Concurring.
I concur in the result. I join Mr. Justice Saylor’s Concurring Opinion respecting the first issue presented. I write separately only to express my view of the jurisprudential *507stability and uniformity concerns implicated in Part II.B of the Majority Opinion. See Majority Op. at 504-06, 980 A.2d at 596-97.1
The Commissioner argues that under either stare decisis, the law of the case doctrine, or the coordinate jurisdiction rule, the Commonwealth Court’s disposition is erroneous because it does not conform to two of that court’s 2005, single-judge adjudications in the Empire and Factory Mutual matters, even though those cases are materially indistinguishable on the claims classification issue presented. In those earlier matters, the court approved and affirmed referee recommendations that assigned the subrogated insurers’ claims to “class (g)” priority status. The Majority recognizes the importance of the preclusion issue, but then determines that we “need not decide” whether the three preclusion doctrines cited by the Commissioner “strictly apply” in this context because, the Majority holds summarily, “[i]t is clear that the broader principles of uniformity and equity apply and would direct the result here.” Majority Op. at 505, 980 A.2d at 597.2
I would meet the Commissioner’s issue head-on because, if a preclusion doctrine applies, the Commonwealth Court has little or no discretion in a case such as this and it should be so informed. On the other hand, if a preclusion doctrine does not apply, we should offer a fuller explanation of the source and contours of the constraints we would impose on the doctrine. For the reasons that follow, I do not believe that the doctrines invoked by the Commissioner apply. Nevertheless, important jurisprudential concerns, arising from the nature of this sort of litigation, the need for stability and predictability, and the institutional relationship of the Commonwealth Court to this Court, counsel that the Commonwealth Court exercise more care in keeping its own house in jurisprudential order.
The core doctrine of stare decisis teaches that:
[F]or purposes of certainty and stability in the law, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those *508which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. While stare decisis serves invaluable and salutary principles, it is not an inexorable command to be followed blindly when such adherence leads to perpetuating error. See [Mayle v. Pa. Dep’t of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709, 720 (1978)] (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is not a vehicle for perpetuating error, but rather a legal concept which responds to the demands of justice and, thus, permits the orderly growth processes of the law to flourish.”).
Stilp v. Commonwealth, 588 Pa. 539, 905 A.2d 918, 966-67 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For stare decisis to apply, a judicial decision must establish binding precedent. “The doctrine only applies to issues actually raised, argued and adjudicated, and only where the decision was necessary to the determination of the case. The doctrine is limited to actual determinations in respect to litigated and necessarily decided questions, and is not applicable to dicta or obiter dicta.” Commonwealth v. Perry, 568 Pa. 499, 798 A.2d 697, 707 (2002) (Castille, J., joined by Newman, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1406 (6th ed. 1990)). The precedential decisions of this Court are binding throughout Pennsylvania, including upon this Court, and the precedential decisions of the lower courts bind those courts as well. See Pries v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Verizon Pa.), 903 A.2d 136, 144 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006) (“Under stare decisis, we are bound to follow the decisions of our Court unless overruled by the Supreme Court or where other compelling reasons can be demonstrated.”); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Ins., 720 A.2d 1071, 1073 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998). Thus, there is an imperative of institutional consistency and stability, both vertically and horizontally.
The law of the case doctrine refers to:
a family of rules which embody the concept that a court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by another judge of that same court or by a higher court in the earlier phases of the *509matter. Among the related but distinct rules which make up the law of the case doctrine are that: (1) upon remand for further proceedings, a trial court may not alter the resolution of a legal question previously decided by the appellate court in the matter; (2) upon a second appeal, an appellate court may not alter the resolution of a legal question previously decided by the same appellate court; and (3) upon transfer of a matter between trial judges of coordinate jurisdiction, the transferee trial court may not alter the resolution of a legal question previously decided by the transferor trial court.
The various rules which make up the law of the case doctrine serve not only to promote the goal of judicial economy ... but also operate (1) to protect, the settled expectations of the parties; (2) to insure uniformity of decisions; (3) to maintain consistency during the course of a single case; (4) to effectuate the proper and streamlined administration of justice; and (5) to bring litigation to an end.
Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (1995) (citations omitted). This doctrine, no less than stare decisis, promotes certainty and stability, but with particular emphasis on the various phases of individual cases.
The coordinate jurisdiction rule likewise addresses individual cases as it provides that “judges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same case should not overrule each others’ decisions.” Starr, 664 A.2d at 1331. In Starr, this Court recognized that the coordinate jurisdiction rule is less an independent legal construct but rather is a member of the law of the case doctrinal family. Id. at 1331-32. In effect, “these rules seek to ensure fundamental fairness in the justice system by preventing a party aggrieved by one judge’s interlocutory order to attack that decision by seeking and securing relief from a different judge of the same court.” Id. at 1332. Departure from either the law of the case doctrine or the coordinate jurisdiction rule “is allowed only in exceptional circumstances such as where there has been an intervening change in the controlling law, a substantial change in the facts *510or evidence giving rise to the dispute in the matter, or where the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed.” Id.
The Commonwealth Court’s prior dispositions in Empire and Factory Mutual were both unpublished, single-judge orders by then-President Judge James Gardner Cohns. Section 414 of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures (“IOPs”) provides that a “single-judge opinion, even if reported, shall be cited only for its persuasive value, not as binding precedent.” See 210 Pa.Code § 67.55; see also Otter v. Cortes, 969 A.2d 1276, 1284 n. 10 (Pa.Cmwlth.), aff'd per curiam, 600 Pa. 634, 969 A.2d 1180 (2009) (opinion to follow); Snyder County Prison Bd. v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 912 A.2d 356, 362 n. 8 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006). This general rule serves its own important values, deriving from the complicated, hybrid nature of our Commonwealth Court, which sits sometimes as a single-jurist court of original jurisdiction, sometimes in single-judge review of administrative decisions, and sometimes in a strictly appellate review capacity, where panels of judges render binding appellate decisions.
The Judicial Code vests the Commonwealth Court with original jurisdiction where such jurisdiction is conferred by statute. 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(4). This jurisdiction includes insurance company insolvencies where the insurance company is a domestic company licensed in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as is the case here. 40 P.S. § 221.4(d); see also Koken v. Reliance Ins. Co., 586 Pa. 269, 893 A.2d 70, 75 n. 10 (2006). When the Commonwealth Court exercises single-judge original jurisdiction, Section 311 of the court’s IOPs provides that, “[depending upon the nature of the matter, the president judge or the duty judge shall by order set the matter down for evidentiary hearing or formal trial, for argument before a single judge in cases in which a single judge may dispose of the matter....” 210 Pa.Code § 67.42. A party or entity aggrieved by a single judge’s order may seek reconsideration, by that judge, under Section 331 of the IOPs: “[w]hen a party files a petition for reconsideration of an order issued by a single judge, the executive administrator or the *511prothonotary shall submit the petition, together with any answer, to the judge for action, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 123(e).” 210 Pa.Code § 67.47. It would appear that Rule 123(e), in turn, provides generally for consideration by the full Court of actions of a single judge: “The action of a single judge may be reviewed by the court____” Pa.R.A.P. 123(e). Thus, in Great Valley School District v. Zoning Hearing Board of East Whiteland Township, 863 A.2d 74, 80-81 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004), the Commonwealth Court instructed that to do so, a party should follow Pa.R.A.P. 2541-2547, the general rules governing applications for reargument. See also Balfour Beatty Constr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 783 A.2d 901, 906 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001).
Given the nature of single-judge decisions of the Commonwealth Court, it is readily apparent that stare decisis is not applicable; thus, in this matter, that doctrine did not command fidelity to the previously decided Empire and Factory Mutual matters. It is equally apparent that the law of the case doctrine does not apply, as this is not: a case returned to a trial court on remand, a second appeal, or a matter that has been transferred. The coordinate jurisdiction rule poses a slightly closer question. If this dispute were a subsequent portion of the “same case” as Empire and Factory Mutual, then the Commonwealth Court would be bound by the coordinate jurisdiction rule. But the hundreds of distinct insurer subrogation claims within the more than 150,000 claims comprising the entire Reliance liquidation process do not quite resemble component parts of the “same case” in the manner understood by the coordinate jurisdiction rule. Thus, the coordinate jurisdiction rule does not apply.
But this does not end the inquiry. The preclusion doctrines evolved in response to particular cases and specific problems. The concern forwarded here poses a new scenario, deriving largely from the unique nature of the Commonwealth Court. The question then is whether the principles animating the preclusion doctrines should apply, in some measure, in this distinct paradigm. In my view, although none of the three primary issue preclusion doctrines fits this situation precisely, *512the policies they promote — certainty, stability, uniformity, consistency, protection of settled expectations — should be given effect. The Reliance liquidation is an extremely complex process in which many parts and layers operate. In light of the challenges inherent in such an undertaking, the Insurance Department Act (“Act”) expresses in its “Construction and Purpose” section that “[t]he purpose of this article is the protection of the interests of insureds, creditors, and the public generally, with minimum interference with the normal prerogatives of the owners and managers of insurers, through ... (iii) enhanced efficiency and economy of liquidation, through clarification and specification of the law, to minimize legal uncertainty and litigation.... ” 40 P.S. § 221.1(c) (emphasis added). The Act provides a statutory scheme for liquidation set forth in Sections 221.19-221.52. From the outset, the Commonwealth Court recognized the sui generis nature of the difficult task the Reliance litigation posed. Thus, on September 9, 2002, then-President Judge Colins issued an Order outlining procedures, deadlines, requirements, responsibilities, and instructions specific to the Reliance liquidation. Both the legislative and the judicial response to the unique challenges of the Reliance liquidation have attempted to provide a uniform, consistent, and predictable paradigm, not unlike the Newtonian concept of the universe. A certain degree of regularity, consistency, and stability in terms of the treatment of similarly-situated claims and claimants is one of the primary goals.
The Commissioner’s application for reconsideration sets forth in detail the internal inconsistency between the single-judge decision here and those in the previously decided Empire and Factory Mutual matters. One of the considerations governing whether to allow reargument is “[wjhere the court has overlooked or misapprehended (as by misquotation of text or misstatement of result) a controlling or directly relevant authority.” Pa.R.A.P. 2543 cmt. The circumstances here would seem to indicate an instance where the court (in the form of a single judge) overlooked “directly relevant” authority even though that authority is not strictly controlling.
*513The Commonwealth Court’s allowance of patent inconsistency in single-judge decisions in the Reliance litigation may derail other critical liquidation activities. For example, as the Commissioner notes, an actuarial study that estimates the ultimate payout obligations to Reliance claimants in the most desirable “(b) priority” category already has been commissioned. The Commissioner uses this study’s projections to determine the appropriate interim distributions to those claimants who are clearly eligible for “(b) priority” status. If individual judges of the Commonwealth Court are free to issue inconsistent rulings, even when confronted with the existence of prior indistinguishable cases, the study projections will need to be adjusted in order to include hundreds of potential subrogation claims. Nor, the Commissioner warns, does the current scheme have procedures in place to address the likely reaction of past subrogation claimants who accepted “(g) status” under the understanding that such was the settled rule.
A failure to appreciate this disruption, or to attempt to acknowledge the issue head-on and distinguish or criticize the prior decisions, in this context, is intolerable. Of course, single-judge decisions in the context of the Reliance litigation, like single-judge decisions in any matter, may be erroneous. But, if so, the corrective measure should be the usual ones available when a preclusion doctrine applies: prompt, open, and formal reconsideration before a Commonwealth Court panel. In addition, there is nothing to preclude a single judge from referring an issue to the Commonwealth Court as a whole. A single judge who is convinced that the prior decisions are problematic may explain the basis for that view and invite correction at a higher level. But single judges in the context of complex liquidation litigations like this one should be mindful of the stakes involved and should be discouraged from essentially ignoring prior cases that appear to be directly on-point. And the Commonwealth Court as a whole should take measures to ensure that the disruptions are minimal.
An additional reason supporting a directive that the Commonwealth Court pay more heed to ensuring consistency and regularity in its decisions in the Reliance liquidation derives *514from this Court’s supervisory authority. The fact that single-judge decisions are not precedential should not be taken as an invitation to a disruption to be passed onto this Court for forced review of an issue arising from demonstrable, doctrinal inconsistencies in single-judge decisions. In this case, the judge provided no explanation for the inconsistency his decision created. He did not suggest that the resolutions in Empire and Factory Mutual were distinguishable or in error when measured against precedent; the law has not changed; and no new evidence has come to light. The court as a whole did nothing to correct or explain the obvious inconsistency. The Commonwealth Court’s obligation to rule consistently in similarly situated cases is an institutional imperative that must be taken seriously, both by single judges and by the Commonwealth Court as a whole.3
. Madame Justice Todd and Mr. Justice McCaffery join this concurrence on the point to which I write.
. The Majority does not identify the broader principles to which it adverts, nor does it cite authority to support them.
. I recognize that, under the Rules of Appellate Procedure and cases such as Great Valley, supra, the Commissioner could have taken measures short of petitioning for review by this Court to ensure the consistency he desires, i.e., by seeking formal reargument before the Commonwealth Court as a whole under Pa.R.A.P. 2541-2547. As I understand it, however, in practice, the court as a whole has an opportunity to consider the reconsideration application made to the single judge, although that practice is not generally acknowledged in the IOPs or the Rules of Appellate Procedure. That informal practice may explain why eleven copies of an application for reconsideration to the Commonwealth Court are required pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2541 even though the court’s IOPs say that the application is exited only to the single judge. Institutional litigants such as the Commissioner may be aware that a single-judge denial has at least some measure of approval by the Commonwealth Court as a whole. Whether my understanding is accurate or not, the Commonwealth Court should have some formal mechanism in place to better police these matters.