I respectfully dissent.
The majority, citing Penal Code section 1538.5 and People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 973 P.2d 52] (Williams), essentially concludes that a defendant fully satisfies his burden of raising an issue when he asserts in his motion that the subject search was conducted without a warrant. Thus, the majority states that once the prosecution has replied to the motion and asserted reasonable justifications for the warrantless search, “The defendant may then file a reply challenging the prosecution’s justification. However, regardless of whether the defendant files a reply, the prosecution retains the burden of proof to establish its justification, and its burden of proof is not eliminated or diminished by the absence of the defendant’s reply.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 300, italics added.) I believe such conclusion is contrary to the teaching of Williams. I conclude that generally the defense is required by Williams to reply to the prosecution’s response and assert with reasonable specificity why the People’s claimed justification is lacking.
The intent of Williams and Penal Code section 1538.5 is to establish a motion procedure which not only properly assigns the burden of going forward and the burden of proof but also promotes the efficient presentation and correct resolution of suppression issues. Central to understanding the nature of that procedure is Williams's observation that the defendant’s burden of going forward is made up of two elements. The defendant has the burden of “(1) asserting the search or seizure was without a warrant, and (2) *307explaining why it was unreasonable under the circumstances.” (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 129.)
The majority errs because it misinterprets the second element of the defendant’s burden. In this respect, Williams notes that the defendant’s burden of going forward requires it to “precisely pinpoint the subject matter” of what the prosecution must prove in justifying the search. (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 129.) Williams observes that in initially filing its Penal Code section 1538.5 motion, the defense is required only to satisfy the first step of that precise pinpointing, i.e, to assert that the search was conducted without a warrant. Williams states: “Therefore, when the basis of a motion to suppress is a warrantless search or seizure, the requisite specificity is generally satisfied, in the first instance, if defendants simply assert the absence of a warrant and makes a prima facie showing to support that assertion.” (Williams, at p. 130.) That the defense need meet only the first prong of its burden “in the first instance,” i.e, in its initial motion, is reasonable since until the prosecution in its response states a justification for the warrantless search, it would be inefficient and impractical to require the defense to meet the second prong of its burden, i.e, that the search was unreasonable under the circumstances. (Id. at p. 129.)
Once the prosecution states the claimed justification for the warrantless search, however, the second prong of the defense’s burden of going forward arises. Williams states “once the prosecution has offered a justification for a warrantless search or seizure, defendant must present any arguments as to why that justification is inadequate. [Citation.]” (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 130, italics added.) The court notes that “if defendants detect a critical gap in the prosecution’s proof or a flaw in its legal analysis, they must object on that basis to admission of the evidence or risk forfeiting the issue on appeal.” (Ibid., italics added.)
I read Williams in the context of the present case to require the defense to reply to the prosecution’s stated justification for the warrantless search by arguing how that justification is wanting. Until that is done the precise issue on which the prosecution bears the burden of proof has not been identified and the defense has not satisfied its burden of raising the issue.
I emphasize that the core issue is one of notice and specificity and not timing or writ procedure. Thus, in Williams the court found that the prosecution was adequately placed on notice of the defense claim that the inventory search was improper when that claim was asserted with specificity and precision in the Penal Code section 1538.5 motion itself. (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 127, 137.) At no time in the present case did the defense argue any inadequacy in the inventory search procedure.
*308I also do not agree with the majority that former San Diego County Superior Court Local Rules, rule 13.2(C)(3)(a),1 as applied, conflicts with Penal Code section 1538.5 or Williams. The rule merely requires a reply to be filed by the defense before the hearing to allow the most efficient and effective presentation of the issues and to avoid the need for continuances. Without a sanction for failure to comply the rule would be nothing more than an empty request. It would, in short, not be a rule at all. The local rule is not onerous and denies nothing to those who simply comply with its reasonable dictates. The rule supports the policy of clarity and efficiency that is the basis for Williams and was properly applied.
In my view, the defense response to the prosecution’s justification for the warrantless search was inadequate and the trial court properly denied the Penal Code section 1538.5 motion.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 7, 2002, and respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 10, 2002. George, C. J., did not participate therein.
See maj. opn., ante, at p. 293, fn. 2.)