delivered the opinion of the Court.
Two brothers, Harold Edward Shockley, aged 23, and Leonard Melvin Shockley, aged 17, were jointly indicted by the Grand Jury of Worcester County lor the murder of Sarah Hearne, a storekeeper. The case was removed to Dorchester County and tried before three judges, without a jury. Both defendants were found guilty of murder in the first degree. Leonard was sentenced to death, and Harold to life imprisonment.
The basic facts are virtually conceded. On the morning of January 16, 1958, a cold, cloudy day, the defendants left their home, where they lived with their parents, at Omar, Delaware, and drove to Snow Hill. They were accompanied by a sister. The trip was made in a 1951 Chevrolet that had been loaned to them by a dealer while the motor of their mother’s automobile was being repaired. The sister was left to visit at the home of a friend. At about 1:00 P.M. Leonard suggested that they drive to Boxiron, a small village in Worcester County, in the vicinity of which they had lived before the family moved to Delaware. They came to a country store, and Leonard, who was driving, backed in alongside the store. Leonard was wearing a dagger or sheath knife on his belt. Mrs. Hearne, the storekeeper, came from her home, about 95 feet from the store, to wait on them.
Shortly thereafter a witness, Clarence W. Bishop, who lived in the neighborhood, walked up to the store and noticed the Chevrolet parked beside it. He opened the door and entered the store. He saw Harold (whom he had known before) standing behind the counter, toward the rear of the store, and heard a scuffle at another point behind the counter. He ran out and reported to another neighbor that it “sounded like somebody was on Sarah down the store.” When he and the neighbor returned, the automobile was gone. In the meantime, the victim had made her way to her home, where she fell dead. The police found her body with her pedal pushers down from her waist and the front of her underpants torn out. She had been stabbed several times in the back and breast, and her throat had been cut. Investigation showed that the cash register in the store had been tampered with *494and jammed. A pool of blood marked the place where she had first fallen, and a trail of blood led to her home.
The police arrested the brothers at their home that same evening. They were taken to the police barracks at Georgetown, Delaware, where they each made statements out of the presence of the other. These statements were duly offered in evidence, and it is not contended that they were involuntary. According to Leonard, he and his brother planned to rob the store on their way to Boxiron, and they both attacked Mrs. Hearne in an attempt to rob her. He said Harold told him to grab her. Leonard admitted that he tried to rifle the cash register but could not get it open. He admitted that he had stabbed the victim and cut her throat. According to Harold, Leonard went into the store to buy cakes and soft drinks, but Harold remained outside in the automobile, until he heard what he described as “scrambling around in there.” He went in to investigate and found Leonard had the victim on the floor between the meat case and the counter with her pedal pushers down. He saw Leonard cut her throat. He then tried to pull Leonard off the victim, and they both fled. He claimed he did not know, when Leonard went into the store, that Leonard had any intention to rob or rape the victim. Harold admitted that they drove home by back roads and did not go back to Snow Hill for their sister. Along the way, they each discarded articles of clothing which contained extensive blood stains identified as of the same type as that of the victim. There were also blood stains in the right front seat of the Chevrolet.
In addition to these statements to the police, there were put in evidence two reports of mental examinations made upon petition of the defendants, pursuant to an order of court, upon stipulation that they “be admitted in evidence with the same effect as if the same had been introduced in evidence by the defense upon the production of the said Dr. Jacob Morgenstern as a witness.” These reports, aside from extensive background material relevant to the psychiatric findings, contained statements which followed the same pattern as the previous statements. It appeared that Leonard had been out of work for about three weeks -before the murder. In this *495statement Leonard denied that he had discussed the attempted robbery with his brother. He said he had drunk “almost a pint of wine” that morning. He had money in his pocket, and there was no reason for him to attempt the robbery. The report definitely stated the examiner’s opinion that the accused had sufficient mentality to meet the Maryland tests of legal responsibility.
The report as to Harold was to the same general effect. Harold said that he was surprised when his brother passed the store, turned around, and passed the store twice, before stopping there, and asked him what he had in mind. Leonard replied: “1 am just riding.” Harold admitted to a previous conviction of larceny and that he was only released on probation a few days before the murder. There is no contention here that either of the brothers was not legally responsible for their acts. They contend that in each case the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdicts. No contentions are pressed as to rulings on the evidence. Neither defendant took the stand.
Maryland Rule 741 c provides that when a criminal charge has been tried by the court, without a jury, this Court on appeal may review both the law and the evidence to sustain a conviction; but the rule also provides that the verdict shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. We think it is perfectly clear that Leonard killed the victim in an attempt to perpetrate a robbery or a rape, so that as to him the verdict of first degree murder must stand. See Code (1957), Art. 27, sec. 410; Stansbury v. State, 218 Md. 255, and cases cited. His own confession and admissions, corroborated by other evidence in the case, point unmistakably to his guilt.
The case against Harold requires a more extended discussion. It is conceded, and the trial court ruled, that any statements in Leonard’s confession, made out of the presence of Harold, could not be used against Harold in weighing the sufficiency of the evidence against him. See Peters and Demby v. State, 187 Md. 7, 14, and Jackson v. State, 180 Md. 658. It is contended that there was no evidence, apart from *496these statements, to show that Harold participated in an attempted perpetration of robbery or rape. We do not agree. We think the evidence would at least support an inference that Harold knew of, and actively participated in, an attempt to rob by forcing the cash register. The testimony of the police officers shows that the cash register had been tampered with and jammed, presumably by one or both of the accused. It might be inferred that this attempt was made prior to, or contemporaneously with, the assault on Mrs. Hearne by the armed brother, because they evidently fled as soon as the victim’s throat was cut, knowing that Bishop had seen them and had run off to give the alarm. It would strain credulity to believe that Harold, the older man, was simply an innocent bystander. His story, that he sat outside in the car until he heard a scuffle in the store, is inherently improbable. It was a cold day, and the store windows were closed. Bishop heard no noise until he opened the door, and he then saw Harold behind the counter while a scuffle was taking place, and doing nothing to prevent' it. The inference is that Harold entered the store with his brother, and not afterwards, and that he was present when the initial assault took place and the attempt to force the cash register was made. It may be inferred from the fact that neither of the brothers had been employed for some time, that both were short of funds. It is difficult to believe that Harold would not have shared in the loot, if the cash register had not jammed so that even the police officers could not open it without further instruction. Knowledge of the brother’s purpose to rob is not the exact equivalent of an active participation in the attempt to rob, but knowledge plus the other circumstances of this case permit an inference that Harold aided and abetted in a concerted effort to obtain money. Even the position of the car suggests that it was placed in a position for a rapid flight. The drive past the store on two occasions also suggests a “casing” operation. In addition, we have the facts that Harold’s clothing was covered with the victim’s blood, that he made no effort to help the victim, and that he went off with his brother by a circuitous route, discarding and concealing the incriminating garments.
*497Exculpatory statements by an accused may be disbelieved by the triers of the facts. Kier v. State, 216 Md. 513, 519; Berry v. State, 202 Md. 62, 66. We noted in Wild v. State, 201 Md. 73, 77, that “knowledge may be inferred from circumstances, even where there is positive denial. Moore v. State, 199 Md. 676, 87 A. 2d 577; Shelton v. State, 198 Md. 405, 413, 84 A. 2d 76, 80. As we said in Hayette v. State, 199 Md. 140, 145, 85 A. 2d 790, 792, ‘on questions of scienter reason for disbelieving evidence denying scienter may also justify finding scienter.’ ” See also Brown v. State, 200 Md. 211, 215, and Ferraro v. State, 200 Md. 274, 278. We noted in Chisley v. State, 202 Md. 87, 109, that “Evidence of the movements and actions of the accused after the killing and before the arrest may be competent evidence.”
We think the cases of Coleman v. State, 209 Md. 379, and Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, relied on by the appellant, Harold Shockley, are distinguishable. In the Coleman case, we held that there was evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Loretta Cox, a young girl who sat outside in a car while a breaking and entering occurred, had no knowledge that a crime was planned, and hence was not an accomplice. In the Watson case, we likewise held that the trial court was not clearly wrong in finding that a female witness to the murder of a newborn child was not an accomplice. In each case we gave full weight to the findings of the triers of the facts. We find nothing to the contrary in Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168. It may well be that in the instant case Harold’s mere presence would not be sufficient to make him a participant in the killing. The trial court stated that they were not satisfied that he participated in the actual killing, or that he knew a killing was to take place. They found, however, that he participated in an attempt to perpetrate a robbery, and that is enough, under the statute, to support a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. We think there was sufficient evidence, or inferences from evidence, to support the finding that Harold participated in the attempted robbery, and we cannot hold that the trial court was clearly wrong in so finding.