concurring.
In this election challenge the Commonwealth Court applied Section 2911(d) of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 2911(d), and ordered the Secretary of the Commonwealth (Secretary) to strike the name of Carl Stevenson (Stevenson) from the ballot notwithstanding that the Secretary had been enjoined from enforcing Section 2911(d) by a permanent injunction in Morrill v. Weaver, 224 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D.Pa.2002). Consequently, the Commonwealth Court order placed the Secretary in the untenable position of being subject to conflicting court orders in that he could not both comply with the Morrill permanent injunction and honor the Commonwealth Court’s directive in this case to enforce Section 2911(d) by striking Stevenson from the ballot. Like Justice Saylor, I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s invocation of res judicata and collateral estoppel because both doctrines depend on the identity of the parties in the prior litigation, which is lacking here. Rather, this case involves basic notions of comity between the federal and Pennsylvania court systems, as well as recognition of a state court’s obligation to recognize the preclusive effect of a final federal judgment. Before elaborating on these points, I comment briefly on the propriety of deciding this undisputedly moot case.
Courts generally should not and will not address a moot case. The Majority invokes the exception to this general rule where “the issue presented is one of great public importance or is one that is capable of repetition yet evading review.” See Maj. Op. at 62, 40 A.3d at 1219 (citing Ass’n of Pennsylvania State College and Univ. Faculties v. PLRB, 607 Pa. 461, 8 A.3d 300, 305 (2010); Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 571 Pa. 375, 812 A.2d 591, 600-01 (2002)).
I have no quarrel with this, but would be more specific. I agree that the question of the enforceability of Section 2911(d)’s residency requirement is a matter of substantial public importance, as are many other matters that this Court *75in its discretion agrees to review. I do not, however, believe that this fact in and of itself would be enough to permit review of a moot case absent some paramount exigency. Rather, this case presents the classic capable of repetition yet evading review paradigm as exemplified by recognition that several unreviewed Commonwealth Court opinions have declared that courts of the Commonwealth are not bound by Morrill. See In re Payton, 945 A.2d 279 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008); In re Nomination Paper of Rogers, 908 A.2d 942 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006); In re Petition for Agenda Initiative, 821 A.2d 203 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003). This is unsurprising as we often confront unrealistic if not impossible time constraints in election matters, which leave little time for deliberation. See Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 23, 515 A.2d 1331 (1986) (applying the mootness exception because the question was capable of repetition yet evading review). Thus, the issue presented herein is the type for which all courts, including those within the federal system that are bound by the constitutional case or controversy requirement, have invoked the exception to the mootness doctrine. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911); Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers, 515 A.2d at 1333; Coatesville Dev’t Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers, 374 Pa.Super. 330, 542 A.2d 1380 (1988).
Turning to the preclusive effect of Morrill, it is undisputed that the litigation in Morrill, in which the Secretary was a party, resulted in a final federal injunction permanently barring the Commonwealth from enforcing the residency requirement of Section 2911(d). The Commonwealth did not appeal and has abided by the injunction by not enforcing this statutory provision. Consequently, the only relevant question is the preclusive effect of this final federal judgment. Resolution turns on the comity or respect that one judicial system should show for the community of law, as well as the recognition of *76final judgments rendered by a court system other than our own.
The majority answers the question by turning to the preclusive doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits parties involved in prior, concluded litigation from subsequently asserting claims in a later action that were raised, or could have been raised, in the previous litigation. Wilkes v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 587 Pa. 590, 902 A.2d 366, 376 (2006); R/S Financial Corp. v. Kovalchick, 552 Pa. 584, 716 A.2d 1228, 1230 (1998).
The term has come to encompass the effect of one judgment upon a subsequent trial or proceeding, Helmig v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 389 Pa. 21, 131 A.2d 622 (1957), and is often used to refer both to res judicata itself and collateral estoppel. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 882, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008) (“The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are collectively referred to as ‘res judicata.’ ”); Clark v. Troutman, 509 Pa. 336, 502 A.2d 137, 139 (1985) (“ ‘Res judicata’ encompasses the modern principle of issue preclusion (traditionally known as estoppel), which is the common law rule that a final judgment forecloses relitigation in a later action involving at least one of the original parties, of an issue of fact or law which was actually litigated and which was necessary to the original judgment.”); Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng’g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir.1978) (describing the major variations in terminology). Application of the doctrine of res judicata requires the concurrence of four elements: identity of the thing sued for; identify of the cause of action; identity of persons and parties to the action; and identify of the quality or capacity in the persons for or against whom the claim is made. City of Pittsburgh v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 522 Pa. 44, 559 A.2d 896 (1989).
Similarly, collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, applies if the issue decided in the prior case is identical to the one presented in the later case; there was a final judgment on the merits; the party against whom the plea is asserted was a *77party or in privity with a party in the prior case; the party or person privy to the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding; and the determination in the prior proceeding was essential to the judgment. Rue v. K-Mart Corp., 552 Pa. 13, 713 A.2d 82 (1998); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Duffield, 537 Pa. 485, 644 A.2d 1186 (1994); Folino v. Young, 523 Pa. 532, 568 A.2d 171 (1990); City of Pittsburgh, 522 Pa. 44, 559 A.2d 896. Neither issue preclusion nor claim preclusion applies unless the party or a person privy to the party against whom preclusion is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in the first action.
“It is a principle of general application in Anglo — American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in person-am in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.” Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940). There are several exceptions to this rule, see Taylor, 553 U.S. at 884, 128 S.Ct. 2161, none of which are asserted herein. Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court’s well established precedent regarding the propriety of nonparty preclusion demonstrates that “[t]he application of claim and issue preclusion to nonparties ... runs up against the deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892-93, 128 S.Ct. 2161 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 135 L.Ed.2d 76 (1996)); see also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969).
As the Majority observes, this case is complicated by the fact that the Secretary, who is subject to the federal injunction in Morrill, is not a party to the election challenge in this case. Despite his nonparty status, the Secretary is subject to the Commonwealth Court order resulting from that challenge. In election matters such as this, which involve private parties, the Commonwealth is more than tangentially involved because to *78effectuate the results of election challenges, the Secretary-must act. Therefore, although res judicata binds neither the Objectors nor Stevenson, the Secretary is subject to the Morrill injunction; thus it is the Secretary who is placed in the untenable position in that he cannot comply with conflicting court orders.
Because neither of the parties to this litigation were parties or in privity with the parties in the prior litigation, we are not presented with a straightforward application of res judicata or collateral estoppel, and I would not invoke either doctrine to uphold the sanctity of the federal permanent injunction in this scenario.1 Nevertheless, as a matter of deference and respect for the actions of courts of other jurisdictions, (i.e., comity), I agree with the Majority that the Pennsylvania judicial system should recognize and be bound by the federal injunction issued in this matter. In this respect, I agree with Justice Saylor.2
Moreover, there is a clearly established rule that state courts must give full faith and credit to the proceedings of federal court. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air v. Commonwealth, 755 F.2d 38, 43 (3rd Cir.1985) (citing Degnan, Ronan E., Federalized Res Judicata 85 Yale L.J. 741, 744 (1976); see also 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4468 (1981) (“It would be unthinkable to suggest that state courts should be free to disregard the judgments of federal courts.... ”)). The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held “the judgments of the courts of the United States have invariably been recognized as upon the same footing, so far as concerns the obligation created by them, with domestic judgments of the States, whenever rendered and whenever sought to be enforced.” *79Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 2 S.Ct. 25, 27 L.Ed. 346 (1883); see also Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 59 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed. 104 (1938) (“[Wjhere the judgment or decree of the federal court determines a right under a federal statute, that decision is final until reversed in an appellate court, or modified or set aside in the court of its rendition.” (internal citations removed)); Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U.S. 30, 33, 44 S.Ct. 432, 68 L.Ed. 885 (1924); Hancock Nat’l Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640, 20 S.Ct. 506, 44 L.Ed. 619 (1900).
As the Majority observes, the scope of a federal judgment is determined through application of federal common law where the federal court was not sitting in diversity. Maj. Op. at 68-69, 40 A.3d at 1223 (citing Taylor, 553 U.S. at 891, 128 S.Ct. 2161). Federal common law is binding because it defines the measure of the basic obligation to respect the judgment. See Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 24 S.Ct. 154, 48 L.Ed. 276 (1903) (noting that it is well settled that “a right claimed under the Federal Constitution, finally adjudicated in the Federal courts, can never be taken away or impaired by state decisions.”). Morrill finally decided the Secretary’s basic obligation with respect to Section 2911(d)’s residency requirement. The Commonwealth Court is consequently without authority to direct the Secretary to contravene the preclusive effect of this final federal judgment. See Yaracs v. Summit Academy, 845 A.2d 203 (Pa.Cmwlth.Ct.2004) (trial court without authority to void an agreement that was incorporated into a federal consent order). For reasons of comity and the preclusive effect in state court of a federal judgment, I believe that any attack on the validity of Morrill must be resolved in federal court. See Delaware Valley, 755 F.2d at 41. I therefore concur that the district residency requirement in Section 2911(d) is unenforceable in Pennsylvania at this time.
. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Chan Air v. Commonwealth, 755 F.2d 38 (3rd Cir.1985) is thus distinguishable on its facts because it involved the straightforward application of the doctrine of claim preclusion where PennDOT was a party to and therefore subject to a federal court consent decree and was also a party in the subsequent state court decision enjoining implementation of the consent decree.
. Unlike Justice Saylor, I would not hold out hope for potential state intervention at a later date. To the extent one desires relief from the federal court’s decision, I believe the only recourse is within the federal system.