dissenting:
It is with regret that I once again dissent from the admission of an individual to practice before this Court. See In re Application of Howard C., 286 Md. 244, 245, 407 A.2d 1124 (1979), and In re Application of Allan S., 282 Md. 683, 693, 700, 387 A.2d 271 (1978).
Part of the problem apparently is a difference between my colleagues and me as to what constitutes good moral character. They seem to be of the belief that one can be said to possess good moral character if he has not violated the law lately. I do not see it that way. Thomas Paine, the political pamphleteer of the American Revolution, observed in The American Crisis No. XXIII (1783), “Character is much easier kept than recovered.” I agree.
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (unabridged ed. 1967) defines “character” in pertinent part:
1. the aggregate of features and traits that form the apparent individual nature of some person or thing. 2. one such feature or trait; characteristic.3. moral or ethical quality .... 4. qualities of honesty, courage, or the like; integrity____5. reputation____ 6. good repute .... [Id. at 247.]
*517Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (unabridged ed. 1961) states in pertinent part on this subject:
1: ... 9: reputation esp. when good .... 10: a composite of good moral qualities typically of moral excellence and firmness blended with resolution, self-discipline, high ethics, force, and judgment---\Id. at 876.]
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (New College ed. 1976) defines the term in pertinent part:
1. ... 3. The combined moral or ethical structure of a person .... 4. Moral or ethical strength; integrity; fortitude. 5. Reputation: .... 10. A description of a person’s attributes, traits, or abilities----[Id. at 226.]
In World v. State, 50 Md. 49 (1878), Judge Grason said for the Court:
It was further contended that the evidence of the police officer was inadmissible, because it related to the character of the accused, instead of being confined to his reputation. Character and reputation are synonymous terms, and we can see no objection to the evidence introduced, that the character and reputation of the accused was that of a “common thief” during the time the witness knew him. [Id. at 56 (emphasis in original).]
Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) states relative to character:
The aggregate of the moral qualities which belong to and distinguish an individual person; the general result of the one’s distinguishing attributes. That moral predisposition or habit, or aggregate of ethical qualities, which is believed to attach to a person, on the strength of the common opinion and report concerning him. A person’s fixed disposition or tendency, as evidenced to others by his habits of life, *518through the manifestation of which his general reputation for the possession of a character, good or otherwise, is obtained. The estimate attached to an individual or thing in the community. The opinion generally entertained of a person derived from the common report of the people who are acquainted with him. Although “character” and “reputation” are often used synonymously, the terms are distinguishable. “Character” is what a man is, and “reputation” is what he is supposed to be in what people say he is. “Character” depends on attributes possessed, and “reputation” on attributes which others believe one to possess. The former signifies reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be reality at present. [Id. at 211.]
As to good character it says:
Sum or totality of virtues of a person which generally forms the basis for one’s reputation in the community, though his reputation is distinct from his character. [Id. at 623.]
If this young man has in fact reformed from his earlier drug habit and stealing, I am delighted. The fact that it is believed by some that he will not revert to his former habits, however, does not in my view automatically establish good moral character. Where would the majority draw the line? As judges and prior experienced practitioners of the law they know that many homicides are a once in a lifetime proposition in which there will be no recurrence of the circumstances giving rise to the homicide. Thus, in the absence of evidence of other violations of law, one could say that the person has reformed. Do my colleagues propose permitting convicted murderers to become Maryland lawyers since they have not killed anyone lately?
I think it safe to say that many of the lawyers whom we disbar for crimes involving moral turpitude would not once again engage in such conduct. Some of them have striven mightily over long periods of time to regain good standing in their communities. Yet the same judges who are passing on *519this application but a few short months ago unanimously denied reinstatement to the bar of this Court of Messrs. Loker, Dippel, and Raimondi.1 See In re Loker, 285 Md. 645, 403 A.2d 1269 (1979), and In re Raimondi and Dippel, 285 Md. 607, 403 A.2d 1234 (1979). See also In re Barton, 273 Md. 377, 329 A.2d 102 (1974). I point out that each of those individuals had numerous testimonials as to his present good character from persons of substance in their respective communities. I further point out that not one of those individuals served a prison sentence as long as the 44 months that the applicant here was incarcerated. I realize it can be said that the General Assembly in its wisdom mandated the length of that period in prison, but in so doing it expressed the public policy of this State. If the sole cause of the applicant’s dishonesty was his drug habit, then I point out that when their applications for reinstatment were denied Messrs. Barton, Dippel, Loker, and Raimondi each had been on the proverbial straight and narrow path for a longer time than the applicant here. He can count only the period since October 1973.
It should be noted that if the applicant here were to be called as a witness in a court proceeding, his prior convictions could, and undoubtedly would, be used to attack his credibility. Maryland Code (1974) § 10-905 (a) Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article; State v. Huston, 281 Md. 455, 459-61, 379 A.2d 1027 (1977), and Cousins v. State, 230 Md. 2, 4-5, 185 A.2d 488 (1962). In the unusual situation in which a lawyer has been called to the witness stand in the areas of the State where I have practiced law it has been the practice often to waive placing him under oath because of the very high standard to which all members of the Bar are expected to adhere.
Qur requirement that a candidate show himself to be possessed of good moral character is for the purpose of protecting the public. In the same manner we have said that the imposition of a sanction on an erring attorney is not for purposes of punishment of the individual lawyer but for the protection of the public. Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Levitt, 286 Md. 231, 406 A.2d 1296 (1979); Attorney Griev. Comm’n *520v. Lockhart, 285 Md. 586, 596, 597, 403 A.2d 1241 (1979); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Andresen, 281 Md. 152, 160, 379 A.2d 159 (1977), and cases there cited. The practice of law often involves handling the funds of clients running into tens of thousands and even hundreds of thousands of dollars. This can and does present a temptation to some individuals, as experience has amply demonstrated. Therefore, I regard honesty as one of the most important traits of character which should be required of a prospective lawyer. He should be forthright and honest in all of his dealings, but particularly where the funds and property of others are concerned. When a person is admitted to the Bar he becomes an officer of this Court. When we admit him we are in effect certifying to the general public that he is a person to whom the affairs of others may safely be entrusted. I am not prepared at this time to say that this young man is possessed of good moral character and thus is a proper person to be an officer of this Court.
I am authorized to state that Judge Digges concurs in the views here expressed.. Judge Digges did not sit in Loker.