Samuel Estep was injured in 1979 while working for Krick Commercial, Inc. He received compensation from Krick under the District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1928, D.C.Code § 36-301 et seq. (1973), which applied to injuries occurring before mid-1982. Estep and his wife then brought a negligence action against the general contractor on the project, Construction General, Inc., which had neither obtained workers compensation insurance for Krick’s employees nor paid any part of the compensation to Estep. The trial court granted Construction General’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that, under Supreme Court precedent, the 1928 Act granted Construction General immunity from any tort liability arising from Estep’s injury.
. This appeal, then, presents the question whether, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1928, a general contractor that did not itself obtain compensation for an injured worker is immune from tort liability when the subcontractor that directly employed the worker did meet its statutory obligation to provide compensation.1 In DiNicola v. George Hyman Construction Co., 407 A.2d 670 (D.C.1979), we ruled that such a general contractor is not immune from tort liability. Five years later, however, the Supreme Court ruled in Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 925, 104 S.Ct. 2827, 81 L.Ed.2d 768 (1984), that an injured District of Columbia worker cannot sue a general contractor in tort unless both the subcontractor and the general contractor have defaulted on their statutory obligations to provide workers compensation for the injury. Under DiNicola, therefore, Construction General would not be immune from *378tort suits brought by Krick employees such as Samuel Estep. Under Johnson, however, Construction General would be immune because its subcontractor, Krick, did not default on Krick’s statutory obligation to provide compensation to Estep. The Es-teps contend that the rule announced in Johnson should not govern injuries covered by the 1928 Act; they argue that we should adhere to the rule of DiNicola. We disagree and, on the authority of Johnson, affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the lawsuit.
I.
In 1927, Congress passed the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (the Longshore Act) to provide workers compensation for maritime employees. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1982). A year later, Congress enacted the District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1928 (the 1928 Act), which simply made the provisions of the Longshore Act applicable to deaths and injuries befalling workers employed in the District of Columbia. D.C. Code § 36-501 (1973). The 1928 Act has no substantive provisions of its own; it merely incorporates the provisions of the Long-shore Act “including all amendments that may hereafter be made thereto.” Id.
The Council of the District of Columbia has since repealed the 1928 Act and replaced it with the District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act of 1980 (the 1980 Act), which, for reasons not relevant here, did not take effect until July 24,1982. D.C.Code §§ 36-301 et seq. (1981); O’Connell v. Maryland Steel Erectors, Inc., 495 A.2d 1134, 1141 (D.C.1985) (as amended), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1066, 106 S.Ct. 1378, 89 L.Ed.2d 603 (1986). Subsequently, Congress amended the Longshore Act in the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1984 (the 1984 Amendments). Among these amendments were provisions designed to overrule the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Johnson of the provisions of the Longshore Act at issue (by way of the 1928 Act) in this case. 33 U.S.C. §§ 904 & 905 (Supp. Ill 1985). In O’Connell, however, we held that the 1984 Amendments had no effect on District of Columbia law because the 1928 Act, to which they would have applied, no longer existed.
More specifically, we concluded that when the 1980 Act repealed the 1928 Act, all claims for injuries occurring before the effective date of the new act, July 24,1982, were cognizable not under the 1928 Act itself, but under the terms of the 1928 Act by way of 1 U.S.C. § 109 (1982), “a savings statute enacted by Congress to deal with the legal effect to be accorded a repealed statute.” O’Connell, 495 A.2d at 1141.2 As a consequence, for purposes of litigating such pre-1982 claims, the federal savings statute incorporated and thus froze the terms of the 1928 Act in the form they had immediately before the 1980 Act’s effective date of repeal. It followed that, because the 1928 Act as such no longer existed as of July 24,1982, there no longer *379was a District of Columbia statute to which congressional amendment of the Longshore Act could apply. Id. at 1140-42; accord, Keener v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 255 U.S.App.D.C. 148, 800 F.2d 1173 (1986) (deferring to this court’s decision in O’Connell), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918, 107 S.Ct. 1375, 94 L.Ed.2d 690 (1987). Whatever power Congress may have had to resurrect the 1928 Act solely for purposes of applying the 1984 Amendments to the District of Columbia, O’Connell must be understood to say that Congress did not do so.
In sum, Estep’s claim is governed not by the 1928 Act but by the terms of the 1928 Act preserved through the federal savings statute. Accordingly, Estep’s claim is governed by the provisions of the Longshore Act as they existed before the 1984 Amendments, since repeal of the 1928 Act itself eliminated the statutory basis for incorporating later amendments to the Longshore Act into District of Columbia law.
II.
Section 4(a) of the Longshore Act requires employers to obtain compensation for injured employees. 33 U.S.C. § 904(a) (1982). In exchange for undertaking this obligation, employers receive immunity under § 5(a) from tort suits by injured employees. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1982). “In return for the guarantee of compensation, the employees surrender common-law remedies against their employers for work-related injuries. For the employer, the reward for securing compensation is immunity from employee tort suits.” Johnson, 467 U.S. at 931, 104 S.Ct. at 2831. It follows that an employer who defaults on the obligation to provide compensation does not receive such immunity. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1982)!
The situation of general contractors, however, presents a special problem. Section 4(a) specifically requires a general contractor to obtain compensation for employees of its subcontractor only if the subcontractor has failed to do so. Thus, a general contractor that fails to obtain compensation does not default on its statutory obligations unless the subcontractor also has failed to obtain compensation. 33 U.S.C. § 904(a) (1982). The 1928 Act did not make clear, however, whether such a non-defaulting general contractor enjoys the same immunity from tort suits that a non-defaulting employer generally enjoys, even though the general contractor has not itself obtained compensation or insurance for its subcontractor’s employees.
In DiNicola, we held that under the 1928 Act a general contractor can be sued for its negligence when the subcontractor has paid the injured employee as the workers compensation scheme demands. According to DiNicola, the general contractor enjoys tort immunity only when the subcontractor has failed to obtain adequate insurance and the general contractor then meets its resulting duty to step in to pay workers compensation. In reaching this result, the DiNicola court interpreted the relevant provisions of the federal Longshore Act; as have other decisions of this court, the DiNicola opinion consistently characterized its reasoning as a construction of federal law and drew upon federal court precedents interpreting the Longshore Act. See DiNicola, 407 A.2d at 672, 674-75; see also Lee v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 509 A.2d 100, 103 (D.C.1986); Milligan v. Brian Construction Development Co., 485 A.2d 593 (D.C.1984); Dodson v. Washington Automotive Co., 461 A.2d 1020 (D.C.1983) (per curiam).
Several years later, the Supreme Court squarely rejected DiNicola’s understanding of §§ 4(a) and 5(a) of the Long-shore Act, as incorporated in the 1928 Act. In Johnson, the Court held that general contractors share the presumption of immunity enjoyed by all employers. Like other employers, a general contractor loses this immunity only if it defaults on its statutory obligations. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 937, 104 S.Ct. at 2834. But, because a general contractor has no obligation to its subcontractor’s employees unless the subcontractor has defaulted, the general contractor cannot default under the statute as long as the subcontractor provides compen*380sation. The general contractor, therefore, loses its immunity only when both the subcontractor and the general contractor have failed to pay workers compensation. It is only the general contractor’s failure to step in after the subcontractor has defaulted that removes the general contractor’s tort immunity. Id. at 938-40,104 S.Ct. at 2834-36.
The Johnson case arose from injuries suffered by employees of subcontractors working for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) as general contractor. The employees were covered by the 1928 Act, not directly by the federal Longshore Act. Their suits against WMATA, therefore, were brought under the 1928 Act, and any resolution of their complaints necessarily constituted a construction of the 1928 Act. Johnson accordingly interpreted §§ 4(a) and 5(a) of the Longshore Act as incorporated into the 1928 Act, the same District of Columbia law at issue in DiNicola and in the present case. See Johnson, 467 U.S. at 927-28 & n. 4, 104 S.Ct. at 2829-30 & n. 4.
Like this court in DiNicola, the Supreme Court in Johnson reached its view of the 1928 Act through an interpretation of the Longshore Act. Both the Supreme Court in Johnson and this court in DiNicola, therefore, drew no distinction between the 1928 Act and the Longshore Act; both courts assumed that a correct interpretation of §§ 4(a) and 5(a) of the Longshore Act constituted a correct interpretation of the 1928 Act. But that is where the similarity ends. Johnson and DiNicola adjudicated the same issue with respect to the same statute and reached absolutely conflicting results. The question, then, is which decision binds us now.
III.
The 1928 Act was enacted by Congress but affects only the District of Columbia. “Acts of Congress affecting only the District, like other federal laws,” fall within the Supreme Court’s Article III jurisdiction. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 687, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1435, 63 L.Ed. 2d 715 (1980). The Supreme Court has the power to review “decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals interpreting those Acts” and may reject decisions of this court interpreting local laws passed by Congress. Id. Accordingly, in Johnson the Supreme Court acted entirely within its authority in deciding for itself the question of contractor liability under the 1928 Act, despite the existence of a local Court of Appeals decision reaching the contrary result. The Esteps argue that we may, nonetheless, decline to enforce the Supreme Court’s construction because Johnson failed to give the deference to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals that the Court’s own precedents demand.
A.
Although the Supreme Court has the power to exercise plenary review over questions raised by Acts of Congress touching only the District of Columbia, it has chosen to treat decisions of this court on questions of local law “in a manner similar to the way in which [it] treat[s] decisions of the highest court of a State on questions of state law.” Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 368, 94 S.Ct. 1723, 1726, 40 L.Ed.2d 198 (1974) (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has stated that it will not overrule the District of Columbia courts on matters of local law “ ‘save in exceptional situations where egregious error has been committed.’ ” Id. at 369, 94 S.Ct. at 1726 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476, 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1325, 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946)).
The Esteps point out, however, that the Johnson opinion betrays no such deference to our decision in DiNicola.3 Nor does *381Johnson even mention the doctrine of deference to the local District of Columbia courts. Had it treated the 1928 Act as a local law, contend the Esteps, the Supreme Court presumably would have deferred to our decision in DiNicola, not overruled it. (Perhaps even more likely, they say, the Court might not have addressed the issue at all in a case arising under the local law of the District rather than under the Long-shore Act itself.) In any event, the Esteps argue we may ignore Johnson because the Supreme Court erred, according to its own doctrine, by failing to defer. They would have us treat Johnson as a state court may treat the rare examples of Supreme Court interpretation of state law that rest on neither a federal statute nor on the federal constitution: just as a state court may ignore a Supreme Court construction purely of state law, this court may ignore the Johnson Court’s non-deferential construction of local law. See Owen J. Jones & Son, Inc. v. Gospodinovic, 46 Or.App. 101, 107, 610 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1980) (en banc) (“A construction of an Oregon statute by the United States Supreme Court is instructive, but not necessarily controlling.”); American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Mark Engineering Co., 230 Md. 584, 588, 187 A.2d 864, 866 (1963) (same).
The view that Supreme Court rulings on state law cannot bind the state’s own courts is justified because “Supreme Court decision of state law questions for the future” — rather than solely for a specific case at hand — “would be such startlingly bad federalism that it could easily be called unconstitutional.” 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4021 at 680 (1977) (footnote omitted). Because the District, however, is not a state, Supreme Court interference with the courts of the District cannot raise legitimate objections grounded purely on concerns about federalism. Moreover, although Congress has directed that District of Columbia courts have great autonomy in the application of local laws — and the Supreme Court itself has embraced this principle — the Court has held only that it will treat decisions of this court “in a manner similar” to its treatment of state court decisions on state law. Pernell, 416 U.S. at 368, 94 S.Ct. at 1726. The principle that a state may ignore Supreme Court rulings on state law, therefore, has no direct application to the relation between the Supreme Court and the District of Columbia courts. Whether there are circumstances in which we may nonetheless decline to follow a Supreme Court decision construing a local law adopted by the Congress, however, is a question we need not decide. Nor, of course, is a matter of local law adopted by the Council of the District of Columbia before us. See Meiggs v. Associated Builders, et al., 545 A.2d 631 (D.C.1988). Whatever merit the Esteps’ argument might have in another context, we conclude it does not apply here, for, as elaborated below, in construing the 1928 Act of Congress, the Supreme Court implicitly concluded that deference to this court was “inappropriate with respect to the statute [ ] involved.” Whalen, 445 U.S. at 688,100 S.Ct. at 1435.
B.
The Supreme Court has stated that the doctrine of deference to the District of Columbia courts on matters of local law does not apply when a question of general federal law “cannot be separated” from the question of local law. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 688, 100 S.Ct. at 1435.4 We believe John*382son embodies the premise that, because the 1928 Act merely incorporates the provisions of the Longshore Act, construction of the 1928 Act “cannot be separated” from construction of the Longshore Act, and thus Congress intended the construction of the local law and the federal law to be identical.
The Johnson Court was aware that the controversy in that case had arisen within the District of Columbia and that the employees had received workers compensation under the 1928 Act rather than directly under the Longshore Act. See Johnson, 467 U.S. at 927-28 & n. 4, 104 S.Ct. at 2829-30 & n. 4. The Court nonetheless refers throughout only to the provisions of the Longshore Act and characterizes its holding as an interpretation of the Longshore Act controlling all future applications of the federal law. The form of the decision, then, is consistent with the premise that the meaning of relevant provisions of the 1928 Act is identical to the meaning of the same terms viewed solely as provisions of the Longshore Act. Because the 1928 Act falls within the Supreme Court’s Article III jurisdiction, it is entirely within the Supreme Court’s power to interpret the local law as a pure incorporation of the federal law and, therefore, as identical in meaning to the federal Act. In applying this view of the local law (as identical to the federal statute) the Supreme Court did not act contrary to any decision of this court. As noted above, our decisions in DiNicola and other cases at least implicitly have taken precisely the same approach. Indeed, in Dodson, we expressly said that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 1928 Act provisions at issue in that case was binding on this court. See Dodson, 461 A.2d at 1024 (following Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., Ltd., 451 U.S. 596, 101 S.Ct. 1945, 68 L.Ed.2d 472 (1981), in construing D.C.Code § 36-501 (1973)).5
*383We believe the Johnson and DiNi-cola courts’ understanding of the relation between the 1928 Act and the Longshore Act is fully justified, at least with respect to provisions, such as those governing general contractor liability, that apply equally to the contexts of land-based and maritime employment. The two laws were passed by the same Congress. More strikingly, the text of the 1928 Act does not track or imitate the terms of the Longshore Act but expressly states the Longshore Act, as such, shall apply as the District of Columbia’s workers compensation law. The full text of the 1928 Act (aside from a provision stating exceptions not relevant here) consists of a single sentence stating that “[t]he provisions of [the Longshore Act], including all amendments that may hereafter be made thereto, shall apply in respect to the injury or death of an employee of an employer carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia” — with appropriate broadening of the terms “employer” and “employee” to extend beyond maritime occupations. D.C.Code § 36-501 (1973). Congress suggested no intention to differentiate between the substantive compensation schemes of the local and federal laws; it provided instead that all amendments to the federal law would become part of the local law. The manner in which Congress wrote the 1928 Act, therefore, indicates its intention that the two laws be substantively the same. From this we infer that an authoritative judicial interpretation of the Longshore Act should generally control the meaning of the 1928 Act.
The Johnson and DiNicola courts, therefore, correctly assumed that to construe the 1928 Act is to construe the Long-shore Act, and vice versa. This conclusion does not preclude the possibility that, in some circumstances, the two Acts may diverge. A court construing the 1928 Act may find good reason to give the local law a gloss different from an interpretation appropriate to the federal law, for the two Acts cover different kinds of employment that may justify different treatment of specific problems. Cf. Gudmundson v. Cardillo, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 230, 126 F.2d 521 (1942) (declining to apply Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932), which construed the Longshore Act, to a 1928 Act case because Crowell concerned constitutional limits on the admiralty power of Congress not relevant to congressional power over the District of Columbia); Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor v. National Van Lines, Inc., 198 U.S.App.D.C. 239, 243 n. 20, 613 F.2d 972, 978 n. 20 (1979) (United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has broader territorial jurisdiction over 1928 Act claims than over Long-shore Act claims), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 100 S.Ct. 3049, 65 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1980); see also Hall v. C & P Telephone Co., 253 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 372-73, 793 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (1986). Here, however, we see no reason to believe the nature of claims arising under the 1928 Act rationally demands a different treatment of general contractor liability from the treatment accorded under the Longshore Act. Accordingly, Johnson, not DiNicola, controls.6
Affirmed.
. In this opinion, we use the term “general contractor” to refer to contractors generally; it therefore includes a subcontractor that hires a sub-subcontractor. Similarly, the term "subcontractor" also includes sub-subcontractors.
. In O’Connell v. Maryland Steel Erectors, Inc., 495 A.2d 1134 (D.C.1985) (as amended), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1066, 106 S.Ct. 1378, 89 L.Ed.2d 603 (1986), which this division is bound to follow, M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971), this court did not directly discuss what law the Council of the District of Columbia intended to apply to pre-1980 Act claims once the 1928 Act had been repealed and the 1980 Act had become effective. Theoretically, the Council could have intended to repeal the 1928 Act only as to claims accruing on or after July 24, 1982, leaving the 1928 Act, as such, including judicial interpretations thereof and congressional amendments thereto, in effect for all claims accruing before the effective date of repeal. This court in O'Connell, however, concluded that the Council instead absolutely repealed the 1928 Act effective July 24, 1982, leaving nothing in its place for earlier claims except the federal savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109 (1982). In reaching this conclusion, we did not make clear whether this result was the Council’s intent or instead was dictated by Congress, irrespective of the Council's intent, as the law that applies whenever a congressionally-enacted statute of purely local application in the District of Columbia is repealed. In any event, O’Connell, in applying to pre-1980 Act claims the terms of the 1928 Act through the federal savings statute, rather than applying the 1928 Act as such, resolved an ambiguity in two earlier opinions that simply said the 1928 Act applied to claims accruing before the effective date of the new act. See Garrett v. Washington Air Compressor Co., 466 A.2d 462, 462 n. 1 (D.C.1983); Carey v. Crane Service Co., Inc., 457 A.2d 1102, 1103 n. 2 (D.C.1983).
. Indeed, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 925, 104 S.Ct. 2827, 81 L.Ed.2d 768 (1984), cites DiNicola only as one of the majority of cases that have "concluded that § 5(a)’s tort immunity can extend to general contractors, at least when the contractor has fulfilled its responsibilities to secure compensation for subcontractor employees in accordance with the requirements of § 4(a).” 467 U.S. at 933-34, 104 S.Ct. at 2832 (citing DiNicola v. George Hyman Construction Co., 407 A.2d 670, 674 (D.C.1979)); cf. DiNicola, 407 A.2d at 674 (approving prior cases "concluding that a land-based general contractor is liable as a third *381party for his negligence"). Johnson, therefore, does not even mention that this court had interpreted the local law directly at issue and had held general contractors not immune unless they did in fact obtain compensation for the injured employees of their subcontractors.
. The opinion for the Court in Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980), does not make entirely clear the relevant sense in which the construction of the local law in that case was inseparable from the federal law. The Whalen Court set out to determine whether, in enacting the local District of Columbia criminal law, Congress intended to allow the local courts to impose separate, consecutive sentences for rape and killing during the commission of a rape. This was a question of construing purely local law, seemingly an issue for which deference to this court was due. The Supreme Court, however, found a nexus *382between local and federal law in the fact that, if Congress had not intended to allow consecutive sentences, then the local courts had violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment by giving Whalen consecutive sentences for rape and first degree murder. The Court believed this nexus was sufficient to remove the case from those in which deference is due, though not absolute. But the question whether Congress intended to allow multiple sentences was logically independent of the fifth amendment bar on courts imposing multiple sentences unless authorized by Congress; thus, Whalen was not a case where local and federal questions were bound together because resolution of the local question depended upon resolution of the federal question. It is difficult to understand why deference was not due on the independent issue of statutory construction. The concurring opinions of Justices White and Blackmun may provide a more solid ground for the Court’s decision to reverse this court’s view of congressional intent in Whalen. In their view, the local court was owed initial deference but had made the kind of "egregious error” that justified the Supreme Court in overriding this court’s interpretation of the Act of Congress in question. See Whalen, 445 U.S. at 695-96, 100 S.Ct. at 1440 (White, J., concurring), 696, 100 S.Ct. at 1440 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
. The treatment here accorded the 1928 Act is entirely consistent with the view that it is a ‘local law” and that the United States Courts of Appeal for the lower federal courts continue to owe deference to this court in interpreting that law. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has developed a practice of treating local interpretations of local law exactly as, under the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), federal courts in the states treat state court interpretations of state law. Hall v. C & P Telephone Co., 253 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 370-71, 793 F.2d 1354, 1356-57 (1986), reh’g denied, 258 U.S.App.D.C. 83, 809 F.2d 924 (1987). The Circuit Court has applied this doctrine to construction of the 1928 Act. Id. at 1355-59; Keener v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 255 U.S.App.D.C. 148, 152-53, 800 F.2d 1173 1177-78 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918, 107 S.Ct. 1375, 94 L.Ed.2d 690 (1987). (The Circuit Court in Johnson, contrary to current practice, did not expressly defer to DiNicola. See Johnson v. Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., 230 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 303-06, 717 F.2d 574, 580-83 (1983), rev’d on other grounds, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 925, 104 S.Ct. 2827, 81 L.Ed.2d 768 (1984).) This deference by the Circuit Court is called for even where the Supreme Court has decided deference on its own part is not appropriate. Just as the Supreme Court is the third and last forum after the Superior Court and this court, the Supreme Court is the final forum after the federal District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals, comprising a system distinct from but parallel to the local court system. The Supreme Court, therefore, may properly construe local law in contradiction to a holding of this court, whereas the federal District and Circuit Courts ought not to *383do so out of respect for this court's primary role in construing District of Columbia law.
. Basically, the dissent says that DiNicola, not Johnson, should control because the Supreme Court "simply failed to recognize that Johnson involved ‘an issue of local law1.... [T]he Supreme Court in Johnson did not interpret the local act.” Post at 387, 390. We are unwilling to end-run the Supreme Court on that basis; Johnson squarely presented, and necessarily decided, the 1928 Act issue.
. District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, D.C. Code § 11-102 (1981); see generally Pub.L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 ("Court Reorganization Act”) (codified at scattered sections of the D.C. Code and U.S.C.).