concurring.
[¶ 28] First, I commend the Court’s forward-thinking opinion because it reiterates that determining credibility and weighing evidence has no place in summary judgment practice. The burden-shifting analysis deals only with burdens of production, not of persuasion. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (stating that “the determination that a defendant has met its burden of production ... can involve no credibility assessment” because “the burden-of-production determination necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment stage”); id. at 524, 113 S.Ct. *7302742 (stating that whether the employer’s proffered reason for the adverse treatment is unpersuasive is a question for the fact-finder). At the summary judgment stage, the court cannot decide which party has presented stronger evidence when competing plausible inferences can be drawn from the facts. See F.R. Carroll, Inc. v. TD Bank, N.A., 2010 ME 115, ¶8, 8 A.3d 646. This is especially true with issues of motive or intent that are present in employment discrimination cases.
[¶ 29] I write separately because it is time to simplify the summary judgment process and eliminate any burden-shifting analysis. As has been discussed thoroughly in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the continued vitality of the burden-shifting analysis is questionable. See Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221-28 (10th Cir.2003) (Hartz, J., concurring); accord, e.g., Peterson v. City College, 32 F.Supp.2d 675, 683-84 (S.D.N.Y.1999); Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 Brook. L.Rev. 659 (1998). I agree that the analysis is outdated, confusing, and unworkable. At this point, it confuses rather than clarifies the ultimate issue in employment discrimination cases: whether there is evidence of discrimination.
[¶ 30] The analysis adds a layer to the court’s already difficult task in deciding a motion for summary judgment on a discrimination claim. This analysis originated in the United States Supreme Court with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), in which the Court applied the analysis to a claim of racial discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the context of a trial. We then adopted the McDonnell analysis for discrimination claims pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act in Maine Human Rights Commission v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261-62 (Me.1979). In that case, we expressly noted that although federal case law applies McDonnell during a trial, it should be used after a trial when the court is assessing the record as a whole. Id. at 1262 n. 13.
[¶ 31] We first extended the analysis to the summary judgment stage in Doyle v. Department of Human Services, 2003 ME 61, ¶¶ 14-15, 824 A.2d 48. Although in Maine we had only applied the analysis at or after trial, we made reference in Doyle to the federal system, see id., which has historically applied McDonnell at the summary judgment stage, see, e.g., Cartagena v. Sec’y of Navy, 618 F.2d 130, 132-33 (1st Cir.1980). Following Doyle we have continued to apply the analysis at the summary judgment stage. See Cookson v. Brewer Sch. Dep’t, 2009 ME 57, 974 A.2d 276; Currie v. Indus. Sec., Inc., 2007 ME 12, 915 A.2d 400; LePage v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 2006 ME 130, 909 A.2d 629 (applying the analysis in the context of a claim pursuant to the Maine Whistleblow-ers Protection Act); Stanley v. Hancock Cnty. Comm’rs, 2004 ME 157, 864 A.2d 169 (same). We have also fastidiously applied the mandates of M.R. Civ. P. 56, e.g., Doyle, 2003 ME 61, ¶¶ 10-13, 824 A.2d 48, while at the same time recognizing the difficulty inherent in deciding these claims at the summary judgment stage, see Cookson, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 21, 974 A.2d 276. It is this precedent that compelled the Superior Court to apply the analysis to Daniels’s claims at the summary judgment stage and that, in turn, requires us to review the judgment in this framework.
[¶ 32] What our precedent has failed to recognize is that the McDonnell analysis is a “procedural device, designed only to es*731tablish an order of proof and production.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (quotation marks omitted). It is framed as three distinct steps in order to help the court conceptually organize the evidence before presenting the ultimate question of discrimination to the jury. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08, 517-18, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (stating that after the defendant meets his burden of production, the plaintiff “has the full and fair opportunity to demonstrate, through presentation of his own case and through cross-examination of the defendant’s witnesses, that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision” (quotation marks omitted)); Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1261 (“The special rules developed by the federal courts provide a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence ... as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.” (quotation marks omitted)). Its purpose is to determine whether there is causation between the employee’s disability and the employer’s adverse action. This is the third element of a discrimination claim.
[¶ 33] The analysis is intricate because claims involving motive and pretext are complex, nuanced, and often difficult for the fact-finder to parse out. However, it is meant to simplify rather than complicate matters for trial; it “was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, in discrimination cases “trial courts or reviewing courts” should not make the already “sensitive and difficult” inquiry into the employer’s mental process “more difficult by applying legal rules which were devised to govern the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in deciding this ultimate question.” U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 34] At the summary judgment stage in employment discrimination cases, the McDonnell analysis unnecessarily complicates what should be a straightforward and objective inquiry pursuant to Rule 56. Rule 56 provides that summary judgment can only be granted to a defendant when (1) there are no genuine disputes of material fact, and (2) the undisputed evidence fails to establish a prima facie cause of action, such that no reasonable view of the evidence would permit a fact-finder to find in favor of the nonmoving party. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); Bonin v. Crepeau, 2005 ME 59, ¶ 18, 873 A.2d 346 (“To survive a defendant’s motion for a summary judgment, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for each element of her cause of action.” (quotation marks omitted)). In these cases, the court’s purview on a motion for summary judgment is limited to the prima facie case pursuant to Rule 56.
[¶ 35] To the extent that the McDonnell analysis functions as an overlay on our standard summary judgment practice, steadfastly proceeding through its three steps is unnecessary and unworkable at the summary judgment stage. It breaks down what is in reality the third element of an employment discrimination claim into its own three-prong showing that volleys the burden of production between the two parties. At this stage it does nothing more than organize the record to determine whether the plaintiff has offered evidence of causation between the employer’s adverse action and the employee’s disability, and whether the defendant has offered evidence to put that issue into dispute. It is not necessary to use the McDonnell analysis to make these determinations. All the court needs to do — and all that it can do pursuant to Rule 56 — is assess the record to determine if there are genuine issues of material fact or if the undisputed *732facts entitle one party to judgment as a matter of law.
[¶ 36] Therefore, I would not apply the McDonnell analysis to discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage. On a motion for summary judgment, I would limit the inquiry in these cases to that which is provided for by Rule 56: whether there are genuine disputes of material fact, and whether the undisputed material facts establish a prima facie cause of action. These are the only questions for the court at the summary judgment stage.
[¶ 37] Here, a prima facie case for employment discrimination requires Daniels to offer evidence that he has a disability, that he can perform the essential functions of his job, and that he was treated adversely because of his disability. See Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 ME 37, ¶ 9, 895 A.2d 309, superseded by statute on other grounds by P.L. 2007, ch. 385, § 3; see also Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1262 (“If the judge finds proof of certain circumstances that the law treats as sufficient to support an inference of unlawful discrimination, then a prima facie case for the plaintiff is made out....”). As the majority recognizes, it is inherently difficult to assess discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage because the third element of the claim requires the court to delve into the employer’s motive or intent. See Cookson, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 21, 974 A.2d 276. Issues of motive and intent are often decided on circumstantial evidence that requires the court to make inferences from the facts and to choose between competing inferences generated by the facts. See, e.g., State v. Pinkham-Murch, 432 A.2d 1297, 1300 (Me.1981).
[¶ 38] When analyzed as Rule 56 requires, this record is rife with genuine disputes of material fact regarding the second and third elements of Daniels’s claim for employment discrimination, which bear on the ultimate issue of whether Daniels has been discriminated against. I would vacate the summary judgment against him on that basis alone, as summary judgment practice requires, without evaluating the strength of the evidence that each party has offered to prove or disprove the third element.