DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.I respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition of this matter. Section 306(b)(2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 512(2), as added by Section 4 of the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350 (Act 57), includes the provision at issue here: “If the employer has a specific job vacancy the employe is capable of performing, the employer shall offer such job to the employe.” The majority is correct *253that Section 306(b)(2) speaks in mandatory language on this point. Further, I agree with the majority’s acknowledgement that the decision in Burrell v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Philadelphia Gas Works), 849 A.2d 1282 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004), does not stand for the general proposition for which it has been cited by Employer Pike County, namely that Section 306(b)(2) of the Act does not require an employer seeking modification to prove the nonexistence of an available position that a claimant is capable of performing.
Section 306(b)(2) of the Act provides the definition “Earning power,” which since the adoption of Act 57 permits a determination of work that a claimant can perform to be based on expert opinion evidence that includes job listings with agencies of the department, private job placement agencies and advertisements in a usual employment area, in contrast with the former requirement under Kachinski v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Vepco Constr. Co.), 516 Pa. 240, 532 A2d 374 (1987), of proof of actual referrals to then-open jobs within the claimant’s physical and vocational limitations. Act 57 at the same time added the requirement that an employer offer a job if it has available one that the claimant can perform. As Rosenberg notes, the Court stated in South Hills Health Sys. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Kiefer), 806 A.2d 962, 966 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002): “Thus, in order to prevail in seeking a modification of benefits, an employer must either: (1) offer to a claimant a specific job that is available, which the claimant is capable of performing, or (2) establish ‘earning power’ through expert opinion evidence.... ”
In Burrell an employer filed a petition to modify a claimant’s benefits based upon surveillance that showed him engaged in work activity in his mother’s shoe shine shop. The Court observed the following:
Neither the express language of Section 306(b)(2) nor the cases decided under it require proof of the absence of specific jobs with employer as a prerequisite to expert testimony of “earning power.” While the statute requires an employer to offer an available position if one exists, it does not require employer to prove the non-existence of such a position. Nor does the statute preclude a claimant from proving the existence of such a position as a defense to modification.
However, we need not decide whether existence of a specific, available position with an employer is part of its burden in other modification circumstances. Rather, we hold that where a claimant unilaterally demonstrates residual productive skill, an employer need not address existence of positions it may have as part of its case-in-chief. As previously mentioned, a claimant is always free to inquire into this area as a defense to modification.
Burrell, 849 A.2d at 1287 (emphasis added). The majority correctly states that the above-quoted text from Burrell did not relieve all modification-seeking employers from proving a lack of suitable positions before they rely upon expert testimony on earning power; rather, the Court held only that the employer need not address available positions as part of its ease-in-chief where a claimant obtains other employment. Although Burrell is not determinative, the reasoning of the quoted text strongly indicates that in other circumstances, in particular where an employer seeks modification based upon expert testimony on earning power, the employer must prove the nonexistence of an available position as part of its case-in-chief to show compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 306(b)(2).
*254There is abundant support for the conclusion that in general Section 306(b)(2) requires an employer that relies on expert testimony to establish earning power to establish the absence of a suitable position with the employer as part of its case-in-chief. First, such a procedure is eminently sensible. In the seminal workers’ compensation case of Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co., 431 Pa. 446, 246 A.2d 668 (1968), the Supreme Court noted that when the existence or nonexistence of a fact can be established by one party much more easily than by the other party, the burden may be placed on the party who can discharge it most easily. Whether an employer has a suitable position available is a matter peculiarly within that employer’s knowledge and is not likely to be within the claimant’s knowledge. Whatever inkling an employee might have concerning possible positions cannot compare to the comprehensive knowledge of the employer of its own operations. Enforcement of the mandatory duty to offer a suitable job if one is available plainly should not be made to turn on the chance that an individual employee, perhaps one among hundreds or more, somehow gains knowledge of a suitable position somewhere in the employer’s business.
An employer’s burden in this regard is not an onerous one. In Allied Products & Services v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Click), 823 A.2d 284 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), where the employer submitted evidence of earning power through expert testimony, the Court observed that the employer’s chief executive officer testified that the employer had no available positions within the claimant’s restrictions. In Edwards v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (MPW Indus. Servs.), 858 A.2d 648 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004), where expert vocational testimony was considered, the employer’s area manager testified that the employer did not have work available within the claimant’s limitations. In general, some employer representative with requisite authority must testify under oath and subject to cross-examination that no suitable positions existed within the applicable period.
Equally as important, the Department of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Workers’ Compensation has provided a definitive administrative interpretation of Section 306(b)(2) in its adoption of 34 Pa.Code § 123.301, relating to employer job offer obligation, which provides in part as quoted by the majority:
(a) For claims for injuries suffered on or after June 24, 1996, if a specific job vacancy exists within the usual employment area within this Commonwealth with thé liable employer, which the employee is capable of performing, the employer shall offer that job to the employee prior to seeking a modification or suspension of benefits based on earning power.
(b) The employer’s obligation to offer a specific job vacancy to the employee commences when the insurer provides the notice to the employee required by section 306(b)(3) of the act ... and shall continue for 30 days or until the filing of a Petition for Modification or Suspension, whichever is longer....
(c) The employer’s duty under subsections (a) and (b) may be satisfied if the employer demonstrates facts which may include the following:
(1) The employee was notified of a job vacancy and failed to respond.
(2) A specific job vacancy was offered to the employee, which the employee refused.
(3) The employer offered a modified job to the employee, which the employee refused.
*255(4) No job vacancy exists within the usual employment area.
(f) If the employer has presented evidence that no job vacancy exists, the employee may rebut the employer’s evidence by demonstrating facts which may include the following:
(1) During the period in which the employer has or had a duty to offer a specific job, the employer is or was actively recruiting for a specific job vacancy that the employee is capable of performing.
(2) During the period in which the employer has or had a duty to offer a specific job, the employer posted or announced the existence of a specific job vacancy, that the employee is capable of performing, which the employer intends to fill.
Subsection (a) restates the mandatory statutory duty for an employer to offer a job a claimant is capable of performing if such a vacancy exists before seeking modification or suspension based upon earning power. Subsection (b), which the majority accepts as controlling, establishes the period in which such an offer must be made, i.e., from the employer’s provision of notice to the employee of ability to return to work under Section 306(b)(8), 77 P.S. § 512(3), for thirty days or until the filing of the petition for modification, whichever is longer. In this case that period runs from November 22, 2002 until July 16, 2003. Subsection (c) provides that the employer may fulfill its obligation by proving either that it notified a claimant of a job or offered a job but the claimant failed to respond or refused, or that “(4) [n]o job vacancy exists within the usual employment area.” Subsection (f) prescribes the manner for the claimant to rebut if the employer has presented evidence that no job vacancy exists.
There is no ambiguity in this statutory/regulatory scheme: an employer must provide notice of or an offer of a suitable job that it has available or it must prove that no vacancy exists. The regulation makes express what is clearly implied by Section 306(b)(2). It is well settled that an administrative agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute is entitled to great weight and will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Eagle Environmental II, L.P. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 584 Pa. 494, 884 A.2d 867 (2005). Section 306(b)(2) as interpreted by 34 Pa.Code § 123.301 provides a procedure that is straightforward and logical. It does not provide for a game in which an employer may conceal the existence of a suitable job and need offer evidence only if the claimant first offers evidence of its existence.
Although the majority accepts that the duty to offer a claimant an existing suitable job is mandatory and that Burrell did not relieve all modification-seeking employers from proving lack of a suitable job before presenting evidence of earning power, it nevertheless concludes that the circumstances of the present case require vacating and remanding rather than reversal. I cannot agree. The majority accepts that the period during which an offer of an available job was required to be made ran from November 22, 2002 to July 16, 2003. The only evidence that Employer offered relating to job availability was a letter from the county commissioners to Rosenberg dated December 3, 2002, stating that the county had no provision for a “permanent” light-duty position and that Rosenberg’s employment therefore would be terminated effective January 17, 2003. While this letter presumably reflects the commissioners’ view in December 2002, it plainly is not adequate evidence to establish that no suitable position became available be*256fore July 16, 2003. As noted by the majority, the Rehabilitation Counselor testified that he did not discuss available positions with the employer.
The majority concludes that once the issue of the availability of a suitable job with the employer is raised by evidence of a possible opening with the employer, ie., raised by the claimant, then the employer has the burden of proof, but Section 306(b)(2) and 34 Pa.Code § 123.301 contain no such requirement. To the contrary, the burden is on employer to establish the absence of a suitable job before it may present evidence of earning power. Because this case includes testimony by Rosenberg that someone was hired to replace her in the elections board position, however, the majority quotes 34 Pa.Code § 123.301(f)(2) to the effect that a claimant may prove that “[djuring the period in which the employer has or had a duty to offer a specific job, the employer posted or announced the existence of a specific job vacancy, that the employee is capable of performing, which the employer intends to fill.” The majority overlooks the fact that this is a provision describing a rebuttal, and it comes into play only “[i]f the employer has presented evidence that no job vacancy exists....”
Employer here simply failed to meet its burden to present sufficient evidence as part of its case-in-chief that no suitable job existed with Employer during the applicable period. Because Employer had a full opportunity to meet its burden in this modification proceeding and failed to do so, the order of the Board affirming the WCJ’s grant of a modification should be reversed.1
Judges PELLEGRINI and FRIEDMAN join in this dissent.
. The majority opinion cites a distinct principle stated in Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co., 431 Pa. 446, 246 A.2d 668 (1968), but I remain convinced that the proposition that applies here is that the burden to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact may be placed on the party who can establish it much more easily. I find the majority’s citation to In re Property along Pine Road in Earl Township, 743 A.2d 990 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), to be puzzling. The only evidentiary aspect of that case is the statement at the end that it is settled beyond dispute in Pennsylvania that the party defending in an action is not required to prove a negative in order to prevail. In this case, however, Employer is the moving party, seeking modification, not the "defendant.” Under Section 306(b)(2) of the Act and 34 Pa.Code § 123.301 there is a mandatory requirement for Employer to offer a suitable job if it has one available before seeking modification based on earning power. Employer must show proof of compliance, either through proof of an offer or through proof that no suitable job was available, as the regulation expressly provides. By offering proof of earning power, Employer is tacitly averring that it complied, and there is no reason not to require proof.
Regarding arguments in Footnote 6 of the majority opinion, I do not agree with the implication that the WCJ made a finding that no suitable work was available before July 16, 2003. The WCJ found that no suitable work was available effective January 17, 2003, based on the letter from the commissioners, but the dissenting opinion does address this question by pointing out that the letter simply is inadequate to answer the question: “Had any suitable position become available by July 16, 2003?” The majority's mention of Rosenberg’s demonstration of residual skill shown through her part-time employment is at odds with Employer’s theory of the case, which was to show earning power through a labor market survey. The part-time employment described all occurred in 2004, well after the period for Employer’s mandatory compliance. This is not a case such as Burrell where the employer relied upon a demonstration of *257earning power through proof of new employment, and I disagree with the statement that admissions of residual productive skill support the procedural aspect of relieving Employer of the requirement of proving absence of a suitable job as part of its case-in-chief.