/appellees admitted, that the representative from Equine’s insurance carrier obtained the recorded statement from Seeber as part of its investigation into the reported loss. In order for a loss to be covered, Equine’s insurance policy required it to cooperate with the investigation of reported losses; this cooperation specifically included providing the carrier with evidence and witnesses regarding the loss. Although there is no direct evidence that Seeber was requested to make the statement on behalf of Equine, I would find that appellants provided ample circumstantial evidence to show that Seeber gave the statement as part of Equine’s duty under the insurance contract to cooperate with the carrier’s investigation into the circumstances of the loss. This circumstantial evidence showed that Seeber acted within his authority in giving the recorded statement. I would therefore conclude that Dr. Seeber’s statement to the insurance carrier would be admissible as to Equine Clinics under the vicarious admission exception to the hearsay rule. See Binder, Hearsay Handbook § 28.04 (2nd ed. 1983); McCormick, Evidence § 267 (3rd ed. 1984); DeFrancesco v. Western Pennsylvania Water Company, 329 Pa.Super. 508, 478 A.2d 1295 (1984).
As previously stated, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the statement is not admissible against Dr. DeLeo. However, I believe that the majority’s reasoning, which *580focuses on prejudice to Dr. DeLeo if the statement is admitted, is misplaced. The established remedy if such prejudice could be shown would be for the trial judge to order a bifurcation; in that way any prejudice to Dr. DeLeo would be avoided.
Accordingly, I would reverse the order granting the compulsory non-suit and remand the case for trial.