The result reached by the majority is unquestionably correct. However, I must respectfully dissent from the rule announced therein. The rule announced by the majority (maj. opn., ante, pp. 665-666) is so amorphous that in reality, there is no rule at all. I too share in the trust, confidence, and integrity in our trial court judges. Nevertheless, the majority rule may allow the trial court to violate at least the spirit of the restriction on plea bargaining passed by the voters as part of Proposition 8, the Victim’s Bill of Rights. (Pen. Code, § 1192.7.)
*672Three points must be emphasized. One, no person charged with any criminal offense has an entitlement to a plea bargain. Two, to the extent that a plea bargain is contemplated, where the offense is enumerated in Penal Code section 1192.7 subdivision (c), there is an express limitation on the process. Three, at a postconviction sentencing hearing, the trial judge is free to impose whatever disposition is authorized by law. Penal Code section 1192.7 has no effect whatsoever on this later observation. The issues now before the court deal only with an antecedent procedure before the actual sentencing, i.e., disposition by way of a guilty plea. In my view, the majority rule tends to eviscerate the restriction on plea bargaining.
I believe that our trial courts are entitled to an objective, reasonable, and workable rule which comports with at least the spirit of Proposition 8’s restriction. Articulation of a clear and workable rule should be the hallmark of an appellate opinion. The rule announced should be one capable of uniform application to persons similarly situated. This is especially true in the context of the determinate sentence law. One of its declared objectives was “. . . the elimination of disparity and the provision of uniformity of sentences . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (a)(1).)
It would be inappropriate to speculate how Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivisions (a) and (b) would be applied in the myriad of situations not before the court (e.g., where the court conditionally commits to the mitigated term). The only issue presented in the instant case is whether the trial court’s conditional commitment of the two-year midterm was a “substantial reduction.” Thus, I only address the selection of the “base term,” “. . . the determinate prison term selected from among the three possible terms prescribed by statute . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 405(b).)
Penal Code section 1192.7, in pertinent part, provides: “(a) Plea bargaining in any case in which the indictment or information charges any serious felony ... or any offense of driving while under the influence ... is prohibited, unless ... a reduction or dismissal would not result in a substantial change in sentence.”
Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (b) provides: “As used in this section ‘plea bargaining’ means any bargaining, negotiation, or discussion between a criminal defendant, or his or her counsel, and a prosecuting attorney or judge, whereby the defendant agrees to plead guilty or nolo contendere, in exchange for any promises, commitments, concessions, assurances, or consideration by the prosecuting attorney or judge relating to any charge against the defendant or to the sentencing of the defendant.”
*673The “unsubstantial change exception” speaks in terms of a reduction. Reduction from what? What is the yardstick for determining whether a reduction is substantial? Is the reduction measured from the theoretical absolute maximum sentence including consecutive terms for all “enhancements,” (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 405(a)) as contended by the People? Is it measured from what punishment the defendant would have received had there been no plea bargain—the majority’s holding? Or is the reduction measured against the presumptive midterm with concurrent sentences on remaining counts with or without reference to other enhancements? Simply posing these legitimate questions underscores my opinion that the statute is not a model of precision.
At oral argument, the People conceded that the statute is “unclear.” This view is shared by the California District Attorney’s Association. (Proposition 8—The Victim’s Bill of Rights (1982) CDAA, ch. IX, p. 16. “This exception [no substantial change in sentence] to the general plea-bargaining prohibition in section 1192.7 is susceptible to a number of interpretations.”) The statute is surely a logical candidate for statutory construction even though it arose through the initiative process. (Curl v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1292, 1300 [276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292].)
The People cite no authority that compels or even suggests that the yardstick is the theoretical maximum period of confinement, in this case, three years eight months. It is not enough to conclusionally say that Proposition 8 is a “get tough on criminals” initiative.
Proposition 8 did not repeal the sentencing procedure specified in Penal Code section 1170 et seq. Nor did it purport to require that a trial court exercise sentencing discretion in any particular manner. Absent the total abolition of plea bargaining, the United States Supreme Court has “. . . unequivocally recognize[d] the constitutional propriety of extending leniency in exchange for a plea of guilty . . . .” (Corbitt v. New Jersey (1978) 439 U.S. 212, 224 [58 L.Ed.2d 466, 477; 99 S.Ct. 492]; cf. In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 278-279 [152 Cal.Rptr. 528, 590 P.2d 383, 100 A.L.R.3d 823].)
Section 3 of Proposition 8, adding section 28 subdivision (a) to the California Constitution, notes that to protect crime victims, convicted felons should be “sufficiently punished.” Section 3 also mentions that procedural reforms (e.g., adoption of Pen. Code, § 1192.7) “. . . are necessary and proper as deterrents to criminal behavior. . . .” Here, as noted by the majority, the trial court “sufficiently punished” Arauz, and the manner in which the punishment was effected does no violence to the deterrent effect of Penal Code section 1192.7.
*674“When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall order the imposition of the middle term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.” (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b), italics added; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rules 420(a), 428(b).) Thus, the midterm is the presumptive sentence selected by the Legislature.
Given this rule, there is no logical reason to credit the People’s theory that the aggravated three-year upper term is the first point of departure. I would construe this amgibuous statute as favorably to the defendant as its language reasonably permits. (In re Nathaniel C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 1002 [279 Cal.Rptr. 236].) Since the drafters of Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (a) did not tell us what yardstick to use, I would simply read Penal Code section 1192.7 in pari materia with Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b) and adopt the presumptive middle term as the yardstick for determining whether a reduction is substantial.
This construction is consistent with the rule that “ ‘[a] statute must be construed “in the context of the entire statutory system of which it is a part, in order to achieve harmony among the parts.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Hull (1992) 1 Cal.4th 266, 272 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526, 820 P.2d 1036]; see also Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 918 [80 Cal.Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33]; People v. Comingore (1977) 20 Cal.3d 142, 147 [141 Cal.Rptr. 542, 570 P.2d 723].)
For purposes of Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (a) a plea bargain for the presumptive middle term must be deemed “sufficient punishment.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (a).) Adoption of the presumptive middle term as the yardstick for measuring whether a contemplated reduction is substantial or not, does no violence to the letter or spirit of the restriction. Moreover, it provides an objective, reasonable, and workable rule for the trial courts.
Since I conclude that the People’s premise is incorrect, it follows that the selection of the two-year middle term as the base term is not a reduction at all, let alone a substantial reduction.
There is little doubt that Arauz was a recidivist who deserved swift and sure punishment. That’s what he got. He had never been sentenced to state prison, let alone been the recipient of a consecutive prison sentence. His previous maximum period of incarceration was 150 days as a term and condition of misdemeanor probation for driving under the influence. Even where Proposition 8 applies, the prosecutor “. . . simply does not have the power to require the trial court to exercise sentencing discretion in any *675particular way." (People v. Superior Court (Ramos) (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1270, fn. omitted.) The sentence here selected is certainly within the broad range of sentencing discretion unaffected by Penal Code section 1192.7.
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 13, 1992, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 9, 1992.