dissenting in which CHASANOW, Judge, joins.
The majority today holds that the limitations on suspension and eligibility for parole prescribed by Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 643B(c) apply only to the first 25 years of a sentence of life imprisonment, thus overruling, explicitly, Leggett v. State, 79 Md.App. 170, 556 A.2d 289, cert. denied, Leggett-El v. State, 317 Md. 70, 562 A.2d 718 (1989), in which the Court of Special Appeals reached the opposite result. [Slip op. at 9]. To achieve that result, the majority applied the reasoning it had previously employed in the case of Malcolm, v. State, 314 Md. 221, 550 A.2d 670 (1988), to section 643B(c), the meaning of which it determined to be ambiguous. I do not agree either that section 643B(c) is ambiguous or that the Malcolm rationale applies. Accordingly, I dissent.
It is well-settled that, in this state, the inquiry into the Legislature’s intention in enacting a statute begins, and ordinarily ends, with the words of the statute. Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993). When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there usually is no need to go further in construing the statute. Id.; Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991). In making that determination, the court gives the words of the statute their ordinary and common meaning, Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 171, 596 A.2d 648, 652 (1991); Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989), neither adding nor deleting words in order to give the statute a meaning not evident by the words actually used, State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 7, 629 A.2d 731, 734-35 (1993); Board of Educ. of Garrett County v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63, 453 A.2d 1185, 1189 *239(1982), or to create an ambiguity which does not otherwise exist. Thus, while, as the majority recognizes, op. at 237, and this Court held in Malcolm, 314 Md. at 234, 550 A.2d at 676, penal statutes are to be strictly construed against the State and in favor of the defendant, see Harris, 331 Md. at 145, 626 A.2d at 950; State v. Kennedy, 320 Md. 749, 754, 580 A.2d 193, 195 (1990); Davis v. State, 319 Md. 56, 61, 570 A.2d 855, 858 (1990); Wynn v. State, 313 Md. 533, 539, 546 A.2d 465, 468 (1988); 3 Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 59.03 (4th Ed.1986), that rule of construction does not apply unless the penal statute is ambiguous. Thompson, 332 Md. at 7, 629 A.2d at 734; Harris, 331 Md. at 145, 626 A.2d at 950; Koyce v. State, 289 Md. 134, 422 A.2d 1017, 1020 (1980).
Section 643B(e) provides:
Any person who (1) has been convicted on two separate occasions of a crime of violence where the convictions do not arise from a single incident, and (2) has served at least one term of confinement in a correctional institution as a result of a conviction of a crime of violence, shall be sentenced, on being convicted a third time of a crime of violence, to imprisonment for the term allowed by law, but, in any event, not less than 25 years. Neither the sentence nor any part of it may be suspended, and the person shall not be eligible for parole except in accordance with the provisions of Article 31B, § 11. A separate occasion shall be considered one in which the second or succeeding offense is committed after there has been a charging document filed for the preceding occasion.
There is nothing ambiguous about this statute. Indeed, what it prescribes is crystal clear: when the prerequisites have been met — a defendant has been convicted on two separate occasions of two separate crimes of violence and has served one term of confinement as a result of conviction of one of them — a defendant must be sentenced the third time “to imprisonment for the term allowed by law,” or if that term is, or may be, less than 25 years, to imprisonment for 25 years. Having been so “sentenced,” the statute prescribes, again *240unambiguously, that “[njeither the sentence nor any part of it may be suspended, and the person shall not be eligible for parole except in accordance with the provisions of Art. 31B, § 11,” pertaining to the release from Patuxent Institution. Thus, whether the sentence prescribed by law is less than or greater than 25 years imprisonment, when the prerequisites of § 643B(c) have been met, the sentence that must be imposed is that “allowed by law,” or the minimum mandatory sentence prescribed by section 643B(c), no part of which may be suspended. When the sentence “allowed by law” is a specific sentence that necessarily is greater than 25 years imprisonment, it is that greater sentence that must be imposed and which cannot be suspended, in whole or part. When' the sentence “allowed by law” is, or may be, less than 25 years, “the sentence” refers to the minimum mandatory term that section 643B(c) requires to be imposed.
The sentence prescribed for first degree murder is set out in section 412(b). It provides:
(b) Penalty for first degree murder. — Except as provided under subsection (f) of this section[1], a person found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole. The sentence shall be imprisonment for life unless: (l)(i) the State notified the person in writing at least thirty days prior to trial that it intended to seek a sentence of death, and advised the person of each aggravating circumstance upon which it intended to rely, and (ii) a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with § 413; or (2) the State notified the person in writing at least 30 days prior to trial that it intended to seek a sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole under § 412 or § 413 of this article.
*241Under this statute, unless the requisite notice is provided that a sentence of death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole is being sought, a defendant convicted of first degree murder “shall” be sentenced to life imprisonment. Thus, for purposes of section 643B(c), in the case of first degree murder, the sentence “allowed by law” is life imprisonment. This is to be contrasted with statutes which prescribe a maximum penalty that may, but need not, be imposed. See, e.g., section 412(c), which provides that, “[a] person found guilty of murder in the second degree shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 30 years.” (Emphasis added). In such a case, the sentence “allowed by law” is any sentence, in the discretion of the court, that does not exceed the statutory maximum. Section 643B(e), however, limits the court’s discretion by mandating that it impose a sentence of 25 years.
To be sure, a sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to section 412(b) may be suspended, in whole or in part, in the discretion of the trial court. Even when, however, a trial court suspends a portion of a life sentence prescribed by section 412(b), the sentence “allowed by law” does not change; it is still life imprisonment. See Williamson v. State, 284 Md. 212, 214, 395 A.2d 496, 497 (1979); State v. Wooten, 277 Md. 114, 117, 352 A.2d 829, 831 (1976).2 As the majority recognizes, see op. at 234, section 643B(c) is a provision that limits the exercise of discretion to suspend a sentence by the trial court. Thus, where it is applicable, because the sentence “allowed by law” may not be suspended in whole or in part, the trial court has no discretion to impose a sentence other than life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
*242According to the majority, “it is difficult to discern from the language of § 643B(c) alone whether the phrase ‘the sentence’ refers to the entire ‘term allowed by law,’ or whether ‘the sentence’ refers to only the 25-year minimum sentence which immediately precedes that phrase.” Op. at 235. That is nothing short of creating an ambiguity which does not exist. “The sentence” refers, as we have seen, to the term of imprisonment that the court imposes when the statutory prerequisites have been met, i.e., sentences the defendant to imprisonment for the term allowed by law. The phrase “but, in any event, not less than 25 years” has applicability only to the extent that the sentence “allowed by law” is, or may be, less than 25 years. Where the sentence prescribed by law must be more than 25 years, whether because it is a minimum sentence or the only permissible sentence, as is the case of murder in the first degree, it is that “sentence” to which the statute refers.
The majority interprets section 643B(c) as giving the trial court discretion “to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole under § 643B(c) [or] to impose a sentence of life imprisonment, and suspend all but 25 or more years thereof. Only 25 years of that imprisonment must be served without parole.” Op. at 237. Whether section 412(b) entrusts to the trial court the decision as to whether the life sentence is with or without parole does not change the fact that the sentence the court must impose is life imprisonment. Thus the majority’s initial conclusion is irrelevant. On the other hand, section 643B(c) quite clearly prohibits a court from suspending the sentence, “allowed by law,” that the court imposes. The majority’s holding, under the guise of interpretation, that after imposing the sentence allowed by law, the court could suspend all but 25 years is simply wrong and, in fact, totally disregards the plain language of section 643B(c).
Malcolm, upon which the majority relies is inapposite. The statute under review in that case was section 286(b)(2), also an habitual offender statute. Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.) 1985 Cum.Sup., Art. 27, § 286(b)(2), in effect when *243Malcolm, was decided, provided that anyone violating its provisions
is guilty of a felony and is subject to imprisonment of not more than 20 years, or a fine of not more than $20,000, or both. Any person who has previously been convicted under this paragraph shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 10 years. Neither the sentence nor any part of it may be suspended, and the person shall not be eligible for parole except in accordance with Article 31B, § 11.
314 Md. at 243, 550 A.2d at 676. We held that this language was ambiguous with respect to whether the parole limitation “applies only to the mandatory ten year sentence, or may be applied as well to any longer sentence that is imposed.” Id. Unlike section 286(b)(2), section 643B(c) requires the court to impose the sentence allowed by law, and prohibits parole or the suspension of any part of that sentence. However we may view the situation when the sentence “allowed by law” refers simply to the maximum sentence, the trial court being able, within that scheme, to determine what specific sentence to impose, there simply is no ambiguity when the sentence “allowed by law” refers to a specific sentence and, hence, does not depend on the court’s exercise of discretion. Therefore, although it may be arguable that, in its usual application, section 643B(c) may be analogous to and, thus, properly interpreted like section 286(b)(2), that is not the case when the conviction at issue is for first degree murder.
In State v. Taylor, 329 Md. 671, 675, 621 A.2d 424, 426 (1993), quoting Hawkins v. State, 302 Md. 143, 148, 486 A.2d 179, 182 (1985), we recognized that section 643B(c) “provid[es] new and different alternatives for dealing with aggressive and violent offenders” and that its purpose “was to ‘protect the public from assaults upon people and injury to property and to deter repeat offenders from perpetuating other criminal acts of violence under the threat of an extended period of confinement. Interpreting section 643B(c) consistently with its plain language, as was done in Leggett, supra, vindicates its purpose. Moreover, the Leggett result is neither illogical nor unreasonable. On the other hand, the construction given it by *244the majority is nothing short of judicial legislation. Rather than seeking to discern legislative intent and, having done so, giving it effect, the majority, under the guise of construction, simply substitutes its judgment for that of the Legislature.
Section 643B(c) was properly interpreted by the Court of Special Appeals in Leggett, which it then applied in this case. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Judge Chasanow joins in the views expressed herein.
1. Subsection (£) exempts minor or mentally retarded defendants from eligibility for imposition of the death penalty, and makes the maximum possible sentence for first degree murder life imprisonment without parole.
. The majority suggests that section 412(d) gives the court discretion to impose a sentence of life imprisonment or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. That is true only insofar as section 413 does not otherwise provide. Moreover, subsection (d) must be read in light of the notice requirements set forth in subsection (b). Thus, unless the State notifies the defendant in writing at least thirty days prior to the trial that it intends to seek a sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole, ‘‘[t]he sentence shall be imprisonment for life.”