concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur with the majority opinion in that pursuant to a petition for custody, brought by a stepparent under 15 V.S.A. §§ 291 and 293, *93the trial court was in error in dismissing the petition, because the applicable statute, 15 V.S.A. § 291(g), clearly and plainly states that “ ‘children’ shall include stepchildren,” and this matter must be reversed and remanded for hearing.
I must dissent from the majority’s holding that the court was in error in denying plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint, to request custody on behalf of a stepparent.
15 V.S.A. § 652(a) plainly and clearly states that the court “shall make an order concerning the custody of any minor child of the marriage.” (Emphasis added.) The court must give effect to the intention of the legislature, Hill v. Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 93, 463 A.2d 232, 233 (1983), and if the meaning of the statute is plain on its face, it must be enforced according to its terms, without further construction. Id. In my view the statute here is plain on its face, and the statute only gives the court power to make custody orders to natural parents. Phillips v. Phillips, 176 Or. 159, 172, 156 P.2d 199, 203 (1945).
Even if we were unable to determine the legislative intent from the statute’s express terms, and we examined legislative history to determine that intent, Town School District of St. Johnsbury v. Town School District of Topsham, 122 Vt. 268, 273, 169 A.2d 352, 355 (1961), the result would not change.
In examining the legislative history of 15 V.S.A. § 652, we begin by considering a portion of the original version of the proposed statute, not included in the final enactment:
(f) If both parents agree, if the court finds that neither parent is fit to have custody, or if extraordinary circumstances, such as prolonged separation, occur between natural parent and child with the child developing a strong attachment to a custodian who is not a parent, the court may grant custody to a grandparent, an adult brother or sister, a stepparent, or some other person with whom the child has previously established a positive relationship.
Vt. House Bills, 1981, H.176 at 6-7 (emphasis added).
The above-quoted, later deleted, provision would have given the divorce court authority to grant custody to a stepparent, if at least one of three circumstances were present. Those circumstances would have included: (1) where both parents agreed to such a custody decree; (2) where the court found that neither parent was fit to have custody; and (3) in extraordinary cir*94cumstances.
As noted by the Supreme Court of Oregon,
“the rejection by the legislature of a specific provision contained in an act as originally reported has been held most persuasive to the conclusion that the act should not be so construed as in effect to include that provision, at least, where there is no basis for the assumption that the words omitted are deemed to be surplusage.”
Gilbertson v. McLean, 216 Or. 629, 642, 341 P.2d 139, 145 (1959) (quoting 50 Am. Jur. Statutes § 330, at 322); see also Roberts v. Spray, 71 Ariz. 60, 66, 223 P.2d 808, 812 (1950); City of Manhattan v. Eriksen, 204 Kan. 150, 154, 460 P.2d 622, 625 (1969); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 5, 22-25 (1931).
To construe 15 V.S.A. § 652(a) as appellant suggests would effectively include that provision which the legislature deleted. That is, if § 652(a) were construed to allow divorce courts to consider the custody of stepchildren, § 652(f), now deleted, would, in effect, become part of the final enactment. The legislature rejected this portion of the proposed legislation, § 652(f), which would have given the divorce court the power to grant custody to a stepparent under certain circumstances, including when neither parent is fit to have custody. The legislative rejection of this provision persuades me to conclude that the act should not be construed to give the divorce court the power tó consider the custody of stepchildren.
Finally, even if we were unable to garner the legislative intent from the plain meaning of the statute’s terms, a comparison of § 652(a)’s predecessor, 15 V.S.A. § 292, with § 652(a) evidences an intent to change the effect of the law.
The predecessor to 15 V.S.A. § 652(a) provided, in pertinent part:
When a . . . divorce [is] granted,. . . upon petition of either of the parents, the court may make such other or further decree as it deems expedient concerning the care, custody and maintenance of the minor children of the parties
15 V.S.A. § 292 (repealed, 1981, No. 247 (Adj. Sess.), § 18) (emphasis added). The legislature repealed § 292 in the same bill in which it enacted § 652(a). 1981, No. 247 (Adj. Sess.).
*95Where there is a significant change in the terms of a statute covering a particular subject, effect must be given to that change. In re Cutshaw, 6 Ariz. App. 330, 432 P.2d 474 (1967); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 370, at 846. The prior law, concerning custody of minor children in divorce actions, granted the divorce court authority to make custody decrees concerning minor children of the parties. Any stepchild would certainly be a child of the parties. In the legislature’s subsequent enactment, § 652(a), the divorce court is authorized to the consider the minor children of the marriage, not the parties. This significant change in the language employed evidences an intent to change the law and restrict the scope of the divorce court’s authority.
In sum, the language of § 652(a) evinces a legislative intent that divorce courts not consider stepchildren and their custody when considering a divorce petition. Further, even if one finds the language of § 652(a) ambiguous, the legislative history of the enactment indicates an intent consistent with my conclusion.
The majority opinion, in adding conditions and words to the statute, i.e., that if a stepparent stands in loco parentis to a stepchild of the marital household, and if extraordinary circumstances exist, custody may be awarded to a stepparent, is just another example of blatant judicial legislating that a majority of this Court recently has been wont to indulge. Peck v. Counseling Service of Addison County, Inc., 146 Vt. 61, 499 A.2d 422 (1985); see Perry v. Superior Court of Kern County, 108 Cal. App. 3d 480, 485, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583, 586 (Ct. App. 1980). The trial court’s denial of the motion to amend is without error.
I am authorized to state that Justice Peck joins in this opinion.