DISSENTING OPINION BY
BENDER, J.:I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s decision affirming the trial court’s judgment entered in favor of Earl and Sharon Patton. Instead, I would reverse the judgment in the Pattons’ favor and direct the trial court to enter judgment for Worthington Associates, Inc., based upon a determination that Worthington met the test set forth in McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 302 Pa. 287, 153 A. 424 (1930), and should, therefore, be deemed Earl Patton’s statutory employer.
Worthington challenges the trial court’s imposition of the “prelude” or “screening question” based on the trial court’s interpretation of Lascio v. Belcher Roofing Corp., 704 A.2d 642 (Pa.Super.1997). This claim centers on the trial court’s placing of the question — whether Patton was an independent contractor or an employee of Worthington — before the jury. In countering the trial court’s action in placing the question before the jury, Worthington asserts that the issue here is whether it met the five-prong test enunciated in McDonald, noting that the trial court and Patton agreed “that if [Patton] were not an independent contractor, Worthington would be his statutory employer because the McDonald test would otherwise be met and Worthington would win as a matter of law.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/5/10, at 5. Moreover, Worthington claims that Las-cio does not require:
a threshold factual determination by the jury of whether Mr. Patton was an independent contractor or employee of Wor-thington as the general contractor. Rather, Lascio focused on whether Mr. Lascio was an independent contractor because the contract in that case, unlike the one here, contained an “independent contractor clause.”
Worthington’s brief at 15.
In discussing the question — who is a statutory employer under the Act — our Supreme Court’s decision in Peck v. Delaware County Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 572 Pa. 249, 814 A.2d 185 (2002), reiterated the criteria set forth in McDonald as follows:
To create the relation of statutory employer under section 203 of the act ... all of the following elements must be present: (1) An employer who is under contract with an owner or one in the position of an owner. (2) Premises occupied by or under the control of such employer. (3) A subcontract made by such employer. (4) Part of the employer’s regular business intrusted [sic] to such subcontractor. (5) An employee of such subcontractor.
Peck, 814 A.2d at 188 (quoting McDonald, 153 A. at 426). The Peck court then explained:
*496The classic statutory employer situation is in the construction industry, where a property owner hires the general contractor, who hires a subcontractor to do specialized work on the jobsite, and an employee of the subcontractor is injured in the course of his employment. See Cranshaw Construction Inc. v. Ghrist, 290 Pa.Super. 286, 434 A.2d 756 (Pa.Super.1981) (general contractor immune from suit as statutory employer of injured employee of carpentry subcontractor). In those situations, the general contractor who meets the five-part McDonald test qualifies as the statutory employer of the subcontractor’s employee, and is immune from suit by that employee.
Peck, 814 A.2d at 188-89. Accordingly, the McDonald factors are the appropriate elements to apply to determine whether the general contractor is protected by the statutory employer defense.
However, as noted by Worthington, the trial court here relied on the Lascio case, wherein the trial court granted JNOV in favor of Barclay-White, the general contractor, on the basis that it was the statutory employer of Mr. Lascio, who was injured while working as an employee at a construction site for one of the subcontractors. Notably, the contract involved in Lascio contained an independent contractor clause, which provided that subcontractors and persons hired by the subcontractors are independent contractors and “shall not be deemed to be the employees of [the general contractor] for any purposes whatsoever.” Lascio, 704 A.2d at 645 (emphasis added). In response to Mr. Lascio’s negligence claim and based on the statutory employer defense, Barclay-White moved for dismissal, but the trial court reserved consideration of the motion until after the jury’s verdict. After the jury found in favor of Mr. Lascio and his wife, the trial court granted JNOV on the statutory employer defense.
On appeal, this Court refused to affirm the judgment, explaining that it would not create a presumption against the validity of independent contractor clauses and reasoning that “[s]uch a holding would allow Barclay-White to ignore that clause and claim immunity in tort but assert that same clause in defense of an action for Workers’ Compensation benefits.” Lascio, 704 A.2d at 645. The Lascio court then remanded the case for the trial court to determine the effect of the contract clause on the issue as to whether Mr. Lascio was an employee or an independent contractor, indicating that Barclay-White could not claim statutory employer immunity if Mr. Lascio was an independent contractor.
Instantly, the contract in this case does not contain an independent contractor clause. Therefore, Lascio is not applicable. Rather, cases like McDonald and Peck guide the decision here. The Peck decision states that “we endorse the principle that, for purposes of Section 203 statutory employer immunity, statutory employer status should be found only where all five elements of the McDonald test are clearly met.” Peck, 814 A.2d at 190. Nor have we found any cases in which an independent contractor analysis was performed where the property owner hires a general contractor, who hires a subcontractor to work at the construction site, and no independent contractor clause is contained in the contract.
Here, the trial court determined that “[t]he threshold issue was whether or not Patton was an independent contractor.” T.C.O. at 5. The court also indicated that “[a]t the conclusion of the trial Patton agreed that if he were not an independent contractor, Worthington would be his statutory employer because the McDonald test would otherwise be met and Wor-*497thington would win as a matter of law.” Id. However, the court overlooked the following: “The issue of whether an employer is a ‘statutory employer’ for purposes of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is properly the subject of a motion for summary judgment, as ‘whether the facts as they are determined to exist constitute an employment relationship is strictly a question of law.’ ” Mullins v. Sun Co., Inc., 763 A.2d 398, 399 n. 3 (Pa.Super.2000) (quoting Wilkinson v. K-Mart, 412 Pa.Super. 434, 603 A.2d 659, 661 (1992)). Accordingly, the determination as to what employment status existed should not have been presented to the jury, but rather should have been decided by the court. Cherniak v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 339 Pa. 73, 14 A.2d 334, 335 (1940) (stating “[i]t is well settled that if the determination of an issue on trial rests on a question of law, the court determines it.”). Thus, I would determine that the jury’s conclusion that Patton was an independent contractor should not stand. Consequently, I would reverse the judgment in Patton’s favor and direct the trial court to enter judgment for Worthington, since Patton agrees that Worthington has met the McDonald test, which controls the outcome here. Peck, 814 A.2d at 189 (a general contractor who meets the McDonald test qualifies as the statutory employer and is immune from suit by the subcontractor’s employee).