I respectfully dissent.
Although there is substantial evidence the dangers of high groundwater and the associated risk of landslides were conveyed to the Hudsons, several facts are undisputed concerning the April 12, 1983, meeting which relate to the county engineers’ recommendations that a special assessment district be formed and the costs of future groundwater pumping. Despite the fact that she never received the March 28,1983, letter, Dana Vaill (Vaill) attended the April 12, 1983, meeting with a neighbor. The meeting was conducted by representatives of Los Angeles County in the Malibu Library, a county building. Among the representatives of county government who were present was Edwin Biddlecomb, regional engineer for the department of county engineer facilities in the Malibu region, Armando Cid, division engineer for the regional offices division of the county engineer department, Art Keene, head engineer and geologist for the county engineer department, Mike Johnson, a geologist with the flood control district, and Peter Ireland, a deputy to Supervisor Dean Dana. The meeting commenced at 7:30 p.m. and concluded at approximately 10 p.m. This meeting occurred well prior to the May 3, 1983, escrow closing on the property purchased by the Hudsons. Portions of the meeting were tape-recorded and have been transcribed. At oral argument, Vaill’s counsel conceded that no evidence was presented which indicates that the transcription is inaccurate in any respect.
At the April 12, 1983, meeting, the county officials estimated that the costs associated with securing expert geological opinions, revitalizing existing drains, installing new drainage systems, drilling observation wells, and *264taking other measures ranged from $25,000 in start-up costs to upwards of $2 million over the longer term. Head Engineer Art Keene was asked about the $2 million figure and he said, “I’d like to explain that two million dollars because those are valid numbers.” Both Art Keene and Edwin Biddlecomb indicated that the county was not responsible for the problem. Furthermore, Armando Cid, the division engineer for the regional offices division of the county engineer, stated that county counsel had concluded that the county was not legally liable for the problem. During the meeting, Vaill raised a question concerning the consequences of spending “all this kind of money” and the problems remaining after the money was expended.
In order to resolve the problem, the various county officials recommended that a special assessment district be created with taxing authority. After a discussion concerning the ongoing problem caused by the high-water table, Edwin Biddlecomb stated: “Okay, before we get any further I’d like to call on Armando Cid, whose gonna discuss these [sic] formation of these districts that might be a method of alleviating the problem. It may be a method of starting up these pumps and having assessment area formed to pay for that, rather than having it on a voluntary contribution basis. It didn’t work before.” Armando Cid discussed the fact that because the county did not want to undergo potential future liability for further damage in the area, it was the opinion of various county agencies that a special assessment district be formed. He referred to the district as a “Geologic Hazard Abatement District.” He stated, “Essentially, jhe bottom line is that if the people here wanted to form a district and it involved the whole procedure and it went through, it would form a district with your own board of directors of five people. In essence you would wind up with a small little city. You have taxing rights. You could tax eminent domain, you could use the Improvement District Acts of 11 and 13 to pay for this thing and spread over 10 years. You could do anything. . . . [T]he bottom line of this whole thing is that it would wind up as part of the tax bill. So if someone did not pay the tax bill, then eventually when 4 years go by, they would lose the property, whatever . . . .” Later, Armando Cid continued: “Usually the way this thing works is that it would take, to get it started, it would take 10% of the property owners, well property owners that owned at least 10% of the assessed evaluation [sic] of the area that you’re talking about, owners that owned 10% of the said value, whatever. ... It would require an initial investment on your part, because of part of this submittal to us is 10%, is what is called a plan of control, and this is where you would have to get a report prepared by an engineering geologist.” He then proceeded to discuss the procedural aspects of setting up a special assessment district.
Art Keene continued the discussion by noting the importance of installing observation wells which he termed as “[v]ery cheap to put in” but he was *265interrupted by Mike Johnson, the flood control district geologist who said, “Nothing’s cheap anymore.” Armando Cid discussed the fact that it was difficult to determine how much the assessment would be. Art Keene indicated that the total costs could be $2 million. Mike Johnson, the geologist with the flood control district also discussed the costs of various wells.
At the conclusion of the meeting, two documents were prepared for signature by the residents. One document was entitled, “We, the following are in favor of county service area-Big Rock Mesa.” The other document said, “We, the following are in favor of landslide abatement district-Big Rock Mesa for those who are in favor of the landslide abatement district approach to the solution of the problem.” Vaill signed both documents.
The foregoing evidence is uncontradicted. Unlike the typical case where persons who attend a meeting offer different versions of what transpired, the issue in the case at bar is presented to this court based upon uncontradicted verifiable evidence of what was actually said. I therefore conclude that Vaill’s failure to apprise the Hudsons of what occurred in connection with future costs and the county recommendations of the establishment of a special assessment district at the April 12,1983, meeting and her reaction to the events at the meeting constituted negligence.1 As a real estate agent representing the seller, Vaill had a duty to disclose facts which materially affected the value or desirability of the property offered for sale of which she was aware. (Cooper v. Jevne (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 860, 866 [128 Cal.Rptr. 724].) Neither the Merrill nor the Byers report apprised the Hudsons of the April 12, 1983, meeting.
There were several matters supported by uncontradicted evidence raised at the meeting which, when considered together, should have been brought to the Hudsons’ attention. First, they should have been informed that the county was disavowing any liability for the rising groundwater levels in the area. Second, the Hudsons should have been told that the county was recommending that a special assessment district with taxing and eminent domain powers be instituted. Third, they should have been notified of the potential costs of the special assessment district. These three factors taken together were matters which would materially affect the value of the property Vaill was attempting to sell to the Hudsons. Finally, Vaill’s lack of concern as to what transpired at the meeting is further evidence of negligence. The issues raised by official representatives of the county at the meeting were important. For Vaill not to recognize this, given her special responsibility as a real estate *266salesperson, constituted negligence. This was a specific ground for revocation appearing in the first amended accusation. Because this is an extremely rare case where negligence is demonstrated as a matter of law, I would therefore affirm the trial court’s finding in all respects except as to Vaill’s negligent failure to apprise the Hudsons of what occurred at the April 12, 1983, meeting. I would therefore remand the case to superior court with directions to issue a writ of mandate directing the Director of the Department of Real Estate to impose a penalty, if any, commensurate with the gravity of the findings supported by the evidence. (Bonham v. McConnell (1955) 45 Cal.2d 304, 306 [288 P.2d 502].)
I am unable to determine whether, as a matter of law, the failure to disclose the events of the meeting constituted “incompetence.” Therefore, I would affirm the judgment in that respect.