dissenting.
In my view, the per curiam determination that a mandatory minimum sentence is not a permissible sentence upon revocation of probation conflicts with settled statutory and decisional precedent mandating that upon revocation, sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing. Moreover, I disagree with the per curiam view that principles of statutory interpretation suggest that the legislature intended to prohibit, by implication, the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences upon revocation of probation. In my view, the legislature has plainly stated that upon revocation of probation, the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, and that mandatory minimum sentences must be imposed for prescribed offenses when the Commonwealth gives notice of its intent to proceed under a mandatory minimum provision and provides adequate proof at sentencing that such a provision applies. Additionally, the Sentencing Code contains numerous mandatory minimum sentence provisions that, for all practical purposes, are identical to the instant provision. Thus, the effect of the per curiam decision today is that, absent legislative amendment to the Sentencing Code, no person on probation for commission of any offense punishable by a mandatory *572minimum sentence, including offenses committed with a firearm, or second or subsequent violent offenses, may properly be sentenced to the applicable mandatory minimum upon revocation of probation, despite having received notice of the Commonwealth’s intent to proceed thereunder. Such a result is unacceptable in my view. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The relevant facts in this matter show that Appellee was charged with one count of possession with intent to deliver narcotics (“PWID”) and four counts of simple possession of marijuana, amphetamine, methylphenidate and drug paraphernalia. As part of a negotiated plea agreement, in exchange for Appellee’s agreement to plead guilty to the one count of PWID, the Commonwealth dropped the other charges and agreed to forego seeking a two-year school-zone mandatory minimum sentence, and to recommend a probationary sentence. Appellee entered the negotiated plea, and the court sentenced him to 12 months’ probation.
Six days after being sentenced pursuant to his negotiated plea, Appellee was apprehended stealing two jars of honey from a Wegman’s supermarket, and was ultimately convicted of retail theft as a summary offense. The Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke Appellee’s probation on the PWID conviction due to his summary retail theft conviction. In its motion, the Commonwealth provided notice to Appellee and the court of its intention to seek the school-zone mandatory minimum.
At a hearing on the motion, the court revoked Appellee’s probation, but questioned whether the Commonwealth had the authority to proceed under the school-zone mandatory minimum provision at the probation revocation stage because it had waived proceeding under that provision at the initial sentencing. The court asked the parties to brief the issue and continued the sentencing hearing. Subsequently, the court opined that the Commonwealth could not proceed under the school-zone mandatory minimum provision at the probation revocation stage. The court then sentenced Appellee to 90 days to 12 months’ incarceration. The Commonwealth appeal*573ed, the Superior Court affirmed, this Court granted allowance of appeal, and the per curiam decision now holds that the Superior Court properly ruled that the Commonwealth is precluded from seeking application of the school-zone mandatory minimum for a PWID conviction upon violation of a sentence of probation.
Section 9771(b) of the Sentencing Code addresses modification and revocation of probation and provides as follows:
(b) Revocation. — The court may revoke an order of probation upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation. Upon revocation the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b).
The school-zone mandatory minimum statute requires the imposition of a minimum two year sentence of imprisonment if a defendant is convicted of PWID within 1000 feet of a school, and provides in relevant part:
(b) Proof at sentencing. — The provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime. Notice of the applicability of this section to the defendant shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth’s intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall consider evidence presented at trial, shall afford the Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present necessary additional evidence and shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence if this section is applicable.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6317(b).1
Instantly, the per curiam opinion correctly states that “the extant question involves the interplay between sections 6317 *574and 9771(b),” and concedes that “upon resentencing, the court is vested with the same alternatives it initially possessed.” Per Curiam Opinion, at 65. However, in my view, the per curiam opinion makes too much of the fact that the Commonwealth agreed to waive the mandatory minimum at initial sentencing, suggesting that the Commonwealth’s decision to decline to seek a mandatory minimum in exchange for Appellee’s guilty plea, conclusively establishes the unavailability of the mandatory minimum sentence as a sentencing alternative at the revocation of probation stage. The per curiam opinion effectively ignores the undisputed fact that had the Commonwealth sought and proved the applicability of the mandatory minimum at initial sentencing, the court would have been obligated to impose it, and, more importantly, that the mandatory minimum sentence was not “available” at initial sentencing only by conditional agreement of the parties and the court. The Commonwealth, as part of a plea bargain, agreed not to proceed under the mandatory minimum provision, agreeing instead to recommend a probationary sentence in exchange for Appellee’s agreement to enter a guilty plea and abide by conditions imposed by the court, and the court agreed to accept that plea. Abiding by the conditions of his probationary sentence was a critical part of Appellee’s agreement in the bargained-for exchange; the agreement was not merely to enter a guilty plea.
In my view, after Appellee violated the conditions of his probation by engaging in retail theft, he returned to the position he was in at the time of his original sentencing when all sentencing alternatives existed unconditionally, including the mandatory minimum. Our jurisprudence makes clear that it is of no moment, for purposes of resentencing upon revocation of probation, that the Commonwealth waived the mandatory minimum as part of a plea agreement, as that erstwhile *575agreement cannot bind the parties or the court at the resentencing stage.
In Commonwealth v. Wallace, 582 Pa. 234, 870 A.2d 838 (2005), this Court reviewed whether the Superior Court had erred in holding that a trial court, in resentencing a defendant after revoking his probation, is restricted to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by the original negotiated guilty plea.2 We began our analysis by citing to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771 and its provision that “upon revocation the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing.” Wallace at 842. We held that the statutory authority and case law make clear that at any revocation of probation hearing, the court is free to impose any sentence permitted under the Sentencing Code and is not restricted by the bounds of a negotiated plea agreement between a defendant and prosecutor. Id. at 843.
We specifically noted:
The rationale for giving the trial court such discretion upon resentencing is grounded in the nature of a negotiated guilty plea, which is a two-sided agreement that imposes obligations on both the defendant and the Commonwealth. On the one hand, the Commonwealth agrees not to prosecute the defendant to the full extent of the law and to recommend a circumscribed punishment. The defendant, on the other hand, accepts this benefit with the implicit *576promise that he will abide by the terms of the agreement and behave in accordance with the legal punishment imposed by the court.
... As a result, if the defendant fails to satisfy his obligations, e.g., by violating probation, he necessarily forfeits any entitlement to a circumscribed punishment.
Id. at 843 n. 6 (additional citations omitted).
The “circumscribed punishment” agreed to here by the Commonwealth was its not seeking imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence. By failing to satisfy his obligation to avoid criminal activity, Appellee has forfeited any entitlement to the former agreement and offer of circumscribed punishment. Therefore, the sentencing alternatives available to the court upon revocation, being the same as were “available” at the initial sentencing, included the Commonwealth’s proceeding under the mandatory minimum provision, which would have bound the court, assuming proper notice had been given and the applicability of the provision demonstrated, just as surely as the court’s acceptance of the negotiated agreement bound it to impose a probationary sentence initially.3
*577The per curiam opinion views the availability of a mandatory minimum on revocation as an infringement upon the sentencing court’s discretion. “If we were to find that the Commonwealth is permitted to seek imposition of the mandatory minimum after waiving its initial applicability, the court would be denied its ‘free[dom] to impose any sentence permitted[.]’ ” Per Curiam Opinion, at 567, 44 A.3d at 66 (citing Wallace, supra at 843-844). The per curiam opinion concludes that “requiring the court to apply section 6317 would result in a de facto restriction on sentencing alternatives[.]” Id.
The reasoning of the per curiam disposition, as I see it, begs the question whether a court has any discretion at all in a mandatory minimum sentencing situation. In my view, it does not, as the purpose of a mandatory minimum provision is to remove sentencing discretion and to require the imposition of a sentence of a particular minimum length as directed by the legislature, where the Commonwealth has given notice and proven the applicability of the particular sentencing provision. In my opinion, the instant per curiam decision to remove the availability of mandatory minimum sentences at resentencing for probation violations on the rationale that such sentences restrict a sentencing court’s discretion, creates an artificial distinction between sentencing and resentencing, and eviscerates the meaning of the term “mandatory.”
Moreover, the rule announced today conflicts with actual sentencing practices in Pennsylvania that have heretofore been recognized as proper by this Court. In Commonwealth v. Infante, 585 Pa. 408, 888 A.2d 783 (2005), pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea to two counts of PWID, the court sentenced the defendant to two concurrent terms of one year intermediate punishment followed by two years’ probation, in lieu of a mandatory minimum sentence of three years’ incarceration. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(3) (where defendant is convicted of trafficking between 2 and 10 grams of cocaine and has prior trafficking conviction, three-year mandatory minimum prison sentence required). Subsequently, the defendant violated the terms of his probation, and upon revocation of probation, the court imposed the mandatory minimum sen*578tence. This Court held that the sentencing court did not lack authority to revoke the defendant’s probation and, on resentencing, to impose “the mandatory minimum sentence that the General Assembly has fixed for his crimes. The Superior Court was in error to hold otherwise.” Id. at 794.4
Additionally, I disagree with the per curiam opinion’s statutory interpretation analysis that observes a distinction between sentencing and resentencing with respect to the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences as reflective of legislative intent. The revocation of probation statute, which makes no distinction between sentencing and resentencing, was enacted in 1980. 42 Pa.C.S § 9771. The proof at sentencing provision here, which similarly makes no distinction between sentencing and resentencing, was enacted in 1997. 18 Pa.C.S. 6317(b). The proof at sentencing provision here is identical to the proof at sentencing provisions contained in many other statutes enacted in the 1980s and 1990s, which make no distinction between sentencing and resentencing. See n. 1, supra. The courts of Pennsylvania have consistently construed the revocation of probation statute to mean that which it expresses, i.e., that upon revocation, the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing. Wallace, supra.
This Court has recognized that “legislative intent to effectuate a drastic change in the law is not to be inferred by mere omission and implication.” Fonner v. Shandon, Inc., 555 Pa. 370, 724 A.2d 903, 906 (1999). Nevertheless, the per curiam opinion now concludes that the legislature intends for mandatory minimum sentences to be available only at initial sentencing or upon revocation of county and state intermediate punishment. The per curiam opinion grounds its determination *579on the legislature’s enactment of statutes for revocation of county and state intermediate punishment in 2004, which expressly provide that the Commonwealth may give notice of its intention to proceed under a mandatory minimum provision prior to “resentencing.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9763(d); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9774(c).
In my view, it is erroneous to conclude that the legislature intended revocation of intermediate punishment to be treated differently than revocation of probation. Intermediate punishment and probation are similar in many ways, and both generally establish conditions the violation of which typically results in the imposition of increased punishment. “Intermediate punishment is described as the conditions that a court can place on a defendant in lieu of total or partial confinement.” Commonwealth v. Koskey, 571 Pa. 241, 812 A.2d 509, 512 (2002). Similarly, “[a]s commonly defined, probation is ‘[a] sentence imposed for commission of crime whereby a convicted criminal offender is released into the community under the supervision of a probation officer in lieu of incarceration.’ ” Commonwealth v. Holmes, 593 Pa. 601, 933 A.2d 57, 59 (2007). Moreover, our courts frequently impose probationary sentences as a means of conditional supervision, and it is not uncommon for a sentencing court to enter a split sentence, i.e., impose a sentence on a single offense that combines elements of both incarceration and probation. Given the similarities between intermediate punishment and probation, and between the proof at sentencing provisions of numerous mandatory minimum statutes and the one at issue here, I disagree that the principles of statutory construction show an intent on the part of the legislature to weaken the longstanding precedent in this Commonwealth that “upon revocation of probation, the court possesses the same sentencing alternatives that it had at the time of initial sentencing.” Wallace, supra at 842-843 (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 497 Pa. 437, 441 A.2d 1218, 1219 (1982)).5
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. The instant proof at sentencing provision is, for all practical purposes, identical to the proof at sentencing provisions contained in a number of other mandatory minimum sentence statutes, including, but not limited to: 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712 (sentences for offenses committed with firearms), *57442 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1 (sentences for certain drug offenses committed with firearms), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9713 (sentences for offenses committed on public transportation), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714 (sentences for second or subsequent offenses), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718 (sentences for offenses against infant persons), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.2 (sentences for sex offenders), and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9719 (sentences for offenses committed while impersonating a law enforcement officer).
. In Wallace, pursuant to the defendant’s negotiated guilty plea to three counts of PWID, the court initially sentenced him to three concurrent terms of twenty-one to forty-two months’ imprisonment followed by two years’ probation. While on probation, the defendant committed another drug offense, and upon revocation of probation, the court sentenced him to three consecutive terms of five to ten years’ imprisonment, the statutory maximum sentence available under the Sentencing Code. The defendant appealed and claimed the sentence was illegal, and the Superior Court agreed, reversing and remanding for resentencing. On remand, the court sentenced the defendant to three concurrent terms of five to ten years' imprisonment, and the defendant appealed once again. The Superior Court ultimately remanded to the trial court for resentencing "limited to the terms of the plea agreement it accepted at the time of original sentencing, that is: concurrent terms with an outside limit of five and one-half years.” Id. at 842. This Court granted the Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal.
. In a well-reasoned concurring and dissenting opinion in Wallace, supra, Justice Saylor correctly pointed out that the analysis of the issue of “available” sentences should recognize that, upon revocation, the imposition of any sentence exceeding that contemplated by the plea agreement is not in strict conformity with the statutory requirement that "the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing.” Id. at 849 (Saylor, J. concurring and dissenting) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b)). This is so because the trial court would not previously have had the option of sentencing outside the terms of the agreement without offering the defendant the opportunity to withdraw the plea. Here, the imposition of a mandatory minimum is also not in strict conformity with the statutory language. The court would not have previously had the option to impose a mandatory minimum sentence because the Commonwealth had agreed not to proceed under the mandatory minimum provision. Nevertheless, as Justice Saylor has correctly pointed out, see id. (citing Commonwealth v. Fusselman, 866 A.2d 1109, 1113 (Pa.Super.2004)), strict adherence to the statutory language would lead to absurd results since, for example, imposition of a term of incarceration would be "unavailable” on resentencing where the plea agreement did not contemplate incarceration. In my view, the "unavailability” of a mandatory minimum provision on revocation simply because the Commonwealth agreed not to proceed thereunder initially in exchange for the entry of a guilty plea, is an equally unacceptable and absurd result.
. I recognize that the propriety of the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence upon revocation of probation was not squarely at issue in Infante, but the holding in the case reflects the accepted practice in Pennsylvania of the Commonwealth’s seeking a mandatory minimum sentence at the revocation of probation stage where probation had initially been imposed pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea agreement in lieu of the mandatory minimum sentence.
. I note tangentially that Justice Baer's dissent in Wallace disagreeing that the Commonwealth’s appeal was properly before the Court, has *580some resonance for me, as I would agree that the issue preserved in the defendant’s first appeal to the Superior Court in that case concerned both the manner (consecutive or concurrent) and length (total period of incarceration) of the sentence imposed, and the Commonwealth did not file a petition for allowance of appeal from that judgment. Nevertheless, the rule in Wallace is broadly stated, controls the issue raised sub judice, and I would conclude, unlike the per curiam opinion, that Wallace requires reversal of the Superior Court’s determination here.