I dissent.
This case does not arise under Government Code section 680731 and is, in any event, moot. The majority opinion avoids these difficulties by assuming them away.
First, on the substantive question, the opinion assumes the answer to the predicate question, whether petitioners, judges of the Stockton Municipal Court District (the Judges), were authorized by section 68073 to dismiss the district’s elected marshal (Croci) as court security officer. Section 68073 empowers a court to remedy the failure of a board of supervisors to provide it with supplies, facilities or attendants necessary for the conduct of its business, essentially matters of money within the board’s power to provide. (See Ex parte Widber (1891) 91 Cal. 367 [27 P. 733]; Los Angeles Co. v. Superior Court (1892) 93 Cal. 380 [28 P. 1062].) That is not what is at stake here.
The majority opinion asserts that section 68073 is applicable because the Board of Supervisors of San Joaquin County’s (Board) failure to remedy Croci’s refusal to provide the Judges with sufficient attendants for court security. However, the Judges did not seek funds from the Board to enable Croci to supply additional attendants for court security. That would have left Croci in office. They wanted to dismiss him as court security officer for mismanagement, a matter over which the Board has no authority. For this reason section 68073 cannot justify the Judges’ action.
Second, on the question of mootness, the opinion assumes that something remains subject to declaratory relief after Croci’s replacement as marshal by election. The relief he sought—a declaration of right to reinstatement as court security officer—has been mooted by that election. The majority opinion concedes that declaratory relief cannot remedy a past wrong. It assumes, however, that the incorporation of a damages claim for lost pension benefits from a dismissed cause of action constitutes a wrong which may be *1876remedied by declaratory relief. Neither is correct. The deprivation of pension benefits is not pleaded as a wrong to be declared and no declaration running against the Judges could affect them.
I treat these issues seriatim.
I
Section 68073
The underlying action was brought by Croci against the Judges seeking to invalidate their order relieving him of his duties as court security officer. The order directed the Sheriff of San Joaquin County to assume the marshal’s duties and assigned the deputy marshals to that office.
The order recites as reasons “inadequate management, scheduling, supervision and training by the Marshal’s Office of its law enforcement attendants [that] created hindrances which endanger the safety of the public and adversely affect the proper functioning of the Municipal Court of the Stockton Judicial District.” It further recites that the Judges appeared before the Board on January 12, 1988, “notifying them of the need of the Municipal Court for sufficient attendants.”
The majority opinion assumes that the Judges’ authority to dismiss Croci derives from section 68073. It asks “whether the [Jjudges’ determination under section 68073 that the services of its marshal are inadequate compels the granting of summary judgment in their favor as a matter of law, or whether the marshal’s declaration disputing this conclusion raises a triable issue of material fact as to the adequacy of those services.” Since the assumption is incorrect it would be a complete waste of limited judicial resources to send this case to trial on an invalid premise.
Section 68073 obligates a board of supervisors to provide suitable rooms, sufficient attendants and supplies for the conduct of a court’s business. It authorizes a court to remedy a deficiency only when the board “fails to provide anything necessary” after notice from the court. As noted, this concerns the provision of resources for the functioning of the courts. (See Ex parte Widber, supra, 91 Cal. 367 [failure to provide suitable rooms]; Los Angeles Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 93 Cal. 380.) “[T]he responsibility for carrying out that policy [is vested] in a board of supervisors.” (Simpson v. *1877Hite (1950) 36 Cal.2d 125, 130 [222 P.2d 225].)2 For this reason section 68073 is pertinent only if Croci’s dismissal was engendered by the failure of the Board to provide resources it was empowered to provide. There was no such failure.
Although the Judges made a perfunctory appearance before the Board to request additional attendants (deputy marshals) it is apparent that they did not request money to enable Croci to provide them. That would have left him as court security officer. They were emphatic that their problems with Croci did not involve additional attendants. “The Judges stress that the present Marshal situation is not one which will be solved with more time or more staff in the Marshal’s Office.” (Declaration of Judge Lucaccini, italics added.)3 It could only be solved by the removal of Croci for mismanagement. The declaration asserts Croci’s deficiencies as: failure to meet and confer; chronic absence; poor morale among the deputy marshals, inadequate training of the deputies; improper scheduling; inadequate provision of bailiffs, who fall asleep; provision of deputy marshals with physical disabilities; improper utilization of staff; and improper management of marshals.
These matters are not within the remedial authority of the Board, as explicitly recognized by the Judges. “We realized that the Board had very limited authority in this area and that the resolution was largely outside its immediate control. This being the case, since the Board cannot take action, the Judges have ordered the San Joaquin County Sheriff to immediately provide attendants to resolve the deficiencies . . . .” (Declaration, supra, italics added.)
The manner of selection and removal of marshals and their deputies is governed by statute. “[I]n some districts the marshal is selected by a majority vote of the judges of the municipal court [e.g., Los Angeles and Sacramento Counties].” (42 Cal.Jur.3d, Law Enforcement Officers, § 13, p. 403.) In Los Angeles “the appointment and removal. . . shall be made by a *1878majority vote of the municipal court judges of [the] county, and [the] marshal shall serve during the pleasure of said judges” provided that a removal may occur only for specified reasons after notice and hearing. (§ 71260.) In other counties a marshal may “be removed only for the causes and in the manner provided for the removal of officers and attaches.” (§ 71086; see also § 71085.) Marshals and their deputies appointed from the civil service lists “hold office during good behavior and may be discharged by the appointing authority only for the good of the service . . . .” (§ 71260.) The manner of removal of an elected official, presumably including an elected marshal, is governed by section 3060, which provides for a proceeding before the grand jury. (See People v. Hawes (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 930 [181 Cal.Rptr. 456].)
For districts like the Stockton Municipal Court District, the marshal is elected because the office derives from an elected constable’s office. (See Municipal and Justice Court Act of 1949, Stats. 1949, ch. 1510, § 4, p. 2682; Stats. 1951, ch. 1296, §4, p. 3182.) Such an elected official holds office until the next succeeding election. (§ 71087.) The laws particularly governing the Stockton Municipal Court District are to be found at sections 74800 to 74809.5.
These statutes restrict the disciplinary authority of judges over a marshal. Because the case is moot, a matter I next examine, it is not necessary to inquire whether the Judges’ order could be justified as an exercise of their inherent powers.4
II
Mootness
Declaratory relief is available “in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) This simple prescription conceals a world of justiciability. It requires that “ ‘the controversy must be of a character which admits of specific and conclusive relief by judgment within the field of judicial determination, *1879as distinguished from an advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts. The judgment must decree, and not suggest, what the parties may or may not do.’ ” (Fairchild v. Bank of America (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 252, 260 [13 Cal.Rptr. 491].) So measured, Croci’s claim is not justiciable.
The only relief which Croci sought below was “a declaration that [he] be permitted to perform his elected duties as Marshal of the Stockton Judicial District. . . .” That relief was rendered moot by an election occurring after the Supreme Court returned the case to us. Croci does not tell us what relief he would be provided by a declaration that he was wrongfully relieved of his duties.
Croci argues that such a declaration would affect his pension rights. This is predicated upon allegations incorporated from the first count of Croci’s complaint which sought damages for breach of contract, that, “[a]s a result of the [Judges’] order ... he was deprived of future retirement benefits because [a] lost car allowance and cost of living increase will not be included in his highest annual rate of pay which forms the basis for his retirement benefit calculation.” In the third count for declaratory relief they are pleaded as damages arising from his dismissal. The first count was dismissed following the grant of a demurrer and is not before us.
As noted, a declaratory judgment is available only if it can declare the rights and duties of the parties to the action in a way that provides specific and conclusive relief. It is not available “where only past wrongs are involved.” (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 817, p. 259, italics added, citations omitted.) That is so for the obvious reason that a past wrong could not be averted or undone by such a judgment. Here, of course, a judgment could not declare that the Judges had a duty to restore Croci to a position to which another had been elected. That is why the focus of Croci’s argument has shifted to the claimed loss of his pension rights. However, he does not assert that the denial of the pension rights he forsees is a wrong (it is asserted only as a damage occasioned by the loss of his position) nor does he tell us what way a declaratory judgment running against the Judges could affect his pension rights. The pension authorities are not parties to the action and there is no showing that they would be bound by a judgment running against the Judges.
Croci appears to believe that the denial of pension rights is a wrong that could be remedied by a declaratory judgment. This fails to distinguish between a wrong and the harm occasioned by the wrong. But he has not put in issue a disputed entitlement to pension benefits nor does he seek a declaration in that regard. And, as noted, a judgment running against the Judges could not in any event affect them.
*1880Croci’s claim cannot be supported by Southern Counties Gas Co. v. Ventura Pipeline Constr. Co. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 372 [96 Cal.Rptr. 825]. It concerned the construction of an indemnity clause in a contract for the construction of underground natural gas pipelines which the plaintiff sought to apply beyond the contract’s one year guaranty clause for faulty work. The trial court entered a declaratory judgment construing “the applicable portions of the contract to permit future claims based on leaks thereafter discovered . . . .” (Id. at p. 380.) The appellate court said that “where ‘there is a reasonable expectation that the wrong [if any] will be repeated,’ the controversy does not present mere academic questions resulting from mootness or other considerations and declaratory relief should not be denied.” (Id. at p. 381, italics added.)
Here, there is no expectation that the wrong—the deprivation of Croci’s security functions—will be repeated. He is out of office. And there is no showing that the consequences of that wrong—the speculative deprivation of future retirement benefits—would be affected by a declaratory judgment against the Judges.
For these reasons I would grant the petition and direct entry of a summary judgment in favor of the Judges.
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 9, 1992. Blease, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Petitioners’ application for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 27, 1992. Mosk, J., and Panelli, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.
All further references to section numbers are to the Government Code unless otherwise specified.
The majority opinion refers to 42 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 159 (1963) in reply to the Judges’ claim there is no judicial review of its action grounded on section 68073. The Attorney General’s opinion, like the majority opinion, assumes the answer to the predicate claim. Although it does allude to section 68073 in the midst of discussing a variety of remedies for a marshal’s nonfeasance in office, it simply asserts, wholly without analysis of its provisions, that it can be utilized to direct the sheriff to provide suitable attendants when a marshal fails to do so. This is not even an analytical straw to be grasped at.
The declaration sets out the chronology and substance of the Judges’ difficulties with Croci during which they commissioned a study of the marshal’s office which showed that it could be reorganized so as to provide sufficient attendants and produce “savings total[ing] $93,290.00.” It was only “[w]hen Croci still took no action” that the Judges appeared before the Board and then issued the order dismissing him as court security officer.
There are additional grounds by which a court might exercise authority over the office of marshal. Marshals must “Whenever required, . . . attend the municipal . . . court[] of the district in which they are appointed or elected to act. . . .” (§ 71264.) “It shall be competent for. . . a majority of the judges of any municipal court to adopt rules for the conduct of. . . the personnel of their court . . . except where the same may be in conflict with any provisions of the State Constitution or laws relating to municipal courts and their attaches.” (§ 72002.1; see Rivas v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 406 [15 Cal.Rptr. 829]; Villanazul v. City of Los Angeles (1951) 37 Cal.2d 718, 723 [235 P.2d 16].) The Judges did not purport to act under these provisions.