dissenting.
In this workers’ compensation case, the Appellate Division has correctly concluded that this compensation proceeding was indelibly tainted by an error of law by the compensation judge and has ordered a remand of petitioner’s claim. The Court has characterized the error as one of overkill and sustains the dismissal of petitioner’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. I disagree.
The appeal concerns a work-connected neck injury in 1989 that has left Ms. Reinhart with a herniated disk that has required a discectomy. During the hearing on this 1989 accident, DuPont introduced evidence of a 1984 work-related injury to petitioner’s pelvis. DuPont argued that some of petitioner’s present complaints concerning restraint on her activities duplicated complaints from her earlier injuries.
DuPont was successful in persuading the trial court to consider a transcript of the earlier 1986 proceedings and sought to prove that petitioner had a propensity for lying, in part because she had exaggerated her running skills in a 1986 interview given to the Woodbridge Home News, her local newspaper. Ms. Reinhart had met the reporter at her health club and had described to him the beneficial effects of exercise during her recent pregnancy. The reporter was interested in the story and called her for an interview. Based on that telephone interview, he reported that peti*168tioner had “a marathon tucked under her belt.” During cross-examination in the 1986 proceedings about how she could run so well despite having suffered the 1984 injury, the petitioner had to admit that she had somewhat embellished on her running skills and that she had not run a complete marathon. She also admitted to other “fibs,” such as jogging with her newborn baby, in order to enhance the account of her athletic endeavors.
In its letter brief to the trial court seeking to admit the transcript of the 1986 hearing into evidence on the 1989 accident, DuPont’s counsel suggested to the court that N.J.R.E. 607 enlarges the ability of parties to introduce evidence affecting the credibility of witnesses, even so far as to allow the use of extrinsic evidence as an acceptable method of showing “a defect of character affecting credibility.” What DuPont sought to show was that because Toby Reinhart had exaggerated her prowess as a weekend athlete or jogging mom, she would have been likely to have been untruthful as well in this matter.
The compensation court accepted the reasoning of DuPont, concluding in its opinion:
[Petitioner] also conceded that she was not truthful with the interview in the Home News entitled, “Pregnancy Doesn’t Have to Stop Exercise.” She characterizes her falses [sic] as merely “fibs.”
The Court concludes that the petitioner has a proclivity to be untruthful, which has a direct bearing on her credibility. These “fibs” caused people to rely upon and take certain actions based on her statements. To her, they may have had no dire consequences; to the Court, it reveals a complete lack of understanding and propensity to be untruthful.
This Court agrees it was error for the judge of compensation to rely on the transcripts concerning the newspaper interview to show a propensity in the claimant to lie.
The error, is not, however, as the Court characterizes it, a matter of “overkill,” ante at 166, 685 A.2d at 1306. Rather, the error displayed a gross misunderstanding of the Rules of Evidence. If every weekend athlete had to account in civil trials for exaggerated accounts of his or her accomplishments, trials would become a bit longer in New Jersey. The stereotypical reasoning *169left standing by the Court would provide material for a satire on the legal process if the compensation judge’s error were not of such grave consequences to the injured worker. The Appellate Division correctly concluded that although there was no error in the use of claimant’s 1986 testimony to test her present complaints to the parts of her body injured in 1989, as well as other residual complaints related to her accidents,
[elvidence of [a prior untruthMness] is not admissible to prove the [disposition] of a person ... [for untruthfulness]. While such evidence may be admitted for other limited purposes, it may not be used to prove that because claimant lied in a previous proceeding that she is lying in this proceeding.
The compensation judge did exactly what he is not permitted to do. He accepted proof that claimant had lied about her jogging in the newspaper interview as proof that she was lying in the compensation proceeding. We should not regard such error as harmless. The Appellate Division felt that flaw so tainted the court’s analysis that it would have ordered a rehearing before a new judge had the judge not already retired. I agree and would order a new hearing.
STEIN, J., joins in this opinion.
For reversal and reinstatement — Chief Justice PORITZ, and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI and COLEMAN — 5.
For affirmance — Justices O’HERN and STEIN — 2.