In October 1952 appellant Mrs. Paul took possession of dwelling property under a three-year lease from Holloway. She paid rent through March 1955 and then vacated the property. Holloway later sued her for rent accruing during the • balance of the *588lease term. The trial court awarded judgment to plaintiff.
On this appeal defendant contends that because Holloway was not the owner, but had executed the lease as “broker” for the owner, he was not the proper party to maintain the action. She invokes Municipal Court Rule 17(a),1 ,which provides: “Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest * *
We have twice had occasion to consider this question. ' Some ten years ago, in Koehne v. Harvey, D.C.Mun.App., 45 A.2d 780,2 on somewhat different facts, we ruled that an agent-lessor had the right to maintain a possessory action against the lessee. We carefully distinguished Heiskell v. Mozie, 65 App.D.C. 255, 82 F.2d 861, 863, on which the tenant relies here, pointing out that it was a contempt proceeding and based on greatly different facts. There, in construing a special rule of court prohibiting all except attorneys from appearing in a representative capacity the court ruled that a real estate agent was not the real party in interest, entitled to manage his own cause personally. But dealing directly with the question which is before us here, the court stated that an agent having a right to make a lease in his own name, “the action could properly be brought in the name of the agent.”
A few years later, in Ancher v. Lamb, D.C.Mun.App., 86 A.2d 533, 534, a case even more similar to ours, we repeated much that we had said in the Koehne case and again ruled that an agent-lessor' could sue in his own name.3 In the Ancher case, as here, plaintiff' brought 'suit in his own ñame as agent for the owner, and' he was described in a similar manner in the lease. We mentioned there that the agent’s right to sue was even clearer than in Koehne, because his status as landlord was established by direct.contract with the lessee.
What we said in the Koehne and Ancher cases applies in the situation now before us. Holloway was in full charge of the property with authority to lease and collect rents. He became lessor and landlord by direct lease-contract with Mrs. Paul, and she obtained possession under the lease.
Appellant stresses'that,the lease was executed by Holloway as “Broker-Lessor” and that he was described in the caption of the complaint as “agent for Cloteal C. Thomas.” But the record left no doubt as to his status, or as to the identity .of his principal, who testified at the trial. And as we said in the Ancher case, this left “ * * * no question as to liability for costs, or any later potential question of res judicata, or any other possible prejudice to defendant by permitting the wrong party to maintain thé suit.”
In another contention appellant claims that the lease was not a “ * * * deed signed and sealed by the * * * lessor * * as required by Code, § 45-106, to convey a term of more than one year, and therefore, she was a tenant by sufferance under Code, § 12-301. It is true that the conveyance in this case was not precisely denominated a" deed. But by its terms the lessor formally did “let and demise” the property to defendant for a “term” and in the acknowledgement the instrument was referred to as a “Deed of Lease,” “deqd,” -and as the “act and. deed” of the parties. In addition it was signed and sealed by the plaintiff. We think it was a conveyance which satisfied the statute.
Appellant also contends that the trial court should have found that plaintiff had either waived rent for the balance of the term of the lease or .by’ his conduct had induced defendant’s breach.' These contentions cannot be sustained. We have found in the evidence no basis for estoppel and *589nothing to require a holding that lessor had waived his rights under the lease. Nor can the lessee’s obligation be discharged because of her claim that lessor failed to notify her that he intended to hold her for the balance of the term. We know of no rule of law requiring that such notice he given.
We have studied the record in connection with other errors assigned, and have found no error.
Affirmed.
. The rule is the counterpart of F.R.Civ. , Proc. 17(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
. Appeal denied by U. S. Court of Appeals, April 11, 1940 . (No. 9216);
. While both the Koehne and Ancher cases were suits for possession we find no material distinction requiring the application of a different rule in a suit-for rent. The lease required payment of rent to Holloway, and also authorized him to sue 'for possession if lessee defaulted.