(dissenting). I am in accord with the principles of law expressed in section II of the majority opinion. I find myself unable to concur in the application thereof by the majority of the court to the principal question involved in this case, namely the construction (considered in section I of the majority opinion) of that portion, Article 12, of the will which gives to George L. Armour “the *286privilege and right at any time within one (1) year from the date of my death to purchase all the shares of American Aniline Products, Inc., which I may own at the time of my death * * *.” These words distinctly indicate direct and absolute personal ownership of shares of stock at the time of the testator’s death. They do not import indirect or equitable ownership of the corporation through ownership of shares of stock in another corporation.
The admissible extrinsic evidence in this case supports the clear language of the will. It is obvious from the record that the testator understood the difference between personal arrd corporate ownership of shares of stock. Dealing in securities and stocks of corporations was a considerable activity in his life. He was a man of pronounced business acumen, learned in corporate organization and its germane language and effect.
It has been said that facts which occur after a will is executed cannot be considered in construing the will, “although some courts have considered the testator’s failure to alter his will, where he knew of the happening of some event after its execution which might affect the disposition of the property, as indicative of his intent.” 4 Page on Wills (Lifetime ed. 1941), sec. 1624, pp. 656-657. See also 5 New Jersey Practice, Clapp, Wills and Administration (1950), sec. 108, pp. 248-250; West Jersey Trust Co. v. Hayday, 124 N. J. Eq. 85, 87 (Ch. 1938), affirmed on the opinion of the former Court of Chancery 125 N. J. Eq. 90 (E. & A. 1939). Cf. Blauvelt v. The Citizens Trust Co., 3 N. J. 545, 552-553 (1950). Granting that the transaction involving the testator’s transfer of shares of Aniline to Sterling was not a fraudulent device to evade taxes, and there is no evidence of fraudulent intent, the testator must have been aware of the principle of law that thereafter he was not the owner of the Aniline shares and that the Sterling corporation did not hold those shares for his personal use but rather to the corporate use. Cf. Frank v. Frank’s Inc., 9 N. J. 218, 224 (1952). The testator being aware of the meaning of the *287plain words used in his will, it is reasonable to infer he Would have altered that instrument had he originally intended a disposition opposed thereto. Article 12 of the will should be construed according to the plain import of the express terms used therein.
With respect to portion III of the majority opinion I concur in the result attained, namely that the consolidated balance sheet be used. The applicable principles of law are expressed in section II of the majority opinion.
For the reasons herein expressed I would reverse the judgment of the Superior Court, Chancery Division, in its entirety.
Oliphant, J., joins in this dissent. For modification—Justices Heiier, Jacobs and Brennan —3. For reversal—Justices Oliphant and Burling—2.