Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“Mutual”) appeals from the judgment entered after a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court (Lincoln County, Bradford, J.) holding that Mutual had a duty under Thomas Hancock’s homeowner’s insurance policy to defend and indemnify Hancock, who, while in a state of alcoholic blackout, beat and raped Jane Doe.1 We vacate the decision of the trial court.
On November 14, 1990, Hancock raped and brutally beat Jane Doe over the course of several hours. Prior to that night, Hancock and Doe had been living together and had no history of violence. The relationship was deteriorating, however, because Doe objected to Hancock’s basement marijuana cultivation. She had threatened to leave him if he did not give up his garden. That night, Hancock was drinking and wanted to talk about their relationship; Doe was packing for a vacation with her family and did not want to talk. Her refusal to discuss their situation infuriated Hancock.
In the early evening, Hancock hit Doe for the first time. Over the next several hours, he struck her repeatedly with a closed fist, breaking bones and inflicting permanent injuries, and raped her. At intervals during the beating, Hancock would demand that Doe mix him another drink; Doe complied. At *1313no time did Hancock stagger or lose the ability to speak coherently. He later pleaded guilty to charges of aggravated assault and gross sexual assault.
Mutual insured Hancock’s home under a so-called “homeowner’s policy.” The policy contained standard language, offering liability coverage for “occurrences” — i.e., “accidents,” and denying coverage for “bodily injury or property damage ... which is expected or intended by the insured.” When Doe brought a civil action against Hancock for injuries she sustained as a result of Hancock’s actions, Mutual defended Hancock, but requested a declaratory judgment that Hancock’s actions were not covered by the policy. The trial court heard the underlying civil action and the declaratory judgment action together. Mutual contended inter alia that Hancock intended the injuries to Doe or at least the injuries were to be expected and therefore the policy did not provide coverage. The trial court rejected Mutual’s assertion that Hancock’s undisputed actions established the requisite intent or expectation and ruled that because Hancock had been too intoxicated to “intend” the injuries, Mutual owed Hancock a duty to defend and indemnify. The trial court stated that Hancock’s “acts were not committed intentionally or knowingly. They were committed without any conscious awareness. His mental state was at best reckless.”
On appeal, Mutual challenges as clearly erroneous the trial court’s ruling that Mutual failed to “earr[y] its burden of proving that Hancock’s acts were intended or expected.” We agree with Mutual that the evidence before the trial court compelled the conclusion that Hancock intended or expected the harm to Doe. See Harmon v. Emerson, 425 A.2d 978, 982 (Me.1981). The Superior Court expressly found that Hancock “repeatedly hit [Doe] with a closed fist in the mouth, nose, eyes and forehead, ... forced her to remove her clothes and have sexual intercourse with him, and choked her to stop her screams for help.” Nevertheless, because the court also found that Hancock committed these acts “during a period of extreme intoxication,” the court ruled that Mutual failed to carry its burden to prove the acts were intentional or expected.
Absent a rare admission by the party, a party’s intent can only be inferred from his physical acts. See State v. McEachern, 431 A.2d 39, 42 (Me.1981) (“rarely, if ever, [is there] direct evidence of a defendant’s mental state”). The fact that Hancock was intoxicated and claims to be unable to recall his violent acts does not negate the overwhelming evidence of physical violence. “[0]ne person cannot accidentally or innocently com pel another to submit to sexual intercourse.” State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291, 1296 (Me.1984). Similarly, a person cannot accidentally hit another person repeatedly with a closed fist. See State Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d 35, 38 (Me.1991) (murder can only be intentional and therefore excluded from insurance coverage); Perreault v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 568 A.2d 1100, 1101 (Me.1990) (child sexual abuse can only be intentional). By proving these physical acts, Mutual carried its burden to prove that Hancock intended or expected the harm to Doe. Therefore, the policy exclusion applies to excuse Mutual from its duty to indemnify Hancock for the damages awarded to Doe. As a matter of law, a systematic, hours-long brutal beating is not a “reckless” act; it can only be intentional and the injuries resulting therefrom expected. On this evidence, the conclusion that Hancock intended the harm to Doe, or at least expected it, despite his intoxication, is compelling.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated.
ROBERTS, CLIFFORD, COLLINS and DANA, JJ., concurring.
. A fictitious name.