I dissent.
The majority conclude the trial court has unlimited discretion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 729.3 (section 729.3) to require urine testing for alcohol or drugs as a condition of probation for violation of an offense, here the use of bad language on the school ground, for which there is no demonstrable relationship to alcohol or drug use.
I disagree. Section 729.3 is permissive and subject to the test of an abuse of discretion. That test is measured in the case law by whether there is a demonstrable relationship between the offense and drug or alcohol use.
The authority to require urine testing as a condition of probation is specifically conferred by section 729.3 which provides: “If a minor is found to be a person described in Section 601 or 602 and the court does not remove the minor from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian, the court, as a condition of probation, may require the minor to submit to urine testing upon the request of a peace officer or probation officer for the *714purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or drugs.”1 (Italics added.) By using the discretionary “may,” section 729.3 commits the decision to order testing in a particular case to the juvenile court’s discretion. By its terms it does not confer absolute discretion.
The question then is whether the discretion conferred has been abused. “The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the ‘legal principles governing the subject of [the] action . . . .’ Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an ‘abuse’ of discretion. [Citation.]” (City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297 [255 Cal.Rptr. 704].)
The minors contend “the decision to impose urine testing in a case which does not involve use of drugs or alcohol, or in which the social history of the juvenile indicates no drug or alcohol use, constitutes an abuse of discretion.” They rely on the leading case, People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 [124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545].
In Lent, the Supreme Court said: “The Legislature has placed in trial judges a broad discretion in the sentencing process, including the determination as to whether probation is appropriate and, if so, the conditions thereof. (Pen. Code, § 1203 et seq.) A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .’ (People v. Dominguez (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 623, 627 [64 Cal.Rptr. 290].) Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.” (People v. Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486, fn. omitted.)
The majority claim the urine testing condition is valid under Lent because it is intended to detect the presence of substances whose use by minors is unlawful, that, it “relates to conduct which is ... in itself criminal . . . .” Moreover, they claim that since the Legislature found that “alcohol and drug abuse” are “precursors of serious criminality” (Stats. 1989, ch. 1117, § 1, subd. (a)(2), p. 4113; maj. opn., ante, at p. 708, fn. 2) urine testing is “reasonably related to future criminality.”
*715This misconstrues the reach of the verb “relate” in the passage in Lent quoted from People v. Dominguez. “If the condition of probation is not directly related to the crime, the condition may be invalidated.” (People v. Dominguez (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 623, 628 [64 Cal.Rptr. 290].) If there is no indication that substance abuse by the minor played a direct role in the offense or was a factor in bringing the offense about, the sentencing court abuses its discretion in imposing search or testing conditions pertaining to such substance abuse. (E.g., People v. Keller (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 827 [143 Cal.Rptr. 184].) The refusal to “consent” to a physical test for drugs “is not in itself criminal” and compelling such “consent” is not a measure “reasonably related to future criminality” in the absence of a showing that substance abuse by the minor has played a role in his misconduct or has even occurred. (Ibid.., also cf., e.g., In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 20 [169 Cal.Rptr. 625]; In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 278-280 [186 Cal.Rptr. 898]; In re Layah K. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1502 [281 Cal.Rptr. 6], all justifying alcohol or narcotics search or testing conditions on the substance abuse of the minor.)
Nor can the urine testing condition be upheld on the ground there is information in the record that persons related to the minors have abused drugs or alcohol. The probation report notes that the defendants’ biological father is a drug dealer, their grandmother was an alcoholic, and the district attorney asserted in argument that Jason, the boy whose fight precipitated these proceedings, was known to use alcohol and marijuana. However, as the minors note, they neither desire nor have they had contact with their biological father for many years, their grandmother died before they were bom, and they are prohibited from any association with Jason.
In our society it is virtually always the case that a minor will have some connection to one or more persons who have abused alcohol or other drugs. This ubiquitous consideration does not warrant a urine testing condition without something indicating that the nature of the relationship affords an inference the minor is more likely to use drugs or alcohol than other minors. There is nothing of this nature in the present cases.
There is simply nothing in the record which links the conduct of the minors to drug or alcohol abuse. Accordingly, the trial court erred in imposing the urine testing condition.
Appellants’ petitions for review by the Supreme Court were denied March 17, 1999. Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., were of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.
Section 729.3 is part of a program “designed to reach our children before they become habitual criminals, and requires the intervention by the juvenile justice system at the earliest signs of drug abuse, gang affiliation, and other antisocial behavior.” (Stats. 1989, ch. 1117, § 1, subd. (b), p. 4113.)