DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge McCullough.Respectfully, I dissent.
Section (4)(i )(4)(8)(a)(ii) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law)1 excludes from “employment” the “[s]ervice performed in the employ of ... an organization which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported by a church or convention or asso-
ciation of churches.” Thus, the foregoing exemption may apply when a religious school: offers actual religious instruction and prayer; emphasizes the religious principles in the presentation of secular subjects; and is controlled by school committees elected by monthly meetings of the affiliated congregation, by a principal appointed by a board of deacons of the affiliated church, or by a principal appointed by the board of elders of the affiliated church. Christian School Association of Greater Harrisburg v. Department of Labor and Industry, 55 Pa.Cmwlth. 555, 423 A.2d 1340, 1345-46 (1980).
In this case, the agency representative, Lindsay Gay, testified in relevant part that he spoke with Imani Christian Academy’s assistant school administrator while conducting a wage investigation. (N.T. 10/18/102 at 5.) Gay was told that the school is “basically supported by” the Petra International Ministries. (Id.) Gay stated that the exemption applies under the Law when a business is owned and operated by a church and primarily supported by that church for religious pur*1177poses and that the exemption applied to Claimant’s employment with the school. (Id.)
Imani Christian Academy’s financial manager, Ray Sisak, testified in relevant part that Petra International Ministries founded the school, has several members on the school’s board of directors, and that many of the school’s employees are both members of Petra and elders of the church. (N.T. 10/18/10 at 8.) Sisak acknowledged that the school and the church were separate non-profit entities and that the school receives no funding from the church. (Id.) Although the school rented space from the church, Sisak indicated that it had purchased its own facility. (Id.) However, Sisak also stated that the school “[o]perates for educational] purposes with a strong religious influence.” (Id.)
In disposing of the instant appeal, the Board’s findings acknowledged Sisak’s testimony regarding the school’s educational purpose and strong religious influence. (Referee Decision at 1.) The Board’s findings also addressed Sisak’s testimony regarding the organizational and financial separation between Imani Christian Academy and Petra International Ministries. (Id. at 1, 2.) However, the fact that the school and the church are separate entities, or that the church does not financially support the school, does not preclude the application of the exemption under section (4)(i )(4)(8)(a)(ii) of the Law. See, e.g., Nampa Christian Schools Foundation, Inc. v. Department of Employment, 110 Idaho 918, 923-24, 719 P.2d 1178, 1183-1184 (1986) (holding that a school was exempt under the relevant statute where an association of several churches were united by their relationship to the school, the school had a religious mission and purpose, and the churches provided moral support even though a small fraction of the school’s revenue came from the churches and the school was not operated, supervised or controlled by the churches).3
Moreover, the Board’s findings utterly failed to address Sisak’s testimony regarding the control of the church over school operations due to the presence of church elders and members on the school’s board of directors and as school employees, and they do not address the agency representative’s testimony regarding the exemption at all. As a result, the matter should be remanded to the Board to make adequate findings of fact regarding the relevant factors to be considered in applying the exemption of section (4)(l )(4)(8)(a)(ii) of the Law. Osborne Associates, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 3 A.3d 722, 733 (Pa.Cmwlth.2010).
Accordingly, I would vacate the Board’s order and remand for further findings of fact.
. Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 753(4)(Z )(4)(8)(a)(ii).
. "N.T. 10/18/10” refers to the transcript of the testimony at the hearing of October 18, 2010.
. See also Kendall v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 393 Mass. 731, 736-37, 473 N.E.2d 196, 200 (1985) (holding that a separately incorporated mental health clinic owned and operated by a religious order to provide education and training to mentally disabled children was exempt under the relevant statute even though it was primarily financed by government funds).