dissenting. While I agree with Justice Duggan that this case is not moot, I write separately because I would not order a remand.
Fifteen years ago, this court held that under Part II, Article 83 of the New Hampshire Constitution, the State has an obligation to fund a constitutionally adequate elementary and secondary education for all public school students, no matter their geography. Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 138 N.H. 183 (1993) (Claremont I). We observed that, in the first instance, it was for the legislature and the Governor to define the parameters of the education mandated by the State Constitution. Id. at 192.
Four years later, in 1997, we held that the then-existing system for financing elementary and secondary public education in our state was unconstitutional because rather than paying the full cost of a constitutionally adequate public education, the State was utilizing local and disproportional tax levies to satisfy part of its exclusive obligation. Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462 (1997) (Claremont ID. In that opinion we made it clear that the State was responsible to: (1) define the content of a constitutionally adequate public education; (2) fund it; (3) ensure that any property tax used to pay for it was administered in a manner that was equal in valuation and uniform in rate; and (4) develop a system of accountability to ensure the delivery of a constitutionally adequate public education. We expressed our confidence that the legislature and the Governor would “act expeditiously” to satisfy these requirements. Id. at 477.
A year later, in 1998, the State sought a two-year extension to fulfill the mandates of Claremont II. Claremont School Dist. v. Governor (Motion for Extension of Deadlines), 143 N.H. 154 (1998). In so doing, it acknowledged that it had not yet constructed “a system to ensure delivery of a constitutionally adequate education.” Id. at 160 (quotation omitted). We denied the requested extension and cautioned that “[ajbsent extraordinary circumstances, delay in achieving a constitutional system [would be] inexcusable.” Id. at 158.
The following year, we determined that the State’s proposal to phase-in a statewide property tax to fund constitutional adequacy would result in unconstitutional tax disparities. Claremont School Dist. v. Governor (Statewide Property Tax Phase-In), 144 N.H. 210 (1999). At that time, the State expressly represented that it was making progress in developing a delivery and accountability system to address how to determine if a school or district was, in fact, providing a constitutionally adequate public education for its students. Based upon that representation, we denied, without prejudice, the plaintiff school districts’ request for the appointment of a master to take evidence and make recommendations to this court on a satisfactory system for accountability. Id. at 212; see Claremont School *739Dist. v. Governor (Accountability), 147 N.H. 499, 504 (2002). We described the request to appoint a master as “premature,” not unreasonable or unfounded. Claremont (Statewide Property Tax Phase-In), 144 N.H. at 212. In so ruling, we intended that the political branches have an unimpeded opportunity to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities. Regrettably, the accountability legislation touted by the State in 1999 “was subsequently sent back to committee and never became law.” Claremont (Accountability), 147 N.H. at 506.
In 2001, the legislature passed Senate Bill 164, “an Act establishing a comprehensive statewide accountability system concerning an adequate education.” Id. (quotation omitted). Because the State, however, was not required under the legislation to assist schools or school districts where students failed to meet prescribed standards, Governor Shaheen vetoed the bill. In her veto message she said, “I cannot support legislation which is more symbolic than substantive on an issue as critically important as school accountability.” Id. (quotation omitted). Four years had passed since the Claremont II decision and still no system of accountability satisfying the requirements of the State Constitution was in place.
In 2002, we issued an opinion addressing the accountability standards required to provide a constitutionally adequate education. We concluded that the standards then in place did not pass constitutional muster. Id. at 500. The accountability rules the State had implemented allowed it to be relieved of its duty when a school district’s tax base or other financial condition contributed to noncompliance with minimum standards. We held that there was “no accountability when the rules on their face tolerate[d] noncompliance with the duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education,” id. at 513. Again, we expressed our hope “that the legislative and executive branches [would] continue to work to satisfy their constitutional duty to ensure the delivery of a constitutionally adequate education to [all] public school students” in our state. Id. at 521. Our opinion made clear that without a system to ensure real accountability, the State’s duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education would become illusory.
Since 2002, the only action taken by the legislature to fulfill its acknowledged obligation to ensure accountability in providing a constitutionally adequate education for public school students was the establishment, within the last few months, of a “joint legislative oversight committee on accountability for an adequate education.” Laws 2008, 173:13, I. The committee is to “review and study the assessment and assistance methods, reporting requirements, and other methods of accountability presently being used by the department of education and local school districts,” id., 173:13, II, and “report its findings and recommendations concerning the sufficiency of existing statutory law to provide accountability for the *740delivery of the opportunity for an adequate education ... and the possible need for additional legislation,” id., 173:13, III. This initiative occurred nine years after the State represented that it was making progress in developing a system of accountability and eleven years after we identified the State’s duty to do so.
It is readily apparent that despite its near decade long assurances that our public education system would contain the requisite controls to ensure the delivery of a constitutionally adequate education, the State has not met its acknowledged obligation. This court, for the past fifteen years, has repeatedly, respectfully and appropriately deferred to the political branches to resolve the critical issues the numerous school funding decisions have identified. See Claremont I, 138 N.H. at 192 (“We do not define the parameters of the education mandated by the constitution as that task is, in the first instance, for the legislature and the Governor.”); Claremont II, 142 N.H. at 475 (“[W]e were not appointed to establish educational policy, nor to determine the proper way to finance its implementation ... we leave such matters ... to the two coequal branches of government...” ); Opinion of the Justices (School Financing), 142 N.H. 892, 903 (1998) (“It is neither our task nor intent to manage the public school systems of the State ....”); Claremont (Extension of Deadlines), 143 N.H. at 160 (declining invitation to determine whether the adopted definition of an adequate education is facially unconstitutional where State concedes it has not completed its efforts); Opinion of the Justices (Tax Plan Referendum), 143 N.H. 429, 445 (1999) (“[W]e have nothing to do with the propriety, expediency, or policy of any law; . . . these considerations concern the legislature, and not us . . . .” (quotation omitted)); Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Public School Financing System), 145 N.H. 474, 478 (2000) (content of a constitutionally adequate education must be defined, in the first instance, by the legislature); Claremont (Accountability), 147 N.H. at 521 (“As in the past, we are confident that the legislature and the Governor will fulfill their responsibility ...” ).
Deference, however, has its limits. Constitutional rights must be enforced or they cease to be rights. The orders of this court going back more than a decade cannot be trumped by extended and repeated noncomplianee. I would reject Chapter 173 as facially unconstitutional for, at a minimum, failing to contain a system of accountability. “In light of the procedural history of this litigation, including . . . [the State’s] previous statements on this issue, and the application of settled law, this conclusion should be neither surprising nor unanticipated.” Claremont (Accountability), 147 N.H. at 519.
I would strongly encourage the political branches to complete their unfinished work in funding, providing for, and ensuring a constitutionally *741adequate education for each public school student in our state so that the long unfulfilled promise of our State Constitution can finally be realized. If the legislative and executive branches cannot, despite their ongoing efforts, satisfy the constitutional mandates of Claremont II and its progeny by the end of the 2009 legislative session, I would be open to a request that this court appoint a master, as was requested almost a decade ago, to make recommendations to this court as to how the state’s obligations for public education can be fulfilled. I would hope that day does not arrive, but recognized and important constitutional rights need to be enforced. Certainty and finality are long past due.